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Abstract. 
 
 
 The study of Greek and Roman battles has been an area of academic interest for 
centuries, but understanding of the archaeological potential of battlefields from classical 
antiquity has remained severely limited. The field has stagnated partly through over-
deference to unsuitable ancient literary accounts, compounded by a lack of exploration of 
the site formation processes on such battlefields. This has resulted in an unjustified 
pessimism among some ancient historians and battlefield archaeologists that any significant 
information can be extracted from the exploration of such sites. Several ancient battlefields, 
and numerous smaller-scale conflict sites, have been identified and excavated in the 
previous three decades. In spite of these projects, there has been a general absence of 
integration of the evidence from these sites into a wider understanding of the archaeology 
of ancient battlefields, and consequently, a failure to use the evidence to identify and locate 
new sites. 
 
 Drawing evidence from a number of excavated conflict sites from the classical world, 
particularly the Roman battlefields at Baecula, Kalkriese, and Harzhorn, this thesis presents 
an argument for a more archaeologically-dominated approach to exploring Greek and 
Roman battlefields, despite the pragmatic challenges in doing so. While the ancient literary 
sources have been the primary base for much of the last two centuries, they contain little 
reliable or accurate evidence with regards to geographic or topographic location of specific 
battlefields or the post-battle processing of battle-deposited material. This research has 
explored the site formation processes on ancient battlefields, working from excavated 
examples including those at Baecula, Kalkriese, and the Harzhorn, as well as other smaller-
scale conflict sites and battle-related graves. This research has considered the issue of site 
formation on ancient battlefields with a particular focus on the impact of post-battle 
processes, looting and the disposal of the dead, on the archaeological assemblages. It 
concludes that while such processes had a significant impact on the assemblage deposited 
by battle, a significant number of artefacts were left behind. The ‘signature’ of ancient 
battle is composed of these artefacts – small projectiles, fragments of military kit, caligae 
nails, and coins – which when found in spatial conjunction, identify battlefield sites. This 
thesis suggests that archaeological methodologies developed for exploration of modern 
(C19th and later) battlefields can be modified for use on sites from antiquity, contributing to 
the identification of battlefield locations and reconstruction of battle-narratives. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and context 
 
 
1.1: Question and aims 
 
This thesis is concerned with reassessing the methodologies used to locate and study 
Greek and Roman battlefields, addressing both the inherent and practical challenges of 
exploring these sites. It is a thesis on battlefield archaeology which happens to focus on 
classical antiquity as well as a work on classical antique archaeology which centres on 
battlefields. Much of the research is a hybrid between the disciplines of battlefield and 
Greco-Roman archaeology, exploring how methodologies used by both can be combined to 
explore battlefields from antiquity. One of the central considerations throughout this 
research has been the issue of whether the archaeological study of classical battlefields 
differs from that of their later (C19th onward) counterparts, and if so, what adaptation are 
required to effectively investigate them as sites. This thesis therefore places much of the 
evidence from antiquity, both archaeological and historical, in the context of wider 
battlefield archaeology, as well as within its contemporaneous context. It reviews the 
validity of text-based approaches as tools for battlefield location, and explores how 
archaeological methodology developed for the study of later-period battlefields can be 
adapted to study sites from antiquity. As will be shown, Greek and Roman battlefields have, 
in a number of ways, been poorly studied in the past, and archaeology is still not a common 
methodology used to resolve problems, or indeed simply explore, individual instances of 
battle from Classical antiquity. There is, in many quarters, a perception that the archaeology 
of battle from this period does not survive, certainly not in any useful form, in the 
archaeological record, despite the (albeit relatively recent) identification and excavation of a 
number of conflict sites. Historians, and indeed many archaeologists, continue to rely on 
topographic reconciliation methods based almost exclusively on a corpus of literary texts 
which are not suited to the purpose. The ancient literary record remains disproportionately 
influential in ancient battlefield studies, while battlefield archaeologists unfamiliar with the 
military and material culture of antiquity have struggled to effectively assess how 
methodologies from their discipline can be adapted to this earlier period. However, the 
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archaeological characteristics of ancient battlefields require adaptations to the 
methodology developed for studying lead-munitions-based C19th battle-related 
assemblages. In particular, the weaponry in use, the deployment of soldiers, subsequent 
longer-term activity on the site, and the limited historical documentation of the 
engagement have all proved problematic factors in the archaeological study of Greek and 
Roman battle.  
 
This research considers why classical antiquity has been so marginalised by 
battlefield archaeology, and why battlefield archaeology has been largely rejected by 
ancient historians. The thesis focuses almost exclusively on the Greek and Roman periods, 
although much of the theoretical basis could be applied, with period-specific revisions, to 
many other ancient and earlier Medieval contexts. Contemporaneous and earlier conflict, 
such as that from Egypt, has been excluded due to lack of availability of evidence as well as 
issues of scale in terms of the material covered by the thesis. The latter reason is also 
behind the omission of significant discussion of prehistoric warfare contemporaneous with 
the Greek and (particularly) Roman worlds. The lack of any historical records was a factor 
given the discussion in this thesis of how to work within a reduced historical record, rather 
than in the absence of one. This thesis does however discuss the conceptual framework of 
battlefield archaeology, the historiography of ancient battlefield studies, and provides an 
evaluation of the ancient literary record with regard to ancient battle. In particular, there is 
an in-depth assessment of the archaeology of ancient battle, addressing what is actually 
meant by the term, and the impact of post-battle activity. There are significant 
methodological challenges in adapting a methodology developed to study post-Blackpowder 
warfare (particularly the C19th) to study sites from classical antiquity, both inherent (the 
archaeological and historical evidence) and practical (the ability to effectively identify it). 
The underlying theoretical assumption is that Greek and Roman battle deposited an 
assemblage of material which, in some circumstances, survives in the archaeological record. 
This much can be demonstrated by the survival of substantial assemblages, of artefacts 
and/or human remains, on multiple battlefields from the period. In some cases, 
assemblages may not survive on sites, or it may not be possible to identify them 
conclusively on the basis of the available evidence. Archaeological exploration in these cases 
may, however, be able to suggest whether the non-survival of the assemblages is the result 
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of natural processes, by scientific analysis of the find context, or whether it reflects a 
spectrum of effectiveness in post-battle site clearance. 
 
Ancient warfare in practice is not the primary focus of this research, although it is 
hoped that exploration of Greek and Roman battlefields will provide new evidence for the 
process of ancient battle. The operation of ancient armies as field units is considered to a 
degree, particularly in the context of post-battle activity. However, there will not be direct 
comment on the field operation of the army - for example, in considering the unit 
dispositional pattern of Roman battle, the varying uses of projectiles and archery by 
different unit types, or the physical distance between soldiers in battle-array will not be 
discussed. This is in part due to the invisibility of certain unit-types in the archaeological 
record of classical battlefields. Issues of unit identification are not limited to the Greek and 
Roman world. In most cases, battlefield archaeology is only able to confirm the presence of 
particular unit or unit-types through the presence of artefacts individually associated with 
them, typically equipment or insignia. Such artefacts, however, are rare. The absence of this 
material from the battlefield, or a particular area of it, cannot alone confirm the absence of 
the respective troops from the area. The research in this thesis into the material 
assemblages deposited on Classical battlefields (predominantly presented in Chapter Four) 
suggests that there may be issues identifying the presence of cavalry, some forms of hand-
to-hand fighting, and forces which did not have a significant metal-based kit. Consequently, 
assemblages may be weighted towards armies, and engagements, with heavy use of metal 
projectiles and kit. However, in the longer term, ancient battlefield archaeology does have 
the potential to contribute a significant amount to the study of ancient battle, by 
documenting individual and group behaviours on the battlefield, the use of weaponry, and 
the impact of both battle and conflict on the landscape. 
 
 
1.2: Thesis structure and organisation 
 
 In this introductory chapter, this research is put into context by examining the 
development of both classical battlefield studies and battlefield archaeology, and 
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addressing why Greek and Roman battlefields have been largely marginalised by both 
disciplines. It is argued that battlefields from classical antiquity can be studied 
archaeologically, but to do so requires a methodological adjustment which takes into 
account the characteristics of ancient battle. The previous failure to do so, rather than an 
absence of archaeological material, has held the field of ancient battlefield archaeology 
back. In particular, reliance on the ancient literary record for evidence regarding ancient 
battlefields has proved a particular issue, as the sources are, in almost all cases, completely 
unsuited to locating sites within the landscape. The ancient literary record and its 
relationship to battlefield studies is discussed in Chapter Two, which considers the use of 
the sources in ancient battlefield studies and the problems this has caused, followed by an 
examination of the texts for what evidence they actually give about battlefields, and how 
reliable and/or useful this actually is. Although it is clear that the ancient literary record 
should not be marginalised entirely, it may reveal supplementary details at best about 
battlefield locations, particularly the ‘lost’ sites of the Roman provinces.  
 
 The remaining chapters (Three to Six) consider a more practical, archaeological 
approach to locating ancient battlefields and studying the archaeology of ancient battle. 
Chapter Three discusses the identification of ancient battlefields through application of 
techniques adapted from landscape archaeology, particularly the identification of battle-
related military installations, monuments, and other constructed features. While this 
approach alone is unlikely to be sufficient to identify an actual battlefield, it does allow a 
limited ground-area to be shortlisted as a potential battlefield, on which survey can then be 
conducted to look for archaeological evidence of battle. The exact nature of this evidence is 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five, particularly in the context of site formation processes 
and their impact on the extant assemblages, discussing in detail what is the "archaeology of 
ancient battle". Both chapters argue that, although post-battle activity, particularly looting 
and disposal of the dead, had a substantial impact on the battle-related assemblages left 
behind on battlefields, the processes as a whole did not serve to strip the site of its entire 
archaeological assemblage.  
 
 The hypothesis that looting was a process which would have removed every metal 
artefact - thus, every artefact of diagnostic value - from an ancient battlefield is considered 
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in Chapter Four. It suggests that a substantial assemblage of small, low-value artefacts was 
left behind on sites primarily through a process of natural obscuration. As such, although 
the artefact record from ancient battlefields is not overwhelmingly martial in nature, and 
may be difficult to recognise outside a prior-identified military context, it can be substantial, 
and contains enough metal projectiles to be associated with conflict. The disposal of the 
dead is addressed in Chapter Five. It is almost certain that in the majority of cases, the 
battle-dead were disposed of in some way on the battlefield itself, whether through 
cremation, inhumation, or abandonment on the site. However, the archaeological evidence 
from a number of conflict-related sites and cemeteries in antiquity suggest that the concept 
of a uniform and organised process of battlefield disposal may be an oversimplification, as is 
the assumption that something was done with the dead beyond leaving them to rot. The 
creation of battlefield graves, by whatever method, was an important factor in site-
formation, as would be the failure to do so.  
 
 The archaeology of ancient battlefields consists of a mixed assemblage of ferrous 
and non-ferrous metal artefacts, and in some cases potentially also mass graves. Although 
almost certainly indicating military presence/activity, the artefact categories individually are 
not necessarily diagnostically indicative of ancient battle. Rather, it is the occurrence of 
multiple battle-relevant artefacts within a limited spatial area that indicates a conflict site. 
This archaeological manifestation requires methodological adaptations in archaeological 
survey comparative to later battlefields. Chapter Six discusses the most effective 
methodology for surveying ancient battlefield sites to make the most of the extant 
assemblages, and the alterations which need to be made to general battlefield archaeology 
approaches to make them suitable for sites from the Classical world. It also addresses some 
of the practical issues regarding the exploration of these sites, particularly funding and 
access to sites. Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a discussion of the evidence, 
drawing back to the original research issues regarding the nature and study of ancient 
battlefield archaeology. The chapter finishes with a discussion of how this research can be 
used in future ancient battlefield projects, both in the identification and study of individual 
sites, and in new avenues of research including the impact of battle on the surrounding 
landscape and its civilian communities, and a more holistic approach to ancient battle as an 
event. 
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1.3: Battlefield Archaeology 
 
 In the last three decades, battlefield archaeology has become a recognised and 
accepted discipline within military studies. There is a conference series dedicated to the 
subject (Fields of Conflict), although it has a patchy record in publishing its proceedings (cf. 
Freeman & Pollard 2001; Scott et al. 2009). A 9th meeting is currently set for Dublin in 2016, 
and postgraduate counterparts have been held at the universities of Glasgow (2011), 
Liverpool (2013), Birmingham (2014) and Oxford (2015). The Journal of Conflict Archaeology 
has published many research articles on battlefields, although thematic and period journals 
are also beginning to feature battlefield archaeology. That said, there has still to appear a 
satisfactory text-book type analysis of the methods and techniques of ‘battlefield 
archaeology’. Foard and Morris’ The Archaeology of English Battlefields: Conflict in the pre-
Industrial Landscape (2012) is a start but its usefulness is limited by the fact that it 
concentrates on battle in England from the C16th onwards. Their discussion of Roman and 
early medieval warfare is limited to less than 20 pages and repeats many of the 
misconceptions which are discussed in this thesis. A similar situation is found in Scott and 
McFeaters’ (2011) article on the development of conflict archaeology, where only 10 lines 
are dedicated to antiquity in an article of almost 30 pages.  
 
There is a more extensive literature on the subject of ‘battlefield archaeology’ from 
the USA but understandably it tends to focus on US examples and/or case studies elsewhere 
from the C17th onwards (e.g. Geier et al. 2011, 2013; Babits & Gandulla 2013 etc) or are 
otherwise simplified or generalised (e.g. Cooksey & Lynch 2007; Starbuck 2011). On the 
continent in Germany at least the subject is beginning to be recognised as a legitimate 
branch of archaeological research, typified by Brock and Homann’s Schlachtfeld-archäologie 
(2011), where it has a multi-period, European perspective, including some pre-Medieval 
examples (see also Eickhoff & Schopper 2014). If the discipline ‘battlefield archaeology’ has 
the beginnings of a footing in ‘academic archaeology’, it has become a subject of 
widespread public interest, with the likes of television series such as Two Men in a Trench 
(Pollard & Oliver 2002, 2003), Battlefield Detectives (Wason 2003), and Battlefield Britain 
(Snow & Snow 2004) as well as numerous one-off documentaries and, increasingly, online 
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content.1 Such broadcasts have in turn created their own ‘books to accompany the series’, 
which given the target audience are understandably of variable quality. Moving further 
afield, archaeological research on battlefields has also been used by heritage management 
organisations, including the US National Parks Service, Historic England,2 and Historic 
Scotland, to register and protect sites, and to satisfy public interest by displaying battle-
related finds in local museums and, increasingly, dedicated battlefield visitor centres. This 
development has in turn generated its own literature relating to how battlefields might be 
preserved and presented, although surprisingly little, at least in the European context, on 
how their research agenda might be advanced. Yet again, as will be argued elsewhere, such 
literature has little relevance to the study of ‘ancient’ battlefields. 
 
 The term “battlefield archaeology” may no longer fully address the research of the 
discipline, a problem not helped by it becoming increasingly synonymous with “conflict 
archaeology”. The latter discipline covers a much wider range of sites, from siege works to 
detainment and concentration camps, aircraft and nautical wrecks, weapon 'biographies', 
and war art. The methodological approach to "conflict" more widely threatens to 
undermine the unique characteristics of battlefields even while they remain recognised as a 
distinctive site-type (Pollard & Banks 2010: 415; Scott & McFeaters 2011: 105). Foard (2009) 
has raised concerns that the term "battlefield archaeology" suggests that it is the battlefield 
itself - or rather, its terrain - which is the subject of interest, rather than the physical 
remains left by battle. He suggests "archaeology of battle" or "battle archaeology" as more 
suitable terminology for the discipline, marking a clearer division between the terrain-
analysis approach taken in the past by military historians, and the archaeological 
investigation of the physical debris of battle.  While a useful distinction, a focus on the 
debris of battle independently of the physical landscape risks marginalising the battlefield 
terrain, although spatial analysis of artefact distribution overlaid onto a topographic map 
may alleviate some of these potential problems. 
 
                                                          
1
 In particular, the website www.lloydianaspects.co.uk provides a wealth of articles, blogs and videos 
addressing issues relating to Classical warfare, including equipment reconstruction and experimentation and 
unit organisation. 
2
 English Heritage divided into two organisational bodies in April 2015, Historic England and the English 
Heritage Trust. Until this date, the English Battlefields Register was managed by English Heritage, but now falls 
under the jurisdiction of Historic England. 
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 One of the most important factors in the development of battlefield archaeology 
was the recognition that individual periods or instances of conflict left distinctive conflict 
remains which could be associated with a relatively narrow temporal window (Scott & 
McFeaters 2011: 107). Thanks to the historical documentation available on munitions, 
archaeologists are often aware of what type of artefacts will be found on a battlefield site 
from a known period, allowing survey and excavation to be targeted more specifically. 
Munitions and projectiles have become the "signature artefacts" of medieval and modern 
battle-related assemblages, and the key diagnostic find for identifying particular areas of a 
battlefield, and its boundary. Lead munitions are by far the most common diagnostic find on 
battlefields from the C17th to C19th. Prior to this, other projectiles, such as iron arrowheads, 
are more common and serve the same diagnostic purpose as lead munitions. Although 
other artefact categories are recovered from medieval and modern battlefields, in many 
cases it can be difficult to associate them with the battle as opposed to contemporaneous 
civilian deposition or military activity unrelated to the battle.  
 
As a result, at some sites the physical location or boundary of the battlefield cannot 
be verified from the non-weapon assemblage, only from the munitions distribution (see 
Pratt 2009; Foard 2012: 36). Exceptions may be made when an element of the non-weapon 
assemblage can be firmly associated with the contemporary military, particularly insignia, 
such as the silver boar recovered from an area of Bosworth battlefield previously 
unrecognised (Foard & Curry 2013: 124-126). On later sites, military insignia, particularly 
regimentally-marked, provide firm evidence both for identifying an area of battle-related 
and locating a particular unit within the area. However, although the non-weapons 
assemblage may not be used in identifying or verifying the boundaries of a battlefield, they 
play a key role in interpreting the wider narrative of the battle, providing a human-interest 
element to the assemblage which is of increasing public interest (e.g. Scott et al. 1989: 191-
223; cf. Pollard 2003). Mass graves may also be used to identify battlefields, although their 
distribution is unlikely to determine the physical extent of the site. Although there may be 
ethical issues associated with the disturbance of war graves (see 6.2.3), battlefield graves 
from the medieval and early modern world can be an incredibly useful resource for 
understanding the anthropological impact of battle, as at Visby (Thordeman 1939), Towton 
(Fiorato et al. 2000), Aspern (Binder et al. 2014), the Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1998), and 
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the WWI Western Front (Fraser & Brown 2007). However, on some battlefields, particularly 
more modern or those of significant national importance, graves may be deliberately 
avoided for nationalist, as at Culloden where there has been strong opposition to excavation 
of the Jacobite mounds, although no similar protests have been raised over exploration for 
the burials of the Government battle-dead (Pollard 2009a). If they are uncovered 
unintentionally or as part of a rescue project, the human remains may be reburied without 
study, as at Camden where the disturbed material has been placed at a significant depth as 
to discourage further disturbance, incidental or otherwise (Smith et al. 2009).3 
 
 The archaeological evidence recovered from battlefields is almost always intended 
to be used alongside an extant historical record, variously validating, elucidating, or 
arbitrating on the extant battle narratives (Foard & Morris 2012; cf. Freeman 2010: 149). 
Some projects have succeeded in confirming the historical record, as at Talamanca where 
the entire archaeological project was conducted to test the veracity of a single source 
(Rubio Campillo 2008). In others, archaeology has highlighted omissions and faults in the 
written sources, as at Balaclava (Freeman 2010). The range of historical sources grows 
substantially from the Early Modern period onward. For the C19th, potential sources include 
official campaign reports, journals, maps, military despatches, and more personal 
testimonies such as letters and diaries, and later, memoirs and oral testimonies as well as 
more formal historical chronicles (Fox 1993; Rubio Campillo 2008; Freeman 2010). From the 
C16th historical publications increasingly featured maps of the battle aimed at narrative 
interpretation (Pollard 2009c) although these were not always free from error even when 
produced soon after the battle, as at Agincourt (Sutherland 2015). Until the C19th, the 
historical record preserves very overt little participant testimony, although it is possible than 
individual experiences influenced the narratives in historical chronicles (e.g. Foard & Curry 
2013: 45). The muster lists of individual soldiers which survive as early as the mid-C14th,4 
and from later conflicts wills and pension lists, provide a record, if not testimonies, of 
individual service.  
                                                          
3
 The archaeological report on the graves at Camden has not been widely distributed to protect the location of 
the graves due to continued concern regarding the threat from relic hunters (Steven Smith pers.comm. 27th 
August 2014). 
4
 A database of muster lists from the C14
th
-15
th
 is available online at www.medievalsoldier.org, while later 
service records are available from the National Archives. 
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Archaeological evidence from a battlefield can be used alongside the extant 
historical record, ideally producing an independent narrative which is a synchronisation of 
the best elements of both (cf. Fox 1993: 7-9). However, methodological problems can be 
encountered when the historical record is inaccurate, leading to incorrect identification of 
the main narrative issues for a battle and as Freeman (2010: 164) notes, one of the 
consequences of battlefield archaeology has been to demonstrate how poorly documented 
many battles were. Narrative errors may be masked by omissions or by internal 
inconsistency with other inaccuracies. The problematic narratives and transmission of 
participant accounts from the Little Bighorn illustrates some of the issues. Many of the 
testimonies were taken from US cavalrymen during Major Reno’s 1879 court martial, from 
soldiers who had deployed with Reno, rather than following Custer into the ambush. They 
had therefore avoided the battle, only arriving at the battlefield several days later 
whereupon they hurriedly buried the dead. Their narratives are highly likely to have been 
altered to exculpate their involvement, and that of Reno, in the conflict (Scott et al. 1989: 
15; Fox 1993: 232).  
 
A significant difference is obvious between the court testimonies and private 
retellings of the battle, evidenced through letters and diaries (Scott et al. 1989: 11). Other 
testimonies, both US and Indian, were taken over 30 years after the battle, by which time it 
had become a culturally significant event, leading to further altered testimonies on the part 
of the US cavalrymen (Hammer 1976). Fox (1993: 228) noted that several Indian witnesses 
contradicted their own testimonies when re-questioned years later, in particular painting a 
more positive picture of the American soldiers. Issues were also raised by the testimony 
when it was demonstrated that some, but not all, Indian participants had transposed the 
compass points 90° clockwise and were unclear about the directions of movement 
throughout their narratives (Fox 1993: 150-151). The record therefore raised many issues, 
almost all of which have been subsequently answered by the archaeology, particularly the 
circumstances which led to the soldiers reaching Last Stand Hill (Scott et al. 1989). In other 
cases, battlefield projects have addressed issues regarding the location of particular units on 
the battlefield (e.g. Balaclava, Freeman 2010), of particular phases of activity (e.g. Culloden, 
Pollard 2009b), and the physical extent of the battlefield (e.g. Towton, Sutherland 2012; 
Bosworth, Foard & Curry 2013; Edgehill, Foard 2012). The application of battlefield 
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archaeology has provided accurate locations for battlefields which had for centuries been 
placed in the wrong position, including Towton, Barnet, Bosworth, Marston Moor, Naseby 
and Culloden in the UK alone (Foard & Morris 2012: 91-95). Where conflicting accounts of a 
battle exist, archaeology may indicate which more closely approximates the truth, as at Palo 
Alto where the assemblage indicated that the American sources - often accused of 
inaccuracy by historians on the basis of "the winner writes the history" - were better 
representative of the engagement than the Mexican narratives (Haecker 2001). 
 
 
1.3.1: Development of the discipline 
 
 Battlefield archaeology is a relatively new development, and the discipline, in 
focusing on sites from the C19th, was originally developed to study engagements from the 
recent past. Until the mid-C20th, excavation on battlefields was limited to a brief period of 
antiquarian interest in locating mass graves, as at Agincourt in 1818 (Sutherland 2015), 
Crécy in the 1820s (Preston 2005: 117-118) and Naseby in the 1840s (Foard 1995: 354-358).5 
The re-emergence of interest in battlefield archaeology in the second half of the C20th saw a 
new focus on the artefact assemblage rather than the features constructed on the site. 
Field-walking survey and archaeological projects at a number of battlefields and conflict 
sites began to explore the potential for reconstructing the narrative of an individual 
engagement from the artefact assemblage, at sites such as Fort Watson (Ferguson 1977), 
Marston Moor (Newman 1981; cf. Foard 2009), and the Little Bighorn (Scott 2013: 7). 
However, it was the introduction of metal detection which proved a particularly valuable 
innovation. Pioneered in the United States, metal detection was used in archaeological 
explorations on the battlefields at San Jacinto, Palo Alto, the Little Bighorn, and the Big Hole, 
and the fort at Valley Forge where the American Continental Army wintered in 1777-1778 
(Connor & Scott 1998). The methodology came to maturity with the often-cited excavations 
at the Little Bighorn in the 1980s, which in its discoveries and the way it set the standard for 
battlefield archaeology has been largely followed by projects ever since (see Scott et al. 
                                                          
5
 The formal archaeological excavations on the graves at Marathon, Thermopylae and Chaeronea in the later 
Nineteenthand early Twentieth Centuries , conducted to professional contemporary standards, frequently go 
unmentioned in overviews of the development of battlefield archaeology. 
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1989; Scott 2013). In 1983 a grass fire stripped the site of its surface vegetation, allowing for 
a more detailed surface survey from field-walking and, most importantly, a metal detection 
survey (Scott 2013: 6-7). The developed methodology prioritised the recovery of lead 
munitions as clues to the narrative development of the battle, first detecting their location 
through survey, then conducting a series of excavations to identify the artefacts, plotting 
their exact find-position with the Global Positioning System (hereafter GPS; see Scott et al. 
1989; Scott 2013: 72-76). Spatial analysis of the munitions created new insights into the 
geographic course of the battle, various phases of skirmishing, and combat disintegration at 
Last Stand Hill, while the non-munitions evidence, such as military kit and cavalry 
equipment, shed light into both the life and death of the American casualties (Fox 1993). 
The archaeology was later used by Scott (2001) to reconstruct more generally the battlefield 
behaviour of US soldiers during the American-Indian Wars. The Little Bighorn project 
remains the benchmark for battlefield archaeology, both in terms of the methodology used 
to investigate a site, and the interpretive use of the evidence, particularly narrative 
reconstruction of the individual engagement in conjunction with the historical record. 
 
 Since the 1980s, battlefield archaeology has grown to encompass a vast range of 
sites temporally, geographically, and thematically (see Scott & McFeaters 2011; Carman 
2013 for recent summaries). Battlefields from across the world, from prehistory to the 
Second World War (and beyond) are studied using variations on the methodology 
developed between the 1950s and 1980s, refining it to the requirements of differing areas 
and historical periods. Topographic reconciliation is no longer accepted by the vast majority 
as a methodology able to settle the location of a disputed battlefield, and explanations are 
required when archaeological material is not recovered from proposed sites. Although the 
discipline was originally conceived as a methodology to study battlefields in the United 
States from the 1860s onwards (Fox 1993), the parameters have been gradually pushed 
increasingly backwards. Sites from the Jacobean War (e.g. Pollard 2009b), the English Civil 
War (e.g. Foard 2012), the Thirty Years War (e.g. Eickhoff 2014), and the Wars of the Roses 
(e.g. Fiorato et al. 2000; Foard & Curry 2013) have all been successfully identified and 
excavated. Archaeological evidence associated with sites from earlier periods, particularly 
the Viking world (Raffield 2013), has proved difficult thus far to identify. In part this is due to 
issues over the exact location of sites comparable with those faced for the Classical period, 
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as well as problems identifying a uniquely 'military' assemblage (Raffield 2013: 128-133). 
There is optimism, however, that the archaeology of earlier Medieval-period battle will soon 
be as recognisable as that of its later-period counterpart. 
 
However, despite the temporal extension of battlefield archaeology into the more 
distant past, the methodology has remained focused on identifying the spatial distribution 
of metal, usually non-ferrous, munitions and projectiles, which may not be suited to all 
periods and engagements. Although adjustments can and have been made, such as at 
Towton where the project was able to target iron arrowheads after identifying their 
magnetic signature (Sutherland & Richardson 2009), battlefield projects focusing on sites 
pre-dating the use of gunpowder weapons are still rare. There are concerns that earlier 
battlefields will have insufficient historical evidence (Foard 2009) and battle-related 
assemblages (Foard & Morris 2012: 37-61) to enable the sites to be accurately identified, let 
alone the actual engagement reconstructed. The reality may however, be more complex, 
particularly where the location of a site is of equal research priority as the narrative analysis. 
Portable metal working hearths, although with no artefacts, have been identified at the site 
of Fulford, suggesting that the archaeology of earlier medieval battle may be complex but 
not completely absent (C. Jones 2011).  
 
While it may not be possible to base an entire narrative reconstruction on the 
remains from earlier sites, any assemblages which can be securely identified with a battle 
will provide evidence for the location of the engagement, which is rarely secure for sites 
pre-dating the early modern period. At Fulford, the hearths have provided evidence for why 
the assemblage may have been so limited, as material was evidently being reprocessed on 
the battlefield in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, while C. Jones (2011) has 
associated their abandonment on the site with the wider conflict narrative of the Norse 
invasion. Identification of battlefield sites above narrative reconstruction currently also 
dominates the relatively new sub-discipline of prehistoric battlefield/conflict archaeology. 
From a riverbank in the Tollense Valley, Germany, human remains and weapons associated 
with a Bronze Age battle have been identified, evidently transported from a conflict site 
slightly upstream (Jantzen et al. 2011). Although the actual battle cannot be reconstructed 
from the archaeology, the assemblage has nonetheless identified that conflict occurred in 
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this area of Germany during the Bronze Age which extended beyond the so-called “warrior-
elite”, and recreated the anthropological impact of the conflict on the human body. 
Although the research parameters are not the same for pre-blackpowder battlefields, the 
potential for research on earlier sites, and for aims other than narrative reconstruction 
relative to an historical record, are gradually being accepted by battlefield archaeology (e.g. 
Scott & McFeaters 2011: 119-121). However, exploration of prehistoric conflict remains 
perhaps overly reliant on the identification of human remains with signs of skeletal trauma; 
James (2007: 162) rightly suggests that much of the pathological evidence from conflict in 
the Early Iron Age, for example, has been lost due to mortuary practice in the period. The 
prevalence of conflict in these periods, and its location, may be severely underestimated as 
a result (see 1.3.3). 
 
 
1.3.2: Ancient battlefields in archaeology 
 
 Although a number of conflict sites from antiquity have been successfully identified 
and excavated, Greek and Roman battlefields do not have a particularly prominent profile in 
battlefield archaeology. This is all the more surprising when it is considered that limited 
archaeological work has been carried out on ancient battlefields since at least the 1860s, 
pre-dating all but the most cursory antiquarian work on medieval and early modern 
battlefields. Between 1861 and 1865 Napoleon III funded substantial excavations at Alise-
Sainte-Reine in the hopes of proving the site to be Vercingetorix’s Alésia. Headed by Eugène 
Stoffel, a career soldier and military theorist who also excavated at Gergovia, the 
excavations recovered artefacts and features which were used to declare the site to be 
Alésia. Although the evidence not necessarily sufficient to identify the site as Caesar’s Alésia 
rather than that of another (undocumented) Late Iron Age conflict, the substantial 
fortifications, weapons, and human remains recovered in both the 1860s and later 
excavations in the 1990s suggests that the initial identification was correct (see von 
Schnurbein 2008; Sievers 2008). Several early antiquarians and archaeologists had 
conducted excavations on the grave-mounds of Marathon, Thermopylae and Chaeronea, 
funded particularly by German archaeological authorities, locating human remains which 
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were rapidly associated with the respective battles (Schliemann 1884; Staïs 1893; Sotiriadis 
1903; cf. Traill 1995: 227-235). Yet these approaches were never developed further, either 
into a more archaeologically-driven discipline of ancient battlefield studies, or even a 
discipline which required verification of the literary and topographic conclusions drawn on 
these sites. Following the Second World War, archaeological work on the Greek battlefields 
stopped, which may be associated with the complete decline of ancient military studies in 
Germany (see 1.3.3). While some studies into the archaeology of Roman conflict continued, 
this research in many cases focused on siege, rather than open-field, warfare (see Coulston 
2001). 
 
 To date, there is remarkably little evident interest in ancient battlefield archaeology 
among the majority of ancient historians. Some have proved dismissive, even hostile, of the 
discipline. The underlying theme behind the attitudes appears to be the question of the 
physical survival of ancient battlefield assemblages, in particular that any substantial 
remains would have been left on the field after looting (cf. Webster 1993: 100). The most 
notable critic-historian is Philip Sabin, who described the archaeology as "the least 
significant for our particular enquiry", going on to say: 
 
 
"Pitched battles in the open field are by their very nature evanescent 
phenomena, and leave little lasting archaeological record. Hence, we 
cannot hope to find anything like the same degree of surviving physical 
evidence as for sieges... for more recent open field engagements such as 
Towton or Naseby, battlefield archaeology may reveal actual remnants 
such as grave pits or musket shot, which can throw significant light on the 
course of the fighting, but ancient battles were so much longer ago that 
even the temporary camps of the two sides are usually impossible to trace" 
(Sabin 2009: 4-5). 
 
 
 Sabin's main concern appears to be in the survival of the assemblage through the 
post-battle looting process, presenting it, with no particular evidence, as a process of field-
stripping that was more effective than it was in any period of subsequent conflict. Sabin 
(2007: 399-400) is also critical of topographic analyses of ancient battlefields, and seemingly 
unappreciative of the potential that archaeology as a wider discipline has for reconstructing 
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past environments, including terrain. Foard has been active in demonstrating the use of 
historic terrain regression through archaeological analysis on battlefield sites, providing 
accurate reconstructions of the landscape at the time of the battle. At Marston Moor, the 
spatial distribution of the archaeological evidence made little sense until it was 
contextualised within the contemporary field-boundary system (Foard 2012; Foard & Morris 
2012). Similar terrain regression at Talamanca has also shed new light on the artefact 
distribution from the battle (Rubio Campillo 2008). The Lion Monument, constructed soon 
after the Battle of Waterloo, has significantly impacted subsequent interpretation of the 
battle, particularly regarding the use of the ridge. Terrain regression has attempted to 
reconstruct the actual appearance of the ridge during the battle by redistributing the 
volume of earth removed to construct the mound, providing a more accurate narrative of 
the French attack and British defence (Wason 2003). At Kalkriese, environmental analysis 
and pollen sampling have reconstructed the landscape and terrain at the time of the Varus 
battle, indicating that, far from the unpopulated and forested landscape expected from the 
literary record, the area was partially cultivated and featured a number of native 
settlements (Tolksdorf-Lienemann 2004).  
 
 Although Sabin is correct to express concern about substantial terrain changes at 
many ancient battlefield sites, rendering the already insufficient literary accounts 
completely useless, his complete disbelief in the archaeology of ancient battle leads him to 
reject the idea that physical artefacts can provide the exact location that the literary record 
does not. Sabin's revolutionary methodology is instead to take an inherent military 
probability approach, combined with gaming theory, within which the physical terrain of the 
battlefield, and therefore its exact location, is marginalised as unimportant (Sabin 2009). 
This approach led him to multiple new conclusions on many ancient battles, although each 
one was only verified by the internal logic of his own project, with no attempts at 
verification. Similar doubts regarding the survival of battlefield assemblages and landscape 
change have been expressed by Whitby (2007: 75-77), although he did concede that 
assemblages could survive in exceptional circumstances, citing Kalkriese and Alésia as 
examples. Coulston, although in many ways an active proponent of ancient conflict 
archaeology, nevertheless expressed similar doubt that battlefield assemblages would 
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survive in any identifiable form on the majority of ancient battlefields, excluding perhaps 
sites of Roman defeat on a scale comparable to Kalkriese (Coulston 2001, 2005).  
 
In Greek warfare studies there has been little discussion of battlefield archaeology, 
although the failure of major authors such as Victor Davis Hanson (1989, 1998, 2001) or 
Hans van Wees (2004) to discuss the subject may betray their opinions on the discipline's 
potential in their period of interest. Once again, this view is conditioned by an expectation 
that assemblages are unlikely to have survived the looting process. This perspective, 
however, gives too much credit to ancient battlefield looting as a site clearing-process, and, 
as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four, vastly underestimates the scale of artefact 
deposition directly resulting from ancient battle. Nevertheless, battlefield archaeology has 
still to be accepted as a viable methodology for studying ancient battle, and historians 
remain, for the most part, reliant on an ancient literary record that is almost entirely 
unsuited to the reconstruction of individual conflicts. 
 
 These prejudices in part link with another issue regarding archaeological work on 
Greek and Roman battlefields: the practicalities of doing so (see 6.2). While many of these 
issues are common to archaeological projects - money, manpower, time, permissions - the 
scepticism detailed leads many experts to suggest that the results will not be worth the 
effort expended, if any emerge. This can prove a significant challenge to securing project 
funding. There is growing interest among Greek and Roman military archaeologists in the 
potential of battlefield archaeology, but prominent funding, and consequently manpower 
and crucial site permissions, can be hard to come by for projects in what is still a relatively 
new field of research. 
 
 Attempts by more modern battlefield archaeologists to extend their methodology 
into antiquity have also proved problematic. To a degree, this lack of effectiveness results 
from a failure to contextualise the issue under consideration, particularly with regard to site 
formation in the form of artefact deposition and post-battle activity, and the specifics of 
ancient warfare. For example, Carman and Carman’s (2005) attempt to apply their 
phenomenological Bloody Meadows Project methodology to ancient Greek battlefields 
made multiple inaccurate assertions resulting from misunderstandings over the terrain of 
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Greece, the nature of Greek warfare, and incorrect identification of battlefield features. This 
attempt is, however, one of very few from battlefield archaeology attempting to draw 
Classical antiquity into the mainstream of the discipline. More widely, there appears to be 
little optimism from battlefield archaeologists that comparable archaeology can be found on 
sites from the ancient world (e.g. Foard & Morris 2012: 37-61). 
 
 
1.3.3: A brief historiography of ancient battlefield studies 
 
 The study of ancient battlefields goes back at least as far as Charlemagne, who took 
an interest in how the tactics and strategies used in ancient warfare could be effectively 
applied to contemporary conflict and commissioned scholars to find sites from Caesar's 
Gallic Wars, particularly Alésia (Sguaitamatti 2006: 467). The ‘modern’ era of ancient 
battlefield studies began roughly in the mid-C18th, developing out of both antiquarian 
interest and modern military concerns.6 In 1747, in the aftermath of the Jacobite Rebellion, 
William Roy was commissioned to produce a comprehensive topographic survey of 
Scotland, identifying key terrain positions for ambush, skirmish, and open battle, which he 
later used to reconstruct Roman conflict in Scotland, particularly the strategic location of 
Mons Graupius which he placed at Dalginross (see Sweet 2004: 181-182). Roy's Greek 
counterpart was William Martin Leake, a military surveyor in the British Army. Leake 
travelled widely through Greece between 1802 and 1810, later publishing a series of 
topographic observations (Wagstaff 2008: 169-172). His principle role in the country was, 
like Roy, to produce an accurate contemporary survey of the landscape, in this case in 
advance of an anticipated Napoleonic invasion through Greece, although ancient 
battlefields were evidently also of personal interest (Wagstaff 2008: 174). Leake's 
publications contain records of 13 battlefield visits across mainland Greece. Leake was 
interested in sites used for multiple conflict, including Thermopylae, Chaeronea, and 
Mantinea, although at the latter he found no topographic explanation for the five conflicts 
at the site, noting only  generic flat terrain (Leake 1830iii: 57). Although Leake's military 
commission suggests that the battlefields would have been tactically evaluated, this is not 
                                                          
6
 The prominence of the contemporary military in Roman battlefield antiquarianism drew strong criticism from 
William Stukeley, without effect (Sweet 2004: 181). 
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evident in the published works. Instead, they present a series of topographic reconciliations 
between the contemporary landscape and the ancient literary record. There is no record of 
his topographic observations being used by the contemporary military authorities, although 
as the Napoleonic conflict was over, and Leake long retired, by the time his publications 
emerged, it is unsurprising that there is no reference to such use. 
 
 A close relationship with the contemporary military was also evident in the German 
Schlachtfeldstudien, a series of ancient battlefield studies in the later C19th and early C20th 
characterised by the work of Johannes Kromayer, Georg Veith and Hans Delbrück.7 
Schlachtfeldstudien developed from separate developments in both German classical 
scholarship and German military theory. One of the defining characteristics of 
Schlachtfeldstudien was a more critical approach to the ancient literary record, ranging from 
questioning of the more speculative elements by Kromayer, to complete rejection by 
Delbrück.8 German classicism as a discipline had grown increasingly critical of the Classical 
literary sources and the unquestioning use of them within academia. Dyson (1993: 195) 
identified this development as a rejection of speculation and adherence to unreliable 
ancient sources in favour of a “systematic collection of facts as a precursor to any real 
knowledge”.  
 
 At the same time, the Germano-Prussian military was becoming more interested in 
military theory, particularly the study of historic battles and campaigns for the use of 
contemporary strategy and tactics, and the consequent development of soldier-
intellectuals. The Prussian military was central to the development of the ‘staff ride’, an 
intensive method of military training which involved detailed study of a campaign both in 
the classroom and through extensive terrain analysis visits to the battlefields themselves. 
The ultimate aim of the exercise was to improve tactical theory in military personnel, by 
placing the battlefield itself at the centre of study (Robertson 1987). The Germano-Prussian 
Army was particularly fond of this sort of instruction, with Alfred Graf von Schlieffen (1833-
                                                          
7
 Kromayer and Delbrück frequently disagreed with the conclusions of one another, engaging in an extended 
feud in print (see Ferguson 1905: 844-45), which Whatley (1964: 120) observed descended at times into an 
exchange of “personal abuse”. 
8
 Kromayer did however, gain a reputation for using the ancient literary record when it supported his 
conclusions and rejecting it when not, which was noted and criticised on multiple occasions by Delbrück 
(1975i: 170-171, 242-251, 332-333) as part of their on-going disagreement. 
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1913, Chief of the German General Staff 1891-1906) conducting two a year (June and 
October), lasting up to two weeks, within or on the borders of German territory (Foley 2003: 
6). The intention was that a thorough grounding in topographic analysis and familiarity with 
terrain-based operational decisions would assist military officers when engaged in real 
conflict.9 Antiquity, despite its temporal distance and the growing discrepancy regarding 
weaponry, was considered to have practical relevance to contemporary warfare, and was 
therefore studied as a military, rather than a purely theoretical, exercise. Schlieffen 
developed a particular interest in Cannae after reading the work of Hans Delbrück on the 
battle (Delbrück 1975i) which he thought could have direct and practical implications for 
modern warfare. From 1909, von Schlieffen published a series of ‘Cannae Studies’ in 
Vierteljahrsheft für Truppenführung und Heereskunde, the journal of the General Staff, in 
which he explored the historical use of flanking manoeuvres on the battlefield to defeat a 
numerically-superior enemy (von Schlieffen 1931).10  
 
 Although many of the Schlachtfeldstudien scholars were not serving members of the 
military, they were often closely involved with the contemporary armed forces. Delbrück 
presented himself as a military theorist, although he did gain some personal experience of 
warfare during a short period of service in the Franco-Prussian War (Delbrück 1975i: 13-14). 
His battlefield surveys were published in a series of narrative works and articles, most 
notably the four-volume History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History 
(1975; originally published 1900-1908), of which the first volume was dedicated to antiquity. 
This publication attempted to explore the common elements of military history from 
ancient Greece to the modern day, serving as a reaction to the current state of the discipline 
which Delbrück (1975i: 19) found to be excessively speculative. Delbrück (1975i: 20) was 
highly critical of the ancient literary record, viewing the veracity of most texts with 
scepticism. Instead, he focused on terrain analysis, military theory, and battlefield behaviour 
to inform his analyses of ancient battle.  
 
                                                          
9
 Foley (2003: 13) noted that a staff ride in 1894 led to tactical decisions which were almost identical to those 
deployed in reality in the 1914 Battle of Tannenberg. 
10
 This became the basis for the German ‘plan’ of conflict prior to the First World War, later dubbed the 
‘Schlieffen Plan’, although von Schlieffen had retired in 1905, before the publication of his studies. The plan 
may have been a retrospective creation to allow the German failure in the war to be blamed on not following 
it (Foley 2003: xvi-xviii).  
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 The defining work of the Schlachtfeldstudien was produced by Johannes Kromayer 
and Georg Veith. Kromayer had no direct experience in the military, and was usually 
accompanied in field-survey military personnel, first by Captain Göppel, then by Colonel 
Janke of the German General Staff (Kromayer 1903: vi), and later by Georg Veith, a Colonel 
in the Austrian army and director of the Military Archive in Vienna. Kromayer's early 
research was funded by the German General Staff, and was personally supported by von 
Schlieffen (Kromayer 1903: v-vii). Kromayer's Greek battlefield surveys were published in 
the four-volume Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland (Kromayer & Veith 1903-1931), 
accompanied by the five-volume Schlachten-Atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte (Kromayer & 
Veith 1922-1929). Although accurate locations for battlefields were recognised as important 
by Schlachtfeldstudien scholars, without which their reconstructions would be 
compromised, the overriding priority was that the studies, alongside staff rides, would use 
examples from the past to teach the modern military how to win battles in certain types of 
terrain. Although Kromayer (1903: 2-3) in particular argued that narrative reconstruction of 
ancient battles was pointless if it was not placed in the correct topographic setting, little 
effort was made beyond terrain analysis to check that this was the case in any individual 
instance. "Verification" that scholars had identified the correct battlefield came from the 
ability to place the reconstructed battle, with the correct outcome, into the physical terrain, 
and there was no search for archaeological material. 
 
 In British scholarship, the study of classical battle remained dominated by reference 
to the literary sources, and a methodology of reconciliation between ancient text and 
contemporary landscape.  A significant proponent of this approach was G.B. Grundy, who 
used his personal topographic surveys of many ancient battlefields to inform his analyses of 
the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars (Grundy 1901, 1948). The ancient literary record was 
placed at the heart of his studies, and topographic survey used almost exclusively to verify 
the texts, rather than explore them (e.g. Grundy 1901: 187-194; 296-300). Whatley (1964: 
123-124) expressed doubts whether this was an effective methodology, instead 
recommending a combination of source critique, topographic survey, military theory, and 
logic (Sachkritik) in reconstructing ancient battles. The contemporary British military had 
minimal involvement in ancient battle studies. Unlike the German General Staff, examples 
from antiquity were not used in officer training. J.F.C. Fuller observed that when he became 
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a tutor at Camberley Staff College in 1923, his teaching on Alexander the Great was the first 
use of case studies from antiquity in modern British officer training, with other tutors 
focusing on the campaigns of Stonewall Jackson or the First World War (Fuller 1958: 5-7).11 
Fuller's discussions of ancient battlefields focus on the reconstruction of individual battles, 
the use of different troop types and military combinations, and the way that terrain 
impacted the operational effectiveness of various units and the exploitation of these factors 
by commanders in antiquity. There was no attempt, however, to verify the locations or 
topographies in which he placed his battle reconstructions. Instead, he followed the 
contemporary academic consensus. Neither ancient academics nor military theorists seem 
to have desired independent or archaeological verification of battlefield locations, or of the 
events which they placed within these topographies. 
 
 Following the Second World War, ancient battlefield studies lost much of the 
impetus which had driven the discipline in the late C19th and early C20th. In particular, 
German ancient battlefield studies went into complete decline and Schlachtfeldstudien fell 
almost completely out of use, a reaction to the aftermath of the war. This is perhaps the 
point where ancient battlefield studies began to stagnate, even regress, seen particularly in 
the failure to adopt many of the theoretical archaeological advances being developed in 
other areas of antique study. This move backwards is best illustrated by the work of N.G.L. 
Hammond and W.K. Pritchett, the two most prominent ancient battlefield scholars of the 
post-War period. Both produced a series of well-argued reappraisals of ancient battlefields 
and their location, but adhered almost exclusively to a methodology which remained 
characterised by reconciliation between the ancient literary record and contemporary 
topography.  
 
 Hammond and Pritchett covered a range of sites across Greece, including Classical, 
Hellenistic and Roman-period battlefields, while Hammond also considered sites associated 
with Alexander the Great in Asia Minor. Hammond published many of his battlefield 
observations as part of larger monograph works, particularly Persian and Peloponnesian 
War battlefields in A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (1986) and those of the Macedonian 
                                                          
11
 Fuller (1958: 5) had decided that antiquity had a relevance to modern military studies after observing that 
British tanks in 1917 deployed in a manner reminiscent of Alexander the Great's cavalry. 
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campaigns in The Genius of Alexander the Great (1997), and a number of journal articles 
detailing individual battlefield studies. Pritchett published his battlefield observations in two 
multi-volume works, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography (8 volumes, 1965-1992) and The 
Greek State at War (5 volumes, 1974-1991), with an earlier monograph on the battlefield of 
Marathon (1960). The long careers and multiple battlefield visits of both scholars meant 
that they were able to engage with the sites over time and develop their thinking, 
particularly at Marathon, on which both Hammond (1968: 18-19; 1988c: 513) and Pritchett 
(1960; 1965-1992i, ii) changed their opinions of over time. 
 
 Both Hammond and Pritchett were meticulous in personally surveying the 
battlefields which they discussed in their work. Hammond had served in Greece during the 
Second World War, posted on multiple occasions as a liaison officer with the Greek 
Resistance due to his knowledge of Greek (Hammond 1982), and often surveyed ancient 
battlefields at the same time of year as the battle had been fought. Pritchett, by contrast, 
involved academic colleagues from other fields, such as hydrologists and geologists, to 
survey battlefields with him and provide insights into the terrain regression which he used 
to inform his conclusions (e.g. Pritchett 1960: 157). Hammond and Pritchett both attempted 
to identify “topographic checkpoints” mentioned by the ancient literary record in the 
contemporary landscape, particularly constructed features such as settlements, 
monuments, and camps. Hammond, for example, noted the presence of a [Roman] camp at 
Cynoscephalae, but did not follow up, failing even to check that the feature was actually a 
Roman camp, and if so, of what date (Hammond 1988a: 69-71, 76-77). Both were clearly 
familiar with earlier reports of archaeological material recovered from sites and would cite 
the evidence when it supported their hypotheses, although never commissioned any 
excavations themselves. No attempts were made to verify that their battlefield locations 
were correct, beyond assessing that the reconstructed narratives would fit the site terrain 
and wider landscape. 
 
 Pritchett, in particular, marked a move towards exploring the social, religious, and 
economic context of ancient warfare, although he, unlike many contemporary classicists, 
did not ignore the phenomenon of actual fighting. Very little has changed however in 
ancient battlefield studies since the era of Hammond and Pritchett. Despite the obviously 
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unsatisfactory nature of text-and-terrain reconciliation, as evidenced by the fact that the 
method has not yet produced one single uncontested and verified battlefield location, 
‘reinterpretations’ of ancient battles remain dominated by analysis of the literary record 
and topographic assessment of the proposed battlefield. The ancient historian Richard 
Evans (2013) proposed to “retrace” individual battles and sieges from antiquity through a 
reassessment of exactly the same literary record which has proved inconclusive thus far, 
alongside, as so often, reassessment of the topographic and geographic context of the 
engagement. His methodology differs from that of the Schlachtfeldstudien only in the 
contextual factors in the narratives which are emphasised at the expense of others, 
primarily it would seem, on the basis of inherent military probability.  
 
 As the ‘old breed’ of military historians died out, the study of ancient warfare was, in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, overtaken by scholars who worked almost 
exclusively in a classical context, and showed little interest in continuing research into the 
reconstruction of ancient battles (Hanson 2007: 10). Hanson suggests that this theme in 
academia reflected a wider societal aversion to issues of violence and warfare following the 
First, and more particularly the Second, World Wars (Hanson 2007: 11). A similar 
phenomenon is seen in the so-called “Pacification of the Past” theory espoused by Keeley 
(1996). He observed that following the Second World War, scholars of prehistory employed 
an almost wilful disregard of both archaeological and anthropological evidence to suggest 
that their period of interest had been one free from warfare, violence, or conflict under all 
but the most extreme circumstances. James (2002) followed Keeley’s analysis with a  more 
detailed study on the Early Iron Age in Britain, which he argued had also been impacted by 
this “Pacification” process despite substantial archaeological evidence for widespread 
conflict in this period. 
 
 The Greek and Roman worlds were never themselves fully “Pacified” in this way; the 
great concern of many ancient writers with issues of warfare meant that classical 
scholarship was never able to deny the occurrence of warfare, nor to marginalise its societal 
impact. In fact, some modern battlefield archaeologists felt that during the academic post-
War aversion to warfare studies archaeologists working on the Roman military were exempt 
from this backlash (Pollard & Banks 2010: 416). However, even within the study of Greek 
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and Roman warfare, newer research avenues were followed which reflected emerging 
trends in archaeology – gender, identity, or post-colonialism, to name but a few – but which 
served to minimise the academic focus on fighting itself. Rather, a new emphasis was placed 
on issues such as commemoration of both wars and the battle-dead, religious and ritual 
aspects of war, the role of non-combatants (particularly women), and the army as a 
community  (see also Hanson 2007: 11-13). However, it is notable that the subject of 
ancient battle has been at least partially rehabilitated following the publication of John 
Keegan’s The Face of Battle (1976), which allowed individual battles to be studied from the 
perspective of combatants. Subsequently, direct attempts have been made to apply this 
analysis to classical antiquity (see Hanson 1989; Sabin 2000, 2007; Daly 2002: 155-200; 
Kagan 2006: 7-95), and the psychology of soldiers is now a new research avenue (e.g. 
Crowley 2012).12  
 
 Although undeniably interesting, in many ways these studies are at best a slightly 
updated version of the methodologies originally used by Delbrück and Whatley.13 Others 
have worked on the practical use of weapons in battle, reconstructing tactical approaches 
and narratives from the physical capability of the weapons in use at the time, alongside, in 
many cases, consideration of the experience of soldiers on the field (see e.g. Coulston 2007; 
James 2010; Krentz 2013). The ultimate weakness of these studies is that the experience of 
ancient battle is generalised, producing a composite conclusion drawn from the ancient 
literary record, the archaeology of weapons and armour, and psychology, which may be 
broadly representative overall, but reveals nothing about individual battles. Despite the 
growing number of excavated sites, the potential contribution of ancient battlefield 
archaeology to illuminate individual conflicts by supplementing the inadequate literary 
record, to provide verified locations for battlefields, remains vastly underestimated and 
underused. The development of the discipline has not helped, being dominated for so long 
by scholars who wanted to preserve the integrity of the ancient literary record, and by the 
need to draw immediately useful military applications from the study of sites. 
 
                                                          
12
 Although see Melchior (2011) for a discussion of how accurate “face of battle” psychological investigations 
can be in the context of antiquity. 
13
 Keegan (1976: 32-33) acknowledged this his methodology owed much to the earlier work of Delbrück on 
historic battlefields. 
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1.4: Why ancient battlefields? 
 
 A valid question is why battlefields from the Greek and Roman worlds should be 
considered of distinctive interest or individual approach, and indeed, why are they any 
different to battlefields from any other period of history? In part, it is a reaction to the way 
that the archaeological element of ancient battlefield studies has been so comprehensively 
marginalised by historians without any convincing argument for why this should be the case. 
Although the conclusions drawn by battlefield archaeology in later periods have on occasion 
been taken as controversial by some (e.g. Fox 2006: 171), in general the reception has been 
welcoming, with some historians even recognising that “…the process of artefact recovery 
has revolutionised the study of battle” (Newman & Roberts 2003: 152). Yet this entire 
potential is dismissed in the context of antiquity on the basis of sweeping statements, based 
on no actual evidence, that ancient battlefields were stripped of their potential archaeology 
by post-battle activity. This preconception is one of the main themes to be addressed in this 
thesis. It is not acceptable that a discipline such as ancient battle studies accepts 
reconstructions of conflict based on iconographic depictions on vases (e.g. Schwartz 2009: 
20-21, 86-92) and epic poetry (e.g. Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 33-43) ahead of archaeological 
evidence from battlefields. 
 
 This research proposes that the study of Greek and Roman battlefields will provide 
evidence for Classical warfare which other archaeological and historical sources have found 
difficult to illuminate. Foremost, it is hoped that battlefield behaviour and tactical 
manoeuvring can be reconstructed from the distributional patterns of material across 
conflict sites, whilst allowing for the fact that not all units or activity will have left (surviving) 
archaeological traces. The composition of surviving assemblages, and the differences 
between sites, can illuminate post-battle activity, a process which can already be seen to 
have varied significantly in the Roman world dependent on the victorious army (see Chapter 
Four). A firmer basis for recognising battle-related assemblages from Classical antiquity may 
aid the recognition of conflict sites which emerge in the incidental archaeological record, as 
the battlefield at Harzhorn did. Beyond the battlefield, simply being able to locate sites on a 
map will assist in understanding the geographic range of military operation, particularly in 
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the Roman world. These locations may provide a firmer basis for reconstructing the social 
and economic impact of warfare on states, military institutions, and civilian populations, 
particularly if it emerges that certain types of landscapes were more commonly fought 
over.14 Military equipment recovered from battlefields may assist in providing more 
accurate dates for the introduction of new forms of weapons and armour, the earliest 
surviving examples of which are commonly associated with 'active' contexts. The discovery 
of lorica elements at Kalkriese, for example, indicated that segmented armour was in use 
much earlier than imagined (see Bishop 2002: 23-30).15 
 
 The temporal period covered by this thesis broadly starts from when ancient battles 
began to be documented by the historical record onwards, from about the C5thBCin Greece. 
As discussed in the introduction (1.1.1), this is a largely arbitrary point in terms of the 
archaeological evidence, imposed largely through necessities of scale. For the same reason, 
the geographic focus is on the Mediterranean and northern European world. The point at 
which this thesis stops is a more difficult question. In some respects, the limit is impacted by 
the continued availability of historical evidence relevant to battle and conflict. Due to the 
discussion of historical literature with respect to the methodology, Ammianus Marcellinus 
and Procopius provide the temporal limits in the Western and Eastern Empires, taking the 
potential period of study through to the late C4th and C6th AD respectively. The latest 
archaeological evidence in the text comes from three sites dating to the mid-C3rd AD, at 
Harzhorn, Abritus, and Dura-Europos. 
 
 Linking the temporal framework of this thesis, and of ancient battlefield archaeology 
more widely, to the existence of an historical record will not come as a particular surprise to 
later battlefield archaeologists. However, within this period there is significant inconsistency 
in regards to the nature, quality, and amount of historical evidence, requiring a certain level 
of methodological adaptation. The study of Classical battle has always occupied an uneasy 
                                                          
14
 Hanson's Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (1998) demonstrated the value of a wider approach by 
linking the practice of war to its wider social and economic impact. Although based almost exclusively on 
literary evidence the work demonstrated the value of linking warfare to a wider context, which can only be 
assisted by more definite locations for individual instances of conflict. 
15
 Previously the examples in the Corbridge hoard (Allason-Jones & Bishop 1988) had been thought to 
represent early use of this armour type. Further early-Augustan pieces have been identified from Germany and 
Gaul based on the Kalkriese type, suggesting that segmented armour was in use by at least 9BC (Bishop 2002: 
23). 
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position between the prehistoric and historical periods. The ancient world in general does 
have a historical record, which preserved a written account of many of the battles and 
conflicts which are the focus of ancient battlefield studies. Very few battles are narrated in 
any detail by the extant ancient literary record, with most are described cursorily as 
happening, with no details, while others are omitted almost entirely from the record, 
referred to only in a vague reference to regional conflict. To all functional purposes, most 
ancient battles are arguably proto-historic, even in some cases prehistoric, relying on details 
about general conflict in the period to reconstruct the probable narrative. Unsurprisingly, 
there is often very little indication of the geographic location of these sites, making it 
difficult, even impossible, to place them within a landscape.  It is possible to interpret the 
Roman-period battlefield at Harzhorn in Germany, an undocumented event, in reference to 
contextual knowledge about the contemporary world extrapolated from the written record, 
but the event itself remains non-historic.  
 
 Although the overall historical record of the period is too substantial to realistically 
say that certain areas of antiquity can be considered ‘prehistoric’, in the functional context 
of ancient battlefield archaeology, they can be as good as. Any methodology developed for 
ancient battlefield archaeology will require a secure reassessment of the ancient literary 
record, and an appreciation that it is likely to play a lesser role than it does in the later 
discipline. That said, any ancient battlefield discovered, regardless of its historical 
documentation, can be subjected to a certain degree of narrative reconstruction, as enough 
is known about the wider context of ancient warfare to provide an interpretational 
foundation regardless of whether the individual battle was described or not. If the 
assemblage is of sufficient quality to facilitate recognition and interpretation, there is no 
methodological reason why battlefields which fall into this prehistoric lacuna cannot be 
studied by battlefield archaeology. 
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1.4.1: “Battle” in battlefield archaeology 
 
 The state of the historical record is not the only problematic contrast between 
ancient and more modern battlefield archaeology. There is a degree of standardisation in 
the type of military engagements which are studied by battlefield archaeology, certainly in 
the medieval and modern world. The battles chosen share certain characteristics, in part 
reflecting the methodology of the discipline, and in other cases, the research aims. Typically, 
battlefield archaeology focuses on engagements which meet conventional conceptions of 
“battle” in the context of western warfare: organised military forces,16 operating under 
formal command and/or in battle-array, with prior military training, with a mutual 
agreement to fight, operating in the open field. These engagements are usually the ones 
best documented by the historical record from the medieval period onwards (Foard & 
Morris 2012: 8-9), providing a range of narrative sources with which to locate the battlefield 
and synthesise the archaeology with narrative activity. Similar defining characteristics are 
shared by military historians (e.g. Keegan 1976; Kagan 2006: 7-22) and heritage 
management organisations (Civil War Sites Advisory Commission 1993; Historic Scotland 
2011; English Heritage 2012).  
 
 Archaeological research was initially focused on the central areas of fighting, as 
suggested by the historical record, although skirmishing following the collapse of one battle-
line is often also archaeologically visible in the area which is often characterised as the 
“immediate landscape context” (Foard 2008: 4). This area can extend for a significant 
distance beyond the area of concentrated fighting at the centre of the battlefield. As well as 
illustrating that artefact deposition extended beyond the area of arrayed fighting, battlefield 
archaeology has also demonstrated that several battles were not the straightforward, 
battle-arrayed engagements which historians have believed, but rather a series of semi-
independent or semi-connected events bearing very little resemblance to contemporary 
tactical conventions. The Little Bighorn archaeology (Scott et al. 1989; Fox 1993) illustrated 
a series of skirmishes and half-adopted battle-lines running across a wider landscape, and 
the battles of Balaclava (Freeman 2010) and First Manassas (Reeves 2010) also indicate a 
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 Usually registered as armies although the classification has been relaxed in the US to groups which were 
recognised by their own society as warriors, to incorporate Native American forces. 
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sequence of small-unit skirmishing rather than battle-arrayed fighting. The archaeology of 
any skirmishes, regardless of military context, does not appear to have differed in great 
detail from more formal battles where it involved comparable military forces and weapons, 
and created substantial assemblages (e.g. Tywardreath, in Ferguson 2013: 164-182). 
However, the focus on formal "battles" has remained. This appears to be a result of the 
relationship between the historical record and battlefield archaeology, in that the latter 
requires a substantial extant narrative against which the archaeological evidence can be 
compared. Typically, battles have been more likely to be documented in detail by the 
historical record than any other type of field engagement (Foard & Morris 2012: 7-10).  
 
 However, it is not only the level of historical documentation of the individual event 
that is important, but also the wider understanding of training and combat/battlefield 
behaviour in a given period. The assemblages from battlefields are not just interpreted in 
reference to the narratives of that single event, but also compared with a series of 
documented military training methods, to see whether the hypothetical battlefield 
behaviours and manoeuvres were followed in reality.17 This is important in the context of 
modern research into the importance of "muscle memory" in combat, and the degree to 
which pre-battle training had reconditioned the instinctive physical mechanisms into 
effective fighting responses. Under extreme conditions, the field of vision becomes limited, 
auditory intake becomes limited, and motor co-ordination will appear reduced.  
 
Training can mitigate these effects to a certain degree, but it is down to archaeology 
to assess how effective the methods were. It has been suggested that the Spartan 
predominance in antiquity was down to their high levels of training, not just because the 
weapon skills became higher, but because the muscle memory which resulted allowed them 
to perform more consistently under combat conditions (Molloy & Grossman 2007: 195). 
Therefore, it has become perhaps disproportionately important to focus on military 
engagements where the proscribed combat behaviours are well-known from the historical 
record, and skirmishes, ambushes, and raids, at least in historical understanding, often lack 
                                                          
17
 At the First Manassas (Reeves 2010) and the Little Bighorn (Fox 1993) it was demonstrated clearly that at 
certain phases of the battle troops abandoned their training, bunching together in a process of "combat 
disintegration", particularly notable at the former where soldiers in the last phase appear to have stopped 
defending themselves and were killed at close range without fighting back. 
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this characteristic. However, as the discipline of battlefield archaeology develops, the 
parameters of what constitutes a "battle" are increasingly widening beyond what had 
previously been accepted as such by military history. An argument can be made that any 
armed confrontation between recognisable armed bodies, including civilian militias, which 
took place in the open-field could be considered, in archaeological terms, to have been a 
battle. 
 
 
1.4.2: “Battle” in antiquity 
 
 This thesis is not intended as a discussion of what constituted a ‘battle’ in antiquity 
in a military, social, or religious context. There is little evidence to suggest that anyone in 
antiquity considered such issues (see Hanson 2007: 4-5), nor that there was a common 
definition of what did and did not constitute a 'battle'. The categorisation and prioritisation 
of particular field engagements is very much a modern concern. There is no intention in this 
research to prioritise traditional 'battle' above other forms of conflict in the classical world, 
as it is probable that a significant proportion, even majority, of violence in this period took 
place away from what is defined in conventional terms as the 'battlefield'. There is a strong 
argument, as for battlefield archaeology in later periods, that the definition of 'battle' in 
archaeological terms should be far more inclusive than it has previously been, incorporating 
skirmishes, ambushes, and attacks on military installations alongside more formal field 
engagements. If a strict definition consistent with military history had been adopted, for 
example, neither Kalkriese nor Harzhorn would be valid subjects for discussion as both look 
to be ambushes and/or running skirmishes with elements of arrayed fighting.  
 
 'Battle', in terms of this thesis therefore, refers to any armed engagements which 
took place in the open field, during a relatively short period of time (days or even hours), 
and between two armed (military) forces,18 regardless of the military context of this 
fighting. Long-running sieges have been excluded due to the difference in unit deployment, 
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 Although in the case of particularly tribal opponents in the Roman world, there would be sense in the 
adoption of a classification similar to that of the United States in accepting warrior forces recognised as armies 
by their own societies, as the soldier/civilian distinction in these cases is often far from obvious. 
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use of entrenchments, and weaponry. The firm association of many of these engagements 
with a known or surviving toponym also makes much of the discussion regarding locating 
sites (Chapters Two and Three) irrelevant to sieges. Further, the known association of a site 
with a historically-documented siege from antiquity makes it far easier to associated 
military-related equipment with the conflict. While this is in fact incredibly useful for conflict 
archaeology as a whole in antiquity, as it may be possible to extrapolated the composition 
of battle-related assemblages from those of sieges, the differing nature of the fighting, and 
potentially also the post-battle activity, this area will need further research beyond this 
thesis.19 It is recognised that in some cases a battle was fought outside a position under 
long-term siege which could be studied using comparable methodology to field 
engagements.20 The many shared characteristics of siege and field warfare certain make this 
a viable hypothesis, although the question is not followed up in this thesis due to issues of 
both scale and the aforementioned difference in the issues regarding location of sites. 
However, assaults on military installations, such as the assault on Velsen (Bosman 1999), 
have been included where spatial analysis of the finds has been consistent with the 
requirements of battlefield archaeology. It is not proposed that any significant distinction 
need be drawn between these conflicts and those in the open field, certainly not to the 
degree that engagements with characteristics of ambush or skirmish over pitched battle 
should be excluded from archaeological study. 
 
 The concept of a 'pitched battle', while extant in antiquity, reflects modern military 
history far more than it does antique reality. Polybius (13.3.3) argued that in earlier 
antiquity pitched battle was viewed as the most honourable method of fighting, in contrast 
to the deception-based tactics used by contemporaries, in particular Philip V of Macedon.21 
It was clearly not, therefore, the only way of fighting. For most ancient historians, however, 
there have been few problems in characterising the phenomena of ancient battle as the 
same in essence as its modern counterpart, but for differences in technology, scale, 
organisation, and purpose (e.g. Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 1-93; Hanson 1989: 9-18; 
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 Not least as much 'post-battle' activity, particularly looting and disposal of the dead, is likely to have tkane 
place during as well as after a siege. 
20
 Particularly in Simon James' recent observations at Dura-Europos (James 2015). 
21
 Van Wees (2004: 134) rightly pointed out that this is undoubtedly a largely romanticised view of the 
organisation of battles, arguing that any battle would seem pre-arranged in a Greek context, where large 
bodies of men moved to a location which had been under attack from an invading army. 
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Goldsworthy 1996; van Wees 2004: 134-138; Gilliver 2007: 125-141; Wheeler 2007: 202-
213). The subsequent narrative accounts frequently reduce the conflict to the movements 
of units – the hoplite phalanx, the Roman legion – around the field of conflict, in a manner 
which may not only be inaccurate due to its generalisation, but an anachronistic perspective 
resulting from historical descriptions of medieval and modern battles (cf. Keegan 1976: 62-
73). As van Wees (2004: 188) concedes, the Greek literary record, for all the (often 
formulaic) description of the pre- and post-battle periods, actually documents very little of 
the battles themselves. 
 
“Battle” seems to have been defined as the period during which the two battle-
arrays physically met in hand-to-hand fighting. Ancient battle historians typically 
characterise the 'battle' as the period of fighting, treating prior activity (mustering, 
speeches) as pre-battle, and later activity (looting, burial of the dead) as post-battle (e.g. 
Ash 2007: 437). The actual fighting phase of battle is suggested by Vegetius (Epitome 3.9) to 
have been relatively brief, a matter of only a few hours, although Pritchett (1974-1991iv: 46-
51) noted that very few battle-narratives from the Greek world give any indication of the 
battle’s duration (cf. van Wees (2004: 134-138) who noted that there is little consistency in 
the length of battles).22 Vegetius (Epitome 3.9, 3.11) suggested that the hope of any pitched 
battle was to achieve a decisive victory against the enemy, even if for a relatively short 
period of time, although he advised that in some cases it might be better to attempt to 
avoid battle and hope that the enemy withdrew through lack of resources, internal 
discontent or desertion (cf. Roth 1999).Battle might only be risked for a substantial prize 
(e.g. App. Bell. Ib. 14.87).  In the literary record, Greek, Hellenistic (Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 
51-54; Wheeler 2007: 203-204) and Roman (Goldsworthy 1996: 183-190; Gilliver 2007: 130-
132) battles frequently began with a period of skirmishing and missile exchange from a 
distance.23 Following the exchange, the armies clashed in hand-to-hand fighting before one 
line collapsed following the breach or outflanking of their formation or the death of the 
leader(s), and fled the field. Van Wees (2004: 191) argued that Greek armies rarely rallied 
                                                          
22
 The duration of battles does not necessarily have any bearing on the site's archaeological potential. The 
substantial assemblages left at Cowpens (Buchanan 1997: 326; Babits 1998) or the Little Bighorn (Miller 1985: 
158; Scott et al. 1989) were deposited by engagements lasting no more than an hour. 
23
 Arrian (Ectaxis 13.1) stated that this period of skirmishing was tactically intentional, aimed at testing the 
terrain before full deployment and/or assessing the strength of the enemy. 
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once their lines were broken, and in Roman warfare the literary record suggests that the 
defeated army fled the field as quickly as possible, also without any significant additional 
resistance (Gilliver 2007: 138-139). None of these scenarios preclude smaller incidents of 
skirmishing on the periphery of the battlefield. Roman sources advised caution in the 
aftermath of conflict in case of further fighting, following the rallying of defeated armies. An 
example of this is the way archaeological work at Kalkriese and Abritus indicates that the 
activity following the break of a Roman army in defeat was far more substantial than the 
literary record would indicate. 
 
 However, multiple histories, treatises and military manuals from antiquity emphasise 
the benefits of unconventional fighting, including ambush, subterfuge, ruse, decoys, 
suggesting that the concept of “battle” in antiquity is likely to have been more complicated 
than historians have suggested. The literary record suggests that in many contexts, warfare 
was not dominated by pitched battle, but by a guerrilla-style campaign of skirmishes, 
ambushes, and raids, particularly characteristic of the northern and African Roman 
provinces but identified elsewhere in the ancient world, including Classical and Hellenistic 
Greece (e.g. Sheldon 2012). These battles may only have been documented in local military 
records (e.g. Tab. Vindol. 164).  Such low-intensity warfare is often characterised in the 
sources as the most effective measure of provincial resistance against the Roman army, 
whose objective it was to force the native force into pitched battle (Bellino 2011). Low-
intensity warfare and skirmishing evidently proved particularly effective against heavily-
armed Greek hoplites and Roman legionaries (e.g. Thuc. 3.97-98), although Tacitus (Ann. 
2.14) had Germanicus state that Roman legionaries were equally suited to fighting in such 
conditions.  
 
While such engagements were recognised as differing in nature from pitched battle, 
there is rarely any moral condemnation for use of such tactics (e.g. Thuc. 5.10-11). Vegetius 
(Epitome 3.22, 3.26) in fact suggested that pitched battle should be avoided whenever there 
was a viable alternative, in favour of raiding, skirmishing, and denial of resources (for 
guerrilla-type tactics see also Polyb. 1.40.6). Tactical treatises addressed the problems of 
being ambushed on the march, suggesting reasonable precautions which could be taken to 
avoid them (e.g. Onas. The General 6.7; Veget. Epitome 3.6, 3.9, 3.13). In the Roman 
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provinces in particular, tribal armies relied on avoiding pitched battle in favour of low-
intensity attacks, ambushes, and skirmishing (Caes. Bell. Gall. 5.26-38; Tac. Ann. 1.10, 1.65, 
14.32; Dio 56.18-22; cf. Bellino 2011).24 The engagement at Kalkriese, conventionally 
described as the “Varus Battle” or “Battle of the Teutoburg”, shares many archaeological 
characteristics with the semi-connected series of events at Balaclava, First Manassas and 
the Little Bighorn, suggesting that it too may be more accurately interpreted as a running 
skirmish rather than a pitched battle – and yet, this does not necessarily mean that it was 
not viewed by contemporaries as a “battle” in its own right. 
 
There is no methodological reason, however, why engagements from antiquity other 
than pitched battle cannot be studied archaeologically. In all the important methodological 
ways, they satisfy the same characteristics as their more formal counterparts, as 
demonstrated by the comprehensive assemblages resulting from the ambush/skirmish 
engagements at Kalkriese and Harzhorn. The main issue is with their geographic location, 
which is poorly documented in almost all literary accounts. However, the location of many 
pitched battles is rarely much better described. In almost all cases for antiquity, 
identification of conflict in the open field (i.e. not an attack on the fortifications of a military 
installation or city) will rely on recognition of the battle-related assemblage. As the 
weaponry, armour, and military kit used in skirmishing, often by the same military units, is 
unlikely to differ from that used in pitched battle, the resulting assemblages are likely to 
share many similarities. In fact, as the most substantial weaponry types surviving on conflict 
sites are projectiles, particularly lead slingshot, skirmish sites may be equally visible as 
pitched battle, if not even more so, depending on the relative length and intensity of 
missile-deployment between the two.  
 
On sites of pitched battle as well as less formal field engagements, periods of 
skirmishing prior to the main fighting, including the adoption of battle-array, and following 
the collapse of one army, can also be included in the period of ‘battle’, as they are likely to 
be archaeologically visible. In this thesis, therefore, the term ‘battle’ does not just refer to 
pitched engagements fought in the open-field, but is extended to instances of skirmishing, 
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 See also informal records such as the unit report on the 1
st
 Cohort of Tungrians from Vindolanda, which 
documented six wounded soldiers (Tab. Vindol. 154). 
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ambush, and assault on military installations including defended settlements. This is not 
intended as an attempt to marginalise the differences between the varying natures of these 
engagement types, although there is no direct evidence to suggest that they were not all 
viewed as different forms of “battle” in antiquity, but is recognition of the fact that lower-
intensity conflict is equally visible in the archaeological record.  
 
Of the various ancient battlefield and open-field conflict sites which have received at 
least partial archaeological exploration and spatial analysis, only Baecula can be defined as a 
pitched battle by conventional military terms. But it cannot be said that the assemblages 
from Kalkriese or Harzhorn, or indeed those of the other sites in Britain, Spain, and the 
Netherlands, are in any way unsuitable for analysis. Nor, in the context of ancient battle, is it 
reasonable to limit the temporal definition of ‘battle’ to the period of hand-to-hand fighting. 
While no doubt this phase may have produced significant assemblages and casualties, the 
exchange of projectiles immediately preceding, and the skirmishing after the collapse of one 
line, would also have led to substantial deposition over a much more extensive area.25 Both 
the periods of skirmishing around pitched battles, and engagements which did not satisfy 
the criteria of ‘pitched battle’ should be incorporated into ancient battlefield archaeology; 
the assemblages from Kalkriese and Harzhorn illustrate how beneficial this may be. 
 
 
1.5: Excavated conflict sites from antiquity 
 
 The reluctance of ancient historians to embrace ancient battlefield archaeology 
becomes increasingly confusing as more field sites are discovered. The substantial 
archaeological remains from ancient conflict sites in general - sieges and attacks on military 
installations and settlements - clearly indicate that there is an archaeology of ancient 
fighting, as it were, and it is unclear why the protestations that it simply cannot survive in a 
field context are so fervent. The lack of archaeological work on ancient battlefields is made 
all the more difficult to understand by the substantial, and highly effective, use of 
archaeology in other sub-disciplines of ancient warfare studies, such as military equipment 
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 Even in later periods, hand-to-hand skirmishing led to distinctive archaeological deposition, particularly of 
military kit fragments, which can be distinguished against the main areas of formation fighting. 
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(e.g. Bishop & Coulston 2006; Rihll 2009; James 2011a; Saliola & Casprini 2012). If a number 
of conflict sites from the pre-Classical and Classical periods around the Mediterranean basin 
have been subject to various degrees of field survey, almost every battle (or conflict) site 
which has been excavated to date comes from the Roman period.  
 
 Three Roman battlefields have been excavated with GPS recording of the individual 
artefacts and their find locations. The sites cover a wide temporal range and correspond to a 
variety of military situations. The earliest, the Second Punic War battlefield at Baecula in 
southern Spain, was identified in 2002 as part of a project locating a number of military 
positions from that conflict (Bellón  et al. 2009: 257), and has produced a range of over 6000 
metal artefacts from the time of the battle (Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012). The early imperial 
period battlefield at Kalkriese, northern Germany, is the best known Roman battlefield, and 
probably marks the site of the engagement variously known as the Varus Battle, the Battle 
of the Teutoburg, and the Varus Disaster (clades Variana). The site was discovered through 
metal detection in 1987 (Clunn 2005), following which it has been extensively excavated, 
producing an assemblage of over 5000 metal artefacts from a landscape area in excess of 
30km² (see Harnecker & Franzius 2007; Harnecker & Mylo 2011). A third battlefield was 
identified at Harzhorn, northern Germany, in 2009, although the first archaeological 
evidence had been recovered in 2001 by metal detectors looking for material from the 
Second World War. The site has been dated to the second quarter of the C3rd AD by the 
coins, and tentatively linked with the campaigns of Maximinus Thrax into Germania c.AD235 
(Berger et al. 2013).26 Excavation at the site has produced an assemblage of over 2000 
battle-related metal artefacts (Berger et al. 2010/2013).  
 
 A number of other sites have been identified by archaeological detritus if they have 
not been explored by excavation. Lead slingshot from La Lantejuela in southern Spain has 
been used to associate it with the battlefield of Munda, the site of a battle in both the 
Second Punic War and the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War, because of the incidental recovery 
of both Carthaginian and late Republican shot from the same site (Grünewald & Richter 
                                                          
26
 The campaign was documented by Herodian (7.2.1-9) and the Historia Augusta (Duo Max. 12.1-5) although 
the narratives suggest it was fought much closer to the frontier; Johne (2006: 262-263) suggested that the 
original text placed the conflict in advance of the frontier but was later altered by a copyist. 
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2006). In southern Italy, early stages of exploratory work have been carried out on the 
battlefield of Numistro, an inconclusive battle from the Second Punic War, although no 
excavation has yet been conducted (Bellón Ruiz 2012). Finally, although the battlefield itself 
has not been excavated, Roman weapons, armour, military kit, and high-denomination coins 
have been recovered from Roman military installations and native settlements running at 
least 22km north-west of the battlefield of Abritus following the apparent route of Roman 
retreat following their defeat (Radoslavova et al. 2011: 28-31). Many artefacts are unbroken 
or partially functional, and the excavators have suggested that their deposition in these 
different locations was deliberate, although whether by fleeing Romans, victorious 
Scythians, looting local civilians, or a combination, is unknown. 
 
 The archaeology of siege and attack on military installations and cities in a Roman 
context was discussed in detail by Coulston's (2001: 31-42) article on the archaeology of 
Roman conflict. He documented multiple examples where in-situ deposits of projectiles, 
weapons and armour have been recovered from siege sites, including Numantia, Perugia, 
Alésia, Velsen, Maiden Castle, Hod Hill, Cremona, Jotapata, Gamla, Jerusalem, Masada, Dura 
and Cremna. In some of Coulston's cases, the conflict concerned went on for an extended 
period, making identification of an individual phase of activity difficult, although it is 
possible to do so for single-context conflicts. At the Roman fort at Velsen (Roman Flevum), 
the distribution of the 517 lead slingshots recovered from the site permitted reconstructed 
of five waves of attack on the fort, each evidently rapidly following the previous, as 
evidenced by the use of five distinctive types of lead slingshot (Bosman 1995, 1999).  
 
Since Coulston's article, two further Roman-period assaults on military fortifications 
have been identified in Spain. A Roman fortification at El Pedrosillo (Casas de Reina, 
Badajoz), appears to have been attacked during the Lusitanian War (155-139BC), 
representing an event undocumented in the literary record (Cerdán et al. 2011). Excavations 
in 2006 and 2007 recovered tent-pegs, lead glandes, Punic coins, and a pilum, and identified 
several constructed features forming a Roman military complex, including two stone-built 
polygonal marching camps, circular fortlets, and a system of parallel tituli on the low- and 
mid-level sections of the high ground. Staying with Spain, a Caesarian-period battle-site 
around the fortified high-ground of Puigciutat has been identified, with excavations 
39 
 
producing lead glandes and caligae nails, and possible other weapon fragments (Ble et al. 
2012). Both El Pedrosillo and Puigciutat appear to represent small-scale assaults on fortified 
positions. Recent excavation at the siege site of Yodefat in Israel has not only revealed a 
large quantity of projectiles, clustered around the northern wall, where a siege-ramp was 
constructed, but also found the same in the civilian residential areas in the town (Aviam 
2006). Caligae nails were also found around the ramp and in the town. From a Greek 
context, the Macedonian assault on Olynthus has been reconstructed from the spatial 
distribution of the lead shot complimented by the arrow heads recovered when the city was 
excavated in the 1930s (see Lee 2001). More recently, conflict archaeology has moved into 
the field of naval conflict, with the underwater excavation of a Romano-Punic battlefield off 
the Egadi Islands (Tusa & Royal 2012). This project has indicated the probable location of the 
naval battle, and explored the resulting underwater assemblage distribution, as well as 
providing new insights into the construction of bronze rams and ships during the First Punic 
War. 
 
 To date, few battlefields from the Greek world have been excavated, and there are 
as yet no substantial assemblages have been identified. As a result, understanding of the 
archaeology of Greek battle is more limited. Incidental finds of weapons, particularly 
projectiles, have been reported from a number of sites including Marathon, Thermopylae 
and Chaeronea, but often without a secure context, making the evidence highly 
problematic. In Greece, archaeological evidence from battlefields is almost exclusively 
associated with the mass graves excavated in the last decades of the C19th and the first of 
the C20th at the same three aforementioned battles. The graves were targeted because of 
their above-surface monuments. Very little archaeological work into the graves, or 
battlefields more generally, was conducted in Greece following the decline in interest 
following the Second World War. Many of the collections of human remains have been lost, 
although there has been a recent study of part of the Theban collection from Chaeronea 
(Ma 2008). In 2009, a battle-related grave was discovered in the necropolis at Himera, 
marking the first major excavation of battle-related archaeology in Greece in over half a 
century (Lee 2011; Atwood 2014). The battle-graves at Himera, unlike those excavated 
earlier, were not marked in any distinctive way, but were discovered during the course of 
rescue archaeology anticipating the extension of a railway line through the cemetery. The 
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nature of the burials was identified due to the unusual demographics, commonly associated 
with the battle-dead,27 and the projectiles embedded in some of the skeletons.  
 
 The relative proliferation of battle-dead from the Greek world stands in contrast to 
the Roman, where physical human remains have only been identified in a battlefield context 
at Kalkriese in a series of at least nine ambiguous bone-pits of uncertain origin (Großkopf 
2007, 2012; Uerpmann & Uerpmann 2007), although some of the burials in the military 
cemetery attached to the fort at Krefeld-Gellep almost certainly reflect casualties from the 
AD69 attack on the installation (Reichmann 1999). Casualties of conflict have been 
recovered from a number of other sites. A quantity of human bone was recovered from the 
ditch of the north-west contravallation at Alésia, which contained Roman and Gallic military 
equipment. Coulston (2001: 35) suggested that these might represent a burial of the battle-
dead, albeit a slightly unusual one in which the valuable weapons and armour had not been 
fully removed. At Velsen, two bodies and a quantity of disarticulated bone were recovered 
from a well, one casualty with a military dagger and belt (Bosman 1999: 92), as well as in the 
silted-up harbour area. The skeletal remains found in the south-west gateway at South 
Cadbury are likely to represent the victims of a Roman-native fight (Barrett et al. 2000). 
Numerous collections of human bone were found at Yodefat, almost certainly representing 
military or civilian casualties of the siege and conquest of the settlement (Aviam 2006), 
while the 20 Roman soldiers (and one Sasanian) found in a countermine at Dura-Europos 
certainly died in the destruction of the city (James 2013). 
 
 The archaeological record relevant to ancient conflict makes it clear that a 
substantial amount of material does survive, from a range of sites. It also suggests that the 
"signature" of ancient battle is likely to be dominated more by projectiles and, to a lesser 
degree, caligae nails. The main point, however, is recognition that ancient battle led to 
deposition of material at least comparable to modern battle in both rate and nature, and it 
cannot be written off with vague comments about post-battle processes - processes which 
apparently failed to touch siege sites and military installations to the same degree. 
Assemblages from ancient battlefields may still be less common than those from their more 
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 Communal clustered burials of males aged 18-35, evidence of skeletal trauma, particularly to the cranium; 
see Redfern (2011: 118-133). 
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geographically-fixed counterparts, but the evidence is beginning to suggest that this is only 
the case because fewer excavations have been conducted on them. 
 
 
1.6: Conclusion 
 
 Battlefield archaeology methodology as it was developed to study sites from the 
C19th United States cannot be applied without alteration to antiquity. Many of the 
fundamental characteristics of modern battlefields are simply not found in the same form 
on Greek and Roman sites. The archaeology manifests differently in nature, material, spatial 
distribution, and overall site formation processes, while the relationship between the site 
and the historical record is beset by far more problems than the substantial, albeit often 
biased, accounts of later conflicts. Concepts even of 'battle' and the artefact range of the 
assemblage significantly differ from later periods as a result. However, none of these 
differences should be viewed as a particular problem. There are adjustments which can be 
made to adapt the archaeological methodology to the characteristics of ancient battlefields, 
which require an understanding of both the disciplines of battlefield archaeology and the 
ancient world. What is clear, just from the excavated conflict sites thus far, is that battlefield 
archaeology methodology has great potential on ancient sites. That the approach has not 
been fully exploited by battlefield archaeologists on Classical sites is perhaps 
understandable, as the necessary contextual knowledge of the ancient world is a reasonably 
significant stumbling block, although all indications are that enthusiasm, if not always the 
belief, is certainly growing. 
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Chapter Two: The Literary Record 
 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
 The historical record is central to the methodology of modern battlefield 
archaeology, indicating what conflicts happened, between which armies, where and why 
they happened, and, in many cases, provide a broad overview of the narrative. 
Archaeologists may therefore know, or suspect, a great deal about a battle before they ever 
come to explore the site itself. Written sources have been similarly vital in the historical 
study of Greek and Roman battle, but it has proved far from straightforward to do so. Many 
historians and topographers have accepted that the Greek and Roman literary records are 
not without fault in the context of battlefield studies. Evidence regarding battlefields has 
been taken from texts from a number of literary genres, not just military or political works, 
in some cases works which had little concern with accurately describing an actual battle  
(such as Pausanias' descriptions of a number of sites including Marathon and Thermopylae).  
 
Some sources are, unsurprisingly, better than others, and the most detailed certainly 
can make a contribution to battlefield archaeology in the classical world. The battlefield and 
conflict landscape of Baecula, for example, matches the description of the site by Polybius 
(10.38-40) and Livy (27.18-20), and the silver-mines documented by Polybius (10.38.7) were 
of particular use in drawing up a shortlist of potential sites. However, as well as matching 
the site at San Tomé where the battle was later identified, the description also applied to 
multiple other sites in southern Spain. Combined with etymological association developed 
by the C19th Spanish historian Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, for over a century the battle was 
thought to have been fought at Bailén, c.70km west of the actual battlefield (Bellón et al 
2004: 12-14). Kromayer, for instance, followed contemporary consensus and placed Baecula 
at Bailén, reconstructing the narrative around the topography of the battlefield (Fig. 1). 
Subsequent archaeological work at the site has indicated that the orientation of the battle-
lines and manoeuvring around the battlefield was somewhat different. 
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Figure 3: Kromayer's reconstruction of Baecula (Kromayer & Veith 1922-1929ii: plate 8). 
 
 
 An ancient battlefield's location and topography may be documented as a 
description of the site, its position, and the terrain, often in the form of a digression 
preceding the main fighting narrative. Alternatively, details about the location and 
topography may only be recorded incidentally as part of the wider narrative, and in these 
cases often the first that the reader knows of a topographic feature on the battlefield is 
when it impacted on manoeuvring during the battle. In neither case are the details 
necessarily extensive or detailed and they serve, in most cases, a purely narrative function, 
and evidently were therefore frequently omitted when judged to serve no such purpose. It 
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is particularly in comparison to the written testimony relating to battles from later historical 
periods, particularly from the Early Modern onwards, that the dearth of evidence from 
antiquity becomes obvious. This is not an innate shortcoming of the sources themselves, or 
their authors, but a reflection of the changing needs of archaeological research into ancient 
battle. 
 
 There has not been a significant reflexive review of the methodological assumption 
that the literary record should be central to any methodology of ancient battlefield study. 
Individual sources were critiqued by Kromayer, Hammond and Pritchett (et al.) as part of 
battlefield case-studies, and for each engagement the relative merit of the evidence 
assessed. However, there is little open consideration of the suitability of the ancient written 
record as a whole as a source of evidence for ancient battlefield studies. Both the narrative 
and geographic information in the ancient literary record is highly questionable, generalised, 
vague, and laden with rhetoric and stylised language. The information that they contained 
may have been sufficient to satisfy an ancient audience, and it is not any innate problem 
with the literary texts themselves that they no longer provide the evidence required by 
archaeologists and historians. Nevertheless, the issues with the literary dimension make it 
difficult either to trust battle-narratives, or the geographic and topographic descriptions of 
battlefields. As a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate the literary record into 
archaeological studies of ancient battlefields in a comparable manner to projects focusing 
on modern sites. In particular, there needs to be far higher levels of critical assessment 
when working with the sources, including examination of the literary and social context of 
each text and of the chain of transmission. This chapter explores the problems associated 
with battle-narratives and battlefield locations in the ancient literary record.  
 
 It is important to assess how accurate the battlefield narratives from antiquity were 
to assess how representative of reality the geographic and topographic descriptions of the 
sites are. If the narrative of a battle was inaccurate due to problematic evidence and 
testimony, or was altered for literary effect, there may have been a consequent impact on 
the battlefield geography and topography, particularly where the information has been 
recovered from incidental mention in the narrative, rather than a descriptive digression. 
Simply, if the battle itself was misunderstood, changed, or partially fictionalised, then it is 
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also possible that the physical setting in which it took place was also altered or simplified to 
accommodate the alternative narrative. Given that the narrative and outcome of many 
battles was closely associated with the battlefield terrain and the use of it by military forces, 
any interpretation or alteration of the narrative may have had a significant impact on the 
description of the topography. This chapter therefore evaluates the ancient literary record 
relevant to battlefield studies. The first sections consider the literary context of battlefield 
narratives, including the genres from which the accounts come, the background of the 
authors, and the source of evidence, discussing the overall reliability of the written record 
from antiquity in regards to battlefields. The later part of the chapter assesses in-depth the 
actual geographic and topographic evidence in the literary sources, suggesting that they are, 
in almost all cases, insufficient to locate the battlefield, while noting that this was never part 
of their purpose. 
 
 
2.2: Battlefields in the ancient literary record 
 
 When discussing battles, the Greek and Roman historical record may provide 
evidence for the location of the battlefield, its terrain, and a basis for the reconstruction of 
the narrative, particularly where it is possible to cross-reference one narrative against 
account of comparable battles. The methodological approach has almost always followed a 
pattern of identifying important terrain features and topographic checkpoints from the 
ancient literary record, whether mentioned openly or inferred from the narrative, and 
attempting to locate them within the contemporary landscape. Although Pritchett (1965-
1992v: 209) claimed that his topographic analyses were intended as a “control over the 
accounts in classical historians over battlefields and the movement of armies”, he, like most 
other battlefield historians, failed to recognise the underlying restrictions of the literary 
record for battlefield study. The accuracy of the ancient literary record on battlefields has in 
some cases been defended beyond the degree to which the content deserves, and major 
topographic errors have rarely led to questioning of the veracity of the overall account. 
Neither Leake (1835ii: 51-53) nor Grundy (1901: 306-310) felt that Herodotus' (7.176) error 
in placing the pass at Thermopylae north-south instead of east-west undermined his 
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reliability, although both observed the orientation correctly in the field.28 Both Pritchett 
(1965-1992ii: 119) and Hammond (1988a: 76) noted major errors in the ancient descriptions 
of the battlefield of Cynoscephalae, but consistently explained these errors as 
transcriptional mistakes or misunderstandings, and they were never evidently viewed as 
undermining the overall reliability of the narratives.  
 
Hammond (1968: 13-14) was highly critical of any methodology which marginalised 
the ancient sources, citing Delbrück as a particular offender. He was equally dismissive of 
interpretations of the literary record which differed from his own, as at Marathon where all 
reconstructions which placed the centre away from the Soros were rejected, based not on 
the historical record or topographic analysis, but his own interpretation of Greek battlefield 
burial (Hammond 1968: 18). Pritchett (1965-1992ii: 68-70) also defended the veracity of the 
ancient record, and like Hammond was critical of its marginalisation. Pritchett's response to 
the Doris-Phokis Expedition project at Thermopylae is highly illustrative, criticising the 
geological team for its treatment of the written sources (see Szemler et al. 1996: 2, n.6 for 
full details of Pritchett’s complaints in print). Topographic reconciliation, alongside new 
methods of interpreting the ancient literary record, remains a constant in ancient battlefield 
studies.  
 
  In the last century the Classical sources have been increasingly subjected to critique 
of their accuracy, but the perceived lack of an alternative in the context of battlefield 
studies means that they have continued to be central in the field. Only some 
Schlachtfeldstudien scholars have attempted to work independently of the historical 
sources.  Even then, Delbrück rightly noted in the context of Kromayer that many of his 
contemporaries in battlefield scholarship treated the historical record inconsistently, citing 
them when they supported an interpretation and rejecting them for a contradiction, based 
on nothing but personal judgement (Delbrück 1975i: 170-171, 242-251, 332-333). However, 
what critique there has been of the ancient literary record has rarely been based on its 
applicability to battlefields in particular, but rather, is reflective of the individual scholar's 
                                                          
28
 Leake produced the first map accurately showing the pass running east-west. Earlier maps of the pass by 
Stuart, Foucherot and Bocage had all ignored the topography and made it run north-south consistent with 
Herodotus (Macgregor Morris 2007: 245-250). 
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attitude to the ancient sources more widely. It is not necessarily just the overall reliability of 
the ancient written sources that needs to be examined, but the specific treatment of 
battlefields by individual authors, and the wider literary conventions that ran throughout 
and between different textual genres. This section also considers the sources of evidence 
for ancient authors on battlefields, particularly those writing some period after the events 
they were describing. 
 
 
2.2.1: Battlefields in ancient historical texts and commentaries 
 
The written record relevant to ancient battle is drawn from a number of genres, and 
texts were created within a context of literary convention which governed both the content 
and form of narrative documentation. It is predominantly historical, biographical and 
tactical works which describe battle narratives and/or geographies relevant to future study. 
Historical works can be further broken down into two main categories, into those  
concerning (near) contemporary events, and (re)documented events from the more distant 
past. Authors did not necessarily stay within the boundaries of one category consistently 
across their works, and adapted their writing style to the literary conventions of each genre 
(Ogilvie & Richmond 1967: 21). Polybius wrote near-contemporary history (The Histories), 
including a lost work on the Numantine War which he was directly involved in, as well as a 
lost treatise on military tactics (Walbank 1957). Pliny the Elder, predominantly a writer on 
natural history, composed an extensive, lost work on the Germanic conflicts of the early 
Roman Imperial period, while Tacitus, although largely concerned with the history of the 
same period, also wrote the biographical Agricola, and the ethnographic work Germania in 
addition to his historical Annales and Histories. 
 
Some of the most detailed discussions of battles and battlefields come from 
historical works discussing near-contemporary events, written within a few decades of the 
conflict they were describing. Many of the best regarded writers from antiquity, such as 
Thucydides, Polybius and Tacitus, were primarily known for writing contemporary history, 
and these authors remain among the most appreciated (Momigliano 1972: 280). However, 
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documentation of recent events, particularly if the author had been involved in them 
personally, could evidently lead to biases entering the historical record. Polybius (1.14.1-3) 
suggested that the histories of the Punic Wars by Philinus and Q. Fabius Pictor were both 
compromised by their personal biases, Philinus towards the Carthaginians, and Fabius 
towards the Romans. Velleius Paterculus has been accused of similar biases, particularly of 
such a positive portrayal of the emperor Tiberius that others, particularly Varus (Vell. Pat. 
2.117-118), were unfairly portrayed. The corollary to this discrimination is that Velleius' 
accounts of events involving the pair are likely to be inaccurately described (see Goodyear 
1982: 639-641). Recognition of bias was not necessarily always retrospective. Tacitus (Hist. 
1.1) recognised that his career progression under the Flavians might lead to accusations of 
bias in his narrative account of the AD69 Civil War, defending himself against this in the 
introduction to the work.  
 
Other ancient historians chose to document the more distant past by (re)writing 
histories of these periods. Some entire works might concern much earlier periods entirely 
(Arrian’s Anabasis of Alexander), others might document more distant events as background 
to later chapters discussing events within their own lifetime, for which the above-discussed 
factors of near-contemporary history would be relevant (Polybius, Livy, Cassius Dio, 
Ammianus Marcellinus). In the C2nd AD Appian wrote a series of war narratives going back 
to the pre-Republican period, in which he drew on many sources for the conflicts which are 
no longer extant. Roman historical writing appears to have fallen into decline towards later 
antiquity, and one of the few late works to contain battlefield narratives is Ammianus 
Marcellinus, also one of the only extant extensive accounts of contemporary events (Mellor 
1999: 110-114). Although his history went back to the accession of Nerva in AD96, 
immediately following Tacitus’ Histories, the surviving part of the work covers the period 
AD353-378, finishing with the Battle of Adrianople. 
 
A sub-category of historical works are the personal accounts of participants from an 
individual campaign, often 'published' decades after the notes were taken in the field. 
Unsurprisingly, these are exclusively associated with the elite, although there is 
archaeological evidence that less formal records were kept by the Roman military, such as 
the Vindolanda Tablets (Bowman & Thomas 1984) and the military papyri from Egypt (Fink 
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1971). Some elite participants appear to have kept personal records on campaign, which 
could either serve as aide-memoirs (hypomnemata/ commentarii) for later histories, written 
by themselves or by others. Notable examples include the accounts published by Ptolemy, 
Nearchus, Onesicritus and Aristobulus on Alexander’s campaigns (all now lost), Xenophon’s 
Anabasis, and the Commentarii of Caesar. The campaign records themselves would have 
preserved, potentially, an objective and complete record of the conflict, although this may 
not be true of any subsequent works. Whether the campaign records were composed to 
provide field-notes for personal memoirs, or future histories written by someone else, is 
uncertain. Caesar’s published works were evidently viewed by Cicero (Brut. 262) as being 
notes rather than a finished work, although Riggsby (2006: 139-148) has suggested that 
Caesar’s work represented a new style of literature halfway between field-notes and 
annalistic history (cf. Cleary 1985). 
 
In both near-contemporary and distant past histories, the purpose appears to have 
been predominantly instructive - militarily, practically, and morally - through illustration by 
examples of correct behaviour in the past. Individual incidents might be included for their 
educational value, such as Polybius’ (2.35.5-6) narration of the 225BC Gallic invasion of Italy 
for the stated purpose of informing future generations of what to do when such an 
incursion happened, and to illustrate how quickly it could be repelled. It is therefore 
unsurprising that most historical narratives focus on military and political issues throughout. 
Polybius (1.1.2-3; cf. 2.56.12) believed that history provided the best education for a life in 
politics, explaining that the arguments for why this was the case have been argued in such 
depth elsewhere that he did not need to address them. However, Lucian (How to Write 
History 9) noted that while the purpose of history was to provide useful information, many 
historians did not. However, any military knowledge to be gained from ancient historical 
works was evidently inferred rather than directly instructed. Rather, it was military treatises 
which offered what appears to be, alongside a certain amount of entertainment value, a 
practical guideline for military operation in the field. 
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2.2.2: Battlefields in ancient military treatises 
 
In addition to formal literary histories, facts relevant to battle and battlefields were 
also documented in strategic and tactical treatises, particularly the works of Onasander 
(mid-C1st AD), Frontinus (late C1st/early C2nd AD), Polynaeus (mid-late C2nd AD), and 
Vegetius (late C4th AD), many of which used historical-based generalisations to illustrate 
points made in the text.29 These texts were often collections of observations made in other 
works, histories or treatises, and both Onasander (The General praef. 9) and Vegetius 
(Epitome 1.28) acknowledged that they had not made their tactical observations first-hand, 
although Frontinus had some military experience from serving in Britain which may have 
informed his work (Campbell 1987: 14-15). The treatises are not directly concerned with the 
documentation of historical narrative, and very few battles are named. Rather, the texts 
discuss ruse and stratagem more widely, drawing on past historical examples to illustrate 
the correct way to react to military circumstance. Onasander (The General praef. 7) made a 
point of stating that his work was entirely based on real events from Roman history, 
although he does not cite individual events by name. In contrast to traditional historical 
texts, which documented the narratives of individual and particular engagements, they 
describe what might be thought of as composite descriptions of military and battlefield 
behaviour.30 Perhaps surprisingly, they do not only document instances of pitched battle, 
but also emphasise how ambush, night-attacks, and skirmishing can be both defended 
against and effectively used. 
 
Many other treatises were written which have not survived, although elements of 
their work appear to survive in the texts of later writers, particularly in Vegetius (Epitome 
1.8, 2.3) who cited several authors, including Cato, Celsus and Paternus, indicating a focus 
on Roman, authors (Milner 1993: xvi-xxvi). Whether the treatises would have proved of any 
                                                          
29
 More specific technical manuals were also written, including Xenophon on cavalry, Arrian on cavalry and 
infantry formation (mid-C1
st
 AD), and Aelianus Tacticus on sieges (early C2
nd
 AD), but they do not frequently 
draw on historical examples to illustrate their text. Vegetius (Epitome 1.8) also referred to military treatises 
written by the Spartans, Athenians and other Greeks, although few examples have survived). Cf. Onasander 
(The General praef. 3) that his work might be seen by contemporary readers as one among many similar texts. 
30
 Thus, treatises also discuss, among many other subjects, the "moral" character of a general (Onas. The 
General 1.1-2.5), principles of march and encampment, and treatment of soldiers on campaign and after 
battle. 
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practical use in the field is debatable. Campbell (1987) observed that many of the (extant) 
treatises are generalised, state the obvious, and, in some cases, contain anachronistic 
information, and there is no significant evidence of the stratagems described in the 
historical narratives of real battles. Nevertheless, he argued that the continued production 
of these sorts of works suggests that they were viewed as being of value, and suggested that 
they would have been of particular use to a society where, due to the political structure, 
high-ranking military positions were taken by members of the civilian elite who did not 
necessarily have any actual experience or prior knowledge. Despite the evident 
anachronism of some of these works, they evidently remained in use not just in antiquity, 
but through to the medieval and even the early modern world, where their tactical 
principles continued to inform military theory (see Campbell 1987; Milner 1993: xiii-xiv; 
Sguaitamatti 2006). The focus on military scenarios other than pitched battle certain would 
have made these manuals useful in the field, and they provide historians today with a 
greater insight into the nature of Greek and Roman conflict than might otherwise be 
possible from the more formal historical record alone. 
 
 
2.2.3: Battlefields in ancient biography 
 
 The final major genre of source relevant to battle narrative and battlefield 
description is what might be best characterised as biographic works, such as Tacitus' 
Agricola, Suetonius' Twelve Caesars, the Parallel Lives of Plutarch and the so-called 
Scriptores Historia Augusta. These works mention individual/specific battles, not through 
the course of a traditional historical narrative, but as key events in the lives of their subjects, 
the majority of whom were involved in military affairs, often as part of their wider political 
career.31 The detail of the battle-narratives varies, projecting an impression of how 
important those, or indeed any, battles were to the biographic characterisation which the 
author was attempting to create. The narratives of the engagements themselves, however, 
were less important than simply noting the fact that they happened, and there are common 
                                                          
31
 For example, every one of Plutarch's Lives sees the subject described as fighting in at least one 
battle/campaign. Military activity is also associated with the majority of Suetonius’ biographies, with the 
exception of Nero, although his description of Caligula’s single campaign is not documented in particularly 
glowing terms (Suet. Gaius. 43-48). 
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references to a campaign in which a number of battles were fought, with no further details 
of what they were, or where (e.g. Tac. Agric. 17, 24; Suet. Vesp. 4.1; SHA Duo Max. 13.1). 
 
  It is uncertain whether the battle narrative in the biographies have any real 
accuracy, or whether they were literary constructs aimed at supporting the biographical 
characterisation of the individual. For example, Ogilvie and Richmond (1967: 19-20) 
observed that Agricola may not have undertaken all the military actions ascribed to him by 
Tacitus in his Caledonian campaigns, as the function of the text was not to annalistically 
document a period of time, but to characterise an individual. In scouting campaigning 
routes, and personally choosing camp locations (Tac. Agric. 22, 26), Ogilvie and Richmond 
(1967: 20) suggest “it could safely be claimed that he had done so because that is what good 
generals are supposed to do” , regardless of whether it had actually happened. In Plutarch, 
the underlying 'goodness' of Marius and his relationship with his men (cf. Plut. Marius 7.2-4, 
14.2-5, 22.3,) is underlined by their allocation of all the spoils from Aquae Sextiae to him 
(Plut. Marius 21.2), in comparison to his reception in civilian life which characterised him as 
cruel, harsh, and unpopular with the political elite (Plut. Marius 2.1-3, 9.2, 10.5, 28.4). 
 
 
2.2.4: The authors of battlefield texts 
 
 Polybius (12.25g.1-3) suggested that personal experience of battle was vital to 
writing 'good' military history, whatever the period being discussed. His views, he claimed, 
came less from literary snobbery, and more from a feeling that anyone without such 
experience would be unable to identify the important elements of a battle and therefore, 
would not be able to construct an accurate and informative narrative. Many of the ancient 
historians discussed above had some military experience, although associating them with 
specific events is dependent on references within their own work. Few extant, and a small 
number of the lost, works were direct descriptions of campaigns the author had personally 
been involved in. Thucydides served as a strategos and trireme commander during the 
Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 4.104.4; 4.106.3), Xenophon’s Anabasis recorded his service as a 
mercenary soldier in Asia Minor, and Caesar's Commentarii documented his experiences in 
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Gaul and during the Civil War.  Although the text has not survived, Polybius served in and 
later wrote a history of the Numantine War, a conflict he served in. Velleius refers to his 
service in Thrace and Macedon (2.101.3), Germania (2.106.1) and during the Pannonian 
Revolt (2.111.3) alongside Tiberius (see also Turner 2015: 261-262). Frontinus had a 
relatively high level of direct military experience, including leading a campaign against the 
Silures while governor of Britain from AD74-77 (Campbell 1987: 14). Arrian documented a 
defeat of the Alans c.134-135 in the Ectaxis contra Alanos, with which he was directly 
involved, and may have served in Trajan’s Dacian Wars, a conflict documented in the lost 
Parthica.32A late example comes from Ammianus Marcellinus (31.16.9), who served in 
Persia and Gaul in the army of Constantius II in the mid-C4th AD. Although his history 
originally went as far back as AD96, the events described in the later books of the work, 
covering the conflicts of the C4th AD, directly concerned the period during which he was a 
serving member of the Roman army and presumably, therefore, involved in. 
 
 The experience of other writers is more questionable. There is no evidence that Livy 
served in the military, despite living through a period where Italy was wracked by civil war. 
There is also no reason to suggest that Plutarch or Suetonius, two of the more prominent 
biographers, had any real involvement in the military, with their careers largely confined to 
the administration in Rome and the provinces.33 Cassius Dio may also have lacked personal 
experience of battle. Although Dio evidently served as proconsul in both Africa and 
Pannonia, there is with no evidence that he was directly involved in conflict during these 
postings (Millar 1964: 17-24). There is limited evidence for the military experience of 
authors of the extant tactical treatises, particularly Onasander, who was known 
predominantly as a philosopher, not a soldier. That said, Onasander (The General praef. 9-
10) openly acknowledged his lack of experience at the start of his treatise, stating that the 
examples used to inform his work were the actions of others but not, he argued, any less 
informative for it. Nor had Polynaeus any significant military experience, another treatise 
author whose background was in rhetoric; Campbell (1987: 16, n.14) noted that the 
majority of real-world examples in his work were drawn directly from Appian and Suetonius. 
                                                          
32
 Arrian did serve on the Danube, but it is not possible to say whether this coincided with the war, nor what 
was covered in the work (Bosworth 1988: 17-22). 
33
 Pliny the Younger (Ep. 3.8) records that he had arranged a military tribunate for Suetonius, which he turned 
down, and it was instead given to a relative, 
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However, military experience alone does not seem to have qualified ancient authors as 
competent military writers in all cases, with several criticised and, in some cases, 
subsequently defended, for their lack of ability in accurately documenting conflict. 
 
 There have been attempts to defend the military reputation of several prominent 
ancient historians, arguing that their failure to document contemporary battles to the 
standard which would be required by modern history should not reflect on their reputation. 
Reassessments of the work of Herodotus (Kiesling 2003), Thucydides (Funke & Haake 2006), 
Polybius (Walbank 1972), Tacitus (Wellesley 1969) and Dio (Millar 1964) have consistently 
emphasised that their subjects were better military historians than they are given credit for 
by modern academia, explaining the absence of certain evidence as a result of literary 
convention rather than incompetence. This is a fair argument. However, recognising that 
the shortcomings in evidence from the ancient authors results from the textual context does 
nothing to alter the fact that these shortcomings exist, and does not change the fact that 
concessions remain necessary. 
 
  
2.3: Battle narratives in ancient historical literature 
 
 Detailed narratives only survive – and perhaps were only produced - for a minority of 
the battles which were fought, and in most cases are associated with the formal pitched 
battles which, although characteristic in the scholarship of ancient warfare, were only one 
component of conflict in antiquity (see 1.4.2). Those which are known are generic 
characterisations of battle, rather than complex reconstructions of activity before, during, 
and after the fighting. Lucian (How to Write History 49) recorded the typical formula for a 
battle-narrative, suggesting that it should focus first on the generals, their speeches, tactics, 
and troop deployment, followed by a description of the fighting as a general impression, not 
focusing on any individual part of the field, including the period of flight and pursuit.34 The 
accounts of the actual fighting are in many cases highly episodic, following a narrative which 
moves from one set-piece action to another with no clear distinction of the time and 
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 For typical narratives, see App. Bell. Civ. 2.70.-2.74; Tac. Agric. 29-35. See also Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 44-93.  
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space.35 Typically, lines will collide and then one line will eventually break, without detailed 
description of what happened in the intervening period (e.g. Polyb. 3.115.1-11; Livy 5.38: cf. 
Plut. Cam. 18.6-7). Actions of individuals in battles, aside from the commander, are almost 
entirely absent. Lucian (How to Write History 49) advised that battle-narratives should not 
concentrate on the activities or actions of individual soldiers or units, although exceptions 
were evidently made for members of the elite, particularly where they went on to a 
prominent political future (e.g. Dio 60.20.3). Caesar’s (Bell. Gall. 5.44) account of two 
ordinary centurions in his army, mentioned by name, and their personal rivalry in battle is 
largely unique in ancient sources. Ammianus Marcellinus has been put forward as one of the 
few ancient historians to write from a "face of battle" perspective (Kagan 2006: 23-95). 
Kagan suggests that his battle-narratives documented certain engagements in a way that 
does suggest the experience of ordinary combatants, although again, there is no mention of 
individual soldiers. 
 
Many conflicts were summarised in a few sentences, and battles did not have an 
narrative. Dio, for example, documented two wars in AD41 with a spectacular lack of detail. 
The first, in Germany, only describes the conquest of the Chauci and Chatti and the recovery 
of the last lost Varian eagle (Dio 60.8.7), while the second, in Africa, describes in passing two 
un-narrated engagements (it is not clear if they are battles), while a potentially disastrous 
march into the desert afterwards is described in greater detail (Dio 60.9.1-5). During the 
Roman invasion of Britain, Dio referred to an uncertain number of battles, probably four, in 
the early phase, of which only two are narrated (Dio 60.20.1-60.22.2),36 and a series of 
undocumented victories after Claudius’ arrival (Dio 60.21.4). Later, Suetonius (Vesp. 4.1) 
recorded the conquest of south-west England by reference to 30 battles fought by the 
future emperor Vespasian, along with the conquest of two tribes and the capture of more 
than 20 towns as well as the Isle of Wight, with no further details as to their narrative. The 
Historia Augusta (Duo Max. 13.1) noted numerous wars and battles in the reign of 
Maximinus Thrax in addition to his Germanic campaign, but provides no details as to where 
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 Keegan (1976: 62-73) argued that an episodic narrative tradition existed throughout military history, 
focusing on changes in movement, uniformity of behaviour, homogenisation of troops and simplified 
motivation, rather than documenting actual events which happened; his Face of Battle was an attempt to 
elaborate on and humanise these standardised descriptions. 
36
 Although Hind (2007) argued that the riverside battles are the same engagements as those against the 
named tribal leaders and therefore are narrated in detail. 
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or what they were. James (2013: 102-105) pointed out that the paucity of evidence for 
individual periods of conflict in traditional historical sources has left scholars looking for 
supplementary information in other genres, citing the British conflicts in the governorship of 
Vettius Bolanus (AD69-71) for which the only extant literary references come from poetry 
addressed to his son (James 2013: 102). 
 
 However, even these vague references seem detailed when compared with other 
sweeping, non-contextual references to periodic conflict. There were clearly many 
engagements, even formal battles, which were not documented by the literary record. 
Britain appears to have suffered significant military upheaval through the C2nd to C4thAD, 
which is only covered by the literary record in a vague reference to problems under Hadrian 
(SHA Had. 5.2) and Commodus (SHA Comm. 6.2; 13.6; Dio 73.8.1-6), the latter documenting 
a northern army crossing the frontier and attacking the provincial interior or Britannia. 
Neither are presented as a military problem comparable to earlier problems such as Boudica 
(cf. Dio 62.1.1-62.12.6), and the references do not describe, or even mention, individual 
battles. Aside from a brief mention of the conflict occurring (Dio 77.11.1-13.4; Herodian 
14.1) the events of Septimius Severus’ campaign in to north-east Scotland are almost totally 
anonymous but for the evidence of the line of advance and retreat supposedly reflected in 
the distribution of campaign camps. Ammianus Marcellinus (27.8.1-10; 28.3.1-2) 
documented later problems in Britannia in AD367 at the start of the ‘Great Conspiracy’, 
again referring to an army crossing the frontier from Caledonia and attacking the province. 
Very little detail is provided by any of these authors.  
 
By contrast, the archaeological record suggests that both periods were significant 
phases of military activity. There is evidence of destruction at forts on frontier installations 
in Britain during the C2nd AD, although recent examination has shown that many 
‘destruction levels’ originally associated with conflict in this period are actually the result of 
other factors (Breeze 2005). A tombstone, RIB 3364, from Vindolanda documented the 
death of a Roman auxiliary in battle, most likely dating to the Hadrianic period (Birley 1998), 
while another tombstone (RIB 3218) commemorated the death of a Roman soldier in an 
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attack on the fort at Galleva (Ambleside).37 The British conflict under Commodus was 
evidently significant enough to warrant the issue of coins in the mid-180s, as well as his 
adoption of the title Britannicus (SHA Comm. 8.4), but the narrative or extent of the conflict 
is unknown. 
 
 
2.4: The sources of evidence for ancient battlefield narratives 
 
 The provenance of the evidence used for ancient battlefield narratives determined 
the accuracy of both the events and their geographic setting. Like all histories and other 
literary works, authors appear to have consulted a range of evidence, from talking with 
campaign participants (if they were writing contemporary history) or accounts produced by 
those who had done so previously, public records. Historians looking at ancient battlefields 
today have slipped into a pattern of assuming that any errors or deliberate alterations in the 
narratives from antiquity came in at the composition stage, rather than the informant, but 
this may not be the whole story. Understanding the chain of transmission, particularly from 
oral eyewitness testimony to written documentation and thereby use by later historians, is 
particularly necessary to establishing the overall accuracy of battlefield narratives, and the 
geographic and topographic evidence within them. 
  
 
2.4.1: Participant and eyewitness testimony 
 
 Polybius (4.2.2) expressly stated that the ability to consult participants directly was 
the predominant reason why he wrote about recent history. It is difficult to know how far 
eyewitness testimony collected directly by authors influenced the eventual narratives, 
however, as it is only occasionally that writers directed referenced their use of them. Even 
when they did however, it is uncertain in some cases how accurate/feasible this would 
actually have been. Polybius (3.48.12) claimed to have consulted survivors of Hannibal's 
crossing of the Alps to establish the accuracy of the route. However, this may be 
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 It is rare for cause of death to be recorded on Roman tombstones, or for battle-casualties to be buried in a 
cemetery context, although in these instances, particularly RIB 3218, the soldier may have died in the camp. 
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questionable. Polybius would have been present in the Alpine area around 151BC, nearly 70 
years after Hannibal's crossing in 218BC. Given the probability that the minimum age of 
combatant participants would have been 16 years old, any surviving eyewitnesses would 
have been in their late 80s or early 90s by the time Polybius could have consulted them. 
Although it is not impossible that some participants had survived to this age, the quality and 
reliability of their testimony is not discussed by Polybius, who does not note the advanced 
age of his informants.38 Momigliano (1972: 281-286) suggested that the importance of 
consulting eyewitnesses has perhaps been overestimated by later historians, and that it was 
rather the documentation of momentous societal events which guided the documentation 
of recent history; certainly, as he observed, many historians appear to have viewed their 
own times as key epochs in human history. 
 
 Even the most devastating military defeats would have had some survivors, who 
made their way home to, potentially, narrate their experiences of the battle. Livy (22.7.9-13) 
described a few survivors of Trasimene arriving back in Rome, surprising (fatally, in some 
cases) relatives who thought they were dead, while other survivors were scattered 
throughout Etruria, or taken prisoner. Roman soldiers who escaped the clades Variano 
rejoined the army and led Germanicus to the battlefield (Tac. Ann. 1.61; cf. 2.15), others had 
been taken into slavery and were evidently released in AD50 during a campaign against the 
Chatti (Tac. Ann. 12.27).39 However, in many cases consultation of eye-witnesses is to some 
degree assumed by historians, based on the detail (and evidently authenticity) of the 
narrative, such as Hornblower’s (2000: 77) conclusion that Thucydides had consulted oral 
testimony for several events during the Sicilian expedition despite no mention of him doing 
so. Public discussion of the war, by participants and generals, has also been cited as a major 
source for Thucydides' narrative (e.g. Hunt 2006: 390), with little substantiation beyond that 
it would have made sense for him to have done so. However, whether the testimony that 
they received from eyewitnesses to battles would have been of any accuracy themselves is a 
different issue. 
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 Demographic analysis produced by Parkin (1992: 92-110) suggests that only c.7% of the Roman population 
would have reached their 60s, and as few as 0.03-0.06% would have reached their 90s. 
39
 Dio (56.22.4) adds the capture and familial ransom of Roman soldiers in Germania soon after the bello 
Variano during a subsequent attack on a Rhine fort, presumably Aliso, adding that these soldiers were 
forbidden to enter Italy. 
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2.4.2: The accuracy of participant and eyewitness testimony 
  
 Where ancient historians are questioned on the accuracy of their narratives, it is 
almost always a question of their own impartiality or ignorance, rather than the accuracy of 
the testimony that they themselves had been given. Ancient writers were aware that the 
accounts given by battle-participants might not be entirely accurate. Thucydides noted that 
on a battlefield combatants were often only aware of what had happened in their 
immediate vicinity (Thuc. 7.44.1), and that participants in the same battle could give 
contradictory accounts of what happened (Thuc. 1.22.3). Caesar (Bell. Gall. 1.22) noted that 
the accuracy of a scout report had been reduced by his fright on discovering a position 
unexpectedly occupied by the Gauls, leading to reports of things which he had not actually 
seen. More widely, Pliny the Elder (NH 7.24) observed that any traumatic or frightening 
event could cause partial or complete memory failure. Aristotle (Parva Naturalia 1.450b.15-
25) argued that the imperfections of memory could lead eyewitnesses to believe they had 
seen events that they had not, which may not have even happened, by incorporating the 
recollections of others, and dreams, into their memory. What has been under-considered in 
the context of battle-narratives in particular, is how the process of faulty 
eyewitness/participant recollection may have impacted the accuracy of 
documented/literary accounts. 
 
 The psychological processes behind the memory process in battle have been 
extrapolated from studies in artificial high-risk simulations, but they raise concerns about 
the human ability to perceive events, form memories, and later recollect accurate details 
about a battle. In stressful situations, perception becomes highly selective, focused only on 
threats to the individual in the immediate periphery, with events elsewhere on the field 
failing to register (Baddeley 1972).40 The process will be exacerbated in the presence of 
lethal weapons, producing a “weapon focus” which will become the sole perception at the 
expense of all other external stimuli (Fruzetti et al. 1992).41 By contrast, in non-dangerous 
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 Baddeley (1972: 538-542) observed that to a certain point stress will enhance performance, but beyond a 
maximum tolerance level performance will dramatically decrease, citing Gettysburg and the Korean War as 
two conflict-specific occasions where this can be observed. 
41
 Fruzetti et al. (1992: 21-24) observed that the weapon focus is conducive to performance and survival in 
dangerous/conflict-type situations, and can overrule prior training. 
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situations individuals are more likely to be aware of the overall narrative rather than specific 
details (Cohen 1996: 89). However, the accuracy of any memories formed under this 
psychological stress will be severely compromised (Clifford & Scott 1978). Baddeley (1972: 
544-545) observed that experienced participants might learn to reduce their stress levels 
under conflict, potentially producing more accurate recollections of events. It would prove 
difficult to supplement the problematic and incomplete narratives of participants with those 
from more distant observers, such as military commanders or civilian non-combatants, with 
the former lacking the neutrality/disengagement necessary to reproduce an accurate 
narrative of an observed event, while the latter, in most cases, lacks the detailed contextual 
knowledge which is also a prerequisite of reliable eyewitness testimony (Vansina 1985: 4). 
 
 It is not only the reliability of the observed narratives that are problematic, but also 
the nature of their transmission into the historical or literary record. Inaccuracies can enter 
recollections long after the actual event took place. In some cases, these are intentional, 
most commonly the phenomenon of the “Bullfrog Effect” observed by Keegan (1976: 33), 
where soldiers claim increasingly implausible acts of bravery on the battlefield. Keegan 
suggested that this was a deliberate process of alteration to enhance individual prestige, but 
psychological studies suggest that over time, falsified recollections can become engrained 
into the memory, becoming indistinguishable from ‘real’ events. Further, as illustrated in the 
psychological studies discussed above, participant’s testimony would exclusively pertain to 
their own personal experiences in the battle rather than providing an overview of the entire 
conflict. Memories of specific events may change over time, in some cases as a result of 
changing personal and cultural perceptions of the event (Vansina 1961: 23-25) or new 
information introduced by others after the event (Fruzetti et al. 1992: 25-28), which will 
over time be implanted into the personal narrative of an individual participant. In other 
cases, memory will undergo a process of neurological re-encoding which ‘rewrites’ the 
original (often incomplete) recollection, increasing with repeated access (Cubitt 2007: 81-
81).  
 
 The contemporary mythologizing of certain battles, such as Marathon, would have 
made surviving participant testimony particularly vulnerable to inaccuracy. As such, 
combatants from a battlefield, having already experienced a period of narrowed and 
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compromised memory formation, may incorporate into their ‘memory’ of the battle events 
which never happened, or which were not experienced by them directly. As a result, they 
may make narrative claims of events which never actually happened, and yet their 
recollection would not be an act of deliberate deception on the part of the combatant. The 
process of inaccurate memory recollection can be exacerbated by the manner of 
questioning under which it took place. Recalled narratives of any kind are subject to 
alteration as a direct result of the manner of questioning (Fruzetti et al. 1992: 35), and the 
desire of the informant to meet, or contradict, the expectations of the questioner (Vansina 
1961: 23).42 
 
 Whatley (1964) discussed the issue of reliable participant testimony in the context of 
Marathon, drawing on the flawed narratives given by many of his contemporaries on 
engagements in which they had fought during the First World War.43 It could be argued, of 
course, that the mental stress of ancient battle may have impacted on combatants in a 
different way, undermining the application of modern psychology to the process of memory 
formation. Tritle (2004) has argued that soldiers in antiquity, from the Iliad onwards, could 
have suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of their experiences in 
battle. Melchior (2011) makes a rather more convincing argument against PTSD in antiquity, 
suggesting that the lack of explosives on the battlefield would have led to a different, if not 
necessarily less traumatic, experience of battle. Certainly, there does appear to have been a 
certain degree of what is now defined as "combat shock", evident in Epizelus' spontaneous 
blindness at Marathon (Hdt. 6.117), and the casting aside of weaponry by the troops of 
Varus at the end of the battle in the Teutoburg (Dio 56.22.1).  
 
 Even accepting the concept of PTSD in antiquity, these examples suggest that 
soldiers in antiquity may have suffered some mental trauma as a result of their conflict 
experiences. Further, the psychological studies cited, and hundreds of others, rely on the 
presence of a weapon and the threat of mortality, regardless of its nature or context, 
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 Although Cohen (1996: 86) argued that while leading questions may lead to inaccurate individual testimony, 
it is unlikely to be enough to completely supplant the original memory, unlike the processes of natural re-
encoding referred to above. 
43
 Including disagreements over the level of light during an engagement (one man recollecting a bright moon, 
the other pitch-black), and the number of shots fired during a patrol, which were exaggerated by up to seven 
times the actual release (Whatley 1964: 121).  
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suggesting that the conclusions can be applied to antiquity. Indeed, evidence does come 
from the ancient literary sources themselves which show an awareness of the problems of 
accurate recollection of battlefield experiences, and the adaption of memory over time, 
albeit with no evident acknowledgement that this would question the accuracy of their 
work. The ultimate result of these factors, unfortunately, is to add a significant element of 
doubt to battle narratives from any period, including antiquity. Even if a participant 
recounted the story of the battle exactly as they remembered it, and the historian in 
question documented it exactly as told, there is no guarantee that an accurate narrative 
would emerge. Even judgement over a majority recollection would be problematic, as it 
would be difficult to be certain that the generalised consensus of opinion had not resulted 
after the battle as a result of post-event memory alteration. 
 
All participants, from generals to ordinary soldiers, would only be able to document 
events which they had personally experienced during the course of the battle. There are 
multiple occasions where ancient battles present, at least in a narratives, as a series of 
smaller linked actions rather than one single engagement. At Marathon, for example, the 
clash of the battle-lines at the start of the engagement is a completely different phase of 
activity to a subsequent skirmish at the Persian ships (Hdt. 6.112-115). The former action 
has a (slightly) more detailed narrative of activity, while the latter has the only named 
casualties. It is more than possible that different soldiers were involved in each of the two 
actions, as in other cases where similar divisions appear, with the result that it is highly 
unlikely that any participant would have a clear idea of what had happened. This is 
particularly relevant when discussing parts of battles where high, or total, casualty rates 
were sustained (according to the narrative).  
 
If there were no survivors of a particular battle phase or event (as opposed to the 
entire battle; survivors having escaped at an earlier point), then who provided the 
testimony? It is possible that testimony could come from the victorious army, but whether 
this is a realistic in many cases is questionable. It is possible that Herodotus, for example, 
had access to the testimony of Persian-army participants for the end-stages of the Battle of 
Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.222-227), although this is not cited. Rather more questionable, 
perhaps, is the source for the late stages of the clades Variana and detailed tortures 
63 
 
inflicted on the prisoners (Vell. Pat. 2.120.6; Flor. Ep. 2.30.36-37; Dio 56.22.1); although 
there evidently were survivors, whether they were involved in either of these events, given 
their longer-term survival, is highly questionable. 
 
 
2.4.3: Campaign journals and military documentation 
 
 The chain of transmission of participant narratives from hypomnemata and 
commentarii into literary history appears to have been complex, as illustrated by the 
historical documentation of Alexander the Great’s Persian and Indian campaigns. A number 
of participant and contemporary histories were taken of the campaign, by military 
participants Ptolemy, Nearchus, and Onesicritus, by the possible campaign architect 
Aristobulus, and official historian Callisthenes, all of which were published sometime in the 
four decades after Alexander’s death (see Lane Fox 1973: 499-500; Hammond 1993: 32-34). 
An additional account was published by Cleitarchus around the same time as the participant 
accounts, although whether he had been directly involved in the campaign is unclear.44 This 
account evidently enjoyed brief popularity around its publication but does not appear to 
have been used in any great detail by later historians (Lane Fox 1973: 499-500; Bosworth 
1988: 61-93). Contemporary records were kept in an official archive containing 
documentation regarding Alexander’s reign, as per all Macedonian rulers, although claims 
were later made that the surviving archive had been faked either during Alexander’s reign, 
or soon after (see Hammond 1988b). The participant accounts and the archive were used by 
later historians, of which works by Arrian, Diodorus Siculus, Justin, Quintus Curtius and 
Plutarch are the main survivors. Unfortunately, the various later historians do not always 
document which sources they used, nor cross-reference between themselves. Arrian (Anab. 
Alex. praef. 1) suggested that, despite both being participants, the accounts of Ptolemy and 
Aristobulus differed at multiple points in the text, and he relied on his own critical 
judgement to arbitrate on each occasion in which they did.45 
 
                                                          
44
 For Cleitarchus see Zambrini 2007. 
45
 See Hammond (1993) for discussion of the sources used by Plutarch and Arrian. 
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 There is less evidence for ancient historians consulting archives of material 
composed by non-elite campaign combatants, those who would have been directly involved 
in the actual fighting. There are no extant campaign diaries, journals, personal letters, 
diaries, interim reports, despatches, or maps written or created by rank-and-file soldiers, 
comparable to the corpus available from modern conflicts such as the American Civil War or 
WWI. Based on the caches of Roman military documents recovered from Egypt and 
Vindolanda, textual sources almost certainly would have been created by ordinary 
campaigning soldiers, including personal letters, which may have provided a more 
individualised narrative of battle (e.g. Bowman & Thomas 1984; Fink 1971). Unfortunately, 
none of the surviving works discuss a battle, with the closest a brief commentary on the 
fighting habits of the Britons recovered from Vindolanda (Tab. Vind. 164).46 Both the 
Egyptian and Vindolanda texts verify, however, that individual Roman military units archived 
relevant operational documents, which are rarely referenced by any literary histories. 
Historians may have incorporated these records, or indeed any other informal written texts 
composed by soldiers, but without direct citation, the degree to which this happened 
cannot be estimated.  
 
 There are reasons to suggest, however, that several ancient historians consulted 
primary military reports which had been stored in a central civic archive. Hornblower (2000: 
39-40) suggested that the somewhat dry, annalistic style of Thucydides’ history may have 
resulted from his use of field reports and/or letters composed by generals on campaign. 
Very few examples of, or indeed even reference to, such despatches survive from the Greek 
world, making military reports somewhat of a lost genre the content of which could only be 
guessed at. Greater certainty can be had from the Roman world, where it is clear that some 
authors had access to military despatches, including scout reports, sent to the Senate from 
the provinces which they could use to establish campaign narratives (Austin & Rankov 1995: 
49). Herodian (7.2.8) recorded the emperor Maximinus Thrax sending a despatch to Rome 
documenting a battle fought in a swamp during his German campaign, as well as his later 
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 For the Vindolanda Tablets see Bowman (1998) and Birley (2002). Surviving examples include unit strength 
reports, supply inventories, lists of work assignments, patrol reports, and personal letters to friends and family, 
providing a unique insight into daily life on the Hadrian’s Wall frontier. See also Fink (1971) for the papyrus 
records from Egypt, including duty rosters, military reports (including details of passwords), pay records, 
receipts, and letters. 
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creation of a painting illustrating the battle which was placed in front of the senate house.47 
Lucian (How to Write History 20) referred to a historian’s consultation of a military despatch 
documenting casualty figures from a battle during the AD162-165 Parthian War, although 
he went on to say that the historian had then completely ignored the figures and made up 
his own.48 
 
 
2.4.4: Earlier histories and epigraphy 
 
 Ancient historians writing about the more distant past might also consult earlier 
historical works. In the C1st AD, according to Josephus (Bell. Jud. 1.14-15), the rewriting of 
older history was more popular than chronicling current events, and this would have left 
ancient authors reliant on earlier works. Evidently, significant events were quickly 
documented in a number of historical sources, if Polybius' (3.47.6-9) reference to multiple 
histories of Hannibal's Alpine crossing is typical. The chain of transmission is often difficult 
to identify, as so few of the texts survive, and authors rarely cited their sources. Exceptions 
were sometimes made where the source of the material was significant, as in Livy’s 
(21.38.3) citation of Lucius Cincius Alimentus on the size of Hannibal’s army, although Livy 
then moved to correct the figures.49 Evidently a significant number of potentially popularist 
histories had been composed in the seventy years since the crossing, although Polybius is 
dismissive of their value. Tacitus (Ann. 1.69) directly referenced Pliny the Elder’s (now lost 
twenty-volume) history of Rome’s wars with the Germans down to c.AD47, undoubtedly a 
significant source of evidence for the Annales, Histories, and the Germania (cf. Sallmann 
1984). It is likely that Pliny’s lost work was the principle source of evidence for the 
Teutoburg battle, although the content can, at best, be only partially extrapolated from 
subsequent writings. Plutarch (Romulus 3.1) cited Diocles of Peparethus and Fabius Pictor as 
sources for his work on Romulus, although noted that the accounts were not an exact match 
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 Herodian places the battle deep into Germania (contra SHA Duo Max. 12.1). It may not be the Harzhorn 
battle as such, but if not is described a potentially similar engagement. 
48
 Citing 70,236 Parthian casualties to 2 Roman dead and 9 wounded, after describing a casualty who died on 
the spot from a stabbed big toe, and a general who killed 27 men with a single shout; Lucian was, 
unsurprisingly, not convinced by this historian’s work.  
49
 L. Cincius Alimentus had been, according to Livy, taken prisoner by Hannibal at an early stage of the war. 
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for one another. Dio (1.1.2) specifically referred to his reading of other writer’s work on 
Roman history, claiming to have read almost everything written by everyone over a period 
of ten years, although he wrote that he would only include a selection of events 
documented by others (cf. Millar 1964). 
 
 Inaccuracies in earlier histories, even those composed by or from eyewitnesses, 
were frequently cited as a reason for the writing of new histories, although how exactly 
these errors were noted is unclear. In the case of conflicting accounts, ancient authors may 
simply have chosen which one they found more credible (e.g. Arr. Anab. Alex. praef.1). 
Tacitus (Ann. 1.1) described his work on post-Augustan Roman history as a chance to correct 
popular perceptions about the period from a position of temporal distance, later adding 
(Hist. 1.1) that the objectivity of historians had been compromised by the political 
environment of the early Imperial period.50 Arrian (Anab. Alex. 6.11.2) documented that 
inaccuracies in earlier histories were the reason for his decision to rewrite the history of 
Alexander the Great, as he did not want these errors to enter the permanent historical 
record. Dio (72.18.3-4) defended his decision to extend his history through to his own times, 
and in doing so record some events which might be seen as trivial, by saying that he felt he 
was in the best position to record them, having been involved in so many of the important 
events of the time. However, use of earlier historical works could lead to issues in 
transmission if misunderstanding or errors were introduced into the later narrative, as seen 
in Livy’s (33.8.13-14) account of the Battle of Cynoscephalae (197BC) has the Macedonian 
phalanx abandoning their sarissas while marching into battle, evidently a complete 
mistranslation of Polybius’ (18.24.9) original Greek which had them lowering them for 
attack. 
 
 It is unlikely that ancient writers would have had access to a complete historical 
record in the composition of their work, or even that one existed. Dio (53.19.1-6) argued 
that there were significant problems with the historical record from the Roman Imperial 
period (in contrast to the Republic) due to the fact that many reports, documents, decisions, 
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 In the Agricola (3), Tacitus added that it was only safe to write the panegyrising biography of his father-in-
law under the benevolent rule of Nerva, evidently referring to the problems experienced by Agricola under the 
rule of Domitian. 
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and even entire events, were kept secret by the Imperial Regime, leaving authors reliant on 
whatever had been voluntarily made public knowledge. Millar (1964: 37) argued that it is 
not unsurprising, given the size of the Roman Empire, that many provincial events were not 
documented even in accessible parts of the political archive, and that many may have had 
no permanent record (beyond, presumably, the local records kept by individual military 
units). As such, there may have been many events which were only known to those who had 
been directly involved in them. This process may partially explain why there is so little 
documented information about conflicts in Britannia, Germania, and other distant 
provinces, although it is still difficult to understand how this was the case even for conflicts 
in which members of the Imperial family, and even occasionally the emperor, were directly 
involved. Several authors appear to have consulted dedicatory inscriptions (cf. Hornblower 
2000: 90-91), sculptural depictions of battle (Paus. 1.15.1, 8.11.6; Herodian 7.2.8), and local 
folklore (e.g. Paus. 8.13.3). 
 
 
2.5: The reliability of the ancient literature on battle-narrative 
 
 In many ways, the ancient literary record is not a particularly reliable source of 
evidence for the history of antiquity. Writers from antiquity readily admitted the inaccuracy 
of works composed by their predecessors and contemporaries, although often presenting 
themselves as a rare exception to this otherwise unreliable corpus (e.g. Polyb. 1.14.5; Tac. 
Ann. 1.1; Dio 1.1.2; cf. Thuc. 1.1.3). Lucian (How to Write History 7; 16) noted that many 
historians deliberately falsified their narratives, although was equally critical of historians 
who recorded a narrative without literary style or structure. Thucydides (1.22.1-2) claimed 
to have only documented events which he either witnessed or was convinced were true as 
described, although he admitted to some issues with remembering exactly what he had 
been told by various informants, and omitted from his work elements from the accounts of 
others of which he was not convinced. Josephus (Bell. Jud. 1.16) implied that the purpose of 
his own record of recent events was to supplement the Roman historical record in which 
much of the narrative was left out. Dio continued his narrative to his own lifetime, because, 
being present at the events, he would be able to create a more accurate narrative than 
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future historians who would be reliant on documentation (Dio 72.18.3-4). Sallust (Bell. Cat. 
3.1-2) noted, however, that historical narratives could be attacked as inaccurate because 
readers did not like the criticisms levelled at particular individuals and would therefore treat 
them as malicious inventions, and actions which readers thought they would be unable to 
perform themselves were dismissed (cf. Thuc. 2.35.2). Denial that they deliberately altered 
historical narrative, however, does not necessarily exculpate authors from suggestions that 
they in fact did so, not necessarily out of a desire to mislead the audience, but to satisfy 
literary convention and audience expectation. 
 
 The idea of audience expectation creates a certain interpretational problem when 
considering the extant narratives of battle, from the fighting to the process of looting and 
disposing of the dead. The idea has been that there is a preconceived societal and 
consequently literary convention with regard to both battle and its narrative, of which the 
reading audience would have been well aware. The framework of this convention has been 
derived from the examples in the text. In cases where certain elements of a narrative are 
not documented openly in a text, whatever stage of battle the absence refers to, the 
assumption has been that the situation was consistent with this pre-understood "normal" 
practice, and therefore did not need to be described. Foreknowledge on the part of the 
audience would therefore be assumed by the author. This explanation has been cited in 
instances of unexpected informational exclusions, such as Herodotus' failure to document 
what happened to the battle-dead from Marathon. However, there is nothing beyond a 
vague internal consistency between the documented examples regarding battle, looting, or 
disposing of the dead, that they do represent an overall societal convention. Aside from 
issues of accuracy innate to the text, authorial knowledge, and literary convention, how can 
it be known with any assurance that these examples are not the occasionally-documented 
representations of a societal normal practice, but rather, instances where such practice, if it 
even existed in reality, was not followed? 
 
 The narrative problem of incorrect or inaccurate testimony on modern 
reconstructions of ancient battle is illustrated by the example of the Teutoburg. No 
reconstructions of the battle prior to the discovery of the battlefield at Kalkriese suggested 
that the Germans had built a rampart, as this was not mentioned in any of the historical 
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sources. All attempts to understand the battle, therefore, were flawed, as they completely 
failed to take into account how the Roman army was trapped in a tactical position from 
which there was minimal chance of escape, between the rampart, a mountain, and a bog. It 
could be that none of the survivors had been at the Oberesch, and so did not know about 
the rampart, or perhaps the feature did not fit the desired narratives of the battle. Maybe 
the rampart was discussed in one of the non-extant sources, such as Pliny, but had not been 
followed by later writers. Whatever the reason, the ultimate result was that no 
reconstructions of the battle took into account the presence of this feature on the 
battlefield, and therefore, all attempts to understand the battle were undermined. 
 
  
2.5.1: Deliberate simplification, alteration and literary topoi 
 
 Battle-narratives were composed within a literary context with certain conventions. 
Some alterations were deliberately made in the interests of comprehension and audience 
interest. Narratives could have events placed in different orders (Bosworth 1988: 42), 
simplified to make sense of the chaotic events of battle (Lendon 1999: 277; Erdkamp 2006), 
and to emphasise the main (practical, political, and moral) points of a wider campaign 
narrative (Woodman 1998: 1; Ash 1999). Polybius (29.12.9) acknowledged that he left 
elements out of his battlefield narratives, which others had included in theirs, stating that in 
his composition of “universal history” it became necessary to be concise where possible.  
 
Elements of a narrative might be exaggerated for effect, particularly displeasing 
Polybius, who went to great lengths criticising Phylarchus' account of the Cleomenean War 
for being sensationalist, making random statements to entertain rather than reflect reality 
(Polyb. 2.56.3-2.59.3). Battlefield narratives may also have been created where actual 
evidence did not exist, perhaps as an amalgamation of evidence from similar incidents. 
Tacitus, for example, described a battle, albeit not in particular detail, between the Parthian 
Empire and a composite force of Sarmatians, Iberians and Armenians (Tac. Ann. 6.34-35). 
Analyses of this battle narrative have concluded that it was not based on oral or written 
sources, but was rather created by Tacitus; his choice to do so is defended in the broad 
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context of ancient historiography (see Ash 1999). As such, it must be remembered that 
while ancient historians may have had access to eyewitness interviews and recorded 
testimony, military despatches, and earlier histories, they were not averse to invention 
when these sources were not available, and there is no guarantee that they were consulted 
in any individual case. 
 
However, the main area in which ancient historians have been criticised for 
deliberate inaccuracy is in troop and casualty figures.51 The inaccurate figures can 
undermine the usefulness of the battle-narratives to battlefield studies, particularly where 
the size of the army is used as a criterion in assessing potential battlefield sites. Brunt (1971: 
694-697) argued that casualty figures were deliberately exaggerated or minimised in the 
literary record, to glorify victory or exculpate defeat.52 In some cases, the casualty 
references are merely vague, referring to several hundred, or under a thousand, casualties, 
rather than a whole number (e.g. Livy 23.46.4). These instances are less problematic than 
those of clear, improbable discrepancy. Herodotus’ (9.70) record of 162 Greek casualties to 
250,000 Persians at Plataea, Livy’s (35.1.10-11) documentation of 12,000 Lusitani casualties 
against 73 Romans in 193BC, Strabo’s (Geog. 16.4.24) description of an unnamed battle in 
Nabataea (26BC) with two Roman and 10,000 native casualties, and even Tacitus’ (Agric. 37) 
report of 10,000 Caledonian dead at Mons Graupius against 360 Roman auxiliary dead, are 
just a few examples to illustrate the scale of the problem. This is not intended as a 
discussion of the accuracy of, or motives for distorting, the casualty figures in literary battle-
narratives, and it is true that these evident exaggerations do not necessarily mean that the 
respective authors were not aware of the real figures. It does have to be considered, 
however, that battle-narratives overall might need to be altered to support the casualty 
figures given by the authors, particularly any elements which would have resulted in a 
higher death rate than the one given. 
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 Brunt (1971: 694) suggested that although it would not be possible for a general to know exact casualty 
figures following a battle, operational reasons would suggest that knowledge of a general quantity would be 
required. It does not necessarily follow, however, that these figures were accurately transmitted in the literary 
record, even where they freely available (cf. Lucian How to Write History 20). 
52
 A process not unknown from later history. Losses could be minimised in official reports to avoid knowledge 
of manpower shortages, as after Cowpens when Continental Army reports cut casualty figures by half (Babits 
998: 150-152). By contrast, during the American Civil War, casualty rates might be deliberately inflated 
(particularly by the Confederacy) both to demonstrate the sacrifice, and therefore bravery, of individual units, 
as well as to exculpate them in cases of defeat (Gilpin Faust 2006: 1006). 
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Battle-narratives appear to have been particularly vulnerable to alteration for 
literary purpose and impact. Lucian (How to Write History 49) has already been cited in 
regards to his formulaic method for writing a battle-narrative in antiquity, highlighting 
certain elements of the event to the exclusion of others. It is likely that an ancient audience 
would have been aware of literary convention in battle-narrative, in turn leading to certain 
expectations of individual texts (Ash 2007). Brunt (1980: 317) argued that battle-narratives 
were among the most vulnerable elements of the ancient literary record to embellishment, 
alongside geographic descriptions. There is no evidence that ancient audiences had any 
objection to such stylistic alterations (cf. Ash 1999: 115-116), although historians were 
aware that the veracity of works written by others in the field was, on occasion, 
questionable. The main problem with the use of topoi in ancient battle accounts, both 
narrative and geographic (see below), is that they undermine the veracity of the entire 
account, and make it difficult to know whether common features between different battles 
reflect genuine similarities, or imagined literary convention. The use of topoi depended on 
both the narrative and the author. Descriptions of battles and/or battlefields may have been 
intended to evoke comparisons with other sites, perhaps most notably in Tacitus’ 
descriptions of the battlefields at the Teutoburg and Bedriacum used to illustrate the moral 
contrast between the battles, their respective commanders, and the current political 
situation in Rome (Woodman 1998: 70-85; Pagán 1999; Manolaraki 2005; Seidman 2014). 
Tacitus may also have adapted his description of the AD69 Civil War to evoke a comparison 
with the war between Antony and Octavian a century earlier (Joseph 2012). Literary topoi 
are most evident in a battlefield context in the description of topography and terrain-base 
tactics, discussed in greater depth later in the chapter. 
 
 
2.6: The geography of battlefield location in antiquity 
 
Walbank (2002: 38) commented that “...we habitually ask from ancient historians 
what we have no right to ask - namely that their topography shall be adequate to permit of 
pin-pointing an action on the contours of a large-scale Austrian Staff Map”. Such a degree of 
accuracy is, unsurprisingly, absent from the ancient geographic descriptions of battlefield 
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locations. Ancient concepts of geography, at least according to Strabo (Geog. 4.1.1), were 
mainly concerned with political and ethnic divisions, not the physical landscape. Nor was 
there a distinctive discipline of “geography”, as would be understood today, with the 
subject of the physical landscape instead being incorporated into other fields of study, 
particularly history (Dueck 2012: 1-3). There are very few objective descriptions of 
geography or topography anywhere in the ancient sources (Romm 1992: 2-6). Geographic 
knowledge for the purposes of travel was limited, and certainly by the Roman world, was 
expressed predominantly in itinerary form, noting only the important and relevant 
landscape features to the exclusion of everything else (Bekker-Nielsen 1988). Either an 
audience was already relatively familiar with the locale of a battlefield, usually because it 
was local, in which case further information was superfluous; or, contrarily, they were not 
familiar with the locale, and therefore no degree of further information would illuminate 
the location, making it also unnecessary. This was a world in which Caesar, in all evident 
necessity, had to remind his readers that Gaul was found to the north of Italy (Caes. Bell. 
Gall. 1.16). 
 
The majority of toponymic references which survive in the literary record are 
narrative rather than descriptive and less frequent the further from Greece and Italy the 
account moves. Polybius (3.36.3) openly addressed the toponymic issue, stating that he 
would not cite unfamiliar place-names in his work, as they would mean little to his audience, 
and would therefore add nothing to his narrative. Polybius’ point is reasonable. As Maxwell 
(1990: 3) observed, the unfamiliar toponyms provided by Roman authors, in his specific case 
Tacitus’ Agricola, have been of minimal assistance in locating any of the battlefields within 
the narrative. Following from this, the topographic descriptions of the battlefields could not 
cite specific details, but rather relied on tactical characterisations of the site - what Walbank 
(2002: 39) termed “...clarity through bold simplification” in the context of Polybius. It is far 
from certain, however, that these characterisations were accurate descriptions of the actual 
battlefield, leading to further problems in identifying accurate locations for sites from the 
literary record alone. 
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2.6.1: Battlefield toponyms 
 
 Many fixed and landscape locations in antiquity were referred to by reference to a 
toponym. A toponym is, in this context, the name applied to a particular place or feature, 
which goes beyond simple physical description, allowing a fixed location to be identified. As 
an example, in the context of Marathon, the deme of Marathon, the city of Athens, and the 
Charadra water-course are toponyms, as they refer to specific named locations. The 
sanctuary of Herakles, by contrast, is not, as this is a generic descriptive name which is not 
distinguishable from any other sanctuaries to the same deity. A toponymically-identified 
landscape location is any place which, although it does not have a toponymic identifier 
itself, can be given an approximate position through reference to toponyms lying in its 
vicinity. 
 
 Toponymically-identified battlefields are the easiest to place in a regional location, 
albeit that this can cover a large, non-specific landscape area. Many battles in antiquity 
were identified through a named settlement, although the two would not necessarily be in 
close spatial proximity, with the varying distance to some degree defined by an individual 
author’s familiarity with the relevant landscape.53 The settlement is usually part of the 
narrative rather than an actual location, certainly in earlier sources, although toponyms do 
occur independently within the narrative in some sources.54 Settlements served as 
geographic checkpoints, from which armies departed, passed on the march, or encamped in 
proximity to, and the distance between them and the eventual battlefield - in terms of the 
actual area of fighting - is usually unspecified. Other toponymic features, such as passes 
(Thermopylae), rivers (Granicus, Hydaspes, Trebia, Allia) and lakes (Trasimene) may also be 
                                                          
53
 Carman and Carman (2005) argued that cultural perceptions of ‘battle’ in the Greek world meant that 
battles were consciously fought outside settlements to ensure visibility by the non-fighting population. This 
takes no account of the fact that settlements are principally mentioned as the last geographical checkpoint 
rather than actually marking where the battle took place; the spatial relationships of settlements to the 
Carmans’ case-study battlefields were not established. 
54
 E.g. Polybius did not refer to Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene, or Baecula as ‘the Battle of...’ (Polyb. 11.20.5), in 
each case the toponym only occurring as part of the battle-narrative; however, he did refer to Cannae as a 
toponym applying to the whole battle (3.117.1), despite the fact that the settlement was only a point in the 
approach-narrative (3.107.2), and his narrative clearly places the battle more specifically on the Aufidus 
(3.110.8-9). By contrast, Livy (21.58; 22.7-8; 27.20) referred to Trebia, Trasimene and Baecula by toponym 
without providing a narrative geographic context of the battle, as did Florus (Epitome 1.22.12-15), although 
both Livy (22.39-57) and Florus (1.22.10-12) referred to Ticinus by its geographic setting, not as “the battle 
of...”. 
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cited. Reference to a water-course or similar feature may not provide a particularly accurate 
location, although it may be possible to narrow the geographic region down through 
reference to other toponyms earlier in the narrative, particularly if the army is said to have 
passed a particular settlement. In cases where a settlement toponym was mentioned then it 
can be possible to establish the region of the battlefield, as for the Trebia near Placentia 
(Polyb. 3.68-70).  
 
However, if a cross-referencing toponym is not mentioned then establishing the 
position of the battlefield on a river is more problematic. Dio’s (60.20.5) placement of a 
battle during the Claudian invasion of Britain in the Thames estuary without reference to 
any other features is largely useless given that the (modern) course of the estuary stretches 
over 100km. The exact location of some Greek battlefields may have been incorporated into 
the religious activity which happened at some sites, particularly those from the Persian 
Wars, although there is no indication in the literary record of the spatial relationship 
between the area of fighting or graves and the focus of cult activity (Thuc. 3.58; Plut. 
Aristides 21.3-6). Ancient writers suggested that the memory of inter-polis warfare was 
intended to be temporary, and therefore the location of the fighting on some battlefields, 
particularly during internal conflicts such as the Peloponnesian War, may not have been 
memorialised (cf. Cic. De Invent. 2.23.69-70; Plut. Moral. 273c-d; Diod. 13.24.5-6). 
 
 Is there any guarantee that the toponyms cited in antiquity were accurate and have 
not been altered? The prompt for this enquiry comes from de Beer's (1969: 131-141) 
observation that multiple toponyms in the narrative of Hannibal's Alpine crossing were 
incorrectly transmitted, particularly the transcription of the river crossed by the army. 
Polybius (3.49.6, 3.50.1) refers to it as the "Skaras", Livy (21.31.4) the "Arar", the name is 
commonly given as the "Isére" in modern translations, in most cases without a note that the 
change has been made. De Beer (1969: 131-133) reconstructed the historiographical 
alteration of the toponym from the C16th onward, suggesting that it was the Aygues river, 
not the Isére, which was originally cited by the sources. Walbank (1957: 387-388) disagreed 
in as much as he believed it was the Isére, and therefore that the copyist alterations had 
been justified, although conceded that Polybius may have introduced the errors by 
incorrectly naming the rivers. Ultimately however, the only certainty is that the original text 
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does not reconcile as easily with the landscape as the altered version, and the entire 
incident illustrates the potential for error when military locations are identified by toponym 
alone. What often results is an unverified reconstruction of a text, made worse when names 
cannot be identified through toponymic continuity, but rather, etymological association. 
 
 
2.6.2: Etymology and toponymic-landscape reconciliation 
 
 Identifying the toponyms associated with a battlefield by the ancient narratives is 
not always straightforward, particularly for sites outside Greece and Italy where continuous 
linguistic use of Greek and Latin names was far lower. It is by no means certain that 
toponymic identification in these cases produces an accurate general location for a 
battlefield, particularly where toponyms are identified by etymological connection rather 
than continuity and/epigraphy - as demonstrated by Baecula, and the multiple generations 
which placed the battlefield in completely the wrong locale. The battlefields of Alexander’s 
Persian campaign are a valuable demonstration of the problems of relying on toponymic 
references in the ancient literary record to locate ancient battlefields. Although geographic 
records were evidently kept by the Macedonian army while on campaign (Dueck 2012: 39-
41), Strabo (Geog. 11.5.5) noted that the physical parameters of the campaign were altered 
by later writers to exaggerate Alexander’s achievements.  
 
The first battle took place on the Granicus river, almost certainly the modern Biga 
Çayı in north-west Turkey. However none of the toponymic checkpoints close to the 
battlefield mentioned by Arrian (Anab. Alex. 1.12.6) - particularly Hermotus and Colonae - 
can be identified to give a more accurate location (Bosworth 1980i: 107-111). Route 
reconstruction of earlier phases of the march place the battle somewhere along the river 
near the modern settlement of Biga, but the exact location in this landscape has been the 
subject of significant debate (see Hammond 1980). Similarly, although the battlefield of 
Issus is clearly placed by the sources on the plain outside the modern city of İskenderun,55 
the exact location is denoted by the Pinarus River, which ran through the battlefield (Arr. 
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 Identified by Strabo (Geog. 13.1.11) as the plain of Adrasteia, where he notes Alexander’s battle took place. 
76 
 
Anab. Alex. 2.8.5). As there are several watercourses in this area the exact location cannot 
be identified from the toponym. While the Deli Çay and Payas rivers are currently preferred, 
it is largely on the basis of whether the initial advance was conducted by the Macedonian 
cavalry or infantry (Kromayer & Veith 1903-1931iv: 369; Hammond 1992: 404; see Bosworth 
1980i: 203-204). Gaugamela has perhaps proved the most elusive of the Persian battlefields, 
not least because of a tendency, noted by Arrian (Anab. Alex. 6.11.4-6) for historians to 
locate the battle by reference to the city of Arbela, c.500-600 stades away from the 
battlefield, because Gaugamela was such an insignificant settlement.56 The toponymic 
checkpoints on the approach to the battlefield (Arr. Anab. Alex. 3.7.1-7) do not provide an 
accurate location for the battlefield beyond it lying west of the Tigris in modern northern 
Iraq. Bosworth (1980i: 293-294) observed that the battlefield has been identified with a 
number of tels thought to mark the ancient settlement of Gaugamela along the banks of the 
modern Gomel, with Jabal Maqlub currently the preferred site, largely due to its size.  
 
The worst located battlefield is the most distant, that on the Hydaspes in the Punjab, 
the modern River Jhelum. Identification of the battlefield focuses on the location of Nicaea, 
a settlement which Arrian (5.19.4) says Alexander built on the site following his victory; 
however, the construction has never been identified, and despite multiple suggestions, no 
convincing argument for the battlefield has ever been put forward.57  There are multiple 
battlefield-related toponyms running through the sources on Alexander’s campaigns, 
including settlements and/or rivers associated with each battlefield itself, many of which 
can be identified in the modern landscape. Nevertheless, these features have not led to a 
secure identification of any of the four major Alexandrian battlefields. The toponyms are 
simply not specific enough to denote a particular position within the wider landscape. 
 
 There are comparable difficulties for battlefields in the Roman Republic. Battlefield-
related settlement toponyms are primarily associated with battle sites in Italy, Hispania, 
Africa, the Near East, and, in some cases, Gaul, but can in many instances be difficult to 
identify in the modern landscape. Epigraphic evidence is often required to validate the 
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 Bosworth (1980i: 293-294) suggests that 80-95km is a more accurate distance, but agrees with Arrian that 
Arbela is not a relevant toponymic reference for the battlefield. 
57
 Nor has that of Bucephala, which Arrian places on the other side of the Hydaspes marking the point at which 
Alexander set out to cross the river. See Bosworth 1980ii: 265-268 for debate. 
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identification of a particular settlement as the toponymic reference in the textual record. 
Toponyms were associated with almost every battlefield from the Second Punic War, and 
yet only Santo Tomé has been verified as a battlefield, in this case Baecula; even then, this 
resulted from archaeological work which corrected the mistakes made by previous attempts 
to locate the settlement from etymological connections (Bellón et al. 2004: 12-14). The 
battlefield of Ilipa has been conventionally located toponymically around modern Alcalá del 
Rio, north of Seville, based on Polybius (11.20.1) and Livy (28.17.14) who both place it near a 
settlement of that name. However, the toponym “Ilipa” was associated with several 
settlements in Spain, of which Alcalá del Rio is the best attested epigraphically and has 
therefore been assumed as the location of the toponym. However, Hoyos (2002) has argued 
that the contextual narrative does not support the battlefield being located in this area, and 
instead suggested that it lay further east, close to the battlefield of Baecula (at the time of 
Hoyos’ article unidentified), potentially at another site of the same name.  
 
The location of Zama in Africa is long-debated, with at least three settlements 
claiming to be the ancient town which gave the battlefield its name. Polybius (15.5.3), Livy 
(30.29.2), and the late Republican Roman biographer Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal 6) mention 
the settlement at Zama in their narrative of the battle. However, only Nepos suggests that 
the battle was actually fought at Zama, while Polybius and Livy both present the settlement 
as a stopover position on the way to the actual battlefield, which Livy (30.29.9) places at 
Naragarra.58 The only epigraphic evidence for a Naragarra comes from Sakiet Sidi Youssef, 
on the Tunisian-Algerian border near the modern town of Sicca (Hoyos 2015: 212-213). 
These literary uncertainties have led to significant difficulties in locating the battle on even a 
regional basis, and as Hoyos (2015: 212) rightly says, “the only topographical certainty about 
the battle of Zama is that it should not really be named Zama.”  
 
From the Caesarian period, the location of Caesar’s victory at Bibracte has been 
based on identification of the oppidum associated with the battlefield. Early modern 
historians had preferred the modern town of Autun as Bibracte, but the settlement of Mont 
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 Polybius (15.5.14) originally named the second settlement as “Margaron”, a toponym unknown anywhere 
else in the literary or epigraphic record (Hoyos 2015: 212), and many modern translations render it Naragarra 
in consistency with Livy. (example from LOEB?) 
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Beavray, c.25km west, is now favoured. Archaeological work has shown that there certainly 
was a Caesarian-period settlement at Mont Beavray (Romero 2006), although there is no 
epigraphic evidence identifying it as Bibracte. There was a similar, if rather more protracted 
debate, over the identification of Alésia, now placed relatively securely at Mont-Auxois near 
Alise-Sainte-Reine, Burgundy. The identification is supported by the large-scale fortifications 
(von Schnurbein 2008) and weaponry (Sievers 2008) excavated at the site. The settlement 
associated with Caesar’s battle against Pompey of Pharsalus is also unidentified, although 
the general area is fairly well accounted for, as it is not clear which settlement Caesar (Bell. 
Civ. 3.6) was actually referring to by the toponym (Morgan 1983).59 Nor has the battlefield 
of Munda been securely located in Spain, with the modern settlements of Ronda, Montilla 
and Osuna all claiming connection to the battle. The recent discovery of Punic and 
Caesarian-period slingshots at La Lantejuela, on the periphery of Osuna, suggest that this 
may be a more plausible location, although there has been no further archaeological 
exploration at the site (Grünewald & Richter 2006). In the Imperial period, uncertainty over 
the identification of the few toponyms provided is more significant, particularly where the 
ancient sources refer to named natural features, rather than settlements. There is no 
evidence in the ancient record as to where in Germania the Teutoburg Forest was (Tac. Ann. 
1.60), nor the plain of Idistavisus where Germanicus fought Arminius (Tac. Ann. 2.12). 
Tacitus’ (Agric. 29) Mons Graupius also remains unidentified. 
 
In the absence of toponymic continuity etymological connections have been 
searched for, but have largely proved ineffective. The battlefield at Baecula was wrongly 
identified as a result of etymological analysis, eventually corrected by topographic analysis 
of all potential sites (Bellón et al. 2004: 12-14). In 1835, a somewhat dubious attempt was 
made to associate Winfeld in the Rhineland with the Varus battle based on the etymological 
association - literally, the ‘Win-Field’ (Gibson 1835: 40). This is even more tenuous than the 
modern extent of the Teutoburg Forest, associated with the same conflict, which barely 
encompasses the area of the actual battlefield at Kalkriese, located on the fringes. The 
German historian Philip Clüver (1616) was responsible for changing the name of the Osning 
Forest, running from Paderborn in the south to the western periphery of Osnabrück, to the 
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 Frontinus (Strat. 2.3.22) refers to ‘Palaepharsalus’, adding to debate that there were two settlements in 
close proximity with the same name. 
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Teutoburg. Clüver believed that the battle had been fought near Detmold, as a mountain 
nearby was known as the “Teutburg”.60 Various attempts have been made to identify 
etymologically the Grampian mountains, either through the root-word ‘crup/crub’ (e.g. 
Feacham 1970) or Ptolemy’s (Geog. 2.3.7) site of ‘Victoria’ (e.g. Fraser 2005: 74), neither of 
which has proved successful (see Campbell 2015: 409).61  
 
Early attempts to locate the battle fought between the Romans and Boudica were 
led astray by a connection made between ‘Mona’ and the ‘Isle of Man’, leading to the 
battlefield originally being sought in southern Scotland (Hingley & Unwin 2005: 116-117). 
On a slightly more unusual note, a considerable amount of academic attention has been 
given to the case of Cynoscephalae, the ‘dog’s head’ battlefield of 197BC. By route 
reconstruction it was known to have been a hill-range somewhere near Pthiotic Thebes and 
Pherae (Polyb. 18.18.1-21.2; Livy 33.6-7). In attempting to identify the exact location, 
Hammond (1988a: 80-81) discussed not just from what angle the ridges of the hill-range had 
the appearance of a dog, but also which breed he believed it to have been (concluding, a 
sheep-dog), although the only details in the ancient record for their description was that 
they gained a significant height (Polyb. 18.22.9). These enquiries often fall into the realm of 
speculation, and may lead to no more accurate locations, certainly through etymological 
association alone, than those for sites with no associated toponyms. 
 
 
2.6.3: Geographic location without toponyms 
 
 There are some battles in the ancient narrative for which there are no associated 
toponyms, or if there are, they lie so far from the battlefield as to be of little assistance in 
locating it, with the majority located in the northern Roman provinces. This is perhaps no 
surprise. Following Polybius, unfamiliar toponyms were unlikely to be included in the 
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 Mommsen (1885) correctly believed the battle lay outside the environs and therefore continued to refer to 
the modern Teutoburg as the Osning. Creasy (1851: 134), following contemporary convention with the battle 
near Detmold, was evidently unaware of the renaming, stating that “...this region still retains the name... 
which it bore in the days of Arminius”; Delbrück (1975ii: 69-96) was aware of Clüver’s renaming but did not 
find it problematic, largely as his identification relied on terrain analysis rather than etymological 
identification. 
61
 Victoria is now commonly identified as the legionary fortress at Inchtuthil (Rivet & Smith 1979: 499). 
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narrative if they added nothing to reader comprehension. It is not necessarily the case that 
no geographic information was provided, with some battlefields located to the tribal 
association of the area, although in some cases this can only be extrapolated from the 
reference to the tribe being fought.62 Battlefields in Britannia and Germania have by far the 
least toponymic identifiers in the extant written sources. Although toponymic references 
from other provinces, particularly those in the Near East, may not have been particularly 
specific, they provide a far greater degree of certainty than the vague references to tribal 
territory/ies and unnamed natural features of the north. The lack of settlement toponyms in 
these provinces in particular may reflect the absence - at least, at the time of the battles - of 
Roman habitation and/or control of the landscape, rather than deliberate omission. Caesar 
(Bell. Gall. 5.11) was able to name the Thames, and so consequently Dio (60.20.5), but no 
other topographic features which evidently did not, as yet, have a Roman name.  
 
By contrast, when the province was more firmly established and a series of Latin 
names were associated with the landscape, toponyms were mentioned in military 
narratives, such as Ammianus Marcellinus’ (27.8.6) unique record of a landing position of a 
Roman army in Britannia, when a late C4th AD force docked at Rutupiae. While, particularly 
in the case of Britain, toponyms might later become associated with the areas of battle, they 
were clearly never retrospectively inserted into the texts of later writers, who appear to 
have followed the geographic citations of earlier writers without amendment. For instance, 
while it might not have existed in AD43, by the time Dio was writing his Roman History two 
centuries later there must have been a Latin(ised) name for the river where Britons and 
Romans fought the first battle of the invasion, but the information evidently given by the 
original sources was not updated to include this in his narrative. Such ongoing omissions 
may, however, reflect the fact that provincial battle locations were rapidly forgotten in 
antiquity. Dio may have had access to all the river toponyms in southern Britain, but been 
unable to identify which one had seen the battle. Similarly, he did not revise the original 
invasion narratives to name the port(s) at which the invasion had arrived. 
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 This corresponds with Strabo’s (Geog. 4.1.1) statement that geography was primarily concerned with 
political and ethnic divisions; in the absence of a polity with which to associate territory (as in the 
Mediterranean and Near East), tribal identification may have been the most viable alternative. 
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Britannia was particularly badly affected by poor geography in accounts of conflict in 
the C1st BC-C1st AD. The last toponymic checkpoint in Caesar’s second invasion of Britain 
was Portus Itius on the Gallic coast (Caes. Bell. Gall. 5.3-5), usually identified as either 
Boulogne or Wissant. Even this is missing from his first invasion, which is only described as 
departing from the territory of the Morini (Caes. Bell. Gall. 4.21-23), tribal territory 
consistent with the Boulogne/ Wissant area. Dio did not name the landing position of the 
AD43 invasion, typically identified now as either Richborough in Kent or Colchester in Essex, 
and could only place the first major battle between Romans and Britons on a river 
somewhere between the (unspecified) landing position and the Thames (Dio 60.20.2-4).63 
The second battle was somewhere in the tidal estuary of the Thames (60.20.5), with no 
reference to nearby settlements.64 Caesar (Bell. Gall. 5.11) had previously provided the 
name of the Thames, presumably explaining why Dio knew the toponym when he had no 
record of any others. Tacitus (Ann. 12.33) could only place the set-piece battle between the 
Romans and the Britons under Caratacus in Ordovician territory, identified now as northern-
central Wales.  
 
The battle against Boudica, based on the sources, could lie anywhere between 
Anglesey and Kent, although the Midlands and the immediate west of London are the most 
common suggestions. Tacitus did not even provide tribal identification of the battlefield 
area (Tac. Ann. 14.33-34).65 Agricola’s battle against Calgacus lay near some mountains 
north of the Firth of Forth (Tac. Agric. 1.25-29). Severus’ campaigns in Caledonia have no 
geographic or topographic context, beyond Dio’s (77.13.3) comment that he reached the 
extremity of the country. Ammianus Marcellinus (27.8.1-10) on the Great Conspiracy of 
AD367-368 mentions some, if not many, toponymic references, although most are 
associated with the route of advance rather than individual battles. As such, only vast 
regional areas can be identified in association with each narrative documented engagement, 
making identification of an actual battlefield somewhat difficult (Fig. 2). 
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 See Manley (2002: 31-37) for a summary of the Richborough – Colchester landing debate. 
64
 A territorial link with Gloucestershire could be suggested by Dio’s (60.20.2) mention of a garrison placed in 
Bodunni territory, usually taken as a transcriptional error for the “Dobunni”. However, it is difficult to fit this 
area into an (traditional) interpretation of the invasion. 
65
 Dio (62.8.1) records that Suetonius Paulinus sailed from Mona to confront Boudica, but does not give any 
indication of where the two armies met. 
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Figure 2: Regional locations for battlefields in Britannia based on the literary sources. 
 
 
 Germania was not much better served. For the Varus battle, Velleius (2.117-118) and 
Florus (Epitome 2.30.29-39) only record that it took place somewhere in Germania, with Dio 
(56.18.5) adding that it was towards the Weser in Cheruscan territory, described by Tacitus 
(Germ. 36) as covering an indeterminate area around the Weser, potentially extending as far 
as the Ems in the east and the Elbe in the west. Alone of the sources related to the battle, 
Invasion AD43
Caratacus AD51
Boudica AD60/61
Mons Graupius AD83/84
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Tacitus (Ann. 1.60) mentions the Teutoburg Forest, but does not locate the forest, and 
based on his narrative the battlefield itself could lie anywhere between the Ems and Lippe. 
However, the vague nature of the geographic location of this particular battle may be 
understandable, given the fact that the narrative ran for three or four days across a wide 
landscape area, of which the identified site at Kalkriese is likely to represent only a part. It is 
little wonder, therefore, that the literary sources were unable to identify a ‘battlefield’ 
within this area. However, the more conventional battle between Arminius and Germanicus 
on the plain of Idistavisus (Tac. Ann. 2.12) is no more closely located than as lying in 
Cheruscan territory, beyond the right bank of the Weser.66 The C3rd AD raid into Germania 
by Maximinus Thrax resulted, according to the Historia Augusta (Duo Max. 12.4) in a battle 
fought in a swamp, 30-40 Roman miles in advance of the frontier, with no further details.67 
 
 However, both archaeologists and historians should consider the very real possibility 
that few Roman soldiers fighting in the provinces, particularly in northern unconquered 
territory, had any idea of where they were campaigning on a day-to-day basis. In a 
landscape with no recognisable Latin-named settlements or landmarks, subsisting 
predominantly on local forage and billeting in temporary camps, it would be unsurprising if 
soldiers did anything other than locate their position with reference to the last named 
location they had seen, and how far they had moved since. This form of itinerant reference 
was, after all, how practical geography worked throughout Roman society, identifying 
routes by distance from recognisable features in the nearby landscape. Where ancient 
historians could mention toponyms or identify a particular provincial area, they frequently 
did, albeit that these references do not provide a pin-point location in the modern world. 
The implication would be that the majority of vague geographic references for battlefield 
locations in the ancient literary record do not reflect deliberate choice, but the complete 
lack of objective knowledge about where battles had taken place. 
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 The battle is usually placed somewhere between Minden and Hamelin but no location has been identified. 
67
 Johne (2006: 262-263) further observed that this may be a ‘correction’ of 300-400 Roman miles, leaving a 
much wider potential provincial area for the battlefield. Herodian’s (7.2.3) account of the campaign suggests it 
advanced deep into Germany, although he does not cite exact distances. 
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2.7: Battlefield topography in the ancient literary record 
 
 If battlefield geography provides a general location for a conflict site, then the 
topographic description should, in theory, provide the exact location of mustering, fighting, 
and flight. Accurate topographic evidence was recognised as an important element of 
historical writing by some authors in antiquity, particularly Polybius who discussed the 
relevance of terrain to battlefield tactics on a number of occasions in his work (e.g. Polyb. 
3.36-38, 3.57-59, 5.21.6, 12.25d-e; cf. Walbank 1957: 367-371). Other writers evidently 
placed less importance on geography and topography, such as Thucydides who, for all the 
positive elements in his work, largely marginalised terrain in his work (Funke & Haake 2006: 
369-373). Topographic evidence is documented in two ways, through a digressive 
description of the site bearing similarities with C19th military histories, and as a narrative 
element.  
 
Most authors swapped between the two, describing certain sites in greater depth 
than others, usually – but not always – providing just enough information to allow the 
reader to follow the narrative, without superfluous details (e.g. Funke & Haake 2006: 378-
379; Ash 2007: 436). Polybius (3.36.2) emphasised the importance of accurate topography 
to understanding a battlefield site, stating that vague approximations were insufficient to 
understand the tactical implications of a site. He also noted that many of his contemporaries 
gave incorrect topographic descriptions of sites, not just battlefields, because they relied on 
secondary information rather than visiting the sites themselves (Polyb. 3.59.8). However, 
when the topographic evidence in the ancient literary record is examined in any depth, it 
becomes obvious that the descriptions are incomplete characterisations of tactical-related 
terrain, which may have been adapted to suit narrative purpose and/or to compensate for 
the author’s personal lack of knowledge regarding the site. It is not the case that the 
topographic descriptions are wrong, as such, although this is a concern in certain cases, but 
rather, that even when entirely accurate, they are too vague and incomplete to actually be 
of any practical use, particularly when the general location of the battlefield is in doubt. 
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The majority of topographic references are to the terrain of the battlefield, 
particularly natural features which played a role in the outcome of the battle. Very few 
ancient narratives mention constructed features in the topography of a battlefield, and the 
majority of references are associated with the Greek world. Religious sanctuaries are 
mentioned when located on, or close to, battlefields, in several cases with armies quartering 
and mustering either within or next to the enclosures, although often spatial relationship 
between the sanctuary and area of fighting is not specified.68  Many of these sanctuaries 
cannot be identified in the archaeological record, and it is therefore difficult to locate a 
battlefield through their position within the regional area.69 There are fewer citations of 
sanctuaries in narratives from the Roman world. Tacitus (Ann. 1.61) recorded Germanic 
religious groves around the Teutoburg battlefield, and a sanctuary of Herakles near the 
battlefield on the Idistavisus plain, near to which the Roman army camped and within which 
the Germans mustered (Tac. Ann. 2.12-16). This may reflect the fact that few constructed 
features were used in battlefield tactics, as suggested by Carman and Carman (2005), but is 
more likely to be associated with the fact that open spaces without features were preferred 
for pitched battle in Greek and Roman warfare, and it is these engagements, rather than 
‘lesser’ skirmishes and ambushes, which were more frequently documented in the historical 
record. 
 
  
2.7.1: Battlefield terrain descriptions 
 
  The use - and risks - of terrain were well known to ancient military writers, and both 
Greek and Roman military manuals cited the importance of terrain to battle, particularly 
choosing the correct terrain for different unit types (e.g. Onas. The General 31.1; Veget. 
Epitome 3.9, 3.13). The characterisations of terrain in most sources are typically subjective, 
                                                          
68
 Nearby: Thermopylae (Ceres; Hdt. 7.176); Plataea (Hdt.. 9.59-62). Encamping: Athenians at Marathon 
(Herakles; Hdt. 6.108); Athenians at Delium (Apollo; Thuc. 4.90); Greeks at Plataea (Androcrates; Hdt. 9.25, 
later Hera, Hdt. 9.52); Spartans at Mantinea (Herakles; Thuc. 5.64); Romans at Cynoscephalae (Thetis; Polyb. 
18.21.1). 
69
 Pritchett (1965-1992ii: 46–49) attempted to associate remains at both Marathon  and Mantinea with the 
documented sanctuaries of Herakles, but in either case it is difficult to prove that the limited sculptural 
evidence has not moved in the intervening millennia. Leake (1835iv: 472-473) unsuccessfully tried to locate the 
sanctuary of Thetis at Cynoscephalae and subsequent work has been unable to do much better (Pritchett 
1965-1992ii; Hammond 1988a). 
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containing no objective measurements or even comparisons (see Table 1). This is 
particularly problematic when it comes to features such as steep and gentle hills, in terms of 
ascertaining what the individual author (and their sources) would define as such, rivers 
which were difficult to cross due to their width, current, and/or banks, and dense forested 
areas. While identifying by what criteria the topography was assessed and described is 
beyond this thesis, nevertheless it should be considered when examining the literary 
descriptions that modern perspectives on natural features may not be consistent with those 
of antiquity.  
 
Typically battlefield terrain was documented in greater detail when it played a 
significant role in the narrative of the battle. While non-relevant terrain could be omitted. In 
some cases it is assumed that undocumented terrain features were left out because they 
served no narrative purpose, as Krentz (2010: 114) did for the Charadra at Marathon, 
dismissing Herodotus’ failure to mention the watercourse by suggesting that “...it probably 
did not play a significant role in what happened”. However, Funke and Haake (2006: 381) 
observed that Thucydides left out important terrain features on multiple occasions, 
particularly in Sicily, which undermine the comprehension of his text, suggesting that it was 
not simply superfluous details which were subject to omission. The focus on tactical terrain 
frequently resulted in an incomplete characterisation of individual battlefield topography 
which, when viewed objectively, could apply to myriad sites within even a relatively specific 
area, let alone a wider regional location.  
 
Relative tactical information was readily relayed - whether the battlefield was an 
open plain or a narrow defile, the position and number of access routes to the battlefield, 
the position of high or low ground, forested and/or marshy areas, and the presence and 
position of rivers and other bodies or water. Each had tactical implications. The openness 
and flatness of terrain was often mentioned in conjunction with unit type, particularly the 
suitability of the terrain (or otherwise) for cavalry. Areas of high ground were mentioned in 
the context of battlefield visibility and supplementary troops entering the battlefield. 
Forests and marshes tied in with issues of ambush, particularly while the army was on the 
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move in the northern Roman provinces.70 Narrow defiles served a similar purpose in the 
Near East, although they were also used more positively as a way to restrict access to a 
battlefield when facing vastly superior numbers. Rivers and seas were used to protect the 
flank and rear of armies, and or by (usually non-Greek or non-Roman) armies to shelter 
behind. The sources also discussed the fordability of water-courses, and difficult terrain on 
the river-banks.  
 
 
Terrain Characterisation Source 
Open plain Marathon (Hdt. 6.108) 
- Treeless Trebia (Polyb. 3.71.1-2); Cannae (Polyb. 
3.110.2); Carrhae (Plut. Crassus 22.1) 
Open plain with hill(s) in battlefield Plataea (Hdt. 9.59-62); Granicus (Arr. Anab. 
Alex. 1.14.4, 1.16.2); Delium (Thuc. 4.93); 
Mantinea (Thuc. 5.64-66); Mantinea (Thuc. 
5.64-66) 
Open plain with hill(s) around the battlefield Issus (Curtius 3.8.28); Caphyae (Polyb. 
4.11.3) 
Open plain enclosed by sea Issus (Curtius 3.8.28) 
Narrow defile (by mountains/sea) Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.176); Trasimene (Polyb. 
3.83.1-3); Beth-Horon (Jos. Bell. Jud. 2.19.8-
9) 
River with various depth Granicus (Arr. Anab. Alex. 1.13.4-6); Tac. 
Ann. 12.33 
Irregular/steep river banks Granicus (Arr. Anab. Alex 1.13.4-6; Plut. Alex. 
16.5); Trebia (Polyb. 3.71.1); Caphyae (Polyb. 
4.11.3-4) 
River running through/alongside battlefield Plataea (Hdt. 9.59-62); Issus (Curtius 3.8.28); 
Caphyae (Polyb. 4.11.3-4) 
High ground hard to climb Sparta (Polyb. 5.22.3-5) 
 
Table 3: Topographic descriptions of ‘located’ ancient battlefields. 
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 Polybius (3.71.2-3) noted the problems Roman armies had faced in these landscapes in the Republic. 
Frontinus (Strategems 2.5) addressed how Roman army had been tricked into ambushes in the past. 
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 The vague nature of the topographic descriptions means that multiple locations even 
within a relatively confined, toponymically-defined, area could be the features documented 
by the narrative, whether they were natural terrain or constructed features. Thucydides’ 
topographic descriptions of most sites contain so little detail that it is unlikely even 
individuals already familiar with an area would be able to reconcile his narrative with the 
landscape (Funke & Haake 2006: 380). Hammond (1988a: 64) observed that he, Kromayer, 
and Pritchett, had all proposed a different location for the battlefield at Cynoscephalae 
based on varying interpretations of both the narrative manoeuvring and the location of the 
sanctuary to Thetis, differing by up to 10km (Fig. 3).  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Cynoscephalae from Hammond (H), Kromayer (K) and Pritchett (P) (from Hammond 1988a: 64). 
 
 
 Even battles fought in landscapes which could have readily been inspected by 
ancient writers suffered from vague topographic descriptions. The battlefield at Cannae, for 
example, can be readily associated both by toponymic continuity of the settlement name 
through to the Medieval world (another battle was fought there in 1018) and association in 
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the narratives (Polyb. 3.110.8; Livy 22.44). Nevertheless a conclusive location has not been 
identified, with Daly (2002: 33-35) observing that at least eight locations have been 
proposed for Cannae battlefield based on the narrative of the battle and the suggested 
course of the river (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: The 8 locations proposed for the location of Cannae based on the literary description (from Daly 2002: 33). 
 
 
The problem is no less for sieges. Jones (1977: 81) observed that in Thucydides’ 
description of the topography of Amphipolis, around the modern site four hills meet the 
criteria for Brasidas’ camp, five that of Kleon’s pre-battle position, and multiple possible 
areas are suitable for the following narrative depending on which combination of initial 
positions is preferred. That said topographic reconciliation can work when the narrative 
refers to unique/singular features within a confined area, such as Josephus’ description of 
Gamla which appears to be highly accurate (Aviam 2006: 373), although the identifying the 
area from the description would have been more problematic had it not been centred 
around a known settlement. 
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2.7.2: The terrain of 'lost' battlefields 
 
 For battlefields with an unknown location, and particularly for those with no 
toponymic references, the topographic descriptions can be next to useless in identifying the 
exact location. As discussed above, the literary sources focus on the tactically relevant 
features, but these often form a generic characterisation of the site rather than an actual 
description. For the northern Roman provinces, there is a greater focus on the risks in 
forested and marshy terrain, particularly with regards to ambush, and native attempts to 
use water-courses, particularly rivers, as natural fortifications. Table 2 summarises the 
topographic information provided for battlefields in Gaul, Germania, and Britannia by the 
literary record. It is evident that the descriptions are generalised characterisations, heavily 
influenced by tactical narrative, and likely to be of very little use in identifying one particular 
site among a wider region. The difficulties in locating battlefields in, for example, Britain, 
become clear when the descriptions in Table 2 are compared with the regional parameters 
illustrated in Figure 2. Many sites within each region meet the vague topographic 
characterisations given by the literary sources in each case. 
 
For the Boudican battlefield, for example, the only geographic or topographic  
evidence is that the battle took place in a defile facing an open plain, which had room for 
two large armies (if not perhaps the exaggerated numbers quoted by the sources), 
somewhere in England. A hydrological search for the battlefield of Boudica came up with 
263 potential sites for the battlefield within just the southern half of England alone, 
although not all were considered as serious candidates (Kaye 2011). Multiple sites have 
been seriously proposed for the battlefield, all of which meet the topographic description 
provided by Tacitus (and were regionally located based on route reconstruction, 
predominantly in the Midlands), continuing the debate which Webster (1978: 111-112) 
thought he had settled by suggesting the site was around Mancetter, north Warwickshire. 
Many further sites have since been suggested in recent years.71 
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 Including Mancetter, Virginia Water, Godmanchester, High Cross, Clifton-on-Dunsmore, Arbury Banks, 
Paulerspury/Cuttle Mill, Church Stowe, Dunstable. 
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Province Topographic description Source 
Gaul (Eburone rebellion 54 
BC) 
Forested, suitable to ambush, two miles 
from the Roman winter camp. 
Caes. Bell. Gall. 
5.32 
Germania (Varus AD9) Forested, marshes, suited to ambush. Velleius 2.119.2 
 (Varus’ camp) Forested plain, landscape 
of marshes and uneven terrain. Native 
religious groves in vicinity. 
Tac. Ann. 1.61 
 Marshes, forested. Florus Epitome 
2.30.36 
 Forested, mountainous, uneven terrain. 
During the battle encountered an area of 
open terrain but forested soon after. 
Dio 56.20.1-2 
Germania (‘Idistaviso’ AD16) Open plain surrounded by forest, 
between the Weser and nearby hills. 
Tac. Ann. 2.16 
Britannia (Invasion AD43) A river thought not to be fordable by the 
Britons, but which the Romans were able 
to cross.72 
Dio 60.20.2 
Britannia (Thames AD43) Area of (tidal) flooding, small areas of 
passable land, not fordable (bridged), 
near swamps. Safe paths through the 
marshes, known to Britons. 
Dio 60.20.5-6 
Britannia (Iceni AD51) Embankment with a narrow approach, 
unsuited to a cavalry attack. 
Tac. Ann. 12.31 
Britannia (Caratacus AD51) Steep hills, with gentle slope areas 
barricaded with stones, with a river in 
front, of varying depth but fordable. 
Tac. Ann. 12.33 
Britannia (Boudica AD61) Open plain, approached by a narrow 
defile, backed onto a wood, minimal 
chance of ambush. 
Tac. Ann. 14.34 
Britannia (Mons Graupius) Open plain, steep hill to the rear, 
forested area nearby, close to native 
settlement(s) and a Roman fortified 
camp. 
Tac. Agric. 35-38 
 
Table 4: Topographic descriptions of non-toponymic (provincial) Roman battlefields.
73
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 Dio (60.20.2) says that the Keltoi (interpreted as Batavians) were able to swim across unexpectedly, as they 
also did at the Thames (cf. Tac. Ann. 14.29), but does not explain how Vespasian and his men were also able to 
cross soon after, only that they crossed in some manner (Dio 60.20.3-4). It is not clear whether the river should 
be considered fordable or not. 
73
 Includes battlefields with no toponym and those with a toponym which cannot be identified in the modern 
landscape. 
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Outside Britain, similar debate can be found in locations for the site of Alésia. 
Although excavations have suggested that it is probable the battle occurred at Alise-Sainte-
Reine, at least ten other sites are commonly cited as viable alternatives for the battlefield 
(Fields 2014: 89).74 
 
 
2.7.3: The sources for ancient battlefield topographies 
 
It has never been fully established exactly where ancient historians sourced their 
topographic information regarding battlefields and military geography more widely - 
particularly, as in most cases, when they would never have visited the place in question. 
Even when sources were describing places they had seen, whether Caesar’s first-hand 
record of his own campaigns, or Polybius’ later tour around the sites of the Second Punic 
Wars, there is not necessarily a correlative improvement in the topographic descriptions. 
Whether any cartographic evidence would have been available to particular authors is 
unclear. Although itinerary maps did exist, they did not contain any contextual geography 
information (Bekker-Nielsen 1988: 155), and the military narratives of earlier historians do 
not suggest that they had access to terrain maps (Horsfall 1985: 198-199).75 Descriptions of 
local/campaign topography appear to have been contained in military despatches sent to 
the Roman Senate by provincial governors, particularly in scouting reports (Austin & Rankov 
1995: 49; cf. Tac. Ann. 1.50).  
 
It is almost certain that the Roman army  scouted the topography of campaign 
regions before moving into them, to minimise the possibility of mistakes made from 
ignorance and identifying locations at which the marching army would be vulnerable to 
ambush (Austin & Rankov 1995: 42-54; Isaac 1996; cf. Polyb. 9.13.6, 9.14.2-3; Onas. The 
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 Lagrely located in Franche-Comté, the modern region of the Sequani tribal territory, where Dio (40.39.1), 
although not Caesar, implied the battle was fought. 
75
 See also Dilke (1985: 112, 210). 
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General 6.7; Veget. Epitome 3.6, 3.9, 3.13, 3.22; for frequency of ambush, see 1.4.2).76 
Generals were recommended to consult with any men in their army who knew the territory 
being moved through if possible (Xen. Cavalry Commander 4.6; Veget. Epitome 3.6). 
Polybius (3.48.1-5) was doubtful that Hannibal would not have researched the route over 
the Alps prior to advancing, as suggested by other contemporary historians. Caesar (Bell. 
Gall. 4.20) says that he attempted to interrogate merchants about the geography and 
topography of Britain prior to his invasion in 55BC, although they were unable to provide 
much useful information due to their own ignorance of the landscape. The AD43 invasion, 
however, may have been geographically informed by Verica (Bericus in Dio), a Briton from 
the native elite who was evidently exiled following a revolt, providing the formal 
justification for the invasion (Dio 60.19.1; cf. Suet. Claud. 17.1). The nature of Roman 
military geographic knowledge in a non-localised context, particularly in terms of provincial 
geography in Rome, is almost completely unknown (see Syme 1988). 
 
 
2.7.4: Literary topoi in battlefield topography 
 
Deliberate alteration and unintentional errors are also a cause for concern in using 
literary topographies to locate battlefields. Topographic descriptions in literary texts are 
often simplified versions of the real landscape, although whether this was because writers 
deliberately engaged in simplification (e.g. Pelling 1981) or due to an original failure to 
accurately observe absolute data during the conflict (e.g. Morgan 1983: 24) is unclear. The 
physical terrain was shaped around the battle-narratives, which were, as argued previously, 
subject to alteration based on literary topoi and narrative purpose. Thucydides’ topographic 
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 Strabo (Geog. 1.1.17) blamed defeats in Parthia and Germania on the military’s ignorance of the local 
landscape and topography. Parthia almost certainly refers to the campaigns of Crassus and/or Antony; for 
Germania, it depends on whether the reference was in the original or revised work. If the former (published c. 
7BC), the reference may be to the Lollian Disaster (16BC) or to Drusus the Elder’s campaigns, particularly his 
somewhat disastrous retreat from the Weser around 11BC (Dio 54.33.3-4); if the latter (published by AD23), 
the Varus Disaster (AD9) and Germanicus’ campaigns (AD15) also become possibilities. It could, however, be a 
composite reference to all four- the ongoing frequency of similar disasters in the same area perhaps 
emphasising the issue. Similarly, Strabo (Geog. 16.4.23-24) noted how poor geographic preparation for a 
campaign into Arabia from Egypt by Aelius Gallus in 26BC, ordered by Augustus, caused large casualties when 
an uncooperative Nabataean official directed the Roman army into unsuitable territory. Although a battle was 
won, the expedition was a disaster and abandoned after six months, with Gallus forced to find a rapid route of 
retreat through the unknown landscape, having lost many of his men. 
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description of the battlefield at Pylos has been criticised for multiple errors, which recent 
scholarship has suggested were the result of deliberate alteration to explain Athenian and 
Spartan narrative actions (Sears 2011).77 Hammond (1980: 77) and Devine (1986: 267-268) 
both argued that the terrain of the Granicus battlefield was deliberately exaggerated to 
emphasise the scale of Alexander’s achievement, although their judgement is in part 
predicated on Hammond’s location actually being correct. Polybius (12.17.12) noted that 
Callisthenes altered the narrative of Alexander’s battle at Issus, describing an event which 
could not have happened in a battlefield with a river running through it - a river which 
Callisthenes had mentioned in an earlier part of the narrative. 
 
In the Roman world, O’Gorman (1995) argued that topographic descriptions were 
altered to fit authorial judgements on conflicts, by exploring the differences between Italian 
and Germanic battlefields in AD69. In the former, agricultural destruction physically 
impeded the Roman army, while in the latter every element of the terrain was hostile to the 
Roman army, exculpating their defeats within these landscapes. Caesar’s topoi-laden 
topographic descriptions of forested and marshy areas in Gaul, Germania, and Britannia run 
through the narrative as areas of potential ambush in which the Roman army could not 
operate effectively (Riggsby 2006: 24-26), and may have been used to justify his decision not 
to campaign beyond the Rhine (Krebs 2006: 119-124).78 Caesar’s (Bell. Gall. 5.32) description 
of the terrain, and indeed, the overall narrative (Bell. Gall. 5.26-38) of an Eburone ambush 
of a Roman column in Gaul in 54BC is almost identical to that of the Teutoburg several 
decades later - and indeed, to Dio’s (54.33.3-4) description of a near-disaster under Drusus 
the Elder in Germania around 11BC. Ash (2007: 439) suggested that forests became 
characterised in ancient historiography as the “traditional refuge for barbarian soldiers”. 
Although there was probably an element of truth in this idea, at least originally, the 
association of Roman provincial battle with forested areas may have developed into a topos, 
with the fighting either assumed to have taken place near a forest by the author, or a forest 
placed into the topography of the battlefield in order that the (defeated) Britons or Gauls 
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 Although Pritchett (1994: 145-176) argued in favour of Thucydides’ topography of Pylos, arguing that 
Thucydides had not made an error in the length of Sphakteria, and criticising historians who, accepting a 
mistake on this point, “felt free to assume other errors at will to accommodate some new reconstruction.”  
78
 Contra Tacitus (Ann. 2.14) in which Germanicus is said to have argued that the Roman army could operate 
effectively in such landscapes, not least because their weaponry was suited to enclosed spaces. 
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could flee into it. The tactical use of forests and marshes for surprise attacks may have 
become a similar topos, and ambushes of the Roman army assumed to always have taken 
place in such contexts. This may be implied by the characterisation of the Teutoburg 
battlefield (Vell. 2.119.1; Tac. Ann. 1.61; Florus Epitome 2.30.36; Dio 56.20.1-2) as almost 
entirely forested and marshy, while environmental analysis of the landscape shows that it 
was managed at the time of the battle.  
 
Water-courses may also have become associated with battle-related literary topoi. 
Dio’s (60.20.5-6) description of the terrain which the Britons lured the Romans into around 
the Thames - uneven, with safe paths through but risk of drowning to those who did not 
know them - is identical to that in Frontinus’ (Strat. 2.5.7) account of Viriathus luring a 
Roman army into uneven watery terrain in Lusitania, where they also drowned in great 
numbers. By contrast, the natives were frequently defeated when they placed their faith in 
terrain which the Roman army was able to overcome, in many cases by crossing unfordable 
water (Dio 60.20.2, 60.20.6), overcoming the high ground, and preventing flank attack.79 The 
main concern for battlefield studies is that where the ancient sources mentioned a forest, 
marsh, or water-course, in the topographic description of a battlefield, is that it may not 
have been a real feature, but a narrative construction inserted to satisfy literary convention 
and audience expectation 
 
 
2.8: Conclusion 
 
 It is clear that the ancient literary record is limited in documenting either the 
narrative of a battle or its physical location. This is not a criticism innate to its original 
composition, as these issues would have been of lesser importance to the ancient audience 
than they are to historians and archaeologists two millennia later. The unwillingness to 
marginalise the ancient literary record in regards to ancient battle is understandable. 
Despite increasing recognition of its limitations, the narratives are still, in many cases, 
accurate enough, particularly if there is no obvious alternative, and are better than nothing. 
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 See Austin & Rankov (1995: 174-180) for rivers as natural defensive architecture to the Roman army, and 
destruction of bridges as prevention against enemy crossing (cf. Tac. Ann. 1.69) 
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However, it is clear that there will be serious flaws in any archaeological methodology based 
heavily on the ancient literary record. The narrative accounts of ancient battle presented by 
the written sources are, at best, elite-focused characterisations which present the broad 
trends of the battle with very little actual detail. So too with the geographic and topographic 
descriptions of the battlefields themselves, which appear less likely to depict actual places 
the further from Greece, and particularly from Rome, the battle took place. It would be 
wrong to completely ignore the literary record, of course, as it can at least identify battles 
which did, in all probability, actually take place. While the ancient sources may not provide 
an accurate narrative or geographic reference, they certainly contain evidence which can 
prove useful in the location or identification of a battlefield.  
 
The historical sources may, however, play a much reduced role in comparison with 
Modern, even Medieval, battlefield archaeology. While not a judgement on the sources 
themselves, the evidence that they contain is in many cases simply not detailed enough to 
provide an accurate location of a battlefield in most cases. Cited toponyms would not have 
had any consistent spatial connection to the actual battlefield, and even in the Greek world, 
do not provide a particularly specific location within what are usually wide and open 
landscapes. For Roman provincial battlefields, particularly during campaigns of conquest 
and consolidation, the army may not have known objectively where their battles were 
actually being fought, and even if they did, this information appears to have been unwanted 
by the readers of battlefield narratives. Even topographically, the literary evidence is 
insufficient and often unhelpful, and the generalised characterisations of battle landscapes 
may reflect the same within the corresponding battle narratives. The texts can, however, 
contribute to drawing up a shortlist of potential sites within a wider geographic area, and 
provide a chronological framework, inclusive of individual events, within which 
archaeologists can work. 
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Chapter Three: Landscape approaches to ancient battlefield 
location 
 
  
3.1: Introduction 
 
 It is not unreasonable to say that all ancient battlefields, outside of those examples 
which have been excavated, are to some degree 'lost' sites. The previous chapter discussed 
the limited usefulness of the ancient written record in providing locations for battlefields, 
beyond association to a general area in a particular landscape. As battlefield archaeology 
methodology is suited to a more limited potential study area, it is worth considering 
whether there are alternative methods for locating sites independent of the written record, 
using archaeological indicators within the conflict landscape. The challenge of locating ‘lost’ 
battlefields is not one engaged with in any great detail by battlefield archaeology, as sites 
with such incomplete historical records often fail to satisfy the background criteria for study. 
Ancient and early medieval battlefield archaeology is therefore somewhat alone in 
attempting to identify battlefields of unknown location. A methodology for situating ancient 
battlefields in a reasonable archaeological study area does not only affect sites in the 
Roman provinces.  
 
Although it can be argued that toponymically-identified sites are securely placed 
within a reasonably limited location, in no other field of archaeology would this general 
degree of uncertainty continue to be methodologically acceptable. While the Battle of 
Marathon, for example, was without question fought on the plain of Marathon, the total 
area of the plain is in excess of 21km², somewhere within which the battle was fought (Fig. 
5). In practical archaeological terms, this level of location is only marginally more useful than 
the regional or tribal-territory locations provided for Roman provincial battlefields. One of 
the primary challenges in ancient battlefield archaeology is the identification of reasonable 
study areas within which to implement preliminary survey prior, if the results allow, to 
excavation and detailed survey. 
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Figure 5: Aerial view of Marathon plain (image from Google Earth). The probable area of the battle is indicated within 
the red-dashed square. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, at best the literary record identifies the 
location of a battlefield based on its (not necessarily close or consistent) spatial relationship 
to a named settlement or landmark or, at worst, a general provincial region or tribal 
territory. Neither is suited to preliminary site survey, which requires intensive activity over a 
relatively small study area. A location incorrect by even a few kilometres may completely fail 
to identify any relevant archaeology. As such, it is necessary, as far as possible, to establish 
as limited a location as possible prior to survey, producing a relatively limited initial study 
area. This location need not be 'accurate' in the modern sense - an inch-perfect map 
reference delineating the exact boundaries of the battlefield - but identification at least of 
potential areas of fighting or pre- and post-battle activity will greatly assist subsequent 
exploration techniques, whether they be more intensive field survey or excavation.  
 Soros 
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 This chapter explores how battle-related archaeology in the conflict landscape 
around a battlefield can be used in the identification of more focussed study areas for 
battlefields, using modelling adapted from both modern (i.e. C20th) combat archaeology and 
landscape archaeology more generally in conjunction with the archaeological record. For 
Roman provincial battlefields located only to a regional or tribal-territory area provincial 
level by the literary record, the landscape evidence begins on a macro scale, identifying 
areas of campaigning and route reconstruction principally through the identification of 
temporary camps. The northern Roman provinces in particular are impacted most severely, 
especially sites in Britain from the invasion of Caesar in 55BC to the campaigns of Septimius 
Severus at the start of the C3rdAD, although those in Gaul and Germania have also been 
studied using similar approaches. Although unlikely to result in as specific a location as that 
given by a toponymic reference, this approach may at least isolate more limited regional 
areas. Ideally, route reconstruction would allow an area sized similar to toponymically-
identified battlefields; an area of c.21km², comparable to that at Marathon, would not be 
unreasonable, although would still present methodological issues for archaeological 
exploration. Within this more limited regional area, other artefacts and features located in 
the more immediate vicinity of a battlefield - camps, military artefacts, graves and 
monuments - can contribute to a still more detailed location, allowing the identification of 
preliminary study areas. 
 
 
3.2: Locating modern battlefields 
 
In the context of modern battlefield archaeology, the initial parameters of the 
discipline – to study C19th battlefields in the United States – did not require the 
development of a detailed methodology for locating ‘lost’ sites, as their general positions 
were already relatively well-known from the historical record. The same is true of sites back 
to at least the Early Modern period (C16th-C17th), from which time some battlefields were 
even captured in contemporary maps depicting the battle itself, which could be published in 
historical accounts and used by the military authorities as training devices (Pollard 2009c: 
31-33). As such, methodologies for locating ‘lost’ battlefields, particularly those in a wide 
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landscape, have not been substantially developed. Military terrain studies have suggested 
that battlefield archaeology uses landscape archaeology and/or terrain analysis as a tool to 
study individual sites, rather than to place a battlefield within a wider conflict context 
(Woodward 2014). The Bloody Meadows Project attempted to identify common 
characteristics in battlefield sites from different historical periods to suggest why certain 
places were “chosen” as battlefields, citing elements such as visibility and the presence/use 
of certain topographic features and terrain types (e.g. Carman & Carman 2001, 2005, 2006; 
Carman 2013). However, as the methodology does not advocate the excavation, and 
therefore the verification, of sites, it is of limited use in identifying or establishing the 
location of individual battlefields. 
 
 
3.2.1: Late Medieval and Early Modern sites 
 
Most battlefields from the Early Modern period onward are located with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy by toponymic reference, usually to a settlement or landscape 
feature in relatively close proximity to the battlefield. During the Napoleonic Wars, 
Wellington tended to name his battles after the location in which he spent the night before 
the engagement, most notably Salamanca, when the battle actually took place at Arapiles, 
over 10km from the toponymic settlement. Marshal Blücher originally proposed naming the 
Battle of Waterloo as the Battle of La Belle Alliance, for the inn at which he and Wellington 
had met following the fighting, rather than for the village of Waterloo where Wellington had 
spent the night before battle (O’Keeffe 2014: 159). “La Belle Alliance” was used by the 
English press in the immediate aftermath of the battle, but Wellington’s dislike of the name 
ultimately led to the engagement becoming known as “Waterloo”. A battle however, can be 
known by more than one toponymic name, a phenomenon well illustrated by the relatively 
recent tradition in the American Civil War of the Confederate Army naming battles after the 
toponym of the nearest settlement (or constructed feature), while the Union instead used 
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nearby water-courses or prominent natural features.80 Very few battlefields or conflict sites 
from this period became truly 'lost', and even when exact locations were uncertain, the 
general position was relatively specific. The location of the Sand Creek Massacre was a 
mystery by historical standards until archaeological investigation was conducted in the early 
2000s. Archaeologists struggled to find the site despite knowing from contemporary 
accounts and maps that it lay in a curve of the Big Sandy Creek less than c.65km from an US 
position at Fort Lyon. It was eventually confirmed by using route reconstruction to establish 
a series of potential study areas for preliminary survey (Greene & Scott 2004: 39-52).81 The 
site had been proposed as the massacre location previously, but had lacked the necessary 
archaeological verification to prove the hypothesis conclusively. It is not, therefore, often 
the case that archaeology is needed to identify a conflict site without any other context but 
rather that it provides the verification of one area of direct engagement, from which the full 
extent of the assemblage, and therefore the battlefield, can be established.  
 
Battlefields in the C19th were often extensive in size and generous in deposition, and 
archaeologists have found that securely locating just part of a battlefield is often enough to 
facilitate archaeological exploration. This initial position can be used as a preliminary study 
area from which further survey and excavation can expand, wherever the area happens to 
lie on the battlefield. All it is necessary to do, therefore, is to identify one location which was 
definitely associated with the battle. In the modern context in which battlefield archaeology 
was first developed, this was a relatively simple task, due to the extensive campaign 
records, maps, and even photographs taken of the battlefield, as well as post-battle features 
marking the location within the landscape. The distinctive nature and military use of lead 
munitions in this period makes it relatively straightforward to identify battle-related 
assemblages, where munitions occurred in sufficient quantity, while the munition type 
frequently provides an immediate approximate date and shortlist of potential combatant 
forces. As a result, it has not proved particularly necessary in modern battlefield 
                                                          
80
 E.g. Manassas/Bull Run, Elkhorn Tavern/Pea Ridge, Perryville/Chaplin Hills, Sharpesburg/Antietam etc. In 
most cases, the historical record used the name corresponding to the victorious army, but there are 
exceptions (Ball’s Bluff (Union defeat, Confederate name Leesburg); Mill Springs (Confederate defeat, Union 
name Logan’s Cross Roads); Shiloh (Confederate defeat, Union name Pittsburg Landing). 
81
 Several factors complicated the location, including that until 1862 the position had been known as Ft. Wise, 
in 1866 the fort was abandoned due to flood damage and a new position of the same name was built c.8km 
east, although the original was not abandoned until 1897, whereupon it was destroyed by Native Americans.  
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archaeology (from the C19th onward), and consideration of how to identify a battle-related 
assemblage is predominantly limited to establishing the extent, rather than existence, of the 
battlefield (e.g. Pratt 2009). 
 
 For battlefields in the late Medieval and Early Modern periods, the situation is 
slightly less straightforward, although not as complex as it is for sites pre-dating the C15th. 
Although the precise extent of the battlefield has often been lost, the historical record in 
most cases preserves the location of the site with the necessary degree of accuracy to 
establish a preliminary study area. Prior to the development of battlefield archaeology, 
attempts to locate medieval and early modern battlefields relied on a similar methodology 
applied to  ancient studies - to locate topographic checkpoints mentioned in the historical 
record within the contemporary landscape, particularly battlefield graves. Topographic 
checkpoints involved in the campaign and around the battlefield are often documented in 
official historical narratives, based on the descriptions recorded in campaign reports and 
contemporary military maps as well as in personal letters and diaries.  
 
In many cases, battlefields in this period were identified in the historical record by a 
toponymic reference, usually but not always, to the nearest settlement. Medieval battles 
such as Agincourt, Crécy, Towton, and Bosworth, illustrate this broad convention, 
geographically associating the battlefield with towns located nearby. For several years after 
the event, medieval battles appear to have been known by more local topographic names, 
referring to a specific location such as a field or water-course.82 When they came to be 
chronicled in more formal histories, such names were abandoned in favour of a settlement 
name locatable on a map, allowing readers unfamiliar with the local topography to locate 
the general area of the engagement (Morgan 2000: 42-44).Toponymic names could also 
replace earlier “iconic” ones which identified a battle by a unique characteristic of the 
event. Examples are relatively rare, and it is clear in the cases of most, such as Towton 
which was referred to by some early sources as the “Battle of Palme Sunday” (Morgan 2000: 
38-40), the toponymic association with the nearby settlement was not forgotten. The use of 
                                                          
82
 E.g.. The Battle of Bosworth Field, was originally variously known as the Battle of Redemore, Dadlington 
Field, Brownheath, Sandeford, and the Battle of Shewsbury as the Battle of Harlescote, Hateleyfield, or Bull’s 
Field (Morgan 2000: 44). 
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toponymic names could, however, lead to problems of accuracy, particularly where the 
associated settlement lay some distance from the battlefield, as at Bosworth where the 
town of Market Bosworth is over 5km from the area of fighting (Foard & Curry 2013). The 
assemblages from medieval battlefields may be less distinctive than their C19th 
counterparts, particularly in the absence of lead munitions, but are still likely to be 
dominated by projectiles which can be associated with the contemporary military.  
 
Towards the later medieval period, the introduction of blackpowder weapons, as 
witnessed at Towton (Sutherland 2012) and Bosworth (Foard & Curry 2013), may provide 
more solid verification of the exact battlefield location. Ferrous assemblages can be more 
difficult to detect during survey, because of the often high levels of signal contamination 
from later material (see 6.4.1), although at Towton it was demonstrated that metal 
detectors can be calibrated to the specific frequency of a projectile-type if one example can 
be recovered from the site, and so greatly increasing the recovery rate across the battlefield 
(Sutherland & Richardson 2009).  A greater problem results from the survival of ferrous 
assemblages, often less robust in the archaeological record (Foard & Morris 2012: 90-91). 
When medieval battlefields are surveyed and recover no battle-related artefact hits, as at 
Agincourt (Sutherland 2005), it is difficult to know whether an assemblage is absent because 
the surveyed area is not the battlefield or because the artefacts themselves have not 
survived. 
 
 
3.2.2: Early Medieval ‘lost’ sites 
 
 Sites pre-dating the C15th present a greater challenge. Many are scarcely more 
accurately located than their ancient Greek counterparts, although few fare as badly as the 
Roman. Although some of the earlier historical sources do mention geographic and 
topographic checkpoints, as in antiquity these references are often not detailed enough, or 
can no longer be reconciled with the contemporary landscape. As with later sites, some 
Early Medieval battlefields, particularly from the C11th onward, are named after a nearby 
settlement, such as the Battle of Maldon or Stamford Bridge in England, both named after 
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the closest village to the site. These cases appear to provide a degree of accuracy for the 
battlefield location comparable to that of sites from the later Medieval and Early Modern 
world. However, Foard (2009) argued that the reliability of such references is significantly 
reduced in the earlier Medieval period, with Maldon representing the earliest possible 
battlefield that could possibly be located through the historical record. Few battlefields are 
known by iconic names from this period, and those which are, such as the Battle of the 
Standard, also retained their associations with settlement toponyms, in this case 
Northallerton, Yorkshire.  
 
Battlefields from the C5th to C10th may be difficult to locate even when they were 
given toponymic names. These toponyms can no longer, in most cases, be applied to an 
actual place in the landscape. The location of the battlefield of Brunanburh remains 
completely unknown because the settlement after which it was named has been lost. 
Although a strong case has been put forward for Bromborough on the Wirral, in part based 
on etymological association, sites throughout Lancashire, Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, 
Devonshire, Merseyside, Northumberland and Dumfries and Galloway have all been 
suggested as potential locations for the engagement (see Cavill 2011). The lack of an 
accurate location, only a vague toponymic reference, is often found alongside a general lack 
of contemporary documentation in the historical record, and as such, these sites have 
generally not been significant priorities for archaeological research. The exception is 
Bannockburn, located somewhere around the settlement and water feature of the same 
name, but without a secure location. Despite intensive archaeological remote survey and 
test excavation, including the successful identification through LIDAR analysis of the Roman 
road known to be pivotal to the progress of the battle, the precise location of the battlefield 
is no clearer now than it has been in previous centuries (see Pollard & Oliver 2003: 8-25 for 
recent results). 
 
However, for battlefields which cannot be identified from geographic and 
topographic references in the historical record, there has been very little methodological 
development. This is perhaps understandable, as it is not a problem which affects the vast 
majority of battlefield sites from the late medieval, early modern and modern periods. 
Indeed there is a degree of pessimism among battlefield archaeologists that sites predating 
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the C11th can ever be located, both through the vagueness of the historical evidence, and 
the non-survival of the physical assemblage (e.g. Foard 2009; Foard & Morris 2012: 18). 
Certainly, the archaeological assemblages on sites of this time may not survive in 
particularly good condition, and may not prove particularly distinctive if they do. As with 
later medieval sites, the archaeology of early medieval battle may be difficult to locate or 
identify as battle-related, and it is difficult to know whether to interpret an absence of 
artefacts as evidence of an incorrect location or as a consequence of other factors. Even 
sites which are relatively accurately located via the historical record, such as Hastings, may 
not have any artefacts recovered by survey. The form of the archaeology may not be 
distinctively martial, as at Fulford where the evidence comes in the form of portable hearths 
used by Hardrada’s army for metal reprocessing, identified as such from examples found on 
other battlefields in Norway (Jones 2011). As such, there is relatively little to be drawn from 
wider battlefield archaeology methodology regarding the location of ‘lost’ battlefields, 
beyond attempting to reconcile the topography of the written record with the 
contemporary landscape, hoping that some archaeological verification emerged along the 
way. 
 
 
3.3: Terrain in ancient battle 
 
 In the past, ancient battlefield studies have been able to rely on a certain degree of 
informal terrain analysis, still based largely on the written record, to locate battlefields 
within the landscape. In a military context, terrain can control movement and activity, and 
unavoidable physical restrictions in the landscape can be used as evidence for where an 
(ancient) army could not have fought or operated. If the nature of terrain in a particular 
area leads to predictable behaviour, particularly with armies of known sizes and troop-
types, then the places where generals would have chosen to fight can theoretically be 
predicted. That said, Whatley (1964: 123-124) observed that terrain alone could not reveal 
military behaviour in more open terrain. The belief that terrain had an innate and 
unchanging impact on military operation can be seen in the attitude of army surveyors such 
as Roy and Leake and in Schlachtfeldstudien where it was attempted to learn from ancient 
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examples how best to operate in certain types of terrain. Roy characterised the typical 
attitude in stating: 
 
 “The nature of a country will always... determine the general principles upon 
which every war there must be conducted... it will appear evident, that what, 
with regard to situation, was an advantageous post when the Romans were 
carrying on their military operations in Britain, must, in all essential respects, 
continue to be a good one now... with proper allowances being made for the 
differences of arms” (Roy 1793: i). 
 
 
In the search for ancient battlefields, whether toponymically identified or lost, this 
attitude has been turned backwards, using terrain analysis to suggest where ancient armies 
could operate effectively, and therefore would have fought, in individual engagements from 
antiquity. Schlachtfeldstudien in particular took this approach, with some, particularly 
Delbrück (1975), working almost exclusively from tactical terrain analysis, alongside his own 
interpretation of how ancient armies operated in the field. 
 
 
3.3.1: Historic terrain reconstruction 
 
 Identification of the exact location of many Medieval and Early Modern battlefields 
has relied on reconstructing the condition of the terrain contemporary with the battle. The 
methodology used is predominantly reliant on an extant cartographic record, with historic 
maps being used to regress battlefield terrain to its past condition (see Foard & Morris 
2012: 18-21). Historic terrain regression can identify features in the landscape which have 
not survived, and assist the spatial interpretation of the battlefield assemblage by 
highlighting which terrain features were extant at the time. At Towton, historic terrain 
regression was used to identify the areas used for mass graves in the aftermath of the 
battle, identifying several previously unknown locations of human bone deposits 
(Sutherland & Holst 2014). Historic map regression was able to show that the road running 
through the clan graves at Culloden was not a post-battle feature, as had been commonly 
assumed, but extant at the time of battle, presumably therefore used to transport the 
bodies of the dead for burial in the area (Pollard 2009b). The distribution of munitions at the 
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English Civil War battlefields at Marston Moor (Foard 2009) and Edgehill (Foard 2012), and 
the skirmish site at Lostwithiel (Ferguson 2013) became much more clear when the 
contemporaneous field boundaries were reconstructed, demonstrating how they directed 
the movement of soldiers around the sites. Historic maps may also indicate where 
battlefields were located by previous scholars and antiquarians, with battlefields often 
marked with a sword symbol. In theory, maps produced soon after the battle, as became 
increasingly common from the Late Medieval period onward (see Pollard 2009c), should 
contain relatively accurate evidence for the general, if not specific, location of a battle. 
However, confusion over the location of a battle could enter the historical record at a very 
early stage, making accurate positions difficult even on contemporaneous maps. Sutherland 
(2005: 246-248; 2015) observed this process in the historical documentation of Agincourt, 
where a series of historic maps provide a range of different locations for both the battlefield 
and mass graves. 
 
 In antiquity, the issue of historic terrain reconstruction is more difficult. There is a 
lack of contemporaneous cartography which might record the original location of 
battlefields or features. While some now non-extant battlefield features may have been 
recorded in antiquarian observations from later periods, particularly in Greece, there was no 
tradition of recording their position on a map until the late C19th, by which time many had 
been lost. However, pollen analysis has proved useful at Kalkriese in identifying the surface 
vegetation of the battlefield landscape at the time of the battle. This environmental analysis 
indicated that while the region around modern Osnabrück was forested in antiquity, 
consistent with the ancient historical record, the region was under a certain degree of 
agricultural cultivation, which had not been expected (Tolksdorf-Lienemann 2004). Recent 
work in the landscape around the Kalkriese area has shown higher levels of native 
settlement than had previously been known (Rost & Wilbers-Rost 2014b). This discovery 
revised the previous evaluation of the battlefield landscape from a heavily forest and 
depopulated region to an area under some degree of organised land cultivation populated 
by a number of settlements. Establishing the extent of the forest and marsh suggested how 
the Roman army were funnelled towards the Oberesch, while the German rampart found 
there provided an explanation of why casualty rates were so high in this area, and therefore 
why the combat cohesion of the Roman army may have collapsed. At Marathon, although 
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the exact area of fighting has not been established, geological analysis has been used to 
establish the sea-levels, coastline and the extent of the marsh at Marathon (Pavlopoulos et 
al. 2006; cf. Krentz 2010: 113-117). Historic terrain regression has been used to reconstruct 
the terrain of the Thermopylae pass in 480BC (Kraft et al. 1987), and debate over the exact 
location of Cannae has also involved reconstruction, albeit without a significant geological 
element, of the course of the Aufidus river contemporaneous to the battle (Daly 2002: 32-
35). The near contemporary battle at Lake Trasimene has had to be relocated as geological 
analysis indicated that the presumed site would at the time of the battle have lain deep in 
the lake. Historic terrain regression is a necessary factor to understanding ancient battlefield 
archaeology, and should be used wherever possible. In particular, understanding the 
physical terrain of both a battlefield and its conflict landscape at the time of a battle may be 
able to highlight errors in narrative interpretation, and potentially also new avenues for 
research. 
 
 
3.3.2: Hoplites, legionaries, and terrain 
 
In some ways it is problematic to reconstruct the tactical use of terrain in ancient 
battle, and retrospectively apply it to the search for exact positions or lost sites, because, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the ancient literary record in regard to battlefield 
narratives is not particularly accurate or reliable. Identifying consistent military use of 
certain types of terrain is problematic if the topographic descriptions were themselves 
inaccurate. Similarly, if terrain is reconstructed from the narrative description of the battle, 
any simplification of the narrative, as discussed in the previous chapter, will also cause 
methodological issues. Traditionally, it has been assumed that the heavy-armed troops of 
the Greek hoplite phalanx and the Roman legions were only effective when deployed in 
level, open-ground of considerable size, and free of natural features, which allowed for a 
decisive battle (e.g. Hdt. 6.102, 7.9; Jos. Bell. Jud. 3.102; cf.  Hanson 1989: 9-18). Marshy, 
forested, and uneven landscapes posed a military threat and would therefore be avoided 
where possible. Thucydides (4.33.2) noted at Sphacteria that hoplites were unable even to 
pursue the enemy over uneven ground due to their armour. The benefits of open terrain 
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were not limited to the Greeks and Romans, but to any large formal army. The Hellenistic 
Spartan tactician Xanthippus is said to have advised Hannibal of the advantages of flat, open 
terrain (Polyb. 1.32.4), and the accounts of the Second Punic War describe the Romans 
avoiding battle with the Carthaginian army in this type of terrain (e.g. Polyb. 3.90.10, 3.92.7, 
3.111.1). Hoplite forces were evidently vulnerable to attack by light-armed troops, 
particularly if they occupied the high ground. During the Peloponnesian War, an Athenian 
force under the command of Demosthenes was defeated by light-armed Aetolian troops, 
who were able to deploy on high ground above the hoplite phalanx and assault them with 
missiles from a distance (Thuc. 3.97.3-98.3). Enclosed terrain might be used to neutralise 
large forces, such as the Persians at Thermopylae (Herod. 7.177), but is generally not viewed 
as a regular part of Greek hoplite warfare.  
 
Similarly, the Roman army evidently preferred to operate in comparable terrain, 
favouring large open-spaces for the deployment of legions, although in many cases care 
seems to have been paid to the natural enclosure of the battlefield to prevent flanking 
and/or rear attack. Legionary units tended not to operate particularly well in other terrain 
types, particularly the marshes, hills, and forests found throughout the northern provinces, 
in which it was typically observed that Roman legions could not fight (e.g. Tac. Ann. 1.63). 
Roman legions caught in these areas tended to suffer defeat, at least according to the 
literary record. Under Sabinus and Cotta in Gaul, a legion was almost wiped out when it was 
attacked in a forest several miles from camp (Caes. Bell. Gall. 5.26-38), as were the legions 
attacked in Germania in similar circumstances under Lollius (Vell. Pat. 2.97.1; Dio 54.20.4-5), 
Drusus (Dio 54.33.3-4), Varus, and Caecina (Tac. Ann. 1.65).  
 
Terrain analysis of ancient battlefields has tended to favour easy approach routes to 
a battlefield and, for toponymically-identified sites, places the fighting in the flattest, most 
open area around the identified position. Correspondingly, when forces who did not fight in 
hoplite or legionary style ‘chose’ the battlefield, the opposite appears to have been true. 
Battlefields with high-ground and uneven terrain were favoured in the British battles against 
Caratacus (Tac. Ann. 12.32-35) and Calgacus (Tac. Agric. 35), although the Roman army may 
only have engaged if they felt they could win despite the topographic disadvantage 
(Goldsworthy 1996: 143-144). 
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There were responses to the difficulties of heavy-armed troops and their struggles to 
operate in certain terrain. Greek armies evidently did use light-armed troops, with van Wees 
(2004: 61-65) suggesting that they may have been a common unit type where the landscape 
was not suitable for heavy infantry. At the Granicus, Alexander is said by Arrian (Anab. Alex. 
1.16.1) to have used his cavalry and light infantry to cross the river, the latter inflicting 
heavy casualties on the Persian force. In the Roman world, the introduction of the 
manipular, and later the cohort, system was a response to the increased need of the army 
to operate in difficult terrain, particularly the against the Samnites in Italy and Spain and 
later with the Sasanian Empire. The new systems introduced a greater degree of flexibility to 
the military operation of the Roman army (Goldsworthy 2003: 47-48, 175-176). By the 
Imperial period, auxiliary troops could be used to operate in difficult terrain, in particular 
Batavian troops who could cross rivers and water-courses as both infantry (Tac. Ann. 2.18; 
Hist. 2.17; Dio 60.20.2) and cavalry (Tac. Hist. 4.12; Dio 69.9.6).83 The battle at Mons 
Graupius was apparently won by the Roman auxilia without the involvement of the legions 
at all, although Tacitus’ (Agric. 35-37) narrative suggests that the battle unfolded in the 
same way as any other pitched engagement in the field. 
 
 
3.3.3: The “selection” of ancient battlefields 
 
Is it realistic or accurate to suggest that ancient battlefields were deliberately 
chosen, given the contemporary level of geographic and topographic knowledge? Polybius 
(13.3.3) stated that armies in earlier antiquity had fought at an agreed time and place, in 
contrast to the warfare of the C2ndBC, of which he was a contemporary, which he viewed as 
more informal. Van Wees (2004: 133) noted Polybius’ idealistic tone, suggesting that his was 
a retrospective opinion as battles had been fought "... as if they had been arranged, because 
there was rarely much room for surprise when a general levy marched out to meet invaders 
in the plain where they had been destroying farms." In many instances, a battlefield was 
“chosen” because one army found a suitable site, took up position, and simply did not move 
from it, waiting for the enemy to need to fight, as with Darius at Gaugamela (Arr. Anab. 
                                                          
83
 Also probably in the AD60 attack on Mona, cf. Tac. Ann. 14.29. 
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Alex. 8.7), Caratacus in Britannia (Tac. Ann. 14.32) and Calgacus in Caledonia (Tac. Agric. 29). 
In both Roman and Greek warfare, armies appear to have moved into the vicinity of one 
another, pitching fortified camps a few miles apart and waited for the right opportunity to 
fight (Sabin 2007: 404). On several occasions, pitched battles resulted from skirmishes 
between scouting parties, most famously at Cynoscephalae (197BC), where Polybius 
(18.21.2-6) noted the chaotic situation leading to the engagement, emphasising that Philip 
had not expected to fight on that day (Polyb. 18.22.1). Some battlefields were therefore not 
chosen but were simply where the two armies happened to engage; the element of pre-
decision would be almost absent.  
 
The ancient literary record also suggests that in some cases, armies hoping to remain 
in the field but avoid battle in the immediate future would adopt a landscape position that 
they hoped the enemy would hesitate to attack. This practice was not always successful, 
with the result that battles could be fought in unexpected positions, with one force 
attacking another from a terrain disadvantage. In his narrative of Amphipolis, Thucydides 
(5.9-10) documented how both Cleon and Brasidas took up positions of battle-array, but 
were each equally reluctant to enter into battle, and hoped to withdraw without being 
attacked. The Athenian retreat in fact presented such an opportunity that Brasidas did 
successfully attack them. In the AD43 invasion of Britain, the Britons attempted to avoid 
battle with the Roman force on multiple occasions, eventually crossing a river which they 
thought the enemy would not be able to pass, but the battle was fought on the banks (Dio 
60.20.2). 
 
The ancient literary record does not support a universal convention in the choice of 
battlefield sites. The characteristics of the ideal terrain varied depending on the composition 
and size of the respective armies, the background and strategic objectives of the campaign, 
and even which side was taking the initiative in provoking battle. There was no consistently 
used terrain-type which suited all military situations. Most ancient writers recommended 
fighting in whatever terrain was either favourable to one’s self or, if that was not possible, 
at least of disadvantage to the enemy (e.g. Onas. The General 31.1; Veget. Epitome 3.6, 3.9, 
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3.13; cf. Polyb. 1.32.4).84 The benefits of surprise and/or ambushing the enemy in difficult 
terrain and of forcing them to move into locations where they would struggle to fight or to 
escape were recommended by military treatises (e.g. Xen. Cavalry Commander 5.9; Veget. 
Epitome 3.6). Deceptions, ruses, tricks, and surprise attacks were all in fact thoroughly 
recommended in theory, and enacted in practice. Thucydides (3.98.2) described an Aetolian 
light-armed force, after attacking an Athenian phalanx from a distance, driving the fleeing 
hoplites into a thick wood which they then set on fire, and, during the Sicilian Expedition, 
Athenian hoplites being trapped in an enclosed orchard and massacred from a distance with 
projectiles (Thuc. 7.81.4-5). Frontinus (Strat. 2.1.) discussed various ruses used to trick the 
enemy into fighting in unsuitable circumstances and disguising the strength of an army from 
the opposition (cf. 2.12.3; Polyaen. 3.9.19) and elsewhere gave numerous examples of how 
to effectively ambush an army on campaign (Front. Strat. 2.5). Polybius (1.84.8-10) observed 
that Hamilcar Barca favoured surprise attacks on his enemies or failing that to entrap them 
in a position from which they could not escape, and starve them out. As such, the “chooser” 
of the battlefield, if this can be said to be an appropriate term, may have selected a site not 
for its advantages for their own army, but rather, the disadvantages for another, 
characteristics which may not be immediately obvious without knowing the exact tactics in 
use. 
 
Although unexpected defeats could be blamed on fighting in unsuitable terrain (e.g. 
Tac. Hist. 2.42), particularly if the army had been ‘tricked’ into entering the area by an 
unreliable native guide (e.g. Caes. Bell. Gall. 5.26-38), it was clearly possible for them to 
operate in a variety of landscapes. Tacitus (Hist. 5.14-17) suggested that it was only the 
relative inexperience of Roman soldiers operating in enclosed terrain such as forests and 
marshes, rather than an innate inability to do so, which was the main tactical problem. This 
echoed an earlier sentiment expressed in Germanicus' encouragement of his troops in 
Germania, where he also argued that Roman military training was adaptable to difficult 
terrain (Tac. Ann. 2.14). In the subsequent battle, Germanicus is described as turning the 
situation to Roman advantage, enclosing the Germans by the same natural barriers with 
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 Armies could be forced to fight in disadvantageous situations through logistic challenge, in particular, and 
Roth (1999) suggests that denying resources to the enemy was often done to leave them little choice but to 
accept pitched battle when offered, despite the tactical risk. 
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which they had hoped to entrap the Roman army (Tac. Ann. 2.20-21). Flat terrain could, in 
some cases, even represent a tactical risk. According to Polybius (1.39.32), for two years 
during the First Punic War the Romans fought exclusively in uneven terrain to neutralise the 
threat of Carthaginian elephants. Elsewhere military treatises addressed some of the 
potential problems of fighting in less than ideal terrain. Onasander (The General 18.1) 
discussed how to adapt battle-array for operating in hilly terrain, while Vegetius (Epitome 
1.27) advised that soldiers should be drilled equally on flat and difficult terrain. This was 
eminently sensible for Roman soldiers in the provinces, who were evidently forced relatively 
often to fight battles on difficult terrain when tribal armies took up position on the high 
ground and refused to move (e.g. Tac. Ann. 12.31; Agric. 29).  
 
 
3.3.4:  A valid approach in antiquity? 
 
Whether it is possible to reconstruct Greek and Roman tactical behaviour and 
attitude to terrain from the written record alone is far from certain. The only consistent 
factor in the ancient sources with regards to military terrain is that armies exploited 
(battlefield) topography when it was suitable to do so, and were wary of the same being 
done to them. Different forms of conflict and troop type would be used if dictated by 
terrain, and neither the Greek nor Roman armies were evidently averse to the use of 
ambushes or surprise attacks. It is probable that, with the exception of ad hoc engagements, 
sites were chosen for consistent reasons. Unfortunately, as that reason is likely to have been 
that it offered the best chance of victory in that particular situation alone, it is unlikely that 
the conclusions from any one engagement can reveal very much about another. Any 
battlefield is likely to have conferred a tactical advantage on at least one of the armies 
which was decisive in causing the battle to be fought there. There are no grounds for 
suggesting however, that this would have been in the same terrain each time. Similar 
tactical occasions, even within the same provincial territories, might have been altered in 
each occasion by myriad unknowable factors - the size and morale of the army, the wider 
tactical and strategic situation, and even the weather. 
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 What must also be considered is that almost everything which is known, or 
presumed, about ancient approaches to military terrain has been derived from the ancient 
literary record. The source’s descriptions of ancient armies manoeuvring around battlefields 
and the topography of the sites have influenced the way that the use of military terrain has 
been interpreted in an antique context. Yet in the previous chapter, it was argued that 
battlefield narratives and topographic descriptions were frequently altered or simplified, 
which may have lead to misunderstandings regarding ancient military attitudes to terrain. 
The battle accounts may present illustrative uses of terrain which served a narrative 
purpose, rather than an accurate documentation of how it was used in reality. In Chapter 
One it was suggested that the literary record may also have been disproportionately 
focused on pitched battle, ahead of ‘lesser’ engagements such as skirmishes which were not 
documented in great detail. Yet these are the engagements which would reveal the reality 
of military operation in the field, suggesting how constrained ancient armies really were by 
particular terrain.  
 
The battlefield at Harzhorn, an ambush of one army, probably Roman, by another, 
likely Germanic, clearly shows that the (probable) Roman army was able to operate 
successfully  in uneven terrain, flanking the high-ground and attacking their ambushers from 
behind (see Berger et al. 2010/13 for a narrative of the battle). Harzhorn may be just one 
engagement of many in antiquity where armies were able to operate effectively in difficult 
terrain, contrary to what the literary sources suggest, leading to a disproportionate 
impression of their unsuitability in such topographies. The focus of the ancient sources on 
pitched battle, consequently, may have elevated the perceived importance of flat, open, 
terrain, when in reality it may have meant nothing more, if a battle was to any degree 
“planned” to be fought in such a context, than a tactical recalculation or sending in lighter-
armed troops. If this is the case, it may be that little predictive value for locating ancient 
battlefields can be extracted from the literary record’s documentation of military terrain. 
These uncertainties make it difficult to apply the kind of terrain analyses which have been 
used in other contexts of battlefield archaeology. 
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3.3.5: Inherent military probability, KOCOA, and METT-T 
 
 Military terrain theory has been used to establish why battles from the past were 
fought in the locations that they were. A consequent methodological development has been 
to use these theories to establish common patterns in the location of sites from an 
individual conflict or period, and more recently, to apply the methodology backwards to 
locate lost sites within a landscape. Following the Second World War, the field of “Inherent 
Military Probability”, the favourite pastime of retired military officers and armchair 
generals, was popularised by the military historian Alfred Burne. His methodology argued 
that the decisions made by commanders in the past, and therefore both the location and 
narrative of individual battles, could be reconstructed by viewing the battle from the 
commander’s perspective, particularly in choosing where to fight – and was unduly 
influenced by contemporary military theory. Although nothing particularly new, as seen in 
the Schlachtfeldstudien use of modern experience and military theory to reconstruct battles, 
particularly by Delbrück (1975), Burne formalised the method and provided a consistent 
framework within which to operate (Burne 1950, 1952). 
 
The majority of Burne’s case studies came from the Early Medieval period, where he 
anticipated the positions taken at battlefields with a known location, but he did address the 
battle between the Roman army and Caratacus. Burne (1952: 1-19) placed the battlefield at 
Clunbury Ridge (Shropshire), as he concluded that Caratacus' main objective would have 
been to neutralise the threat from the Roman army which outnumbered his own by 
choosing a battlefield with limited access. This approach has been a longstanding and 
informal practice, employed by ancient historians and archaeologists without necessarily 
realising it. When Webster (1978: 96-97) located the Boudican battlefield at Mancetter, he 
chose the site following a reconstruction of what he thought Suetonius Paulinus’ objectives 
and decisions would have been. Although this was not cited formally as “inherent military 
probability”, the underlying methodology is identical. Sabin’s (2009) concept of 
“comparative dynamic modelling” used to reconstruct ancient battles also bears a close 
resemblance to Burne’s approach. 
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More recently, the US military theories of METT-T85 and its sub-sets, of which KOCOA 
is the best-known,86 have been introduced to battlefield terrain studies and archaeology, 
also contributing to the interpretation of battlefield assemblages (see Scott & McFeaters 
2011: 115-116; Babits 2014). The potential benefit of this tactical analysis to ancient 
battlefield archaeology is that it does not rely entirely on reconstruction of contemporary 
strategic, tactical, or cultural attitudes to warfare (although they do have a role in many 
analyses), but is focused rather on absolute evidence, such as the range of weaponry, and 
physical terrain. METT-T and KOCOA have primarily been used to establish why battles were 
fought in particular locations, or the consequences of adopting a particular position, 
working within the parameters of a pre-identified site. At the Little Bighorn, KOCOA analysis, 
particularly field-of-fire analysis, allowed the excavators to understand the vulnerability of 
the position adopted by the US cavalry in the last stage of the battle (Scott & McFeaters 
2011: 116).  
 
The application of the methodology to the location of lost battlefields or conflict 
sites may be limited, certainly without a substantial archaeological corpus verifying the 
parameters of the factors in the relevant period. However, the methodology has had some 
success in identifying ‘lost’ military positions, albeit within a limited area. METT-T and 
KOCOA have also been used to search for naval battlefields and their associated shipwrecks, 
from the American Revolutionary War and the 1812 War through to the naval war of the 
American Civil War (e.g. Mapping Charleston’s Civil War Naval battlefield)87 through and the 
study of German WWII U-boats in the Atlantic. Areas of potential engagement have been 
approximated using tidal reconstruction (= avenues of approach), while the range of guns, 
both from the shore and from ships, has been used to establish potential sinking positions (= 
observation and fields-of-fire), successfully identifying a number of naval conflicts (Babits et 
al. 2011). A review of the potential for KOCOA in locating ‘lost’ battlefields from the early 
medieval to early modern periods has suggested that, with enough contextual knowledge 
about warfare in a particular period, the methodology can suggest likely battlefield areas 
within a limited region, particularly when assessed alongside chance artefact finds (McNutt 
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 “Mission, Enemy, Troops Available, Terrain, Time”. “Terrain” often encompasses KOCOA analysis. 
86
 “Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Avenues of Approach”. 
87
 http://www.sc.edu/news/newsarticle.php?nid=4460#.VfPPYEiFPIU, accessed 20/09/2015). 
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2014). However, it has already been suggested that a sufficient level of objective contextual 
knowledge about the operation of armies in antiquity in regards to terrain may not, at this 
time, be available. This does not mean however, that there is no evidence for the location of 
ancient battlefields in their wider conflict landscapes. 
 
 
3.4: Ancient battlefields and conflict landscape analysis 
 
 Although military terrain studies based on strategic analysis of a campaign 
may be problematic for antiquity at this time, there are still alternative archaeology-based 
methods which can be used to identify evidence of conflict in a landscape, and therefore, 
locate potential study areas for battlefields which are suitably sized for preliminary survey. 
Battlefields from any period are not independent sites, but exist within a contextual 
landscape which they were affected by, and in turn impacted. In viewing a battlefield as the 
focal point of a much wider conflict landscape, a greater range of archaeological material 
can be used independently to identify potential battlefields or other conflict sites. This 
approach takes advantage in particular of the fact that the archaeological evidence of 
conflict in antiquity was not always restricted to the core battlefield, nor to the assemblage 
directly deposited by fighting. Coulston (2001: 43-44) has previously argued for a focus on 
conflict landscapes in studying Roman warfare. Rather than a focus on battlefields as the 
only important archaeological sites, he suggested that sites of skirmish and settlement 
destruction would be of equal importance for understanding the Roman army at war. The 
ultimate purpose would be to understand how conflict affected provincial history in a 
particular period more generally, through regional study, without necessarily examining 
individual conflict episodes - battles, skirmishes, etc - within the narrative in any particular 
detail. However, taking a more holistic view of the conflict landscape may marginalise the 
actual instances of conflict, leaving archaeologists still reliant on generalised impressions of 
battle and warfare derived from the literary record and weaponry studies. Coulston (2001: 
44-45) does not seem particularly convinced that many Roman battlefields survive in the 
archaeological record, suggesting that only significant defeats, such as Kalkriese and, 
hypothetically, battles such as Adrianople, can have left any identifiable trace. 
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 A methodology has been developed in C20th conflict studies to address problems of 
battlefield location in the era of industrialised mechanical warfare. Although the location of 
a conflict zone is usually well-documented, establishing the actual epicentre of the battle - 
in reality rather than on a theoretical plan or military despatch - often relies on identifying 
the physical evidence of battle within the conflict landscape. Modern battle, like its ancient 
counterpart (and, in all probability, that of the Medieval and Early Modern periods), does 
not leave an easily defined physical boundary, indicating which areas of the landscape were 
part of the battlefield - or rather, part of the areas involved in fighting -  and which were 
not. A much wider region than just the direct position of fighting is materially impacted by 
battle, and the locations of activity conducted both before and after this phase are 
considered of equal importance to understanding the event entirely (Woodward 2014: 41-
47). The physical evidence comes from military and civilian contexts, and can include 
features created some time after the battle, particularly monuments. The battle-related 
archaeology will gradually intensify towards the core battlefield area, with an increasing 
spatial density (if not necessarily even absolute numerical increase), independently 
identifying the conflict epicentre (Schofield 2005: 17-20). Towards the battlefield core, there 
is likely to be a shift in the assemblage from material associated with pre- and post-battle 
activities to direct evidence of fighting, predominantly of primary deposition, and the spatial 
density will (hypothetically) increase within the central area. 
 
 For antiquity, and the Roman period in particular, there are three main 
archaeological indicators of conflict and/or battle in the wider landscape. One is 
temporary/marching camps, created to billet soldiers on campaign, with the certain 
presence of one or more camps close to the battlefield. These camps may form a 
continuous chain a significant distance from the battlefield, meaning that the general route 
of advance may be identifiable. Second are concentrations of military, potentially battle-
related, artefacts, ranging from secondary depositions in native settlements or, more rarely 
hoards or votive deposits, to primary deposits on both the battlefield core and in the 
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surrounding landscape.88 Third is the presence of battle-related memorials and battle-
casualty graves, which are most likely to be found in closer proximity to the battlefield itself. 
Hypothetically, all three identifiers should be found in increasing spatial density towards a 
battlefield, if not in greater absolute quantity, and the presence of all three within a limited 
conflict area, delineated by the literary record or from route reconstruction, would be 
strong grounds to suggest the close proximity of a battlefield site. In identifying a shortlist of 
candidate sites for preliminary study, those with at least two, if not three, of these verifiers 
would be recommended for initial survey and consideration, as addressed in the following 
section. 
 
 
3.5: Campaign route reconstruction 
 
 Route reconstruction has been used since the 1940s by archaeologists, and some 
historians, to establish potential battlefield locations, particularly in the Roman world. The 
introduction of aerial archaeology, and its impact on the identification of Roman military 
installations, has proved a particularly significant development. Attempts have been made 
in the past to identify battlefield locations, particularly in the Roman world, from route 
reconstruction based on information given by the literary record. However, they have led to 
little more than confirmation of a general area of operation, due in no small part to 
inaccurate or uncertain distance figures, uncertainties in calculating a day’s march, and the 
consistent lack of movement direction. Even Caesar’s campaigns are difficult to reconstruct 
into a physical route, despite his frequent citation of distance or days marched. The 
reliability of Caesarian route reconstruction is undermined by historiographical errors such 
as the distance of the battlefield of Vosges from the Rhine, which is variously placed 
between 5 and 50 miles from the river by the different sources (Caes. Bell. Gall. 1.53; Plut. 
Caes. 19.11; Orosius 6.7.10; cf. Pelling 1981: 753-758). As such, literary route reconstruction 
rarely leads to a more accurate location than identifying a battlefield as lying in the same 
tribal territories as the wider narrative itself often suggests. However, archaeology-based 
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 Although distinguishing "battle-related" from general military artefacts (and indeed, from civilian use) is not 
particularly easy. In the case of battle-related artefacts, they will represent a much more valuable diagnostic 
tool in the case of areas without significant contemporaneous civilian/background use of Roman military 
material culture (see 4.2.2). 
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methods have been attempted previously in a range of campaign contexts. A geological 
team has examined the passes through the Alps to establish which would have been 
navigable at the time of Hannibal's crossing, and, rather more speculatively, which satisfy 
the description of the landscape, particularly with regard to a rock-fall and explosion 
(Mahaney 2004; Mahaney et al. 2008a, 2009b; cf. Polyb. 3.54.7-56.1; Livy 21.36-37).89 
Hydrographic evidence has been brought into the debate over the landing position of 
Claudius' invasions of Britain and consequently the geographic range of the land advance, 
although the reconstruction is undermined by the lack of certainty regarding the departure 
position (Grainge 2002). 
 
 Issues of supply and logistics have also been incorporated following research 
calculating the daily needs of the Macedonian (Engels 1978), Roman (Roth 1999) and Cyrean 
(Lee 2007) armies. Breeze (1986/87) proposed a route reconstruction of Agricola's campaign 
in Caledonia based on food, fodder and supply needs, as did de Beer (1955) for Hannibal’s 
route over the Alps. A logistics study has been made of the potential Boudican battlefields in 
England (Kaye 2011). However, these reconstructions are undermined by uncertainties over 
the actual number of troops on campaign, and how many camp-followers were associated 
with the army. It is unlikely that citation of the number of legions and/or auxilia involved in 
a campaign will always provide an accurate figure.90 While calculations for the logistical 
requirements of an army of whatever size can be reliably calculated, it is also difficult to 
establish how reliant an army was on foraging rather than a supply-chain in an individual 
campaign. What is more tangible however, is the evidence of military operations stemming 
directly from the archaeological record in the form of military installations. 
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 Only Livy (21.37) documents a firing event, to clear the route ahead which had been blocked by a recent 
rockfall. Polybius suggests that multiple previous rockfalls had sheared away the path, making it too narrow for 
the army to pass, rather than blocking it, and that that the Carthaginian army cleared the debris to create a 
route past the cliff (Polyb. 3.55.6). Walbank (1957i: 391) suggested that Livy misunderstood Polybius 3.54.7. In 
later articles, the team subsequently acknowledged that the firing event may not be true, but did not dismiss it 
as a possibility (Mahaney et al. 2008a: 42-44). 
90
 For example, the fact that three legions and their auxilia were supposedly involved in the clades Variana 
suggests casualty figures upwards of 15-20,000 men, but Rost and Wilbers-Rost (2010: 119) suggested that a 
maximum of c.10,000-15,000 would have filled the conflict landscape at Kalkriese. Clearly these legions were 
not therefore manned to maximum strength, although whether the lower figures represented the operational 
strength, or they were moving as split forces (see below) through the landscape, with the other divisions 
attacked elsewhere, is uncertain. 
121 
 
3.5.1: Temporary camps. 
 
 Route reconstruction to locate ‘lost’ battlefields is not a methodology that seems 
immediately applicable to Greek battlefield archaeology. In the previous chapter, it was 
observed that the majority of ancient battlefields in Greece known from the historical 
record can be identified to a general locale by toponyms associated with them in the text. 
The exact location of the site, relative to the toponymic feature, is less clear, and may be 
identified by reference to temporary camps in the vicinity (4.5.2), but the overall location 
does not need to be inferred through the approach route taken. However, route 
reconstruction could provide more insight into the exact location of the battlefield, in 
establishing, for example, on which side of a toponymic feature the battle may have taken 
place. More importantly perhaps is the potential to identify conflict areas, and indeed 
battlefields, which were not documented by the historical record. 
 
 Unfortunately, there is little evidence, literary or archaeological, to suggest that 
Greek military temporary camps were fortified, and therefore would have left a significant 
identifiable trace in the landscape. There is limited evidence to suggest that Greek overnight 
camps were defended by any constructed features, particularly when they were not in the 
known vicinity of the enemy. Xenophon (Lac. Pol. 12) suggested that the Spartan army 
rarely fortified its camps in the field, relying instead on making the camp area circular and 
keeping watch, although Anderson (1970: 60) suggested that even the Spartans would build 
defences when necessary.91 There is no evidence that the Hellenistic armies fortified their 
overnight camps (Anderson 1970: 63-66). Xenophon (Cyrop. 3.3.26-27) noted that Persian 
forces by contrast often did fortify their positions, but put this down to the necessity of 
enclosing and controlling the cavalry’s horses, particularly in the case of a night attack. In 
Bithynia, a Greek guard-force struggled to defend a palisaded camp from attack, eventually 
breaking down the defences themselves to fight in the open (Xen. Hell. 3.2.3), which Tuplin 
(1993: 150, n.10) suggested might support a Greek unfamiliarity with defending palisaded 
positions. The fact that the proclivity of the Athenian general Iphicrates for always fortifying 
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 By contrast, Pritchett (1974-1991ii: 141) implies that despite Xenophon’s clear omission of a palisade or 
defences of any kind, that they must have existed anyway because it is inconceivable that they did not, 
particularly in the circular camp described. 
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his position in the field was deemed worthy of note by Polyaenus (3.9.17) has been taken to 
imply that his activity was not representative of common practice (cf. Anderson 1970: 59-
60; Tuplin 1993: 150, n.10). Anderson (1970: 61-62) suggested that the climate of Greece 
would make it relatively easy to camp outdoors on campaign, without the need for tents or 
other shelter, although Polyaenus (2.1.21) noted that the army of Agesilaus in Boeotia cut 
down local timber around each new camp to make tents.  
 
The physical effort required to construct defences at every overnight stop may not 
have been considered worth the trouble. Polybius (6.42.2-4) suggested that the Greek 
reluctance to construct camp defences was down to laziness, although a comment in 
Xenophon (Cyrop. 3.3.26) suggests that it may have been a more pragmatic issue of 
manpower, as he says that Asiatic armies were able to construct ditches around their camps 
due to their sheer manpower. The overall impression from the ancient literary record is that 
Greek temporary camps are likely to have had very little impact on the landscape, and in 
most cases would not involved the construction of any defences or shelters. The 
archaeological survival of any traces of these camps is, therefore, unsurprisingly minimal. As 
such, although the location of temporary camps within the wider Greek conflict landscape 
might have been able to shed light on both the location of historically-documented 
battlefields, and perhaps identified engagements which lie outside the extant record, it is 
unlikely that the features will be identifiable. 
 
 Roman temporary camps are quite the opposite and left a significant trace behind in 
the form of the earthworks constructed as defences even on overnight stops, and which 
have been recognised as evidence for route reconstruction for almost three centuries. As 
early as the 1720s, antiquarians in Scotland were using the position of identified Roman 
military installations to reconstruct the campaign route of Agricola and the location of Mons 
Graupius (see Maxwell 1990; Sweet 2004: 167-182). However, it was with the introduction 
of widespread aerial survey in Europe during and following WWII that there was an 
intensification of identifications, prompting a new wave of route reconstruction studies 
based on the position of Roman military installations. A number of publications soon 
emerged documenting previously unknown Roman military installations (Crawford 1949; 
Nash Williams 1969; Frere & St Joseph 1983; cf. Jones 2011: 19-24). The majority of known 
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temporary camps in the Roman provinces were initially identified through aerial 
photography. The methodology has proved highly effective in identifying sites in Britain, 
particularly Scotland, where 82% of currently-known Roman temporary camps have been 
identified through aerial survey (Jones 2011: 1-3).92 Thanks to these surveys, it is now 
known that a Roman army, probably in the Flavian period, campaigned up the north-
western curve of Caledonia as far north as Moray (see e.g. Hanson 1987). Likewise the 
progress of two battle groups led by Septimius Severus and his son Caracalla in the early 
C3rd into the same region has been defined by a sequence of camps.  
 
Many of the temporary camps have been tentatively associated with these 
historically-documented campaigns, with chains of them linked by similarities in size and 
form, as well as by their geographic clustering. Approximate dates have been established for 
many camps with test-pit excavation, although in many cases this has served more to verify 
the identification of the earthwork as a Roman camp than to interrogate its depth or 
chronology in any depth. The ancient sources provide a historical context for the military 
installations discovered through aerial photography and excavation, without which their 
military purpose would be less secure. The spatial distribution of the Flavian camps is far 
more significant when associated with the campaigns of Agricola, particularly in noting how 
far north the army advanced over the course of the various seasons (e.g. Maxwell 1981). In 
battlefield terms, the chain of camps identified in Scotland have been used in attempts to 
identify the site of Mons Graupius, with the chain along the north-east coast in particular 
being used to support suggestions of a more northerly battlefield than had previously been 
imagined, particularly at Bennachie, Aberdeenshire (e.g. St Joseph 1978). However, Hanson 
(1987: 20) cautioned that in some cases inference on campaign location based on 
identification on temporary camps can become circular. He noted that the fact that Roman 
forts were found in Caledonia was taken as proof of Tacitus' veracity regarding the 
campaigns of Agricola, but many have only been associated with Agricola, rather than 
general C1st AD activity, because Tacitus said that Agricola was active in the area.  
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 For the categorisation of temporary camps (marching, practice, siege, construction etc) see R. Jones (2011: 
6-12). I follow Jones in not making a distinction between the various categories in terms of route 
reconstruction, although battlefield camps are dealt with separately in a later section. 
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In the case of the Severan campaign identification of the camps in particular has 
further illuminated the operational status of the Roman army on campaign as well, in that a 
large single force could break up into several smaller forces, taking different routes, before 
meeting up together at a later stage. Although it is hinted on some occasions in the literary 
that the Roman army did split into smaller units on certain occasions, often when dealing 
with a provincial force fighting a guerrilla-style campaign, as Tacfarinas in Africa (Tac. Ann. 
3.74) and Calcagus in Caledonia (Tac. Agric. 25), archaeological confirmation of this would 
prove an interesting addition to knowledge about the operation of the Roman army in the 
field. Similar studies have been made of marching camps in Wales. Extant examples cluster 
along the English borderlands and in the northern territory, although the chronology and 
identification of the Welsh campaigns with which the camps were associated has not been 
as successfully established (Davies & Jones 2006: 1-66). Identification of individual campaign 
routes has been hampered by the lack of historical narrative, and the incompleteness of the 
archaeological record, with the archaeological trace of many camps having been destroyed 
by subsequent land-use (Davies & Jones 2006: 7-10). 
 
 In other Roman provinces, progress in the identification of temporary camps has 
been more limited. In some ways, this reflects less application of aerial survey in these 
areas, an increase of which now is proving important in identifying new camps, particularly 
from the Eastern European provinces such as in the modern Czech Republic and Slovakia 
(Jones 2011: 29). The widespread accessibility of satellite imagery, particularly Google Earth, 
is making it easier than ever before for archaeological researchers to identify Roman 
military installations remotely, particularly where a range of images taken at different times 
of the year are available in a backdated archive (see Hanson & Oltean 2013). However, there 
are still difficulties with identifying temporary camps in some provinces. In some parts of the 
Empire it has been and remains difficult to obtain private pilot licences, which has in turn 
hindered the emergence of aerial archaeology. Modern security restrictions and limitations 
continue in what would be attractive regions to explore: south-east Europe, parts of eastern 
Turkey, Syria and North Africa. The potential of applying such techniques can be seen in 
Kennedy and Bewley's (2004) recent programme of flying in Jordan. 
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The most common methodological problem has been a lack of suitable underlying 
conditions in the terrain, whether through the level and type of cultivation, subsequent 
land-use, or other obscuration.  For example, attempts to locate camps associated with the 
course of the progress of Varus’ army in the area around Kalkriese, particularly the 
immediate approach to the site and early phases of attack (as documented by Tacitus (Ann. 
1.61) and Dio (56.21.1)), have proved ineffective to date. The terrain on and immediately 
around the battlefield was covered in the Late Medieval period by a layer of agricultural 
fertiliser, which is not conducive to aerial survey. It has been possible to identify camps 
elsewhere in the region which were cautiously associated with the campaign, particularly at 
Porta Westfalica where an installation was detected through aerial photography and 
suggested to be the easternmost of Varus’ camps. Recent excavations have confirmed the 
camp dates to the early C1st AD, although proving that the camp is associated with Varus 
and not Germanicus’ subsequent campaign in the same region may prove difficult. New 
methods of remote sensing may prove more able to identify these installations than aerial 
or satellite survey. Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) survey, in particular, is proving 
adept in identifying temporary camps in landscapes not suited to traditional aerial analysis, 
including a range of practice camps near Xanten (Böedecker 2014). Although no examples 
(known to be) directly associated with a documented battle or campaign have been 
identified with LIDAR thus far, the technology and its impact on identifying Roman 
temporary camps can only be positive in battlefield studies, although the impact on 
identifying, as opposed to confirming, camps may remain somewhat limited for some time. 
  
 Identifying and dating the position of military installations, particularly Roman, in the 
archaeological record demonstrates where the army was operating in a given period, and 
this can often be tied in with the extant historical record to provide a context for the 
conflict. Not all camps will have survived, meaning that there will be an incomplete picture 
of the scale of operations, as the area encompassed by the camps may represent only the 
minimum conflict landscape. Battlefields may have been located beyond the area indicated 
by the presence of surviving camps. However, one reasonable certainty, particularly in the 
Roman world, is that a camp was constructed in close spatial association with each 
battlefield. It may not survive in the archaeological record, but there may be value 
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nonetheless in establishing that there was a viable location where a camp could have been 
located in the short-listing of potential battlefields for preliminary survey. 
 
 
3.5.2: Greek battle(field) camps 
 
 Although overnight temporary camps appear not to have been fortified by Greek 
armies, it is probable that camps occupied on a medium-to-long term basis, in the vicinity of 
the enemy army and in expectation of battle, were more protected (Anderson 1970: 60). It 
is the fortified camp that is more likely to be found in the vicinity of a Greek battlefield, as 
opposed to the undefended examples used on the march. Polybius (6.42.2-4) contrasted the 
form of Greek fortified camps with contemporary Roman examples, observing in particular 
that the Greeks preferred either to defend their camp with a wooden palisade alone, 
without constructing bank and ditch entrenchments as a further line of defence, or to rely 
on the surrounding terrain to protect the structure. Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.14) described a 
ditch in front of the Spartan camp at Leuctra as there by chance. The Macedonians were an 
exception, according to Polybius (5.2.5), and did construct ditches around their temporary 
camps, although he did not discuss the issue in his digression on the difference between 
Greek and Roman examples (cf. Arr. Anab. Alex. 3.9.1). In a study of Greek temporary 
camps, Pritchett (1974-1991ii: 133-146) appeared to verify Polybius’ description, observing 
that wooden palisades are by far the most common form of Greek camp defence mentioned 
in the literary record, adding that the presence of surrounding ditches is also implied. 
Pritchett did not refer to the construction of banks as being constructed from the material 
removed to create the ditches, nor has this been considered in any other discussion of 
Greek camp fortifications, despite the obvious fact that the creation of ditches would have 
displaced a significant amount of turf. Roman-period writers saw a danger in relying on a 
palisade alone, and recommended that camps were defended with a palisade and ditch 
(Polyb. 18.18.1-18; Livy 33.5.5-12; cf. Onas. The General 8.1), but there are few comparable 
references from Classical or Hellenistic Greek writers, and indeed, as mentioned previously, 
Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.3) implies that Greek armies may have found it a hindrance to fight 
from behind a palisade. There are several instances where natural features or pre-existing 
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defences such as city walls were used to defend Greek field-camps, as suggested by 
Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.14, 7.5.8). The literary record also documents Greek armies encamping 
within the enclosures of religious sanctuaries (see 2.7). 
 
Calculating the spatial position and tactical role of the Greek temporary camp in a 
battlefield situation is somewhat difficult. Very few of the Greek sources provide any 
evidence for the distance between the camp occupied immediately prior to battle and the 
area of fighting. At Gaugamela, Arrian (Anab. Alex. 3.9.4) states that the camp was 30 stades 
(c.5.5km) from the actual battlefield, although this is not necessarily a typical distance as 
Arrian suggested that a greater caution than usual was taken in the approach to the 
battlefield, expecting traps. The fortified camp does not appear to have lain a significant 
distance from the battlefield. The fact that camps were fortified in the presence of an 
enemy army suggests that there were more concerns about attack than when armies were 
in the general field, although this may be associated with the campaign booty which was 
stored within (e.g. Xen. Hell. 3.2.3). Fortified camps may also have been used as a defensive 
retreat position in the aftermath of a defeat on the battlefield, and potentially a location for 
conducting post-battle diplomacy. Although van Wees (2004: 191) has argued that Greek 
armies did not typically rally following the collapse of their battle-line and flight, the literary 
record does document the battlefield camp being used as a site of refuge and, admittedly 
relatively infrequently, a position of attempted rallying. At Leuctra, the defeated Spartan 
army is described by Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.14) as retreating back to their camp, where some 
of the soldiers proposed to return to the battlefield to recover their battle-dead by fighting 
for them, although the scale of casualties already sustained prevented them from doing so 
 
 While Greek temporary camps along the approach to a battlefield were not fortified 
and are unlikely to be visible archaeologically, the same is not necessarily true of camps in 
the vicinity of the battlefield. These positions, occupied on a longer-term basis, featured 
ditch entrenchments, presumably also banks, and palisade defences, which may have left a 
more significant archaeological trace in the record. It may be possible to model their 
position from the terrain around a conflict area, if the sources are correct in suggesting that 
they would use natural defences in the terrain as much as possible, although identifying 
these features would require consideration of the historic terrain. The camps are unlikely to 
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lie any significant distance away from the battlefield. The literary record suggests that there 
may have been a tactical purpose to the camps beyond enclosing an area for soldiers to 
sleep in. As well as functioning as a storage depot for campaign booty, they provided a 
refuge for defeated soldiers after battle, although there is little evidence to suggest that 
they were used as positions from which to rally back to the battlefield. 
 
 
3.5.3: Roman battle(field) camps 
 
 Roman battlefield camps, and temporary/field camps more generally, are far better 
documented both archaeologically and historically than their Greek counterparts, and are 
frequently documented in battle narratives. Although suitable locations were evidently 
assessed by scouts in advance of the main force (e.g. Polyb. 6.41.1-2), battlefield camps 
have been typically viewed as the last over-night position adopted by the army before 
coming in to proximity of the enemy and the battlefield. In the conventional literature 
Roman camps are characterised as over-night or slightly longer semi-fortified dormitories 
either for units on the move or campaigning in the summer (as aestiva) or else as a 
temporary season length bases such as winter quarters (hiberna). In either case up until the 
C3rd AD when the tactical use of the army started to shift, camps are regarded as akin to 
adjuncts to  the tactical role of the army, one that was designed and meant to pursue its 
enemy and to fight in the open. The prescribed layout of the camps in order to facilitate the 
mobilisation of units at short notice into battle array and the relatively insubstantial nature 
of the defences provided along with the poor protection offered to the gates would seem to 
support this interpretation of camps as part of the offensive nature of the army.  
 
There are grounds however, for suggesting that camps had a far more tactical 
function, not least in the preliminaries to battle. In instances of pitched battle, camps would 
have been constructed knowing that an engagement was, or could be, imminent, although 
in the case of more surprise attacks, constructions might have to be more ad hoc responses. 
In many pitched battle narratives, both sides are often described as constructing battlefield 
camps, with the actual fighting taking place somewhere between the two. Goldsworthy 
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(1996: 143) suggests, largely based on Caesar, that camps would typically lie two Roman 
miles (c.3km) apart, although distances of up to six Roman miles (c.9km) were not unknown. 
Distances of two and three Roman miles (c.3-5km) are typical in the written sources overall 
(e.g. Polyb. 15.6.2; Front. Strat. 2.1.4). If camps belonging to two different armies, or indeed 
just two camps spaced roughly 3-5km apart, could be identified in a potential battlefield 
area, the landscape lying between them should certainly be prioritised for archaeological 
survey. It is only at Baecula that a Roman temporary camp has been found in the environs of 
a verified battlefield, with an equivalent Carthaginian camp on the opposite side of the field. 
The Carthaginian camp was of a trapezoid rather than conventional playing-card, shape, 
showing indications of alteration to fit the local topography (Bellón et al. 2009: 260). A 
similar unusual shape can be seen in the Roman battlefield camp at Cynoscephalae, 
originally identified on the ground by Hammond (1988a: 81-82) at Zoodochos Pigi, and still 
visible in aerial images (Fig. 6). 
 
 
Figure 6: Hammond's Roman camp feature identified on Google Earth (March 2015). 
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The literary record in many instances suggests that the battlefield camp was far 
more than a logistical feature, but in fact served a vital tactical function to the Roman army. 
Battlefields may have been chosen not just for the terrain involved in the actual fighting 
element of the battle, or indeed the topography of the battlefield periphery, but also for the 
suitability of the surrounding topography for constructing a large, secure battlefield camp. 
Vegetius (Epitome 1.22) noted the importance of building any camp in a secure position, 
particularly avoiding high-ground from which it could be attacked. Sites with suitable 
fighting terrain and encampment areas nearby would therefore be more likely to be chosen 
as battlefields, where possible. The topography did not necessarily have to allow a 
conventionally-shaped camp, as illustrated by the terrain-based adaptations made at 
Baecula and Cynoscephalae, and more than one camp may have been required to contain 
the entire army.  
 
The battlefield camp appears to have functioned as a withdrawal position during a 
battle, to which the Roman army could fall back to and defend if they began to lose in the 
open field, particularly by Livy (44.39.2-4) who described the battlefield camp as a secure 
location for any military emergency,  from which on several occasions the army was able to 
rally and rejoin the battle. Capturing the battlefield camp could become a priority if only to 
prevent a routed army from rallying (e.g. Caes. Bell. Gall. 1.24, 2.24; Bell. Civ. 3.96–97; App. 
Bell. Civ. 1.82, 2.81). Livy (5.38) blamed the defeat at the Allia on the failure of the Roman 
consular tribunes to construct a camp or entrenchments on the battlefield; as there was no 
fortified position to withdraw to, the aftermath of the battle descended into panic and 
slaughter. On many occasions, both Roman (Polyb. 1.19.4; Dio 76.6) and non-Roman (Polyb. 
1.10.14) soldiers were pursued back to the camp following defeat on the battlefield. In a 
battle exhortation, Polybius (3.64.6) had Scipio suggest that a Carthaginian cavalry unit 
fleeing to the refuge of the camp was a sign of their cowardice, although in general this 
appears to have been a conventional tactical decision. Withdrawing the usually much 
greater distance to the nearest settlement was portrayed as a last resort (Polyb. 1.34.11). 
The literary record contains several instances where the Roman army was ambushed by 
native provincials, with the attack evidently delayed until the entire force had departed 
from the previous temporary camp (and consequently, it had been deconstructed and 
would no longer function as a defensive position without reconstruction). A group of the 
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Eburones ambushed a Roman army departing from their winter-quarters in Gaul, waiting 
until they had advanced several miles (Caesar says two miles; c.3km) before attacking, 
allowing the Eburones to encircle the Romans and prevent them from retreating to the 
winter fortress, although some evidently tried (Caes. Bell. Gall. 5.32-35).  
 
The function of the battlefield camp as defensive installation (where necessary) may 
partially explain why Roman armies under ambush attempted to construct them, most 
notably perhaps Varus in the Teutoburg who, according to Dio (56.21.2), encamped to 
prevent constant attack in the open, and chose the most suitable site (as far as was 
possible) to build the camp (cf. Tac. Ann. 1.61).93 Tacitus (Ann. 2.21) elsewhere described 
men being drawn from the front ranks to build a battlefield camp during an engagement in 
Germania, emphasising the importance of the camp, although the distance of the battlefield 
from the previous' nights camp is not specified. 
 
An issue relevant to battlefield identification is the spatial relationship between the 
temporary camp and the area of fighting. To a degree, this presupposes a degree of 
deliberate choice in the location of a battlefield, an issue discussed in the previous section. 
Where a battle was expected, the spatial relationship may have been as consistent as 
possible. In situations of unexpected battle, the distance may have been less controllable, 
but there is evidence that if the space was too great, an ad hoc camp would be constructed 
near to the field by reserve rankers. The ideal distance between the battlefield camp and 
the area of fighting may have varied depending on the size and deployment of the army. 
The Roman camp at Baecula lies c.4km south of the battlefield periphery, and is the only 
case where both the camp and battlefield have been excavated and verified. Vegetius 
(Epitome. 3.11) advised that an army should move only a small distance from their 
encampment to the battlefield due to the adverse effect of physical exhaustion from 
marching in fighting performance.94 This is consistent with Goldsworthy's (1996: 143) 
observation that Caesar frequently built his camps no more than two (Roman) miles (c.3km) 
                                                          
93
 Vegetius (Epitome 1.25) discussed how to build a camp while under threat from the enemy, advising that the 
entire cavalry and half the infantry would draw up in battle-array to defend the remaining men while they built 
a camp behind. The existence of advice on how to build a camp in such circumstances suggests that they were 
not particularly unusual. 
94
Cf. Onasander (The General 6.9), although his advice was more concerned with the dangers of engaging with 
an enemy directly following a march to their position, advising a period of rest beforehand. 
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from the opposition, presumably therefore an even lesser distance to the battlefield, should 
it have fallen into the area between the two positions. As well as avoiding strenuous effort 
prior to battle, the Roman army would have benefitted from close proximity in the 
aftermath, in transporting the wounded and tired survivors back to the camp, along with 
any booty or prisoners taken. These logistical functions would require the battlefield camp 
to be located relatively close to the battlefield, but the exact spatial relationship could vary.  
 
 Clearly, Roman battlefield camps had a tactical importance which went beyond 
being places to billet troops before and after fighting. If Roman battlefield camps did 
function as pre-planned fall-back positions, as suggested by multiple examples in the written 
record, then the spatial relationship between the camp and the area of fighting is likely to 
have been relatively close. Certainly, the 4km between the Roman camp and the battlefield 
periphery at Baecula may be typically representative. The implications for battlefield 
location would be profound. If a secure, protected battlefield camp was a tactical necessity 
of comparable importance to the operational terrain of the battlefield, which had to lie 
within c.4km of the area of fighting, the number of potential battlefield sites might be 
greatly reduced. By contrast, surprise ambush attacks by native forces might be deliberately 
targeted on the Roman army when it passed through terrain without such suitable sites, 
reducing the possibility that the Romans could barricade themselves into a secure defensive 
position. 
 
 
3.6: Battle-related assemblages and features in the wider conflict landscape 
 
 Aside from the presence of military installations in the vicinity of the battlefield, the 
positions of which are likely to have been decided in the pre-battle period, the 
archaeological record suggests that post-battle activity also left a permanent mark on the 
landscape around the battlefield. If identifiable, these artefacts and constructed features 
can serve as independent archaeological indicators of regions of conflict and more specific 
battlefield locations. In the past, conflict zones from antiquity have been identified through 
evidence of settlement destruction or abandonment, which can be associated with 
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historically-documented periods of warfare. The landscape range of Boudica’s rebellion has 
been confirmed by the contemporaneous destruction levels located at Colchester, London, 
and St Albans (Webster 1978: 89-106). Destruction may not be evident in the record 
however, as demonstrated by the lack of verified settlement evidence in the territory of the 
Sequani in Gaul, described by Caesar (Bell. Gall. 1.5) as being subject to widespread 
destruction, yet with very little archaeological evidence (Walser 1998: 44-45). Breeze (2005) 
noted in the context of Hadrian’s Wall that evidence of burning and abandonment should 
not be automatically associated with destruction, arguing that there are a number of other 
causes, including intentional and accidental destruction, which may also account for the 
destruction of a settlement or military installation. This section considers alternative 
archaeological evidence for conflict and battlefield location, focusing on dispersed 
assemblages located on the periphery and surrounding landscape of a battlefield, including 
native settlements, and post-battle constructed features and monuments. 
 
 
3.6.1: Hoards and battlefield booty 
 
Archaeological evidence of the intensification of conflict within a landscape 
potentially associated with battle may be indicated by a concentration of Roman military 
finds or of high-value hoarded material. It is nothing new to observe that hoards are 
associated with areas of conflict, most notably those of civilian populations attempting to 
obscure their valuables, although there are other possible ritual motivations in some 
circumstances (see Reece 1988; Johns 1996). However, other archaeological material 
deposited as a direct result of battle may also identify conflict landscapes with a battlefield 
at the epicentre. Suggestions have been made that Roman soldiers occasionally hoarded 
high-value material in the vicinity of a battlefield before going in to battle, such as the 34 
gold coins from Bredgar (Kent), which have been associated with the first battle of the AD43 
Roman invasion (Carson 1959).95 However, the majority of battle-related archaeology in the 
landscape is related to the post-battle period, and thus far, to instances of Roman defeat. 
The battle-related assemblages from the conflict landscapes around Kalkriese and Abritus 
                                                          
95
 Although Hind (1989: 11) questioned how far in advance soldiers would be aware of imminent battle, 
particularly in this case where the battle was fought at British, rather than Roman, instigation. 
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illustrate the movement of battle-deposited material away from a battlefield. In both 
battles, the Roman army was comprehensively defeated, leaving provincial combatants and 
civilians as the main looters of the battlefield. This lay contrary to ‘normal’ circumstances 
where the Roman army were evidently victorious in the field, and thus would be the first to 
loot the site. Both sites had concentrations of high-value artefacts on the battlefield 
periphery, including weapons and coins, which appear to have been deliberate Roman 
attempts to hide the material when it became clear that a defeat was inevitable (Rost & 
Wilbers-Rost 2010: 133; Radoslavova et al. 2011). A comparable coin hoard was found at 
the Caesarian-period conflict site at Puigciutat in Spain, and has been cautiously associated 
with deposition around the time of the battle, although the illegal nature of the original find 
means that very few details have been publically disclosed (Ble et al. 2012). 
 
At Kalkriese, the peripheral deposits were the first accurate indication of the 
battlefield location, when Mommsen (1885) observed that a large quantity of high-
denomination early C1st AD coins was consistently being disturbed by agricultural activity, 
an inconsistency in an area with no known contemporaneous Roman settlement and/or 
economic activity. The area was subsequently prospected by Clunn (2005: 2-3) following 
Mommsen and identified as the battlefield periphery. Subsequently, weaponry and other 
military artefacts have been recovered from Germanic settlements west of the Oberesch, 
the site previously thought to mark the furthermost limit of the battle-deposited material. 
Some of the iron artefacts showed evidence of post-battle reprocessing, turning iron 
weapons into items for everyday native use (Wilbers-Rost 2009a: 129); a supposed lack of 
Germanic expertise in working with iron was noted by Tacitus (Germ. 6).  
 
Rost and Wilbers-Rost (2014) have subsequently suggested that some of the battle-
related material in Germanic settlements to the west of the Oberesch may have been 
deposited by Roman soldiers fleeing in this direction. The material from the clades Variana 
however, appears to have moved much further than just the area directly around the 
battlefield. The Hildesheim Treasure has been associated with looting of the baggage-train 
from the battle, despite the site lying c.130km from the battlefield at Kalkriese (Storgaard 
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2003).96 The identification remains active, if unverified. Even further afield, material from 
Denmark, particularly from both bog-sacrifices and grave goods from Hoby, on the south-
west coast of Lolland, has been identified as booty taken from the battlefield (Storgaard 
2003: 112). However, excavations of Germanic settlements around the battlefield have until 
recently not been a priority and are therefore in a relatively early stage. As they advance, 
the depositional pattern of battle-related material in the conflict landscape is likely to be 
further illuminated. The material recovered thus far suggests however, that it was not just 
high-value material that moved through the conflict landscape around the battlefield, but 
relatively mundane and functional items, including a potentially small quantity of (broken) 
weaponry. 
 
The immediate conflict landscape around the battlefield at Abritus provides further 
illustration of the distribution of battle-related material through civilian settlements in the 
aftermath of a Roman army defeat. The looted assemblage extended in excess of 10km 
from the (probable) battlefield, and has been interpreted as the result of civilian looting or 
the presence of soldiers, either fleeing Romans or their victorious enemy (Radoslavova et al. 
2011). Many of the artefacts were weapons and armour, in some cases in complete, 
immediately functional condition, providing evidence for their desirability among non-
Roman populations and as implied by the literary sources.97 Far more weapons and armour 
were recovered than non-weaponry finds, which were represented by two iron military tent 
pegs and a range of coins. Although further research is required, if Kalkriese and Abritus are 
typical, they suggest that whenever the Roman army was defeated in battle, metal 
artefacts, particularly weaponry, would move through the conflict landscape and be 
secondarily deposited in  settlements beyond the battlefield periphery. 
 
 
 
                                                          
96
 Although the treasure was found in 1868, when the battle was commonly thought to have happened at 
Detmold, c.78km from Hildesheim, and the treasure was somewhat used to "verify" this identification (e.g. 
Lindemann 1967). 
97
 Iron spear butts (9), bronze helmet rivets (23), stabilising bracing (9), and cheek-pieces (3), bronze lorica 
squamata plates (c.100), bronze (5) and iron (2) shield bosses, iron spatha blades (3), iron scabbard fragments 
(2), iron dagger-blade (1), iron spearheads (4), iron ballista bolt (1), and bronze beneficiarius consularis insignia 
(Radoslavova et al. 2011: 36-47). 
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3.6.2: Identifying battle-related material outside a battlefield context 
 
Identifying these finds however, may prove difficult in the majority of Roman 
provinces. Distinguishing artefacts associated with military use from contemporaneous 
civilian use is often difficult, particularly in the case of kit fittings, which were used by 
combatant and non-combatant personnel and can be identical in form to clothing fittings in 
wider society. Allason-Jones (1988) has previously discussed the overlap between military 
and civilian material culture in the Roman world, suggesting that in many cases the use-
identity of an artefact can only be determined from the context of its find (cf. James 2001: 
82-84, Bishop 2011: 115). Iron nails found in forts (and possibly also at Kalkriese) have been 
identified as shield-nails when they come from a military find-context, however they can be 
almost identical in form to furniture nails from civilian contexts (Allison 2013: 90). 
Identifying battle-related artefacts independently of a known battlefield or even military 
context, against a background contamination of near-identical contemporaneous civilian 
material culture, may prove difficult in many of the Roman provinces. James (2001: 84) has 
noted that conceptions of Roman ‘military’ material culture are further complicated by the 
almost-certain presence of a range of non-combatant personnel and others in the military 
installations from which the characterisation has been drawn. Identification of military 
equipment is made more difficult by the lack of uniformity over time, and in the overlap 
between legionary and auxiliary equipment which is increasingly obvious in the 
archaeological record (see Haynes 2013: 241-249).98 
 
Against the background of a civilian population it may be difficult to distinguish 
artefacts indirectly deposited as a result of ancient battle, particularly those removed from a 
battlefield to a civilian settlement. Only in cases where there is an absence of contemporary 
Roman military culture among civilian populations have battle-related assemblages proved 
distinctive. Mommsen (1885) identified the Varus battle as the only reasonable explanation 
for the quantity of high-denomination coins uncovered by agricultural activity in the area 
around Kalkriese. The lack of Roman settlement in this period, or following the battle, is also 
why it has subsequently been possible to associate the entire assemblage with military 
                                                          
98
 The archaeological record suggests that a significant proportion of military equipment was produced on a 
localised level and conditioned by situational necessity and preference (e.g. Bishop & Coulston 2006: 266-267). 
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activity- there evidently was no background "contamination" from materially-
indistinguishable civilian activity. Archaeological teams working on conflict sites associated 
with the Punic Wars in Spain have also found pottery to be a useful diagnostic indicator, if 
not necessarily of battle, then certainly of the presence of the Roman army. Large 
concentrations of Graeco-Roman pottery, particularly amphorae, have been found at 
numerous Roman military temporary camps. As similar concentrations are not known from 
contemporary civilian or trade contexts, the army is viewed as the most likely cause, 
particularly where artefacts such as projectiles or kit fragments are found in conjunction, 
providing an archaeologically diagnostic indicator of the location of the army.  
 
From settled provinces such as Britain, such identification will prove more difficult, 
and it is usually only high-value or votive (particularly riverine) deposits, and some 
destruction levels, which have been associated with campaigning. Even for campaigns of 
conquest there can be problems, despite the fact that there should be (hypothetically) little 
background civilian use of military-type artefacts, the dating of these artefacts is rarely 
secure enough to say that they did not post-date a historically-documented territorial 
invasion, and secondly, because it is not impossible that these artefacts had entered local 
usage prior to military invasion or direct political control. In Britannia, all military-related 
archaeology has been automatically dated to post-AD43, interpreted exclusively as material 
introduced to the country following the Claudian invasion. Creighton (2006: 47-68) has 
argued that, by contrast, the early C1st material at Fishbourne, Gosbecks and Silchester was 
directly introduced by the Roman military prior to the invasion, suggesting that the army 
was stationed at these positions pre-AD43 as support for native leaders and elites.  
 
If the material was introduced to Britannia before the invasion, then its presence at 
any point in the landscape is not necessarily indicative of military presence or action as a 
result of conflict. Furthermore, a movement of "Roman" material independently of 
territorial conquest or control is implied by the artefacts recovered from Caledonia, north of 
the contemporary frontiers. It is likely that the military involvement in the area was of a 
higher level than is documented by the historical record, particularly in the C2nd, and 
therefore the army may have been responsible for some of the background archaeology. 
However, the nature and quantity of the assemblages suggest that frontiers could be 
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flexible regarding the movement of material culture (e.g. Hunter 2001). As it is the degree to 
which these artefacts were ever viewed as “Roman” by the people who used them is open 
to debate. 
 
Despite the problems associating casual and incidental finds with individual conflicts, 
any battlefield location project would benefit from the study of antiquarian reports, 
documenting caches of material (particularly weapons), and, in England, the annual Portable 
Antiquities Scheme reports which may contain evidence of previously unrecognised and 
unexplained artefact densities in the open field. Nevertheless there is still likely to be an 
impact on conflict landscape assemblages from incidental finds, as with the archaeological 
record more widely. Consultation of past reports may help to alleviate some of the 
problems. The main point is that Roman battle-related archaeology was not always confined 
to the battlefield, but could spread through a wider conflict landscape, including non-Roman 
settlements from the battlefield periphery outwards. The distribution of such artefacts may 
contribute to locating the battlefield lying at the epicentre of the dispersed assemblage.  
 
  
3.6.3: Battle-related monuments: victory monuments 
 
In modern combat archaeology, monuments and memorials are one of the key 
indicators of a conflict landscape epicentre, growing increasingly numerous and spatially 
concentrated closer to the area of most intensive activity (Schofield 2005: 19; Fig. 7). In 
most modern cases, monuments to battle, whatever their physical form, are spatially 
associated with the core battlefield area, but they can also be distributed, in lower numbers, 
in the wider landscape. Their identification, therefore, contributes to identifying the 
battlefield study area rather than the regional location. Battlefields have been marked by 
near-contemporary monuments for most of documented history, although their exact form 
is uncertain as very few survive (Foard & Morris 2012: 18-21). In some cases, they took the 
form of victory monuments, in others, mortuary monuments dedicated to the battle-dead. 
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Figure 7: Modern conflict landscapes and theatres of war (from Schofield 2005: 19). 
 
 
The ancient literary record suggests that battlefield monuments were neither 
common nor unknown features on ancient battlefields. On Greek battlefields, a quantity of 
arms and armour were evidently left as a victory trophy. Trophies are an almost ubiquitous 
feature of Greek post-battle narratives, constructed by the victors from the weaponry of the 
defeated in the immediate post-battle period (e.g. Thuc. 4.44.3, 4.97.1; Xen. Hell. 4.3.21, 
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7.2.15).99 Thucydides’ (1.105.6) description of an army caught in the middle of creating a 
trophy suggests that only part of the force would have engaged in this process. Pausanias 
(9.40.7) claimed that the Macedonians did not set up battlefield trophies, hence their 
absence from Hellenistic Greece, although Arrian (Anab. Alex. 1.16.4) claims that Alexander 
did construct a trophy on the Granicus battlefield. These trophies were evidently not 
intended to serve as permanent monuments, and ancient authors suggest that they would 
be allowed to fall into disrepair naturally over time (e.g. Plut. Mor. 273c-d; Diodorus 
13.24.5-6). 
 
More permanent marble or bronze memorials are rarer in the literary record, 
although references do exist. Pausanias (1.32.4-5) documented a marble victory monument 
at Marathon, and a separate memorial for Miltiades, the foundation of which may have 
been discovered in the north of the plain (Vanderpool 1966). However, victory monuments 
are more commonly associated with Pan-Hellenic religious sanctuaries, particularly Delphi. 
Pausanias (10.9.5-11.6) recorded a large number of battle victory monuments there, many 
in the form of human and deity sculptures, the majority of which were paid for from the 
victory booty. Monuments were also constructed in cities and settlements. Pausanias 
(3.12.9) described a shrine in Sparta dedicated to Maron and Alpheius, two casualties at 
Thermopylae, who were evidently recognised for their actions in the battle. Monuments to 
individuals, however, are less common than those to the battle itself or its collective 
casualties. 
 
 It is difficult to assess whether the construction of monuments was common on 
battlefields in the Roman world. The Roman army is not widely associated with the 
construction of battlefield trophies, as described in literary sources such as Cicero (De 
Inventione 2.23.69). However, a number are cited elsewhere. Pausanias (9.40.7) claims that 
Sulla constructed two trophies at Chaeronea following his victory over Mithridates. Drusus is 
said to have constructed a mound to serve as a trophy during his Germanic campaigns (Flor. 
Epitome 2.30.23), although it is not clear that it was located on a battlefield. Tacitus (Ann. 
2.18; 2.22) refers to the construction of victory trophies in Germania, in the context of them 
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 For a full list of literary references to the dedication of Greek battlefield trophies, see Pritchett 1971-1991ii: 
246-275. 
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being destroyed by the native population. Greek-style trophies are depicted on Roman coins 
commemorating victories, and sculpturally on Trajan’s Column (Fig. 8), which has led 
Coulston (2001: 25) to suggest that they were not as uncommon in reality as they are in the 
literary record. 
 
 
Figure 8: Tropaeum on Trajan's Column. Plate 78, scenes 204-206 (from www.trajanscolumn.org). 
 
 
Excavators have suggested that a battlefield trophy was constructed by German 
warriors at Kalkriese in imitation of the Roman style (Achim Rost pers. comm. 19th 
September 2015), and which implies that this was a known convention in the Roman world. 
There is further evidence of a classical-style trophy having been constructed by 
Scandinavian mercenaries at Thorsbjerg Bog in Denmark in the early C1st AD (Storgaard 
2003), again supporting the idea that these features were not exclusively Greek practice. 
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In the Roman-period literary sources, conflict monuments appear more commonly in 
cities or at key points of landscape visibility. A typical example is Augustus’ Tropaeum 
Augusti at La Turbie built on a key access route between Italy and Gaul and commemorating 
victory over the Alpine tribes, all of whom were named on the monument (Pliny NH. 3.24) 
which was. Similarly, Claudius erected his triumphal arches to his conquest of Britain in 
Rome and Gaul, the latter at Gesoriacum (Boulogne), marking the most common port for 
travel to and from Britannia (Dio 60.22.1). Part of the inscription on the Rome version 
survives. Although it does not mention any individual battles, it focuses instead on the 
submission of eleven ‘British’ kings (CIL VI.40416 = VI.31203 = AE 1948.80 = ILS216; Barrett 
1991). However, archaeological evidence has suggested that permanent victory monuments 
may have been more common both on battlefields and in military installations than is 
suggested by the written sources. At Adamklissi, a large mausoleum was constructed on a 
ridge close to the Tropaeum Traiani, overlooking an altar which records the name and town 
of origin of nearly 4000 casualties of war (see Richmond 1967).100 Both Richmond (1967) 
and Frere and Lepper (1988: 299-304) suggest that the Adamklissi monuments are situated 
on a battlefield. Dio (68.8.2) does record Trajan dedicating an altar to his battle-dead in 
Dacia. The question that remains unanswered is whether Adamklissi, particularly if it does 
mark a battlefield and battle-dead burial, was the exception in Roman practice that it is in 
the archaeological record, or simply, the only recognised extant example of a more 
widespread practice. The fact that two permanent victory monuments were also erected at 
the battlefield of Chaeronea following Sulla's victory over Mithridates, one of which has 
been identified archaeologically (Camp et al. 1992), suggests it may not have been unusual 
practice.  
 
Victory altars are also known from the Roman world, found archaeologically in 
military installations, which may have more informally recorded and commemorated battle 
on a more local level. An altar dedicated to Victoria was discovered c.400m outside the 
Roman city at Augsburg in Raetia, dated to AD260. The altar commemorated a victory of a 
Roman force over a Germanic war-band. No Roman units are named, although the 
commander, Marcus Simplicinius Genialis, is mentioned. This engagement, whatever its 
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Contra to perceptions that casualty lists were not created in the Roman world; see Clark 2014: 26-29, cf. 
Hope 2001. 
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nature, was evidently part of the wider “Third Century Crisis” and no doubt linked to the 
temporary abandonment of the limes in Raetia between 259 and c.265, but the actual 
engagement itself is not documented by the historical record. It is likely to be an error to 
examine Roman battle commemoration only by looking for monumental or pan-Empire 
practices, with evidence of local practices of memorialisation becoming increasing in the 
archaeological record. These more informal practices are particularly useful where they 
commemorate engagements which are not known from the written sources.  
 
 Monuments to victory, and sometimes defeat, could be constructed on battlefields 
in both the Greek and Roman worlds, although the scale to which this happened is unclear 
from the ancient literary record alone. The potential problem is that they may not survive 
with any above-surface trace. Archaeological exploration of a potential conflict area may 
turn up evidence of the monuments, particularly foundations or inscriptions, and it seems 
probable that these features would have a close spatial association with a battlefield. 
However, there is less evidence for smaller-scale memorials and monuments in settlements 
surrounding the battlefield, contrary to later memorialisation practices where local interests 
are represented in the conflict landscape. This does not mean that they did not exist, but at 
the very least, they do not appear to have survived in sufficient quantity to allow any 
reconstruction of a battlefield area. Instead, monuments appear to have been constructed, 
in most cases, in places of visibility to the core population. In the Greek world, this took the 
form of cities and religious sanctuaries, in the Roman, in the major cities of the Empire and 
key route points such as mountain passes (e.g. the Tropaeum Augusti) or ports (Claudius’ 
triumphal arch at Gesoriacum). It is unlikely, therefore, that there will be any increasing 
spatial concentration of battle-related monuments approaching the battlefields of antiquity 
comparable to that of modern sites, and indeed, there may be few or none on the sites 
themselves. In antiquity, it is more likely that study areas relevant to Greek battlefields, 
rather than Roman, can be shortlisted by this methodology, not least because their general 
location is often already known from topographic references in the literary record. It 
appears from both archaeology and literature that Greek battlefields were more visible 
through monuments, both the marking of graves and, in the case of non-inter-Greek 
warfare, with commemorative monuments. 
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3.6.4: Battle-related mortuary monuments 
 
 Much of what is now known about the disposal of the Greek and Roman battle-dead 
comes not from their physical remains, but rather the processes of memorialisation which 
followed, both on the battlefields and in settlements and sanctuaries. Although it is difficult 
to know whether the Greek battle-dead were universally left on (or near) the battlefield, it 
does in most cases seem probable, although formal inhumation or cremation may not have 
been universal (see Chapter Five). Monuments appear to have been constructed to mark 
these burials, although physical traces of only a few have been identified. Some took the 
form of tumuli, as at Marathon, Thermopylae and Plataea, sculpture, as at Chaeronea, or 
inscribed casualty lists, more commonly known from the communal burials of the war-dead 
in the Athenian Kerameikos. The exact spatial relationship of the place of burial, and 
consequently of the mortuary monument(s), to the battlefield is unclear due to the lack of 
artefact excavation on Greek sites, although in practical terms the grave is unlikely to have 
lain any significant distance from the area of fighting. It may be the case that the above-
surface monuments have largely disappeared, making the graves invisible from the surface. 
At Marathon, antiquarians travelling in the early C19th reported a second tumulus lying a 
short distance from the Soros, which was identified as the burial mound of the Plataeans 
and slaves (e.g. Leake 1841: 101).101 However, the second mound had evidently been lost by 
the time any cartographic or archaeological work was conducted on the site. For some time, 
two tumuli at Vrana, lying c.2.5km north of the Soros, were instead identified as the 
Plataean and slave burials (e.g. Hammond 1968), although this view has become less 
popular in recent years (see van der Veer 1982: 301-304). Pritchett (1974-1991iv: 128-129) 
suggested that the Vrana burials may be those of civilians killed by a Persian scouting party, 
although van der Veer (1982: 304) notes that the nature of the graves also makes this 
unlikely. 
 
 In the Roman world, it has been suggested that battlefield graves were not marked 
with any monuments, and that there were no casualty lists or informal memorials to 
(individual) casualties (see Clark 2014: 26-29). Pliny (NH 7.54) claimed that battlefield graves 
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 Leake described the tumulus as “... a heap of earth and stones, not indeed of any considerable height, but 
having much the appearance of being artificial.” 
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in the provinces were being disinterred and their remains despoiled, forcing the Roman 
army to adopt cremation as a form of disposal. It follows that efforts would not be made, if 
subsequent identification of the grave by hostile local populations was a concern, to mark it 
with monumentation. That said, an unmarked burial, even a cremation, would still be 
obvious from the surface in the immediate aftermath of the grave’s creation, and declining 
to mark it with any constructed monuments would not decrease its visibility. Germanicus 
allegedly raised a tumulus over the Varian dead in AD15 when he ‘rediscovered’ the 
battlefield, although the monument was destroyed soon afterwards by the Germans (Tac. 
Ann. 1.61-2; 2.7). The idea of marking a battlefield grave with a monument was therefore 
not entirely unknown in the Roman world, for all that it appears to have been uncommon 
from the literary record alone. This is further confirmed by the casualty altar at Adamklissi. 
While there have been arguments that the inscription of soldier’s names and place of origin 
is not a casualty list (e.g. Cooley 2012: 67-71), although very little has been offered by way 
of a viable alternative explanation. Human remains have not been found associated with 
Adamklissi, although this may not necessarily undermine the suggestion that the site marks 
an actual battlefield or battlefield grave. More informal or individual memorials to the dead 
may also be found in close association with battlefields and conflict landscapes, although 
very few epitaphs record a death in battle (Reuter 2005). The Caelius stone from Xanten (CIL 
13.8648) commemorates a casualty of the Varian War (not necessarily the Teutoburg, 
although this seems most likely) in a more informal context. While one tombstone alone is 
not enough to argue for a change in the way that Roman battle memorialisation is viewed in 
contemporary scholarship, it does, along with Adamklissi, suggest that the process was 
more complex than it appears in the literary record. Whether any archaeological traces 
survive is less clear. 
 
 Even without above-surface monuments, graves may have been discovered on 
battlefields and can be used to identify potential study areas within a landscape. In the 
cases where the above-ground monuments have been lost from Greek battlefield graves, 
the reported discovery of human remains in the past would still prove a useful tool to 
battlefield identification. Returning to Marathon, in the late C19th numerous agricultural 
workers reported finding human remains on their land in the north of the plain, an area 
which had been marshland in antiquity. On investigating the reports, the German surveyor 
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von Eschenburg found a large quantity of human bone in a vineyard, and suggested that the 
area was that of the burial of the Persian casualties from the battle, which Pausanias 
(1.32.5) reported the Athenians had done in a non-specific manner (Pritchett 1965-1992ii: 1-
11). Although not necessarily indicative of a formal burial, inasmuch as the historical record 
also implies that large numbers of Persians died through drowning by fleeing into the marsh 
(Paus. 1.32.7), the presence of potential battle-casualties on the site would support a 
hypothesis that a battle has taken place close by. Mass graves have been reported by 
Roman antiquarians engaged in looking for battlefields, particularly Mons Graupius (see 
Maxwell 1990). If they could be associated with conflict, mass graves in the Roman period 
would also strongly indicate a battlefield on or near the burial. While the lack of details and 
frequent loss of material from antiquarian discoveries of graves make it difficult to trust the 
reports, records of human remains in the landscape may still prove a useful desktop 
research took in identifying potentially battlefield areas. 
 
 
3.7: Battlefields and historical context 
 
 Discovering a battlefield within a landscape does not necessarily provide it with a 
historical context, particularly those from the Roman provinces. In many ways, the 
archaeological evidence relies on the ancient literary record, however problematic it is, to 
provide a historical context for any evidence of conflict in antiquity. The Flavian and Severan 
camps in Caledonia can be better understood because of the known campaigns of Agricola 
and Septimius Severus. In some cases, uncertainties in dating have meant it is difficult to 
distinguish which period of conflict a site is associated with. The Iron Age hill-forts at Hod 
Hill, Maiden Castle and South Cadbury, all show evidence of conflict in the mid-C1st AD, but 
it is not possible on the archaeology alone to conclusively link it to the AD43 invasion, the 
post-AD43 consolidation, or the Boudican Revolt. In some ways this does not necessarily 
matter, as pointed out in the case of South Cadbury, where it was observed in the context of 
a massacre that “...we are glimpsing the actions of people undertaken... in the aftermath of 
internecine conflict. The exact moment within the first century AD when this... occurred is 
not only unknowable; it is largely irrelevant” (Barrett et al. 2000: 116). In the case of 
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toponymically-identified battlefields, it may be thought of as simpler to associate any 
evidence of conflict with a historically documented battle associated with a site or area, 
although the possibility that additional, unattested battles may also have taken place should 
not necessarily be excluded. 
 
In the Roman provinces however, it may be more difficult to identify the historical 
context of a battlefield, due to the vagueness of location and evident incompleteness of the 
documentation regarding conflict. If a battlefield was discovered in Caledonian territory, 
with a material culture consistent with the late C1st AD, it would be immediately tempting to 
identify it as Mons Graupius, when in reality, it could be associated with any number of 
conflicts which took place as part of the Agricolan campaigns. The issue of providing a 
historical context has been particularly problematic at Harzhorn. The coins from the site 
date it to between 225 and AD236, during which period the only historically documented 
campaign is that of Maximinus Thrax (Berger et al. 2013; cf. Herodian 7.2.1-9; SHA Duo Max. 
12.1-5). The dating issue is complicated by the presence of a dolabra inscribed “LEG IIII S A”, 
identified as the mark of the Legio IIII Flavia Severiana Alexandriana (Fig 8; Wiegels et al. 
2011). This legion was, at the time, stationed in Singidunum (modern Belgrade) in Moesia 
Superior, over 1000km from the battlefield (Farnum 2005). However, the excavators have 
not been able to state conclusively that the battle even involved the Roman army, rather 
than a Germanic force(s) using military kit also used contemporaneously by the Roman army 
(Meyer & Moosbauer 2013). Although it is clear that the army equipped with Roman-style 
weaponry won the battle, the historical context of the engagement is completely unknown, 
beyond a potential association with Maximinus Thrax. This does not however, remove 
anything from the narrative reconstruction of the battle which has been possible from the 
artefact distribution, which in turn makes this engagement, without a name, one of the best 
understood military engagements from antiquity. 
 
 Even archaeological battlefields which do synchronise with the known historical 
record may be subject to debate over their identification. The identification of the 
battlefield at Kalkriese has been subjected to numerous challenges which associate it 
instead with the campaigns of Germanicus, and a battle between the Germans and the 
Roman army under Caecina. Peter Kehne (2000) has been a particularly prominent objector 
148 
 
to the identification, arguing that a later date is far more plausible. In one article he (2003: 
93-104) went so far as to accuse a “Kalkriese-Kartell”, keen to exploit the upcoming 
anniversary of the battle, of deliberately hiding finds which would support a later date for 
the site, including artefacts inscribed with references to the Legio I and Legio V Alaudae. 
However, as Wilbers-Rost (2003: 138) rightly observes, objections to the identification of 
Kalkriese as the Varian site are based largely on numismatic dating, while consideration of 
the entire assemblage makes it almost certain that the site is associated with the 
destruction of Varus’ army. Baecula has also been subjected to questioning about its 
identity, albeit on a much smaller scale, despite the close correlations of the site at Santo 
Tomé to the description of the battlefield in the historical record. There is no significant 
doubt that the site dates to the Second Punic War, but objections have been made that it 
was identified as Baecula for archaeological convenience on insufficient evidence (Canto 
2011). However, the evidential basis for this is largely that the site does not fit the historical 
narrative of the conflict, rather than anything to do with the archaeology, and is unlikely to 
have any real substantiation. Given that one of the major aims of ancient battlefield 
archaeology should be to free the discipline from the constraints of a problematic written 
record, the fact that sites do not exactly fit an interpretation of the sources should not be a 
major issue. Although a known historical context is certainly a valuable interpretive tool, 
research at Harzhorn suggests that its absence is not a insurmountable problem. In some 
cases, the identification of battles and campaigns that are undocumented may be more 
valuable than locating a historically-attested site such as Mons Graupius. 
 
 
3.8: Conclusion 
 
 Current archaeological research suggests that there may be evidence for ancient 
battlefield locations within the wider landscape around a site. If identified, this evidence can 
provide a narrower range of potential study area which can subsequently be subjected to 
more detailed survey. This may lead to identification both of historically documented sites 
and, potentially, also to sites whose existence is not noted in the ancient sources. The 
minimum extent of campaigning in the Roman provinces can be determined from the 
149 
 
presence of temporary installations, although a counterpart is unlikely to exist through the 
majority of Greek warfare. Both Greek and Roman armies, however, do appear to have 
constructed battlefield camps within a relatively close distance of the battlefield, no more 
than c.5km in documented cases, which may provide more accurate landscape 
identification. Battle in the Roman world has been shown through the conflict landscapes of 
Kalkriese and Abritus to have had a material impact not just on the battlefield, but in the 
surrounding area. Influxes of Roman military equipment, or indeed simply metal, into a 
civilian settlement may be indicative that the site lay within a conflict landscape, or was at 
least impacted by the presence of one elsewhere. Post-battle constructed features, 
including mortuary architecture and memorials, are unlikely to survive in the archaeological 
record to indicate the location of a battle. They were clearly originally extant on many sites, 
and it may be possible to identify their location through the remains of foundations, historic 
map and terrain regression, and antiquarian reports. The most important factor is the 
recognition that, just as in C20th conflict, the physical impact of battle in antiquity was not 
confined only to the battlefield, but spread into the surrounding area. As such, it may be 
possible to recognise this impact in the landscape, use it to establish the focal point, and in 
so doing, locate the battlefield. 
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Chapter Four: Artefact assemblages and battlefield looting102 
 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
 The archaeology of ancient battle is defined by more than just weapons and armour, 
in some circumstances representing elements of the entire kit carried by soldiers on and 
around the battlefield. Establishing what form the archaeology of ancient battle takes in 
contemporary assemblages is central both to the recognition and identification of new sites, 
and narrative reinterpretation of individual engagements. Unlike post-blackpowder warfare, 
there is no single artefact category which defines ancient battlefield assemblages. Rather, 
they are characterised by a range of metal finds, predominantly small, low-value artefacts 
which would have been difficult to recover in the aftermath of battle. The survival and 
spatial distribution of the assemblages is impacted both by depositional processes before, 
during, and after the fighting, as well as post-battle recovery activity, most typically looting. 
 
 In this chapter, and Chapter Five, there is what might be considered a 
disproportionate focus on post-battle processes, looting and the disposal of the dead, 
including consideration of the ancient literary evidence. This focus reflects the fact that 
there has been little serious engagement with the concepts of ancient post-battle 
processing on a general level, only an acknowledgment that looting and disposal happened 
and will affect the archaeology in some way. An in-depth consideration is necessary of post-
battle activity, inclusive of the written evidence, to understand not just site formation 
processes on ancient battlefields and the consequent assemblages, but also why they 
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 For the purposes here, the term "looting" is used in a non-perjorative way to describe the recovery of any 
material from a battlefield, regardless of its original ownership. The material itself is correspondingly referred 
to as "loot". In modern conflict studies "looting" is typically characterised as a process of economic 
appropriation for individual, as opposed to state, enrichment (see Azam & Hoeffler 2002; Mac Ginty 2004, 
857-859) but can be employed in a battlefield context, In this thesis, the term is used in part for consistency 
with the difference in terminology used in classical antiquity to refer to battlefield recovery as opposed to 
other military contexts (see 4.4.2), and to avoid confusion in changing terminology dependent on which army 
was conducting the activity. It also reflects that many of the artefacts taken on to ancient battlefields were 
private, rather than institutional, possessions. The term "looting" should not be taken to imply that the process 
was a non-legitimate process nor that judgement is being passed on the moralistic qualities of the activity in 
either antiquity or the modern day.  
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manifest in one particular way over another. Archaeological methodology can then be 
targeted towards the archaeology which will survive on these sites. 
 
Looting is one of the major site formation factors on battlefields from any period, 
severely reducing the assemblage which survives in the archaeological record. The process 
not only reduces the absolute quantity of material, but can also distort the spatial 
distribution of the assemblage, particularly by reducing the density of artefacts in the core 
battlefield. The ancient literary record together with archaeological evidence from military 
installations suggests that the majority of weapons and armour deposited during ancient 
battle was recovered in the aftermath of fighting by looting. The weapons assemblages 
recovered from military installations, which in some cases can be substantial, was unlikely to 
have been incidentally located in these positions, but transported as part of the wider 
process for the recycling of military kit within the Roman army (see Bishop 1985). Very few 
finds of military equipment from inside installations are likely to have been incidentally 
located there, and survive in context only because circumstances prevented their removal, 
often rapid abandonment or surprise destruction. However, the assemblages from a 
number of battlefields have indicated that a far wider range of small projectiles, fragments 
and non-weaponry artefacts were also deposited by battle and, in some cases, by the 
process of looting itself. It is these artefacts which survive on ancient battlefields in 
diagnostically significant quantities, and which define the archaeology of later battle. 
However, it is improbable that these artefacts were deliberately rejected, particularly by 
subsequent civilian looting, but rather survived because their physical size made them 
difficult to see. 
 
By studying the looting process in any historical period, particularly extrapolating 
backwards from identified battlefields, it becomes possible to model both the probable 
assemblage nature and distribution for comparable sites. This modelling may prove 
particularly useful for battlefield studies in the Greek and Roman world where recognition 
of battle-related material within the wider landscape is a research priority. This chapter 
examines the deposition of artefacts during the process of ancient battle and the 
subsequent battlefield looting process in detail, and the consequent nature of ancient 
battlefield archaeology in the modern day. It suggests that the signature archaeology of 
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ancient battle may not be defined by single artefact categories, as on later battlefields, but 
rather by the close spatial proximity of a relatively high quantity of different military-related 
artefact categories. 
 
 
4.2: The archaeology of ancient battle 
 
 The “archaeology of ancient battle” has traditionally been envisioned, certainly in 
the period of battle, as being almost identical to the “archaeology of ancient military 
equipment”, but represented by a larger quantity of broken pieces. Along with the bodies of 
the dead, weaponry and armour are almost exclusively the only artefacts mentioned in the 
post-battle narratives of the literary sources (e.g. Polyb. 15.14.1-2; Sall. Bell.Jug. 101.11 Tac. 
Agric. 37; Ann. 2.18; 14.37; Dio 76.7).103 The literary sources, particularly Roman period 
ones, frequently describe the spatial deposition of weaponry, armour and the dead as being 
extensive across the battlefield. Assemblages are described as extending over several miles 
(e.g. Plut. Caes. 19.11; Tac. Agric. 37, Ann. 2.18; Sall. Bell. Jug. 101.11). In other cases, they 
are portrayed as large heaps on the battlefield (e.g. Polyb. 15.14.1-2; Caes. Bell. Gall. 2.27; 
Tac. Ann. 14.37, Hist. 4.20; Plut. Aemilius 21.5, Caes. 20.5). In ancient battlefield studies, 
assemblages have commonly been characterised as containing weaponry, typically 
projectiles and swords, and armour, including shields, body-armour, and greaves. What 
appears to have been forgotten, in many cases, is that weapons and armour were in reality 
a composite creation made from multiple different fittings and pieces bound together, 
which could be fragmented under physical stress. 
 
However, a far wider range of artefacts were actually taken on to the battlefield by 
individual soldiers, and this is reflected in the surviving assemblages from sites, including 
coins, brooches and pins,, fittings, buckles and studs. The archaeology of ancient battle also 
contains cavalry equipment, particularly fittings from bridles and harnesses, also deposited 
during or after the period of fighting. The Kalkriese and Harzhorn assemblages also 
contained dolabra, part of the entrenchment equipment Vegetius (Epitome 2.18, 2.25) said 
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 See Hanson (1989: 197-203) for literary descriptions of post-conflict Greek battlefields. 
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the Roman soldier carried on the march, and which could evidently be used on the 
battlefield (cf. Tac. Hist. 2.45). Items which were not typically fastened to or carried by 
soldiers are less common on battlefields, although they occur in great quantity at Kalkriese 
as a result of the looting of the Roman baggage-train. The Kalkriese assemblage includes a 
range of what are defined as “camp goods” in later conflict archaeology, typically deposited 
when an armed force moving between military installations was attacked and destroyed on 
the march. A comparable assemblage to that at Kalkriese, including cooking-ware, furniture 
and decorative features along with jewellery was recovered from the Sand Creek Massacre 
site, but is uncommon in most battlefield contexts (Greene & Scott 2006: 89). Similar 
assemblages were not recovered from Baecula or Harzhorn and yet the assemblages from 
both did contain non-weaponry artefacts and potentially personal possessions, as on many 
later battlefields such as the Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1989). It is clear that the concept of 
ancient battlefield archaeology as characterised only by weapons and armour is an 
oversimplification of the reality. 
 
 
4.2.1: Depositional processes 
 
The assemblages deposited by ancient battle are substantial both in nature and 
spatial distribution. Although the majority of artefacts are usually located in the core area of 
the battlefield, where the main fighting was concentrated, some are found in the periphery 
in areas associated with advance, rout, and retreat. The landscape at Kalkriese is perhaps 
the most substantial, covering an extended area almost 15km in length, with a 
concentration at a central site at the Oberesch, and a small extension of material 2km to the 
north-west which may represent fleeing soldiers (Fig. 9). The assemblage from the Harzhorn 
battlefield also extends over a large landscape area, with multiple concentrations of 
material which have been identified as ‘hot spots’ of activity (Fig. 10). At Baecula, the only 
pitched battlefield explored to date, transect survey revealed high levels of deposition in the 
core battlefield (Fig. 11).  
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Figure 9: Distribution of Roman finds in the Kalkriese conflict landscape (from Rost & Wilbers-Rost 2010: 118). 
 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of Roman finds at Harzhorn (from Berger et al. 2010/13: 321). 
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Figure 11: Transect survey of the core battlefield at Baecula (from Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012). 
 
 
Battle-period deposition is an unusual archaeological phenomenon. Unlike most 
sites, the assemblage recovered does not represent an extended period of occupation, 
during which it may be difficult to identify individual instances beyond general layers of 
stratification. Rather, the temporal range is usually limited to days, even hours, making most 
battlefields single-occupation sites. As such, the depositional process has typically been 
defined as “battle”. Although the rates of battle-period deposition are unlikely to match the 
quantity of individual munitions used on post-blackpowder sites, particularly sites such as 
Gettysburg where thousands of rounds of munitions were deposited, the assemblage left on 
the battlefield is likely to have been substantial by the end of the fighting. Hundreds, if not 
thousands, of items of weapons and armour would have lain on the surface, and many more 
projectiles, ranging from large pila heads to small lead glandes to arrowheads, all of which 
are common finds on ancient conflict sites (see 1.5). 
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Unlike most military situations, particularly in the Roman world, accidental loss – of a 
kind – is accepted as a probable cause of deposition for military artefacts on a battlefield. In 
other circumstances, it is argued that accidental loss is an improbable cause of deposition, 
particularly for larger objects such as weapons and armour, because their size made them 
difficult to lose (Bishop & Coulston 2006: 24-25). However, the situation seems somewhat 
different in the context of a battlefield, where incidental loss was common, at least 
according to the literary sources, and it is rather the failure to recover these artefacts later 
which was the more problematic factor. A large number of projectiles were evidently lost 
during the battle, and it is likely that only a small proportion actually became embedded in a 
soldier or enemy shield (Pritchett 1974-1991v: 56-61; Goldsworthy 1996: 183-190). Sim and 
Ridge (2002: 78-79) calculate that a force of 100 archers and 100 ballista operators could 
deposit 6000 arrows and 1100 bolts in the space of five minutes, representing a substantial 
deposition on the battlefield. 
 
It might also be expected that at least one sword and shield (or equivalent weapon 
and armour) would be deposited for each casualty during the battle. Depending on the army 
sizes involved, this could be represent hundreds, even thousands of artefacts deposited as a 
result of casualty loss during the battle. Unlike modern munitions, it may not be possible to 
distinguish fired from unfired projectiles, as no obvious trace was left by the propulsion 
process. Unfired munitions and projectiles can represent a number of factors, from being 
dropped or lost in battle before firing, falling from the bodies of the battle-dead as they 
were being moved, as at Palo Alto (Haecker & Mauck 2009), and, as documented in 
numerous instances from the American Civil War, being confiscated from captured soldiers 
to prevent them from being used in a rallying attack (Lawrence Babits pers. comm. January 
2015). 
 
Greek and Roman sources also record deliberate discarding of weaponry, often to 
facilitate escape from the battlefield, although on some occasions as a gesture of surrender 
(e.g. Thuc. 7.45.2; Polyb. 15.14.2; Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.95; Diony. Hali. Antiq. 5.47.1; Plut. 
Flamininus 8.4; Dio 56.22.1). Hanson (1989: 181-184) implied that intentional abandonment 
played a minor role in battlefield deposition, as very few soldiers would deliberately discard 
weaponry to flee as it would pose more of a tactical risk than carrying it. However, during 
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the end-stages of the Varian battle, Dio (40.24.3) documented Roman soldiers deliberately 
discarding their weaponry in a process comparable to the combat disintegration seen in the 
late stages of the Little Bighorn (Fox 1993: 48-49) and, to a lesser degree, the First Manassas 
(Reeves 2010). It is probable that deliberate discarding of weaponry did take place on 
ancient battlefields, regardless of the measured tactical risks, although it may be down to 
archaeology to establish to what degree this happened. Substantial depositions of caligae 
nails have been identified at Baecula and Harzhorn, evidently themselves the overall 
consequences of accidental loss during battle. Spatial analysis indicates that they are 
concentrated in areas of rough terrain and/or intensive manoeuvring on the battlefield, 
particularly associated with engagement with the enemy. The distribution therefore 
suggests that the deposition of caligae was not even across the battlefield, but rather, 
concentrated in particular areas of activity or terrain. 
 
The impact of hand-to-hand fighting on the deposition of artefacts on a battlefield 
has not been dealt with in particular depth by later battlefield archaeology. The introduction 
of blackpowder guns into battle reduced the period spend in direct contact with the enemy, 
although battlefield archaeology is increasingly indicating that periods of hand-to-hand 
skirmishing were common on the periphery of battlefields through to at least the C19th. 
Identification of these incidents has suggested that the scale of deposition resulting from 
close-quarter fighting can be substantial, if often inconsistent. At Towton, non-weapon 
artefacts were found in a number of clusters on the battlefield, evidently associated with 
hand-to-hand fighting, but at Bosworth, fought only 14 years later, almost no non-weaponry 
artefacts have been recovered (Foard & Curry 2013: 191-192). At Culloden, a concentration 
of military kit fittings from the battlefield periphery appears to have been deposited by 
hand-to-hand engagement, including buttons, buckles, and insignia (Pollard 2009b). In 
antiquity, far more of the battle would have been fought at close-quarter,   with a greater 
number of combatants and wider range of metal-based equipment in use by individual 
soldiers. The depositional rate of damaged weapon and armour fragments should, 
therefore, be both higher and more widely distributed on sites from the Classical world. A 
number of kit fittings were recovered from the battlefields at Baecula and Harzhorn which 
showed evidence of deposition due to damage in fighting. A far higher quantity has been 
recovered from Kalkriese, but in this particular circumstance the majority of the deposition 
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appears to have been the result of post-battle stripping of the Roman dead, rather than 
damage in battle (see Rost 2009a, 2009b; Rost & Wilbers-Rost 2010, 2012). Kalkriese raises 
the possibility that some of the deposition at a battlefield may directly result from the post-
battle period, suggesting that the theory of single-cause deposition – fighting – may in some 
cases be an oversimplification. 
 
 
4.2.2: Recognising ancient battlefield archaeology 
 
 Modern battlefield archaeology has suggested that the discipline requires a site to 
display “unique depositional patterning” (Scott & McFeaters 2011: 107) in the distribution 
and nature of the assemblage. Diagnostically-relevant “signature” artefacts have been 
identified in many later periods, and are in most cases associated with weaponry. Post-
blackpowder sites are typically recognised through the presence of musket or pistol balls, 
canister shot or other munitions, while medieval sites such as Towton and Bosworth can be 
recognised through the presence of iron arrowheads. This focus is not because other non-
weaponry artefact categories are never recovered from sites, as buckles, buttons, insignia, 
cavalry fittings, and coins are frequently found on battlefields from all periods (Foard & 
Morris 2012: 23). However, it can be difficult to associate the deposition of these artefacts 
firmly with battle, as opposed to any other loss mechanism (Foard 2012: 36; cf. Pratt 2009). 
Although the non-weaponry finds may be used as a supplementary source of evidence in 
reconstructing the battle, particularly phases of hand-to-hand skirmishing, they are not 
often used in a diagnostic manner to identify the location or physical extent of a battlefield.  
 
By contrast, the large assemblages of munitions and projectiles deposited by more 
modern conflict are more distinctive and can be identified as resulting from battle even 
when they are found unexpectedly. At Megiddo in Israel, a team of biblical archaeologists 
with no experience of conflict archaeology were able to identify an assemblage from a 
battle of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which was discovered when they cleared topsoil above 
previously excavated Neo-Assyrian remains (Cline & Sutter 2011). At Harzhorn, the 
excavators have had trouble even distinguishing Roman material from later artefacts in the 
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assemblage. This has not concerned the weaponry as much as the military kit, particularly 
caligae nails, the form of which in the Roman period is often indistinguishable from 
examples used through the medieval, and even early modern period (Berger et al. 2010/13). 
The dating of c.950 artefacts remains uncertain because of this overlap in typological form.  
 
 However, identifying the assemblage from an ancient battle may be difficult in some 
contexts, particularly when a site is identified independently from an associated toponym. 
There is a range of artefact types, predominantly weaponry and armour, which can be firmly 
associated with the presence of combatants, and often, from find-context, with conflict 
more specifically. Deposition of weaponry, particularly projectiles, is often evidence of 
fighting, although Breeze (2011) noted in the case of Burnswark, and therefore potentially 
other sites, that a projectile assemblage might also be left by military training exercises. 
Weapons and armour were, as noted by Bishop (2011: 115-117), far less vulnerable to 
accidental loss than smaller non-weaponry fittings, and it is likely that any substantial 
assemblage would represent deliberate activity. However, weaponry and armour are only 
part of ancient (Roman) battlefield assemblages. As argued later in this chapter, it is not just 
the density and distribution of weaponry which is diagnostically significant to ancient 
battlefields, but also a range of non-weaponry finds, particularly kit fittings, horse fittings, 
coins and caligae nails (Roman).  
 
Some of these artefact categories can be associated, often predominantly, with the 
presence of the military in general, although there is little possible distinction between 
combatant and non-combatant users (see Allison 2013: 65-108). Ancient battle-related 
assemblages are characterised not just by one artefact type, although certain artefacts such 
as weapons are more diagnostically significant than pottery. Rather, they are characterised 
by location of several different types of artefact, some of which may be exclusively located 
with the military and others not, in a spatially limited context. Identification is particularly 
assisted if the material stands out from any civilian background, often associated with 
Roman material in an area of no known Roman settlement, as at Kalkriese. Spanish 
archaeologists working on identifying sites from the Punic War in northern Spain have 
recently found that concentrations of Graeco-Roman pottery have proved diagnostically 
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significant, if not of a battlefield, then of areas of Roman military activity, as these artefacts 
are not known from contemporaneous civilian settlements. 
 
As the assemblages of ancient battlefields may well be characterised not just by the 
presence of weaponry but also non-weaponry artefacts, it may prove a challenge to 
recognise these assemblages in the archaeological record, particularly when they emerge 
incidentally. There is a question of how such artefacts can be diagnostic of battlefields when 
the prior identification of the area as a military site is necessary to associate them with the 
army at all. Marginalising the non-weaponry assemblage is unlikely to be particularly 
helpful, however, as it has an important role to play in both identifying/verifying and 
interpreting battlefield sites. However, it may prove difficult first to identify the non-
weaponry assemblage as being associated with a battle, prior to any corroborating 
weaponry and armour finds, and secondly, to be certain that the artefacts were deposited 
as a direct result of battle, rather than subsequent land-use. At Baecula, Kalkriese, and 
Harzhorn, the identification of the assemblages did not face the latter problem, as none of 
the areas appear to have had high levels of subsequent civilian occupation or land-use. This 
issue may prove a greater problem in other provinces. 
 
The problem with recognising ancient battlefield assemblages is that the surviving 
archaeology is not characterised or dominated by the same artefact categories as the 
original battle-period deposition was. In considering the survival of ancient battlefield 
assemblages, it is not the initial deposition of material which has been protested by 
historians (e.g. Hanson 1989: 204) as much as the survival of the assemblage. This is 
typically not in terms of the general survival of any element of the archaeological record, 
dependent on taphonomic processes and chemical conditions, but rather, predicated on the 
assumption that the entire battle-deposited assemblage would have been cleared by the 
victorious army following the battle (e.g. Webster 1993: 100). To some degree, Webster is 
correct. The quantity of weaponry and armour which survives, if any, is a very minimal 
proportion of what was originally deposited, with the majority of the assemblage removed 
at an earlier point, in all probability very soon after the fighting had finished. However, the 
fact that assemblages survive at Baecula, Kalkriese and Harzhorn, as well as at other ancient 
conflict sites, demonstrates that looting did not universally clear a battlefield of all artefacts.  
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The fate of the other artefacts, such as clothing fittings, cavalry equipment or coins, 
deposited on the battlefield is less clear. They are not discussed by the ancient sources, and 
as a result, have largely not been recognised by ancient battlefield studies. To understand 
the survival of ancient battlefield assemblages, it is necessary to attempt to reconstruct the 
battlefield looting process based on the archaeological remains, to determine what artefacts 
were recovered in the aftermath of battle, and which were not. It could be argued that 
Baecula, Kalkriese and Harzhorn are aberrations and are not representative of ancient 
battlefields as a whole. While this argument has commonly been used to explain Kalkriese, 
where the circumstances of the battle are admittedly unusual (e.g. Coulston 2001; Sabin 
2007; Whitby 2007) it is less clear what unique circumstances affected Baecula and 
Harzhorn, particularly the latter which was a typical pitched battle. If battlefield looting was 
so effective at clearing battlefields, then how did these assemblages survive and what other 
sites might therefore also have done? 
 
 
4.3: Battlefield looting in historical context 
 
Battlefield looting has a significant impact on the archaeology of battle in any period, 
and understanding the level of looting/relic hunting, and targeted areas, has made an 
important contribution to understanding the impact of the process on the spatial 
distribution of the assemblages. Exploring the historical phenomenon of battlefield looting 
may provide a contextual framework with which to interpret the processes evident on 
ancient sites. Battlefield looting can be a multi-staged process, beginning in the immediate 
aftermath of battle, and sometimes continuing for months, even years, often with local 
civilian involvement in later phases. In the initial post-battle period, there appears to have 
been a definite selection bias towards functional weaponry and munitions, either for 
immediate reuse or general military supply, and even damaged weapons could be recovered 
to “cannibalise” for parts, or scrap and reprocess (Babits 2011). Few firearms have been 
recovered from any excavated battlefield, and even fragmented pieces are rare.104 
Munitions and projectiles were evidently also recovered in substantial number in the 
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 Sites with firearm fragments include Culloden (Pollard 2009b); Pea Ridge (Carlson-Drexler et al. 2008: 52-
54); and the Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1989: 186). 
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aftermath of battle. Foard and Morris (2012: 63) suggest that iron arrowheads were 
systematically collected from medieval battlefields, although those which had broken with 
the points embedded in the topsoil could easily be missed. On blackpowder battlefields, 
munitions were collected by soldiers and civilians in the aftermath of battle, particularly in 
the core area of the site. The only weapons, munitions or indeed any metal artefacts, which 
escaped recovery are likely to have done so because they were physically obscured on the 
battlefield, often because of their small size. Before the widespread use of metal detectors, 
archaeological surveyors faced comparable problems identifying munitions during field-
walking, although later surveys have indicated that the majority of the assemblage was in 
the topsoil (Foard & Morris 2012: 67). 
 
In both immediate and subsequent battlefield looting there was evidently a spatial 
concentration on the core battlefield, the area of most intensive fighting. This has created a 
distributional effect visible on multiple sites in the United States which has been informally 
named the “donut effect”.105 The “donut effect” is created by the concentration of post-
battle looting in areas of high artefact deposition (i.e. heavy battle-period activity) at the 
expense of more peripheral areas of lower deposition (Legg et al. 2005: 70). The higher 
recovery rate of artefacts from the areas of highest original deposition artificially reduces 
the proportional discrepancy between the central and peripheral battlefield areas. In 
extreme circumstances, this could lead to the almost complete stripping of artefacts from 
the central area of a battlefield. Although areas of high deposition may still have numerically 
superior artefact quantities overall in comparison to the periphery, the scatter represents a 
far lower proportion of the original assemblage. 
 
As such, it would be expected that material, whatever the proportion, will survive 
across the entire extent of a battlefield – in central areas, because the original density was 
of sufficient quantity that elements survive despite intensive looting, on the periphery 
because, despite lower overall depositional rates, less of the assemblage was removed by 
looting. Spatial interpretation of any battlefield assemblage must always consider the 
phenomenon of post-battle looting and its impact on the extant archaeology, particularly in 
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 Thanks to Professor Lawrence Babits and Dr. Steven Smith for this term. 
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associating particular areas of the site with particular intensity levels in fighting. Although 
weapons and munitions were of the most prominent interest to looters, it is evident that 
almost anything would have been taken as being of value to someone, however low its 
innate value. The extant assemblages are unlikely to represent rejected material, but rather, 
the portion of the assemblage which was not visible during post-battle activity. 
 
 
4.3.1: The purpose of battlefield looting 
 
Political theory recognises four pre-requisites to looting in any violent context: the 
availability of (potential) looters, the availability of ‘lootable’ material, the absence of 
restraint, and a permissible socio-cultural environment (Mac Ginty 2004: 861-866).106 In 
most cases, the ultimate purpose of looting is one of economic acquisition, whether on an 
institutional or individual basis, although there are isolated instances of both looting as a 
process of resource denial, and for destructive purposes (see Azam & Hoeffler 2002; Ball 
2015: 311-313). The artefacts which are of greatest priority to recover, and were therefore 
taken earlier in the process, were those of the highest value, either in terms of their 
immediate functional use, or longer-term economic value. Modern social studies of looting 
make a distinction between legitimate and sanctioned military recovery of battle-deposited 
material (mainly weapons), and the predatory economic appropriation of material 
resources, including personal belongings, for individual, rather than institutional, benefit 
(Mac Ginty 2004: 857-59). 
 
However, contemporary ideas on the legitimacy (or otherwise) of looting are based 
on modern military logistics, where soldiers are equipped centrally from state resources. A 
distinction can therefore be drawn between weaponry and military kit, which can in most 
cases be legally recovered or looted, and personal possessions, the taking of which is 
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 “Lootable” can refer either to the value of the material and the consequent worth of taking it, or to its 
physical availability, particularly regarding onward transportation. Large, bulky items in particular will only be 
lootable, whatever their innate value, when the possibility exists of moving them; in cases where it is not 
possible, more valuable elements may instead represent the lootable worth, and be stripped from the larger 
object. 
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prohibited by the majority of modern armies.107 This distinction is perhaps not as clear-cut 
in antiquity, since soldiers paid for and owned their own military equipment, making it their 
own personal property and not that of the institutional army or state. Xenophon (Hell. 4.2.5) 
describes Hellenistic commanders offering financial incentives to units for supplying 
themselves with proper equipment, and elsewhere documents soldiers individually selling 
their arms when necessary (Xen. Anab. 7.2.3). The process of equipping soldiers in the 
Roman Republic is unclear, with regards to whether there was state supply of equipment or 
merely general supervision of the suitability of privately-sourced kit, although in either cse 
soldiers eventually paid for their own equipment.  In the permanent standing army of the 
Empire kit was often supplied or facilitated by the army and paid for in a series of regular 
deductions from wages (Bishop & Coulston 2006: 262-263), although this does not 
necessarily imply uniformity. The distinction between institutional and personal resources in 
antiquity is therefore less clear than in modern concepts of military looting. 
 
Many of the artefacts looted from battlefields of any period may have gone back 
into military circulation, particularly munitions in later conflicts, easing the economic and 
logistical pressure of constant resupply. Civilians frequently became involved in efforts to 
loot battlefields, particularly during long-running conflicts which had impacted their own 
economic prospects. A memoir written after Sherman’s campaign in Georgia in 1864 
documents local populations combing the battlefields searching for munitions which they 
could sell back to the army in exchange for food and clothing (Gay 1894: 249-252). The New 
York Evening Post (July 10th 1863) had previously reported mass looting from the battlefield 
at Gettysburg by entrepreneurial civilians, who were alleged to be collecting thousands of 
dollars worth of munitions every day. It was not just munitions that were of interest, 
however, as observed at Waterloo by one combatant who noted that a sale of clothing 
stripped from the battle-dead was organised soon after the battle by Lord Edward Somerset 
(Mercer 1870: 62). The process of battlefield looting at Waterloo was extensive and varied, 
affecting far more artefact categories than weapons, armour, and military kit (see O'Keefe 
2014: 57-67). During WWI, many soldiers on the Western Front informally supplemented 
their kit from artefacts taken directly from casualties, also functioning as a form of resource 
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 See Harrison (2008) for legal issues and looting of personal possessions during conflict. 
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supplementation (Fraser & Brown 2007). Similar practices occurred in WWII, although there 
was found to be a blurred boundary between resource supplementation and theft in the 
battles fought in the Pacific theatre. One case study of American soldiers suggested that 
personal belongings were left alone on the European and African battlefields, but frequently 
stolen in the Oriental campaigns, and taken as souvenirs of war, particularly those belonging 
to Japanese casualties, despite official prohibition (Harrison 2008). Subsequent battlefield 
looting activity, often after the end of a conflict, still focused on the recovery of munitions, 
but the market shifted from the contemporary institutional military to individual 
antiquarians. Battlefields could be combed for souvenirs to sell to interested tourists, 
particularly at famous sites such as Waterloo (Semmel 2000; O'Keefe 2014: 57-67) and 
Gettysburg (Reardon & Vossler 2013: 753), and later, the battlefields of the Western Front 
(Lloyd 1998: 23). Relic hunting has become such a problem since the widespread availability 
of metal detectors that it is likely that almost all known battlefields in the United States 
have already been stripped of most of their assemblages (Legg & Smith 2009: 227). 
 
 
4.4: Battlefield looting in antiquity 
 
Battlefield looting as a process is almost universally referred to in the historical 
record relating to conflict, but is not necessarily a well-understood process. Although there 
have been common characteristics, particularly the retrieval of weaponry and booty for 
either state resource supplementation or individual economic acquisition (see below), the 
actual functioning of the process has varied between periods. In some cases the ancient 
literary record does make reference to the looting of a battlefield, although often very few 
details are given. There is no real doubt that the process took place almost universally on 
ancient battlefield sites in the aftermath of conflict, as it has done on counterparts 
throughout later history. However, the mechanics of battlefield looting in antiquity are little 
understood, and most of what is known has been extrapolated from literary descriptions of 
military looting in other contexts, particularly the sacking of captured cities. Without 
understanding the process however, both how it was carried out and why, it is difficult to 
reconstruct the impact of looting on ancient battlefield assemblages, and thereby, the 
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original processes of deposition. The question of whether there was a selection bias towards 
weaponry and armour in antiquity, either in the literary sources or the archaeological 
record, has not been previously considered, largely as it has been commonly assumed that 
these were the only artefacts to have been present on battlefields during the looting 
process. 
 
  
4.4.1: Textual descriptions of campaign looting 
 
Campaign looting is presented by the literature as a common, even integral, part of 
warfare in both the Greek and Roman worlds, which was not subject to any wider societal 
constraints. In fact, it was portrayed by several ancient authors as widely accepted even by 
defeated populations (e.g. Xen. Cyrop. 7.4.73; Livy 31.30.2-4).108 The sources fail to give any 
detailed descriptions of the process, with the only extended looting narrative coming from 
Polybius’ (10.16.10-10.17.5) description of the sack of Carthago Nova in 209BC. In Polybius’ 
account a group of soldiers, numbering no more than half the available force, would collect 
the booty while the others remained on guard. The booty would be centrally gathered and 
then evenly distributed, in kind or in sales profit, between the soldiers who had collected it 
and those who had guarded them. In other instances of looting, particularly of a baggage-
train, the sources simply record that it happened, without any extended descriptions of the 
process. Limits might be imposed on individual occasions for strategic or disciplinary 
reasons, but instances are rare in the literary record.109  
 
Much of this activity was state-sanctioned and, to a degree, facilitated the operation 
of ancient armies in the field. Greek poleis, it has been argued, may even have gone to war 
in order to acquire booty for the purpose of state enrichment, some of which was dedicated 
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 See Mac Ginty (2004: 861-866) for the necessity of a permissive socio-cultural environment in longer-term 
military looting. 
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 Roth (1999: 148-150) states that non-sanctioned looting (‘pillaging’) would have been strongly punished by 
the Roman military authorities, who could impose harsh sentences on soldiers found guilty of doing so (cf. 
Front. Strat. 4.1.6). Although, Mac Ginty (2004) observed that while consistent severe punishment can prevent 
soldiers from non-sanctioned looting, such a regime can rarely be implemented during conflict. Onasander 
(The General 10.2.7) advised that members of foraging parties who engaged in unauthorised looting should be 
punished, although the concern seems mainly strategic – that they were vulnerable to surprise attack while 
preoccupied with raiding. 
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as votive offerings (Pritchett 1974-1991i: 74-75; Gabrielsen 2007). Looting provided a way to 
supply armies on campaign, whilst also serving to weaken enemy provisioning (Roth 1999: 
150-153), and Xenophon (Hell. 2.1.1-5) suggested that under-provisioned soldiers might 
undertake unsanctioned attacks to loot supplies. In the Roman literary record, booty was 
used to motivate soldiers to enlist and fight (Caes. Bell. Civ. 2.39; Bell. Gall. 7.28; Dio 64.9.4; 
Polyb. 10.17.1; Sall. Bell. Jug. 54.1; 68.3; 84.4; Tac. Hist. 3.26)110 and to win their loyalty 
(Plut. Caes. 23.4). Looting was a tactical tool used to force enemy armies to fight or 
withdraw (App. Hann. 3.17; Polyb. 3.111.3-5; 5.51.10-11; cf. Roth 1999: 306-309) and 
subdue hostile populations (Sall. Bell. Jug. 54.5). 
 
In neither the Greek nor Roman worlds were armies legally obliged to offer a share 
of campaign booty to soldiers. Nevertheless, they often appear to have done so. Pritchett 
(1974-1991v: 375-389) argued that Greek soldiers received a share of booty distributed in 
the field, either in goods or as a share of the collective sales profit, but that anything which 
was not given in the field became the property of the state (Pritchett 1971-1991i: 85-92). 
Pritchett (1974-1991iii: 56) also suggested that soldiers could be sent out on foray missions 
after which they were allowed to keep whatever they found. Roman campaign booty could 
be distributed as a share of material goods (Caes. Bell. Gall. 7.89; Polyb. 9.27.11; Dio 11.11) 
or their collective sales profit (Polyb. 10.16.4-6). On several occasions soldiers were allowed 
to keep whatever they personally recovered (Polyb. 9.27.11; Dio 11.11). Failure to distribute 
fairly a share of the booty to soldiers was criticised by some ancient authors (App. Bell. Ib. 
60; Cato De Sumptu Suo 51.169; Sall. Bell. Jug. 41.7), while a general prohibition of looting, 
for whatever reason, could lead to immediate military discontent (Dio 41.26.1; 74.8.1; Plut. 
Luc. 14.2).  
 
However, over-eager or premature looting collection could be a tactical problem, 
leaving armies vulnerable to surprise or rallied attacks, observed in both Roman (Caes. Bell. 
Gall. 7.45; Onas. The General 10.2.7) and non-Roman (Tac. Ann. 1.65; 14.33) contexts. 
Polybius (10.16.2-8) advised that no more than half the army should be allowed to actively 
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 Although Brunt (1971: 411-412) and Roth (1999: 301-305) argue that under the Empire booty alone was not 
sufficient financial grounds for recruitment, being too dependent on the goodwill of commanders and/or 
emperors, and generally of insufficient worth to motivate men to enlist for length service periods. 
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collect booty at any one time. Several ancient authors record thefts from the common store 
of booty, particularly by those involved in its collection (e.g. Dio 27.90; Polyb. 10.17.1-2; 
Plut. Marius 21), and Lee (2007: 123-124) suggested that valuable artefacts small enough to 
carry in a soldier’s pack would frequently have been stolen from the battlefield. The literary 
record suggests that any surplus campaign loot which could not be immediately transported 
or sold would be burned to avoid it falling into enemy control (Livy 23.46.6; Plut. Marius 
22.1; Polyb. 5.8.8-9; Tac. Ann. 14.32).111 
 
 
4.4.2: Textual descriptions of battlefield looting 
 
 The ancient literary record almost exclusively refers to looting as a process focused 
on the collection of weapons and armour from the battlefield. Aside from noting that in 
many cases a period of battlefield looting, most of the ancient literary sources provide very 
little detail on the actual process, including who was involved, how long the process took, 
what artefacts were taken, or whether the assemblage was collected centrally or not. 
Although these details might not be seen as particularly relevant to military historians, who 
need only to know that the process took place, understanding the process is vital to 
interpreting the site formation processes. It is not clear exactly who carried out the 
collection, as in post-battle activity the sources predominantly refer to the army as a 
collective entity, not the activity of individuals.  
 
In most cases it is implied that soldiers were the main gatherers of battlefield 
material, as they were following the capture of cities or enemy baggage (Veget. Epitome 
3.25; cf. Polyb. 10.16.1-10.17.5). Vegetius (Epitome 3.25) claims that soldiers referred to 
their looting activity as to “collect the field” (“colligat campum”), although this colloquial 
phase is otherwise unknown from the literary record (Milner 1993: 114 n.7). The literary 
record does not always exclude other parties being involved, although they may have been 
involved in secondary phases of looting following initial military activity. Xenophon (Hell. 
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 Florus (Epitome 2.24.9) appears to confirm that the usual practice of destroying surplus booty was to burn 
it; however, in the instance he is describing, it is instead thrown into a river, evidently for symbolic reasons, 
suggesting that the method of destruction was less important than its occurrence. 
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3.4.22) implies that in the Hellenistic period there were civilian camp-followers who 
positioned themselves around battlefields in the hope of plundering them, but it is not clear 
whether they were officially sanctioned or not. Roth (1999: 91-115) suggested that in the 
Roman world there were also camp-followers involved in battlefield looting, although their 
main role was as middle-men merchants who bought booty from Roman soldiers. Polybius 
(18.27.3-5) implies that Roman soldiers were more interested in looting the enemy camp or 
baggage than the battlefield in his description of the aftermath of Cynoscephalae (197BC), 
in which the majority of soldiers went to loot the Greek camp; they only looted the 
battlefield when the camp was declared off-limits.  
 
Greek sources particularly refer to the stripping of the dead rather than just the 
collection of dropped weaponry and armour (e.g. Thuc. 4.44.3), and it is not clear whether 
there was a process of central collection. There is more obvious reference to centralised 
collection in the Roman sources, with Livy’s (27.2.9) description of the central gathering of 
booty from the battlefield of Numistro while the dead were being collected for cremation, 
and Plutarch’s (Marius 27.4) of the collection of artefacts from the battlefield at Vercellae in 
the battlefield camp of the co-commander Lutatius Catulus.112 There are no obvious Roman 
references to the piling of loot on the battlefield, which at the Allia Livy (5.39.1) seems to 
identify as a Gallic practice, although this does not necessarily mean it was restricted to 
them, or was not practiced by Roman troops. None of the sources mention the deliberate 
abandonment of material on the battlefield by the Romans, although there are literary 
references to the re-emergence of damaged weaponry and armour at Chaeronea (Plut. Sulla 
21.4) and Philippi (Verg. Georg. 1.493-97). Tacitus (Ann. 1.61) described the Varus battlefield 
when Germanicus returned six years later. The field was still littered with broken Roman 
weaponry and armour, although this description may reflect literary motive rather than 
reality (see Pagán 1999). 
 
 The literary terminology of the Greek and Roman texts suggests that at some point a 
distinction was drawn between booty taken on the battlefield and in wider campaigning, 
although Pritchett (1974-1991v: 72) cautions that the vocabulary used to describe military 
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 See Polybius (6.31.13) on the central collection and storage of campaign booty within the camp (cf. Polyb. 
14.10.2). 
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looting may have become generalised over time, and appears to draw a finer distinction 
than was intended. In Greek texts, while a range of words are used to describe campaign 
booty, skyla (ςκυλα) is most frequently used to describe battlefield booty, typically arms 
and armour and the religious dedication of the artefacts (Pritchett 1974-1991i: 54-58).113 
Later Greek-language authors, particularly Plutarch, used a variety of terms to refer to 
battlefield booty, but skyla was never used in a generalised looting context, and in all extant 
texts refers exclusively to captured arms and armour (Pritchett 1974-1991v: 132-148).   
 
There is no obvious literary reference to artefacts which were not weaponry or 
armour, either to their presence on the field or subsequent recovery/abandonment. 
However, Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.5) suggests that the dead may also have been stripped of 
their clothing in addition to their armour, noting on one occasion that the bodies of 
casualties were naked, on another in moderate surprise that they had been left with tunics 
on (Hell. 2.4.19), although in most sources the clothing of the dead is not mentioned. 
Roman authors made a comparable distinction between booty recovered on campaign, 
praeda and manubiae,114 and material recovered from the battlefield, spolia. While the 
former referred to anything recovered in campaign looting,115spolia is only used to describe 
weaponry and armour recovered from a battlefield (Bradford Churchill 1999: 87).Most 
sources suggest (surplus) spolia was destroyed, although Shatzman (1972) argued that it 
could form part of the general’s manubiae if required (cf. Plut. Marius 22.1, Marius taking 
the spolia from Aquae Sextiae for use in his triumph).  
 
Non-weaponry military ephemera collected from a battlefield, such as standards and 
signalling trumpets, are mentioned in addition to spolia and not as part of it (App. Bell. Civ. 
1.41; Sall. Bell. Jug. 74.3; Plut. Marius 27.4). No other non-weaponry artefacts are 
mentioned in the context of Roman battlefields. As with skyla, it seem probable that at 
some point a distinction was drawn between praeda and spolia both in terms of recovery 
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 See Pritchett 1974-1991v: 73-152 for discussion of literary terms. 
114
 Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 13.25) elaborated that praeda was booty directly taken from the enemy, while 
manubiae was the monetary proceeds from sold booty, which could be given to the state and used, in part, to 
dedicate monuments to the victory and other votives. Cicero (De Lege Agraria 1.12) made a similar distinction, 
as cited by Gellius. Gellius has been rejected by Shatzman (1972), suggesting that manubiae represented the 
general’s individual share of the campaign booty rather than a distinction between goods and money. 
115
 E.g. Slaves and livestock (Caes. Bell. Gall. 6.3; Livy 31.30; Plut. Lucullus 14.1); precious metal and coins (Plut. 
Lucullus 17.6-7; Tac. Hist. 3.33); grain (Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.42); household items (Plut. Pompey 4.1). 
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context and range of material; however, the impact that this had on the manifestation of 
battlefield looting in reality is unclear. In neither the Greek nor Roman sources can the 
artefact categories mentioned serve as evidence of a selection bias towards weaponry and 
armour, as such, due to the complete failure to mention other types of material. 
Prioritisation of recovery however, is certainly implied. The recovery process is certainly 
portrayed as one of complete field-stripping which left no visible weaponry or armour 
behind – leading to the question, which will be dealt with later in the chapter, of what 
happened to the non-visible assemblage? 
 
 
4.4.3: Ritual dedication of battlefield booty 
 
 The literary descriptions and non-battlefield archaeological sites, particularly military 
installations and religious sanctuaries, certainly suggest that there was a selection bias 
directed towards the recovery of weapons and armour. The purpose of battlefield looting is 
not openly discussed in the extant literary sources, nor consequently is where the artefacts 
recovered were later distributed. But descriptions of the use of material in a ritual context 
do exist. Some weaponry and armour was left on Greek battlefields in the form of a trophy 
(see 3.6.3), although the quantity is unspecific in most cases. Iconographic depictions of 
Greek battlefield trophies typically suggest only a small amount was used in this way, often 
only a single panoply, although there is no way of knowing whether this represents an 
artistic convention rather than reality. The remaining weaponry and armour appears to have 
been removed, although none of the Greek sources explicitly state that the battlefield was 
cleared of all battle-related material. Arms and armour were dedicated as votives in Pan-
Hellenic religious sanctuaries, where they would evidently be openly and publically 
displayed (Jackson 1991: 233; Pritchett 1974-1991iii: 240-276).116 Captured equipment 
might also be sent to polis sanctuaries. Demosthenes is said to have sent 300 panoplies to 
the sanctuaries of Athens as a dedication (Thuc. 3.114.1), as apparently did Alexander 
(Arrian Anab. Alex. 1.16). If Plutarch (Mor. 224 B, F) is to be believed, the Spartans were an 
exception in choosing not to dedicate captured arms and armour, to which Pritchett (1974-
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 Thuc. 3.57.1; 4.134.1. 
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1991iii: 292-293) could not find any literary contradiction. Thucydides suggests that 
battlefield booty was counted towards the annual income of a polis (Thuc. 2.13.4), but there 
is no reference in Greek sources to systematic reuse or reprocessing of battlefield 
equipment.  
 
There is no mention of deliberate later attempts to recover material from 
battlefields, for monetary gain or as souvenirs of battle, although the on-going religious 
activity at the Persian War battlefields in particular (cf. Chaniotis 1991) may have increased 
rates of later (incidental) artefact recovery. Pritchett (1974-1991v: 132) noted numerous 
literary accounts of battlefield booty being displayed in the victorious polis, a process which 
appears to have become more common from the later C5thBC onwards (Jackson 1991: 243-
247). Earlier, weaponry and armour was also dedicated at religious sanctuaries, some of 
which was inscribed with the name of a battle, although it is difficult to interpret the context 
of many of these dedications, the origins of the artefact, or the nature of the dedication 
(Pritchett 1974-1991iii: 249-271). 
 
Although references in Roman sources to the use of battlefield booty to construct 
trophies are not entirely unknown (see 3.6.3), the literary record implies a greater use of 
this material for use elsewhere. In terms of public display, the most common method 
appears to have been a military triumph.  Weaponry and armour appear to have been used 
in triumphs from the C3rd BC onwards (Beard 2007: 147-153), although it may not be 
possible to distinguish between booty from a battlefield and that taken more widely on 
campaign. Even where Plutarch (Marcellus 21.2) cites the triumphal display of barbarian 
weaponry and blood-stained spoils, it is hard to say that these artefacts originated on a 
battlefield. Elsewhere Plutarch (Marius 22.1) implies that only a small amount of weaponry 
and armour from a battlefield would be fit for display in a triumph.  
 
Bishop and Coulston (2006: 30-33) suggest that depositions of Roman military 
equipment, particularly in water, may represent votive offerings by individual soldiers, 
rather than the incidental loss to which they were often previously associated. In the light of 
the severe penalties for losing equipment, they suggest that soldiers may have secured a 
replacement before dedicating their offerings. The replacements may have come from 
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battlefield booty. Jørgensen (2001) suggested that a similar practice of votive dedication of 
battlefield spoils can be seen in the weaponry-sacrifices in Danish bogs in the first five 
centuries AD, from nearby battles and/or troops returning from service in the Roman 
Empire. He noted a lack of non-weaponry finds among the assemblages, such as tools, 
harness/wagon fittings or household items, leading to the suggestion that weaponry was 
prioritised by the recovery and/or transportation process (Jørgensen 2001: 15). Kaul (2003: 
37) argued that in some cases the bog-depositions may not have been made for ritual 
reasons but with the intention of later recovering the material. Denial of the material to the 
enemy in the short-term, with the intention of recovering it at a later time, may also have 
been a factor in bog depositions. 
  
  
4.4.4: Recycling battlefield booty 
 
A more pragmatic element to battlefield looting is suggested by the concept of 
economic and resource supplementation, recovering the material because it was needed 
rather than wanted for display. In this context, weapons and armour can be highlighted as 
particular priorities for recovery. In good condition, they represented immediately 
functional, and therefore valuable, artefacts which could be immediately returned into 
military supply, and perhaps more importantly, had to be denied as a resource to the 
enemy. As broken pieces, they still represented a valuable source of metal which could be 
mended or recycled, reducing demand for new sources of raw material. However, the 
ancient sources do not mention recovered equipment being reused or reprocessed, aside 
from one limited occasion when battle-recovered weaponry was used to equip a new legion 
during the Second Punic War (Livy 23.14.4).117 Caesar (Bell. Gall. 2.27) and Livy (Livy 38.22.6) 
do suggest, however, that projectiles could be reused during the same engagement . By 
contrast, pila are characterised as being impossible to re-use on the battlefield due to 
bending on impact (Caes. Bell. Gall. 1.25; cf. Bishop & Coulston 2006: 50-52). That said 
Polybius (6.25.6-9) noted that Greek and later Roman spears had an iron butt-spike which 
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 By contrast, non-Roman armies did make use of Roman equipment taken if they had won the battle, 
particularly Hannibal (Polyb. 3.87.3; 3.114.1), Hamilcar (Polyb. 1.78.13) and later, Arminius (Tac. Ann. 2.25) and 
Tacfarinas (Tac. Ann. 2.52). 
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meant that they could be reused on the battlefield even if the point had broken or bent (cf. 
Bishop & Coulston 2006: 53-54). Tacitus (Ann. 2.5) believed that the Roman army was 
vulnerable to the loss of weapons in battle, which had a negative impact on the morale of 
soldiers. In most sources, battlefield loot, just as campaign surplus, is described as being 
destroyed rather than distributed to soldiers or sold (App. Bell. Pun. 20.133; Livy 1.37.5; 
23.46.5; Plut. Marius 22.1; Florus Epitome 2.24.9).118 
 
Despite the absence of references in the ancient literary record, it is clear that 
damaged weapons and armour were recovered and re-used, certainly in the Roman world, 
and in all probability, also the Greek. The reuse and recycling of metal military equipment is 
well-known in the Roman period (Bishop & Coulston 2006: 27-30), but less attested in a 
Greek context. Hanson (1989: 204) has suggested that Greek soldiers could be rearmed 
from battlefield booty or its sales profits, although he offers no archaeological (or literary) 
basis for this assertion, and it is unclear whether reprocessing of damaged kit was included 
in his statement. By contrast, Pritchett (1974-1991v: 132-133) argued that Greek battlefield-
recovered material was never resold or redistributed, particularly by the Spartans, although 
concedes that it is likely that this custom was ignored when necessary. 
 
Bishop and Coulston (2006: 27-30) have commented on the Roman proclivity for 
recovering and recycling as much metal as possible from military sites, battlefields included. 
Bishop (1985) argues that the metal resources of the Roman army represented a “universal 
stock”, constantly recycled, into which genuinely new pieces were only infrequently 
introduced. The economic pressure which could result from loss of even a modest quantity 
of weaponry and armour in battle could be significant, with substantial effort required to 
both source new metal and manufacture replacement pieces (Sim & Ridge 2002: 113-115). 
As such, the recovery of any weaponry, armour and other metal artefacts from a battlefield 
would have been a priority in the looting period, to enable their replacement back into the 
military supply chain. Bishop and Coulston (2006: 25) suggested that the reports of the 
destruction of weapons and armour on the battlefield in the ancient sources had been 
misunderstood, and applied only to the burning of the wooden elements following the 
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 Appian (Bell. Pun. 20.133) describes the Roman custom that arms, siege-engines and ships should be burnt 
as victory votives to Mars and Minerva, whatever happened to the remaining spoils. 
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removal of any metal pieces. Hoards of (battle) damaged weaponry and armour have been 
recovered from a number of military sites including Colchester (Hawkes & Hull 1947), 
Corbridge (Allason-Jones & Bishop 1988) and Grad near Šmihel (Slovenia; Horvat 2002), 
suggesting that damaged metal was put back into economic circulation from at least the 
Late Republic. Some elements of the Corbridge Hoard show evidence of “cannibalisation”, 
particularly the armour, where functional or undamaged elements of irreparable kit had 
been taken to patch up other pieces before the remainder was recast (Bishop 2014: 82).  
 
Comparably, pieces of Roman military equipment showing evidence of previous 
repair have been recovered from the C1st AD conflict context at South Cadbury, 
demonstrating the use of this kit in the army (Barrett et al. 2000: 116). Recent excavations 
at the Second Punic War Roman campaign camp at La Palma, Spain, have suggested that a 
wide range of lead artefacts, including domestic artefacts such as fishing weights, were 
collected by the Roman army during the conflict for processing into lead projectiles (Guillén 
2009; Ble et al. 2011). The camp is interpreted as a logistical hub for the collection of booty 
and the resupply of the campaigning army, with a certain level of manufacturing and 
reprocessing within the camp.119 However, whether it would have been considered 
worthwhile to collect the smallest projectiles is a different issue. While there was clearly a 
policy of metal recycling in the Roman army, the chance of easily recovering many of the 
projectiles fired, particularly glandes, would have been low in the aftermath of battle. 
Projectiles may to some degree have been seen as 'one-use' weapons, particularly glandes 
and arrowheads, taking only a short time to replace (Sim & Ridge 2002: 113-115). 
 
The archaeological evidence from Roman military installations suggests, therefore, 
that weaponry and armour was not always abandoned or destroyed on the battlefield, but 
could be removed by the centralised military to go back into circulation. This would imply a 
selection bias targeted towards the most valuable material at the expense of smaller, less 
valuable, non-weapon artefacts. With the exception of the lead pieces at La Palma camp, 
there is less evidence for non-weaponry artefacts being removed in great quantity to 
military installations. It is possible that this absence reflects a more comprehensive recycling 
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 Cf. Polybius (14.10.2) for transfer of booty from smaller camps to semi-permanent campaign installations. 
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system in the case of smaller artefacts. There may also be issues in associating non-
weaponry artefacts removed from a battlefield, in a military context or outside of one, as 
associated with battle, as there is no real distinction between buckles, brooches, or caligae 
nails which were used in the context of battle and those which were not. Although it seems 
probable that there was a prioritisation of weapons and armour which equates largely to a 
selection bias, the degree to which this occurred may appear disproportionate due to the 
problems recognising the recovery of other artefacts. There is nothing however, in the 
recognition of a recycling process for military equipment and other metals, which suggests 
that the looting process would necessarily have recovered every artefact from a battlefield. 
 
 
4.4.5: Abandonment of metal resources 
 
None of the ancient literary sources openly document the deliberate abandoning of 
material on the battlefield. It is argued by Bishop & Coulston (2006: 27-30) that the 
economic and logistical cost of metals in antiquity made it unlikely that metal was ever 
voluntarily abandoned from any military context. However, a number of hoards from 
military installations suggest that it was recognised that in some circumstances the 
abandonment of metal artefacts was in reality unavoidable, and therefore, a small amount 
of loss was acceptable. When doing so however, there were evidently conventions to limit 
the economic impact of the abandonment, both by leaving the least useful artefacts behind, 
and doing as much as possible to prevent non-Roman recovery of the material at a later 
date. The archaeological record suggests that the Roman army attempted to deny local 
populations access to military metal supplies, even those they were not using themselves. 
This is particularly evident in the deep burial of abandoned hoards during the site closure of 
Roman military installations (Bishop 2011: 22). Large quantities of metal were only left 
behind on Roman military sites in limited circumstances, and may have been associated 
with military situations where transportation of such bulk was logistically disadvantageous. 
Manning (1972: 46) suggested that the Inchtuthil and Newstead hoards were left because 
transporting such large quantities of metal through the hostile landscape of Caledonia was 
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inadvisable in both circumstances.120 Taking into account the physical burden which ancient 
soldiers already had with their military kit,121 it may be improbable that surplus weaponry 
and armour could have been transported any real distance, even in the hope of profiting 
from it later.122 In such situations, although the loss of the metal resources may have been 
an economic disadvantage, it was outweighed by the risk of trying to transport it to another 
military installation.  
 
Native populations may have been able to recover these metal resources and 
eventually use them to advantage, but this process, if it happened at all, would not 
necessarily have posed an immediate threat, particularly if non-functional material was left. 
In later military contexts, material did on certain occasions have to be deliberately 
abandoned, particularly following an ambush attack. During the American-Indian Wars, 
abandoned material at conflict sites, including settlements, was frequently destroyed by the 
US army to prevent it from being of any immediate re-supply use, often simply being 
smashed to pieces and discarded (Greene & Scott 2006: 92). 
 
The assemblages of artefacts which were left behind, whether on a battlefield or in a 
military installation, typically appear to have represented less (immediately) functional or 
valuable pieces, suggesting that when abandonment of some metal was unavoidable, non-
weaponry artefacts, damaged kit, and base metals were more likely to be abandoned. 
Attempts to keep the most valuable artefacts and metals from enemy capture can be seen 
at a number of conflict sites. Deliberate attempts were made to hoard valuable weapon 
fittings and high-denomination coin hoards at Puigciutat, Kalkriese and Abritus (Ble et al. 
2012; Rost & Wilbers-Rost 2010: 133; Radoslavova et al. 2011), although whether this 
reflects official Roman military policy or simply individual decisions made on the spot is 
uncertain. Whether this was a more widespread practice in reality, but in many cases failed, 
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 See multiple instances in Tacitus (Ann. 1.51; 1.65; 2.5) of the vulnerability of baggage-trains in Germany 
121
 Average physical burdens for ancient armies: Greek hoplite c.9kg light-armed, 14-21kg full panoply (Krentz 
2013: 135); Cyrean/Hellenistic c.31kg (Lee 2007: 126); Macedonian c.36kg (Engels 1978: 17); Roman c.43kg 
(Junkelmann 1986). 
122
 Rost & Wilbers-Rost (2014a: 503-504) suggest that the Germans at Kalkriese may have used captured 
Roman baggage-wagons to transport their booty from a battle; this would be an effective solution.  
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is unattested archaeologically, as the evidence would be, unfortunately, an absence of 
hoarded material.123  
 
There is no archaeological evidence as yet for the cremation of excess spolia on 
Roman battlefields, as documented by the historical record, although magnetometry survey 
may reveal some evidence for this in the future (see Chapter Six). The general Roman 
attitude to the abandonment of metal in a military context appears to have accepted it 
when there was no viable alternative, and if the amount of immediate functional weaponry 
and armour could be kept to a minimum. Any material which was left behind would be 
obscured, often by burial, where possible. This therefore does not exclude the possibility 
that metal artefacts were left on a battlefield by the looting process, if the abandoned 
assemblage was of minimal functional value and, perhaps more importantly, if it was 
obscured enough to escape the Roman looting process, then it may have been considered 
acceptably hidden from the enemy. 
 
 
4.5: Ancient battlefield assemblages: the archaeological evidence 
 
It is from the actual assemblages recovered from battlefields that the processes of 
deposition and recovery can be best understood. In some ways, the assemblages broadly 
support elements of the looting process as described in the ancient literary record or 
extrapolated from the archaeological evidence in Roman military installations, religious 
sanctuaries, and settlements. However, they also reflect elements of the looting process 
which are consistent with those from later periods, suggesting that evidence can also be 
extrapolated from consideration of looting as a more general process. Complete weapons 
and armour are almost entirely absent from the archaeology of ancient battle, as on most 
battlefields from any period, although evidently projectiles were no easier to completely 
remove from the site than they were in later warfare. The remaining assemblages are 
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 See also Carson (1959) for the Bredgar hoard as a deliberate burial of high-denomination coins by a Roman 
officer during the invasion of Britain (AD43), although Hind (1989: 11) questions whether the logistics of the 
campaign would have led any soldier to feel at such particular and imminent risk. To this could be added the 
question of how the officer concerned would have hoped to recover it, given the level of contemporary 
geographic and topographic understanding of Britannia. 
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substantial, both in absolute terms and in comparison to those recovered from some 
modern sites. At least 2000 artefacts have been identified at each Roman battlefield, 
comparing favourably with assemblages from more modern sites, albeit that the latter may 
often have been heavily collected. The analysis of Edgehill, for example, was based on an 
assemblage of 1125 battle-related artefacts, predominantly lead bullets (Foard 2012: 154-
155).  
 
Other surveys have resulted in far fewer artefacts, particularly when limited to a 
small area of a battlefield or on a site which has been previously collected, as demonstrated 
at Culloden where field seasons in 2000 and 2005 resulted in just 228 bullets being 
recovered (Pollard 2009b: 144-149). There are several mitigating factors for the Culloden 
excavation, including extensive previous looting, some immediately prior to the excavations, 
and limitation of the excavation to National Trust for Scotland property, when it was known 
that adjacent areas of the site produced a far more prolific assemblage. However, the 
relatively limited assemblage from this area could still be used to reconstruct a narrative of 
the battle in this area (Pollard 2009b), suggesting that there is no methodological reason 
why the assemblages from ancient battlefields are not of sufficient quantity to facilitate a 
similar application. 
 
 
4.5.1: Greek battlefield assemblages 
 
The verifiable archaeological evidence from Greek battlefields is, to date, 
unfortunately sparse. There have been no major excavations on Greek battlefields, aside 
from the mass graves at Marathon, Thermopylae and Chaeronea, and few of the incidental 
finds reported from these sites can be verified with regards to their provenance. Early 
antiquarian visitors to Marathon reported finding bronze and iron arrowheads in the Soros 
(Gell 1827: 59; Leake 1841: 100), while one traveller also reported finding inscribed lead 
shot in the area around the tumulus (Dodwell 1819ii: 159-160). Collections of arrowheads 
allegedly recovered from Marathon and Thermopylae are now on display in the British 
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Museum, the Pitt Rivers Museum, the Karlsruhe collections (all Marathon) and the National 
Archaeological Museum of Athens (Thermopylae; Fig. 12). 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Arrowheads from Thermopylae in the National Museum of Archaeology, Athens (author's own). 
 
Larger weapons and armour pieces have been allegedly recovered from Greek 
battlefields. The Royal Ontario Museum contains two bronze Corinthian-type helmets 
‘found’ by the politician George Nugent in the 1830s: one from Marathon plain (including a 
skull said to have been found in the helmet; ROM no.926.19.3) and the other, this time 
without skull, at Thermopylae (ROM no.926.19.4). If no excavation has been formally 
conducted on open battlefields in the Greek world, the assemblage from the urban battle at 
Olynthos in 348BC suggests that a substantial projectile assemblage was left by Greek battle 
(Lee 2001), which can be used to reconstruct the narrative of individual battles. 
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4.5.2: Roman battlefield assemblages 
 
The Kalkriese assemblage contains in excess of 5000 individual finds, c.90% from the 
Oberesch, where 4000 metal artefacts and 400 coins were found (Harnecker & Franzius 
2008; Harnecker & Mylo 2011). An additional 400 artefacts and 1000 coins have been 
recovered from the wider battlefield landscape (Wilbers-Rost 2009a: 129). Much of the 
assemblage from the Oberesch was preserved below a German rampart constructed 
immediately prior to the battle, parts of which appear to have collapsed soon after, 
preserving below a partially-looted assemblage. Some 3073 artefacts have been recovered 
to date from Harzhorn, of which 338 are definitely non-Roman, c.950 are undated but 
c.1740 are Roman (Berger et al. 2010/13: 334). From Baecula, 6123 metal artefacts have 
been identified to date (Cárdenas Anguita et al. 2011: 921), although it has not been 
possible to identify what larger artefacts all the fragments belonged to (Bellón Ruiz et al. 
2012: 359). A complete catalogue has not yet been published. On all three battlefields the 
assemblage is densest at the central part of the site, gradually decreasing towards the 
peripheral areas of the battlefield, with periodic concentrations of artefacts identified as 
representational of intensive activity.  
 
With the exception of projectiles, there is little evidence for weaponry at any of the 
battlefields. Only projectiles have been recovered from Baecula and Harzhorn, while even at 
Kalkriese there is only one small sword tip fragment (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 5). This is 
contrast to the 20 scabbard fitting-pieces (38 individual fragments) which were probably 
deposited by stripping the metal edging during the looting process (Rost & Wilbers-Rost 
2012). At Baecula and Harzhorn armour is equally rare, with none as yet reported from the 
former and only 28 fragments of body-worn equipment124 found at the latter and including 
iron chain mail and bronze armour fragments and a small number of iron belt fittings and 
buckles (Berger et al. 2010/13: 334-337). A greater quantity of armour fragments has been 
recovered from the Kalkriese Oberesch. Eighty individual shield pieces have been identified, 
from 363 individual fragments (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 5-8, fn. 36-91; 2011: 24-5, fn. 
2078-2101), as well as fragments of mail (9) and lorica (36). Excavation also identified a 
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 “Am Körper getragene Ausrüstung”; inclusive of kit fittings, buckles, brooches etc. 
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number of helmet fragments (23), predominantly joint fittings but also a substantial iron 
cheek-piece (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 8-10, fn. 92-117) and a cavalry mask iron base 
(Harnecker & Mylo 2011: 25-6, fn. 2102-2138). None of the armour fittings were complete, 
and many had been broken into several fragments. 
 
 The only weaponry found in any quantity on the battlefield sites is projectile, mainly 
small shorter-range examples. At Baecula, arrowheads, 27 lead glandes (none inscribed) and 
over 200 plumbatae were recovered from the lower, peripheral slopes of the battlefield, 
most likely marking the Roman assault route. Towards the Carthaginian position a smaller 
quantity of large, shorter-range projectiles were recovered, including 10 pila-heads at the 
summit (Atwood 2014: 34-35). At Harzhorn the assemblage is equally dominated by longer-
range projectiles. To date 214 have been identified, including arrowheads, pila-heads and 
lead glandes, although the most numerous category is catapult-bolts, of which 131 have 
thus far been excavated, concentrated along the lower slopes of the battlefield (Berger et al. 
2010/13: 334-335). The projectiles recovered from Harzhorn are mostly complete and of 
considerable size, rather than fragmented pieces (Fig. 13). 
 
 
Figure 13: Projectile point from Harzhorn (author's own). 
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The projectile assemblage from the Oberesch differs somewhat. Very few small, 
longer-range projectiles were recovered from the site, arrowheads (3) and miscellaneous 
projectiles (17), although more were recovered from the wider conflict zone, including 3 
lead glandes from the area north of the Oberesch first prospected by Clunn (2005). The 
longer-range projectiles were significantly outnumbered by the number of large, shorter-
range range pila (37) and spear (26) elements, including one lance-head with a partial 
fragment of wooden shaft in situ measuring 31.6cms in total (24.3cms lance-head alone; 
Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 4, fn. 7). Several attachments between the iron projectile 
element and the wooden shaft have been recovered, which are likely to reflect the looting 
process and the removal of the head from the useless wooden element (see Rost & Wilbers-
Rost 2012). The distribution and lack of glandes may suggest that in this instance, the 
longer-range projectiles may have been used as hand-held weapons rather than as 
projectiles, in this late stage of running battle.125 
 
It is probable that the projectile assemblages from these battlefields represent a 
limited proportion of the original deposition. Glandes are the most common projectile find, 
recovered from all battlefields and a number of other Greek and Roman conflict sites (see 
1.5; cf. Rihll 2009), although there is a general assemblage bias towards smaller projectiles 
which did not have any attached wooden elements. Glandes have been recovered from a 
number of Roman conflict sites which have not been formally excavated, most notably from 
La Lantejuela in southern Spain, which has been identified as the Punic and Caesarian 
battlefield of Munda from the inscriptions on the projectiles (see Grünewald & Richter 
2006). A total of 59 glandes has thus far been recovered, many of which were inscribed in 
either Punic or Latin script. They measure between 2.8 and 5.6cm with the majority in a 
heavily corroded condition (Grünewald & Richter 2006).  
 
Similarly inscribed glandes, in this case T.LABI, were recovered from Alise-Sainte-
Reine during the C19th excavations on the supposed site of Alésia. The inscription has been 
associated with Titus Labienus, one of Caesar's commanding officers in Gaul (e.g. Caes. Bell. 
                                                          
125
 For use of the spear as a hand-held weapon in for Greek warfare see Schwartz (2009: 86-92; although his 
use-analysis of spears is partially based on artistic iconographic evidence); for Roman, see Bishop & Coulston 
(2006: 53-54). 
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Gall. 5.8), as similar examples have been found in the Roman camp at Sens, likely used as a 
campaign base by Labienus (Fields 2014: 86). Their discovery at Alise-Sainte-Reine suggests 
a direct link with Caesarian-period conflict, if not alone of the site being that of Alésia. 
Glandes provided evidence for the Frisian attack on the Roman fort at Velsen during the 
AD28 revolt and were the primary conflict-related artefact find from this site (Bosman 
1999). Lead shot is also the most common diagnostic find at Puigciutat, evidently mapping 
the route of assault during this otherwise unknown conflict (Ble et al. 2012).  
 
It seemed at first that lead glandes were likely to be a significant diagnostic indicator 
of Roman (and indeed, due to comparable use, Greek) battlefields. However,  the failure to-
date to identify whether the site of Burnswark marks a conflict or military training site 
demonstrates that even a substantial assemblage of glandes may not be sufficient to 
identify a battlefield (see Campbell 2003; Breeze 2011). Standard works on Roman warfare 
suggest that projectile discharge typically only occurred once during open field battle, 
before the physical meeting of the battle-lines (e.g. Goldsworthy 1996). First the longer-
range projectiles such as glandes or arrows would be despatched, followed by a wave of 
shorter-range projectiles, such as pila, immediately before the armies clashed.126 As such, 
projectiles would be expected to be deposited more towards the periphery of the 
battlefield, with the longer-range projectiles further away than the shorter-range from the 
physical centre.127 Coulston (2001: 30) suggested that projectiles may also have been used 
in the late stages of battle on small groups of soldiers attempting a ’last stand’ as their army 
fled as, he argues, at Kalkriese.  
 
Concentrations of projectile deposition would be expected to dominate in areas fired 
upon, but this would vary within each battle. At Harzhorn the physical distribution of 
projectiles is difficult to assess because the conflict appears to have been an ambush rather 
than a field battle. At Baecula the spatial distribution of glandes is most dense in the 
Carthaginian lines (marking areas fired upon), with a secondary concentration in the Roman 
lines (Fig. 14). A smaller quantity was distributed in the area between the lines. With one 
                                                          
126
 See Rihll (2009: 160-167) for a recent suggestion that glandes may have primarily been catapult 
ammunition rather than used by hand-slingers. 
127
 See Thorne (2007: 219-220) for a suggestion that multiple phases of projectile use were employed during 
Roman battle as armies withdrew and re-clashed. 
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exception, all glandes were found in the central axis of the battlefield. Concentrations were 
separated by a distance of c.300m, the approximate range of the projectile-type (Bellón Ruiz 
et al. 2012: 366-367). 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Distribution of lead glandes at Baecula (after Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012: 367). 
 
 
The hypothetical probability of archaeological survival for longer-distance projectiles 
is reasonable on battlefields, as they were small, low-value and deposited in both the core 
and periphery, and were often made of lead. The presence of glandes in any quantity almost 
certainly illustrates a military presence on any site, even if their deposition was due to 
logistical necessities rather than the actual occurrence of conflict (Rihll 2009: 148). Glandes 
in particular could provide a key diagnostic indicator for an ancient battlefield, if they can be 
recognised and recovered. The difficulty comes with sites such as Kalkriese and the 
Oberesch, where long-range projectiles are outnumbered by short-range, and by many 
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other artefact categories as well. The explanation for this may be that the Oberesch 
represents an end-phase conflict area, the assemblage of which was created late into the 
battle, when long-range projectiles had already been expended, leaving only shorter-range 
pila and hand-held weapons with which to fight. While long-range projectiles are certainly 
useful as a diagnostic indicator of battle, based on current evidence they may not survive in 
quantities comparable to munition remains from later historic battlefields. 
 
 The non-projectile assemblage is dominated by small, low value non-weaponry 
artefacts. The biggest single artefact category from the Roman battlefields by far is caligae 
nails. Just under 700 were recovered from Baecula (Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012: 366-71), and 
over 1400 from Harzhorn, making up nearly 80% of the assemblage securely identified as 
Roman (Berger et al. 2010/13: 334). On both sites, the nails were concentrated in areas of 
rough, hard terrain, evidently marking formal tactical manoeuvres and movement which 
caused stress on the footwear and for nails to work loose.128 At Kalkriese the number of 
shoe-nails is far smaller, with 36 shoe-related finds (64 individual fragments), including a 
partially-preserved leather sole with 3 nails in place (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 12, fn. 
172), which may be a result of the physical terrain, the manoeuvres, or the absence of shoes 
by this point. Caligae nails have also been identified at the Caesarian-period conflict site (the 
exact nature of the site has not yet been established) at Puigciutat in north-eastern Spain, 
evidently spatially corresponding with areas of approach to the fortified upper area of the 
site, and typically also an area of rough terrain (Ble et al. 2012). Based on the conflict sites 
thus far excavated, caligae nails may be one of the key diagnostic artefacts on, at least, 
Roman battlefield sites, particularly those with rough terrain. 
 
 Personal effects have been recovered from each battlefield, in the greatest quantity 
from Kalkriese. A small number of amulets, buckles, brooches and jewellery have been 
reported from Baecula (Atwood 2014: 34), while from Harzhorn, a small quantity of 
jewellery has been recovered, including a Taunus-Wetterau-type fibula, and two bronze 
finger-rings (Berger et al. 2010/13: 335). From Kalkriese however, the overall non-weaponry 
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 Although accidental loss is no longer a popular explanation for the deposition of military kit (Bishop & 
Coulston 2006: 24-25), it is generally accepted that small, non-vital fittings such as caligae nails may have been 
deposited by this mechanism. 
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assemblage is both larger and more diverse than the others, including a range of fibulae 
(81), belt buckles and fittings (76), decorative plates (9) and nails (33) which can be linked 
with the military through their presence on a Roman army site (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 
14-16; 26-36; Harnecker & Mylo 2011: 7-9; 14-17). So too for the range of ‘administrative’ 
artefacts including styli and plumbobs, and the tools, scissors, dolabra, rings, decorative 
plates, and furniture fittings, including bed fragments and glass-eyed statues, which were 
also recovered from the Oberesch (Harnecker & Franzius 2008; Harnecker & Mylo 2011). 
The wide range of artefacts attests to the capture and looting of a baggage-train.  
 
No mule or cavalry equipment has been recovered from Baecula, but 16 fragments, 
including the fittings from an abandoned wagon and several iron horseshoes, have been 
excavated at Harzhorn (Berger et al. 2010/13: 343-47). A further 124 horse and mule fittings 
were recovered from Kalkriese, including the bridle fittings and decoration from a mule 
partially covered by the collapsed rampart (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 17-19, in particular 
fn. 249-252). Dolabra heads were recovered from both Kalkriese and Harzhorn. However, in 
the case of almost all the non-weaponry artefacts, it might prove difficult to identify their 
military association from the find alone, due to the significant crossover between 
contemporary military and civilian finds, potentially limiting the diagnostic potential of these 
finds on sites which had not already been identified as a battlefield and/or corroborated by 
other artefacts. 
 
Few non-Roman artefacts have been identified. A number of arrowheads, coins and 
pottery fragments from Baecula are of Carthaginian type, and are primarily associated with 
the Carthaginian position towards the north of the battlefield (Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012, 366-
69; Atwood 2014: 35).129 There is a lack of Germanic material from Kalkriese, originally 
attributed to the ability of these combatants to clear the site of their remains (Rost 2009a: 
53). Rost and Wilbers-Rost (2010: 134) subsequently suggested the assemblage reflects the 
use of ‘Roman-style’ weaponry and armour by the Germanic combatants, some of whom 
may have been serving, or have served, in the Roman auxilia. At Harzhorn a small number of 
artefacts have been cautiously identified as Germanic, although this is unverified (Berger et 
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 See Bishop & Coulston (2006: 48-50) for the problems identifying ‘Roman’ weaponry and armour in the 
Punic War period. 
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al. 2010/13: 349-53), and it has been suggested that, as at Kalkriese, the Germans may have 
used equipment indistinguishable from that in contemporary Roman use (Meyer & 
Moosbauer 2013).130 
 
At Kalkriese the assemblage is a composition of the kit which might belong to each 
individual soldier and a baggage-train. The published artefact catalogues, representing the 
finds which can be identified, illustrate the range of material, although the assemblage 
composition is likely to be representative of large-scale (Roman) defeat rather than ancient 
battle in general. To date the assemblage from the Oberesch represents 90% of the c.5000 
total finds thus far recovered from the conflict area. In the catalogues to date, 1627 
individual indentified artefacts have been published, several from within the same context 
(Harnecker & Franzius 2008; Harnecker & Mylo 2011).  
 
 
Figure 15: Unidentified fragments from the Oberesch (author's own). 
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Although there has been discussion over military and civilian use of the same non-weaponry artefacts 
(Allason-Jones 1988; James 2001; Allison 2013) there has been limited publication on the use of Roman 
weaponry and armour by non-Roman forces – if, indeed, the concept of  ‘Roman’ is applicable or relevant in 
this context. 
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Many artefacts were fragmented, some of which could be associated with a common 
artefact in post-excavation analysis. If it was possible to identify multiple fragments from 
the same artefact, in the published catalogue were grouped under a single find number, 
with each individual piece distinguished by a different alphabet letter. A total of 2343 
individual find numbers have been published from the Oberesch.131 Many of these artefacts 
are in a heavily fragmented condition, particularly the pieces of shield-binding, and 
individual pieces can be of very small size and impossible to identify as a particular artefact 
type (Fig. 15). 
 
Most of the artefacts deposited on the battlefield would have been in the baggage-
train during the battle and would not be expected on battlefields where the Roman army 
had not been defeated, although the presence of a collapsed wagon at Harzhorn (see 
below) suggests that elements of the train caught on the move might have been vulnerable 
even in the case of a Roman victory. The vast majority of these artefacts would not have 
been identified as associated with a Roman army had the site not already been identified as 
a battlefield, although this was made easier, as previously mentioned, by the lack of Roman 
civilian activity in this area at the time of the battle. Many of the artefacts discovered at the 
Oberesch are there because of the presence, and looting, of the Roman baggage train. 
Much of the artefact range, particularly non-functional items such as furniture, represent 
the ‘camp goods’ of a campaign, suggesting that either the baggage was captured and 
looted at the Oberesch, or was transported here for processing.  
 
The range and nature of the baggage-related assemblage from Kalkriese has many 
similarities with the contemporaneous assemblage from Haltern, a fort possibly destroyed 
in an attack soon after the Teutoburg battle (see Harnecker 1997; Müller 2002). The 
Kalkriese assemblage reflects the range of material carried by the baggage-train, possibly 
only when conflict was unexpected, and so a similar range should not be expected in 
circumstances where a comparable baggage was not captured and/or destroyed. The 
interpretation of the assemblage has largely excluded coins, although the hoarding of high-
                                                          
131
 This thesis has taken ranged find numbers (e.g. 23407A-E) as five entries, following excavator precedent. To 
reflect artefact proportions recovered, tables referring to the Oberesch finds will include both the artefact 
entry quantities and the individual (fragment) find number quantities.  
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denomination coins is discussed in the context of deliberate obscuration processes as, like 
much of the non-functional assemblage, the coins are likely to be present only because of 
the baggage-train.132 
 
The published artefact catalogues record 771 individual identified artefacts 
associated with the weapons, armour and dress of Roman soldiers and the cavalry/mules 
(Table 3). Many are in a fragmented condition, with the consequence that the 771 artefacts 
are made up of 1004 individual fragments, mostly found in close spatial relationship with 
the artefact grouping. The military finds make up less than half the overall assemblage from 
the Oberesch, with the rest comprising artefacts associated with the baggage-train. Within 
this assemblage, offensive weapons are dominated by short-range projectiles and spears, 
but represent only 11-14% of the total military assemblage, and only 5% of that from the 
whole site. Long-range projectiles are almost completely absent, represented by only three 
arrowheads. No glandes were found at the Oberesch, although a small number have been 
recovered from the wider conflict landscape. Only one sword element survives, although 
several scabbard fittings have also been recovered.  
 
The defensive equipment makes up almost half of the entire military assemblage (by 
fragments), dominated by shield fitting fragments, which represent over two-fifths of the 
total military assemblage and one-fifth of the total fragment assemblage from the 
Oberesch, supplemented by a small quantity of helmet and body-armour pieces, few of 
which had fragmented into multiple pieces. 2/5th of the military fragment assemblage and 
just under 1/5th of the total assemblage were made up of miscellaneous military kit, 
including body-worn kit (belt-fittings, phalerae, and decorative rivets/studs), fibulae, caligae 
nails, and horse/mule equipment. Each category makes up 3.5-4.5% of the total fragment 
assemblage from the site. Caligae nails are not as dominant in the assemblage from the 
Oberesch as at Harzhorn, which may reflect differences in terrain or manoeuvring. 
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 For discussion of the coin assemblage see Berger 1996. 
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Artefact type Individual artefact 
quantity133 
% of individual military 
catalogue (771) 
% of total individual 
catalogue (1620) 
Projectiles 90 11.5% 5.5% 
     - pila 32 4.1% 2% 
     - lance/spear 55 7% 3.4% 
     - arrowheads 3 0.4% 0.1% 
Sword 1 0.10% 0.05% 
Scabbard 20 2.4% 1.3% 
OFFENSIVE 111 14% 6.85% 
    
Shield 296 38% 18.3% 
Helmet 20 2.5% 1.2% 
Body armour 44 5.5% 2.7% 
DEFENSIVE 360 47% 22.2% 
    
Miscellaneous 
body-worn kit 
90 11.5% 5.5% 
Fibulae 81 10.5% 5% 
Caligae 52 7% 3.2% 
Horse & mule 
kit 
77 10% 4.75% 
OTHER134 300 39% 18.45% 
    
TOTAL   47.5% 
 
Table 3: Military artefacts at the Oberesch based on individual find numbers (figures from Harnecker & 
Franzius 2008, Harnecker & Mylo 2011). 
 
                                                          
133
 Inclusive of separate find numbers but not multiple fragments of same artefact (e.g. 100A-E as one, not 
five). Includes identifiable artefacts only. 
134
 Categories included because their presence on the battlefield at the Oberesch cannot be put down purely 
to the Germanic capture of the Roman baggage-train. 
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Artefact type Total artefact 
fragment  
quantity135 
% of total military 
fragments (1004) 
% of total fragment 
assemblage (2343) 
Projectiles 90 9% 4% 
     - pila 32 3.2% 1.5% 
     - lance/spear 55 5.5% 2.35% 
     - arrowheads 3 0.3% 0.15% 
Sword 1 0.1% 0.05% 
Scabbard 20 1.9% 0.95% 
OFFENSIVE 111 11% 5% 
    
Shield 420 42% 18% 
Helmet 28 2.5% 1.2% 
Body armour 44 4.5% 1.8% 
DEFENSIVE 492 49% 21% 
    
Miscellaneous 
body-worn kit 
108 11% 4.5% 
Fibulae 82 8% 3.5% 
Caligae 104 10% 4.5% 
Horse & mule 
kit 
107 11% 4.5% 
OTHER 401 40% 17% 
    
TOTAL   43% 
 
Table 4: Military artefacts at the Oberesch based on total fragment quantities (figures from Harnecker & 
Franzius 2008; Harnecker & Mylo 2011). 
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 Inclusive of all metal elements, including multiple fragments of same artefact (e.g. 100A-E as five 
fragments). Includes identifiable artefacts only. 
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The data illustrate that just under half of the assemblage from the Oberesch can be 
directly associated with the military. Many of the artefacts are highly fragmented, although 
in many cases more than one piece can be identified as belonging to a single artefact. Table 
4 indicates that while the military artefacts were in most cases fragmented, this was no 
more common than among the non-weaponry assemblage.. The proportions remain close 
to evenly balanced between military and non-specific artefacts across the Oberesch. The 
creation of so many fragments suggests that, in certain circumstances, the looting process 
was itself a cause of artefact deposition. The presence of a large quantity of defensive 
equipment fragments is almost certainly reflective of post-battle reprocessing, rather than 
battle-period deposition as a result of fighting. In particular, the shield-binding was 
evidently ripped from the wooden bases for easier transportation, depositing small 
fragments nearby. Several pieces recovered from below the collapsed rampart had been 
crumpled into balls to further aid this process (Rost 2012/13: 103). Under logistical pressure, 
therefore, a system emerged where artefacts which were valuable as a whole were 
removed as such from the field, while those which were not, such as shields which were, in 
essence, a piece of wood overlaid by a small quantity of metal, were broken down and only 
the desired elements taken. 
 
Both Rost (2009a: 53-56) and Wilbers-Rost (2009b: 1341-1342; see also Rost & 
Wilbers-Rost 2012) have observed differences in the distribution of projectiles, which are 
almost exclusively recovered from below the collapsed rampart, and fragmented pieces of 
military armour and kit, which are almost exclusively found away from the rampart. They 
suggest that the nature and spatial distribution of the assemblage does not necessarily 
reflect battle-period deposition, but subsequent battlefield activity.  They suggest that the 
overall assemblage at the Oberesch was increased by the abandonment of Roman 
casualties, wounded and dead, who had been transported as far as this point, but who could 
no longer be moved due to intensification of the battle (Rost & Wilbers-Rost 2010: 133). The 
assemblage left behind represents the in situ stripping of the bodies on the battlefield, with 
a certain degree of violence (Rost 2009a: 52-54). Wilbers-Rost (2009a: 126) suggests that 
prioritised and valuable artefacts – weaponry, armour, and precious metals – were collected 
along the line of the rampart, particularly around the access-points, serving as a storage 
point from which material could be taken away, and were lost unintentionally when the 
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rampart collapsed. As such, even the find-spots of pila and other short-range projectiles 
may not represent their original conflict-period deposition, as they may have been moved 
prior to being lost; they are all found in close spatial association with the collapsed rampart. 
Rost and Wilbers-Rost (2010: 130; 2012) suggest that the concentration of shield fragments 
in front of the rampart is the result of shields being collected centrally from across the 
battlefield and stripped of their metal in this single area.  
 
The overall caution is that the intensive deposition of artefacts at the Oberesch does 
not necessarily correspond to an equally intensive period of fighting, and may instead 
document the spatial distribution of post-battle activity. Rost (2009a: 55-56) has identified a 
pattern of “inverse spatial proportion” between assemblage deposition and survival in the 
core and periphery areas of the Oberesch, comparable to the phenomenon observed on 
C19th battlefields in the United States, informally known as the  ‘donut effect’ (see 4.3). He 
suggests that this phenomenon is visible in the Oberesch assemblage, with a greater 
proportion of the large and/or valuable artefacts surviving on the battlefield periphery 
where looting is likely to have been least intensive. He cites the successful deliberate 
obscuration of high-denomination coins and a silver scabbard on the periphery of the 
battlefield as evidence that the fringe areas of a battlefield were not looted as intensively as 
the central areas. 
 
In comparison to the Oberesch, a very limited range of artefacts has been recovered 
from the Harzhorn battlefield, reflecting the fact that a Roman baggage-train was evidently 
not captured as a result of this engagement. There have been problems identifying some of 
the metal elements recovered, some are as-yet undated, but an assemblage of 1740 
artefacts has been identified and dated. The assemblage is entirely dominated by caligae 
nails, which represent over 4/5th of the total assemblage, and are distributed across the 
entire battlefield. Long-distance projectiles comprise just over a 1/10th of the remaining 
assemblage, themselves dominated by catapult bolts which make up 60% of the total. Body 
equipment, including armour and non-armour elements (separated at the Oberesch) and 
horse/mule fittings. represent a fraction of the total assemblage, as do tools and coinage. 
The dominance of the caligae nails in the assemblage actually has a fairly negative impact 
195 
 
on statistical analysis of the rest of the assemblage – in Table 5, the assemblage proportions 
have been considered both including and excluding caligae from the figures. 
 
 
Artefact type Quantity % of total 
assemblage 
 
% of non-caligae 
assemblage 
Caligae 1417 81% - 
Projectiles 214 12.3% 66.2% 
     - catapult bolts 131 7.5% 40% 
Body-worn items 28 1.6% 8.7% 
Horse/mule fittings 30 1.7% 9.3% 
Tools 16 0.9% 4.9% 
Coins 11 0.6% 3.5% 
Miscellaneous 24 1.3% 7.4% 
 
Table 5: Artefact proportions at Harzhorn (from figures in Berger et al. 2010/13: 334-335). 
 
 There are far fewer examples of defensive weaponry or armour fragments from 
Harzhorn, which is likely to reflect the lack of severe looting at the site; indeed, the lack of 
reprocessing fragments is one of the reasons that the site has been identified as that of a 
Roman, not Germanic, victory. Evidently, none of the stripping processes evident at 
Kalkriese took place at Harzhorn – or, if they did, the resulting fragments of shield-binding 
and kit pins were very effectively cleared from the site. As such, it is difficult to attribute the 
presence of the extant assemblage to the looting process, rather than battle.  
 
The excavators suggest, in contrast to Kalkriese, the spatial distribution of the 
Harzhorn assemblage reflects to a much greater degree the original conflict-period 
deposition, particularly in regards to projectiles (Berger et al. 2010/13). The lack of swords, 
shields and helmets suggests that there was, as would be expected, a process for clearing 
the battlefield at some point; without knowing the original deposition density, it is difficult 
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to know how effective this was. Evidently a number of projectiles were missed – what 
proportion is unknown – but there is nothing to suggest that they had been moved in the 
post-conflict period, particularly those which were located on the slopes of the Harz. The 
excavators suggest that the lack of body-worn kit fragments reflects the recovery of the 
Roman dead from this battlefield (Berger et al. 2010/13: 332). There is no evidence 
comparable to the Oberesch that the (Roman) dead were brutally stripped while on the 
battlefield, although difficulties would be presented if they had not been removed from 
their armour fairly soon after the battle. However, a concentration of kit fittings in “hotspot 
1” has led to the suggestion that the Romans suffered a small defeat in this particular zone 
of the battlefield, with kit fittings deposited through looting, as at the Oberesch, although 
the good condition of the finds does not quite match this hypothesis (Berger et al. 2010/13: 
384-385). The rest of the assemblage was left behind after the initial recovery of weaponry 
and armour. The excavators suggest that the large size of many of the artefacts left, and 
their relative visibility, indicates that there was no subsidiary looting for scrap metal (Berger 
et al. 2010/13: 332). 
 
 The difference in the assemblage composition between Kalkriese and Harzhorn has 
been attributed to the varying nature of the battles. At the latter, the Roman army was 
victorious and therefore in control of the post-battle recovery of material and the battle-
dead, whereas at Kalkriese they were routed by a Germanic force that thereafter directed 
the post-battle activity. The stripping of the Roman battle-dead, in particular, appears to 
have varied significantly between the instances of victory and defeat.  Harzhorn has allowed 
the understanding of assemblage deposition to be somewhat refined at least. Initially, it had 
been suggested that a substantial assemblage would only be left by the defeat of the Roman 
army in battle (e.g. Coulston 2001: 44). However, Rost (2009a: 51) has since suggested that 
any large army with a metal military material culture may leave behind a battlefield 
assemblage. The interpretation of the assemblage from Harzhorn suggests that this is not 
entirely accurate. While it is possible that both sides were armed in Roman-style kit and 
therefore the presence of Roman, rather than Germanic, kit could be indicative of the 
defeated army, it is clear from the distribution of the artefacts that the victorious army is 
represented in the assemblage, particularly in the distribution of the caligae nails and the 
catapult bolts. The lack of a published artefact catalogue from Baecula makes it difficult to 
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assess at this stage how closely it resembles the assemblage from Kalkriese or Harzhorn, 
although the reported finds thus far – caligae, arrows, glandes – suggest the latter. Baecula 
does however, clearly indicate once again that assemblages can survive on battlefields 
where the Roman army were victorious, as well as when they were defeated, as at 
Kalkriese. 
 
  
4.6: Site formation and assemblage survival 
 
 The nature of the assemblages at Kalkriese and Harzhorn certainly appear to confirm 
the selection bias towards weaponry and armour suggested by the literature. Although 
Baecula is, as yet, less thoroughly published, early indications from the site do not suggest 
any discrepancy emerging from this site. No non-projectile weapons or armour have been 
recovered from any of the excavated Roman battlefields, seeming to confirm the recovery 
of these artefacts in the earliest phases of looting. From Kalkriese, it can be observed that 
the weaponry and armour must have been removed during one of the early phases of 
looting, as none has been recovered from below the rampart which collapsed during or 
soon after the battle.136 This would certainly seem to confirm the prioritisation of weaponry 
and armour in the immediate period after battle, alongside valuable metals (such as the 
silver plating on the cavalry mask), which is what would be expected. However, the 
assemblages make it clear that a wider range of artefacts were deposited during ancient 
battle, and were evidently available for looting in the post-battle period. Given that the 
extant assemblages may only reflect a small proportion of the original deposition, are there 
are any other factors beyond selection bias which have impacted the quantity, nature, and 
distribution of battlefield assemblages? 
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 A mule skeleton was entirely articulated and showed no signs of predator damage or other surface-
exposure, suggesting that the rampart had collapsed to cover it shortly after the battle, if not during it (Rost & 
Wilbers-Rost 2014a: 499). 
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4.6.1: Phases of looting 
 
 In the case of Kalkriese, although it is probable that the same is applicable to any 
battlefield, the evidence suggests that there were multiple phases of looting: the first 
conducted by the victorious army in the immediate aftermath, followed by subsequent 
looting, including by local populations. The first stage prioritised weaponry and armour at 
the expense of the other battlefield ephemera, which was usually smaller, more difficult to 
find, and of lower value. The partial collapse of the Germanic rampart at Kalkriese preserved 
part of the battlefield before it had been completely looted, allowing the difference in 
artefact density and nature to be compared with areas which were more thoroughly looted. 
Based on the nature and spatial distribution of the finds, Rost (2009a, 2009b; cf. Rost & 
Wilbers-Rost 2012) suggests that there was a hurried initial looting period which prioritised 
weaponry, armour, and portable valuables, most of which would have been found in close 
spatial conjunction with the bodies of the dead. During this phase, the remaining 
assemblage was not necessarily permanently rejected, but found to be of insufficient value 
to be worth recovering as a priority.  
 
A second phase of (Germanic) looting conducted several weeks or months later was 
more thorough, although by this time some battle-related material had been covered by the 
collapsed rampart.137 During this phase, and any subsequent looting activity, some battle-
related material was left unrecovered in accessible areas of the battlefield. Although these 
pieces may have been deliberately rejected, it is more probable that they survived as the 
result of physical obscuration by topsoil or surface vegetation. With a few exceptions, the 
surviving assemblages are made up of small, non-functional, low-value artefacts that, in 
many cases, were fragments from a larger artefact. They were, as Rost (2009a: 51) 
described, “…scattered widely and were too small and worthless to expend search time”. 
Material recovered from a Republican campaign camp at La Palma in north-east Spain 
suggests that metal was frequently prioritised for collection by the Roman military for 
reprocessing, represented at this camp by a large quantity of bronze non-military artefacts 
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 A phase of Roman looting may have taken place alongside the disposal of the skeletal remains, by 
Germanicus or otherwise, two to ten years after the battle, but this depends on the verification of the 
Oberesch bone-pits as Roman activity. 
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and weights (Noguera 2012: 275-277). Despite the innate value of any metal in antiquity, 
and the evidence from La Palma that almost any artefact would be collected by the Roman 
military for reprocessing if it was readily available, the actual time which could be dedicated 
to the collection of such artefacts was limited, certainly in the initial stages of looting. 
 
 
4.6.2: Natural obscuration 
 
 The physical size of artefacts from the battlefields is relatively small. Although there 
are some exceptions, most finds are certainly within the parameters of having become lost 
in the topsoil or surface vegetation. The projectiles lost at Harzhorn are certainly not of 
insubstantial size and would not be easily missed during the looting process had they been 
lying on the surface. There certainly are several examples of large artefacts being left on the 
battlefield, most notable the dolabra heads from the Oberesch and Harzhorn. The former is 
53cm long, certainly of a size to be visible. However, multiple larger objects were preserved 
on the battlefield because they were obscured by the collapsed rampart, and it may not be 
possible to read too much into the survival of the dolabra at the Oberesch.  
 
 
 
Figure 16: Inscribed dolabra from Harzhorn (from Geschwinde & Lönne 2013: 279). 
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 More relevant perhaps is the dolabra excavated at Harzhorn in 2010, of comparable 
form to the Kalkriese example and measuring 44.5cm (Wiegels et al. 2011; Fig. 16). 
Attention was immediately drawn by the inscription ‘LEG IIII SA’, seemingly identifying one 
of the legions involved in the battle.138 Presumably it would have been considered an 
artefact of value and would have been recovered if possible, and the failure to do so was 
evidently not because of its small size. Rather, it may be that the artefact, and many 
comparable others from the smallest items upwards, were not recovered because they 
were not visible on the surface of the battlefield. 
 
 Surface visibility appears to play a role more widely in the survival of battlefield 
assemblages, to the degree that obscuration by surface vegetation or topsoil embedding is 
likely to be one of the key factors in the survival of assemblages. The physical impact of 
battle on the surface of the battlefield causes many artefacts deposited during the fighting 
to be re-deposited in the topsoil, often while the conflict continued. As a result, many 
smaller artefacts originally deposited on the site surface during the actual battle were below 
the surface at the end of it. Larger artefacts would have been less vulnerable to this process, 
particularly those, as Rost (2009a: 51-52) observes, which were attached to the bodies of 
casualties or, presumably, in close spatial association with them. Post-battle looting may 
have been somewhat of a field-walking exercise, picking up artefacts which were obvious to 
the naked eye but perhaps not speculatively digging in the topsoil.  
 
The effort which would have been expended in recovering the artefacts would have 
outstripped the value they actually had. As such, this may explain the failure of the literary 
sources to refer to the deliberate abandonment of the fragmented finds on the battlefield. 
The Roman army would have been unable to see them, and were potentially entirely 
unaware of their existence, certainly to a degree that would have been transmitted to the 
writers of ancient sources. It should be expected that surviving assemblages will 
overwhelmingly be dominated by small, low-value artefacts which could easily have become 
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 Inscribed objects are thus far rare on Roman battlefields. Only three have been recovered from Kalkriese: a 
scabbard fragment from the Oberesch had an inscription reconstructed as ‘T. Vibi(i) (centuria) Tadi(i) l(egionis) 
P(rimae) A(ugustae) X LX’ (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 5, fn. 26); an armour fitting inscribed ‘M. Aii (cohort) I 
(centuria) Fab(ricii) (Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 9, fn. 114); and a plumbob inscribed ‘CHOI’ (c(o)ho(rtis) I) 
(Harnecker & Franzius 2008: 20, fn. 315). 
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obscured by the topsoil. Wilbers-Rost (2009a: 125) notes that environmental analysis of the 
Kalkriese battlefield suggests large areas of the eastern portion were covered by thick 
surface vegetation, in contrast to the western portion in front of the rampart which were 
open pasture, and suggests that more artefacts would have been more easily obscured in 
the wooden eastern area of the site. Similarly at Harzhorn, environmental analysis suggests 
that the battlefield area was wooded at the time of the battle (Berger et al. 2010/13: 379), 
which would again present issues with visibility during any looting activity. 
 
 Some artefacts, particularly projectiles, may have been made less visible by 
embedding in the topsoil, even allowing for the substantial size of some of the recovered 
material. The projectile quantities at Harzhorn suggest that projectiles without (e.g. glandes) 
or with small (e.g. catapult bolts, some arrows) wooden elements may have been more 
likely to go unrecovered than those with, which would, unless broken, presumably have 
been more noticeable. Sim and Ridge (2002: 90) suggest that projectiles were in many cases 
seen as a temporary weapon - they term them “disposable” - which might only be used 
once or twice, in part due to the high potential for damage, but also reflecting the 
uncertainties in terms of recovery. The production method for the smaller long-range 
projectiles was fairly rapid, less than a minute for individual arrowheads, as contrasted to 
ten hours for a pilum, and most of the ‘disposable’ projectiles would not be fire hardened 
(Sim & Ridge 2002: 78-90). While the extant assemblages show that relatively few 
projectiles (in comparison to probable deposition) have survived through to the modern 
day, it is as yet difficult to quantify how much of the recovered assemblage was taken in the 
immediate aftermath of battle, and how much in the subsequent two millennia of site 
occupation which followed. 
 
 
4.6.3: Later looting and relic-hunting 
 
It is probable that the majority of subsequent looting phases were conducted by 
local populations who may also have uncovered artefacts as a result of subsequent land-
use. Abandoning smaller, non-weaponry artefacts posed little immediate tactical threat to 
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the victorious army, certainly less than an extended delay on the battlefield might prove to 
be, and would not represent a huge economic loss to the institutional army. No doubt 
subsequent looting-phases would have recovered the artefacts had they proved visible; 
however, the value and interest of a scatter of caligae nails or a broken fibula may have 
been limited even soon after the battle. The assemblage at Kalkriese was protected by the 
medieval-period deposition of a layer of fertiliser (Esch) across the site, which minimised the 
impact of agricultural activity on the assemblage. Despite the subsequent land-use of the 
area, both the artefacts and rampart remains were preserved.  
 
Civilian involvement in Roman-period battlefield looting can be extrapolated from 
the presence of material in local settlements around of Kalkriese and Abritus, although in 
both cases the material may have been deposited by soldiers, either fleeing Romans or 
victorious provincials. In both instances the Roman army had been defeated, after which it 
might be expected that local populations would be more involved in battlefield looting than 
in the instance of a Roman victory. Added to this is the problem previously referred to of 
identifying military artefacts in civilian contexts, and the additional issue that any 
reprocessing of the metal into other artefacts would make it impossible to identify the 
battlefield-looting origins of the piece. As a future project, it could prove illuminating to 
model civilian involvement in battlefield looting by measuring economic changes in the 
vicinity of conflict sites consistent with a sudden influx of metal, which may provide 
compelling evidence for civilian acquisition of material from a battlefield. The Abritus 
landscape assemblage does, however, provide compelling evidence for the involvement of 
civilian populations in battlefield looting, at least in the case of Roman defeat, and the 
prioritised recovery of functional weaponry in particular. 
 
 Although the assemblage at Kalkriese was afforded protection firstly by the collapse 
of the rampart, and secondly by the medieval deposition of the Esch, the assemblages from 
Baecula and Harzhorn illustrate that these features are not absolutely necessary for the 
preservation of a battlefield assemblage. If these battlefields were not protected by the 
deposition of an Esch-type layer, then there must be other mechanisms which protected 
battlefield assemblages in the longer term, particularly low settlement/population density 
and minimal or non-invasive subsequent land-use. The German civilian population around 
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Kalkriese and the Oberesch is still largely invisible, although recent archaeological work has 
been carried out in native settlements within the surrounding conflict landscape (Rost & 
Wilbers-Rost 2014b), and excavation on the Oberesch itself has recovered a quantity of 
pottery which suggests a reasonable level of pre- and peri-battle settlement occupation. The 
population density around Baecula is, as yet, not well documented; however, it can be 
observed that (a) the immediate hinterland had a number of named oppida at the time of 
the battle and (b) that from other areas of Spain that there was dramatic depopulation and 
abandonment of pre-Roman settlements at the end of the C3rd BC, associated both with the 
end of the Second Punic War and a series of indigenous revolts which were brutally 
suppressed (Noguera et al. 2014: 59). 
 
Harzhorn was an under-populated region in the C3rd AD. Although the region was 
subject to agricultural activity and covered by a road network, the battlefield itself was not 
intensively settled. There was a relatively dense population in the south-western Harz 
region until c.AD300, but evidence of depopulation in the period after (Berger et al. 
2010/13: 373-374) and, the excavators have suggested that there may have been no 
secondary phase of looting due to an absence of local population. Little Roman material has 
emerged subsequently in the area, but it has not been sought.  Until the discovery of the 
Harzhorn battlefield, there was little evidence, particularly historical, for a Roman presence 
in this area of Germania in the C3rd AD. There has been minimal agricultural activity on most 
of the Harzhorn area more recently due to the poor quality of the soil, and areas of it appear 
to have been given over to forestry in the C19th, offering some protection to the 
assemblage. Few to no artefacts have been recovered from the areas which were 
agriculturally managed in later periods (Berger et al. 2010/13: 329-330). The assemblage at 
Harzhorn may have been further protected by the geology of the area, particularly the 
presence of limestone, which naturally preserved many of the iron artefacts; many of the 
iron artefact hotspots from Harzhorn overlap with areas of limestone (Berger et al. 2010/13: 
327; 356). The physical survival of the battle artefacts in the ground will, of course, be 
impacted by general degradation process dependent on the chemical content of the soil and 
the artefact. However, it is notable that many iron artefacts have emerged from Roman 
battlefields, not just the copper-alloy fittings or lead projectiles which might have been 
expected based on the artefact profiles of later battlefields. 
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 Subsequent looting by relic hunters is a difficult issue in the context of Roman 
battlefields. Unlike their later counterparts, it is difficult to say that these sites have been 
deliberately targeted as battlefields due to the lack of identification of most sites, although 
the concentration of artefacts associated with battle may contribute to sites being targeted 
in general. Areas which have been identified as a potential battlefield may have been 
prospected by surveyors attempting to verify the location. Rihll (2009: 147-150) noted that 
glandes, which as discussed are likely to be key to identifying and studying ancient 
battlefields, are commonly targeted by detectorists, who (in most countries) have no legal 
obligation to record or report the finds.139 Most end up in private collections or are put up 
for sale; many may come from battlefields which have been looted without the detectorists 
even realising this is what they are actually doing. At Harzhorn, the original (illegal) 
detectorist prospection in the early 2000s was intended to look for material related to the 
Second World War, not the Roman period (Berger et al. 2010/13: 314). Nevertheless, the 
removal of material constituted Roman battlefield looting, regardless of intent, highlighting 
the importance of recognising conflict-related material when it emerges incidentally. At 
Baecula too, it was recognised that the battlefield had been covered by metal detecting relic 
hunters in the 1980s, albeit again without realising that they were looting a battlefield 
(Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012: 359). Although unintentional, these activities may significantly 
impact the surviving archaeology and need to be factored in to spatial analyses of the 
remaining assemblages. 
 
 
4.7: Theorising Greek battlefield archaeology 
 
 Without venturing too far into groundless speculation, it should be considered how 
far the archaeology from Roman battlefields will also be seen on Greek sites. In many ways 
this issue is difficult to address without archaeological work on a number of Greek 
battlefields, providing insights into the similarities between the assemblages recovered from 
them and their Roman counterparts. It is worth considering the potential range of 
methodological cross-over between sites and assemblages and the hypothetical applicability 
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 “Glandes are likely to have been deposited on battlefields (the kind of environment that detectorists 
frequent but archaeologists do not)” (Rihll 2009: 147-148). 
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of the above considerations. There is cause for optimism about the survival of archaeology 
on these sites. As discussed in the Roman context, the presence of any army with a metal-
based material culture on a battlefield creates the potential for significant archaeological 
deposition during the overall battle period, particularly in terms of the weapons and armour 
of the dead, projectiles and kit-fittings. A battlefield in the aftermath of conflict in the Greek 
world, therefore, is likely to have had more than a passing resemblance to its Roman 
counterpart, resulting in a commonality in at least the initial stages of the battlefield site 
formation process. 
 
 The Greek literary sources imply a similar process of selection bias in the early 
phases of battlefield looting, which is verified by the presence of battle-recovered weaponry 
and armour in religious sanctuaries. The larger-piece weaponry, particularly swords, 
helmets, shields and greaves, would not be expected to survive on Greek battlefields any 
more than they would on Roman. Many antiquarian reports of weapons and armour 
discovered on Greek battlefields are of dubious provenance and cannot be taken as 
evidence for the presence of this material in the genuine archaeological record. Although 
what happened to the recovered material aside from votive dedication is less certain, and 
there are likely to be polis- and circumstance-based variations, it is probable that the only 
large-piece weaponry and armour left on a Greek battlefield was a limited quantity 
deliberately left as a battlefield trophy. The process of natural obscuration, as discussed 
above, does not in most cases affect large artefacts, particularly those which would be 
spatially associated with the bodies of the battle-dead. It can be broadly accepted that a 
large quantity of projectiles would have been deposited on Greek battlefields. As on Roman 
sites, the deposition of projectiles might be expected to be concentrated in the areas at 
which they were fired. Smaller projectiles would have been as vulnerable as all their later 
counterparts, from Roman battlefields through to the C19th, to embedding in the topsoil and 
surface obscuration, and a number of examples, albeit also of dubious provenance, have 
been discovered on Greek battlefield sites. 
 
 However, it has to be considered whether these artefacts, which largely correspond 
to what the literary sources document, represent the entire range of Greek battlefield 
deposition or whether, as evidenced in the Roman world, Greek battle deposited a much 
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wider range of artefacts. Such consideration is, of course, entirely speculative at this stage, 
pending further archaeological study. Nevertheless, is it necessary to consider what the 
assemblage range might have been before any conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
concurrence (or otherwise) between Greek and Roman exploratory methodologies. Greek 
body-armour would potentially have been vulnerable to physical damage by the sheer force 
of battle, which could lead to fragmentation. However, the Roman assemblages suggest that 
this is a relatively rare reason for deposition. Very few kit fittings were recovered from 
Baecula or Harzhorn, in contrast to Kalkriese, suggesting that the deposition of armour 
fragments may rely on the stripping of the dead, not fighting. Armies equipped in leather or 
linen armour may be unlikely to leave behind much evidence of their kit, as seen at Baecula 
where the non-metal armour of the Carthaginian mercenaries appears to have left little 
archaeological trace.140 Any German casualties at Harzhorn, also potentially equipped in 
non-metal armour, have also left few kit fragments behind, in contrast to the range of 
fittings left by the stripping of metal armour at Kalkriese. Hoplites consistently fought in 
metal armour (Anderson 1989), and it is possible that the stripping of the battle-dead could 
have led to fragmentary assemblages comparable to that of Kalkriese – although whether it 
would be recognisable as battle-related is a different issue. As Greek metal armour was 
predominantly made of bronze it is likely that any fragments on the battlefield would be 
made from this metal, in contrast to Roman sites where iron is more common.  
 
 It is not possible to say whether the wider range of projectiles, kit and non-weaponry 
artefacts from Roman battlefields would have been deposited by Greek battle, and 
therefore what the signature or characteristic of Greek battle would manifest in the 
archaeological record. A bias towards bronze artefacts over iron is probable, while a range 
of artefacts beyond weapons and armour may have been deposited on Greek battlefields, as 
on their Roman counterparts, including coins and personal possessions. There may be non-
metal artefacts associated with military kit – in the grave of Theban casualties at Chaeronea 
(338BC), the shoes of the casualties have no metal elements, instead being fitted with bone 
eyelets. As for Roman sites, therefore, a wider range of diagnostically-significant artefacts 
may have been deposited during battle in the Greek world. However, assessing what might 
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 For Carthaginian kit during the Punic Wars, see Daly 2002: 81-111. 
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survive from this potential assemblage is difficult and will vary on a site-by-site basis. 
Without knowing the ultimate purpose(s) of Greek battlefield looting it is difficult to say 
how rigorous the search for deposited artefacts would have been, or how either economic 
supplementation or enemy resource denial would have influenced the process. Aside from 
victory trophies, there are no mentions in the Greek texts of (metal) artefacts deliberately 
abandoned on the battlefield, but the same is true of the Roman sources, which 
archaeology has demonstrated was not the case. Until further archaeological work has been 
done, there is no way to assess the potential impact of surface obscuration, the occurrence 
of multiple looting phases, or to quantify the involvement of local populations. 
Nevertheless, there are grounds to suggest that comparable archaeological assemblages 
could realistically have been deposited on Greek battlefield sites, and any methodological 
process developed for Roman studies should be applicable to the study of Greek sites. 
 
 
4.8: Conclusion 
 
 The Roman archaeological assemblages provide the best insight into the ancient 
battlefield looting process, adding multiple complex dimensions that were not apparent 
from the other sources of evidence. There is a broad confirmation of the selection bias in 
the absence of weaponry and armour from the battlefields. However, it is clear that a 
significant assemblage of projectiles went unrecovered, particularly small long-range pieces, 
in a greater quantity than is implied by the literary record. Other small, low-value, non-
weaponry artefacts were also left behind in some quantity, and the evidence from Kalkriese 
suggests that they are predominantly evidence for the looting process itself and the forceful 
stripping of casualties on the battlefield. The assemblages are spread over a wide conflict 
area, associating battlefield-proximate features, particularly temporary camps, with the 
area of conflict, creating a vast physical landscape relevant to the actual battle which moves 
far beyond the area encompassed by battle narratives. The greatest insight, however, has 
been the re-conceptualisation of ancient battlefield looting as a multi-stage process, 
conducted in various phases by different groups with access to the battlefield. The 
consequence is that battlefield site formation cannot be judged simply on the military 
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involvement in looting, but with consideration also of civilian populations and subsequent 
land-use, both in antiquity and through to the modern day. 
 
Extant ancient battlefield assemblages are likely only partially to represent their 
original quantity, nature and distribution in the immediate aftermath of fighting, but in 
doing so they provide a valuable insight into the looting process. It is evident that there was 
a selection bias in the looting process, certainly in the first phase of looting, which recovered 
large-piece weapons and armour, the majority of which were the non-ferrous assemblage, 
at the expense of projectiles, kit fittings, and other small artefacts. The deliberate 
abandonment through rejection of material is not suggested by the sources, and the size of 
the finds and their spatial distribution suggest it was predominantly artefacts obscured by 
topsoil and vegetation which were not recovered. The result, at least on Roman sites, is an 
assemblage dominated by small iron artefacts, distributed over a wide area which is not 
necessarily restricted to the area of fighting.  
 
The resulting assemblages may not be glamorous or exciting. They will be dominated 
by (small) projectiles and caligae nails, with concentrations of material possible both in 
areas of intensive activity and of post-battle collection of material. While broken weapons 
and armour might once have been viewed as the archaeological remains of Classical battle, 
the reality is more prosaic: an artefact scatter dominated by artefacts which were not large 
enough to find or valuable enough to search for. However, it is likely to prove significantly 
distinctive, particularly in the northern Roman provinces, to function as a ‘signature’ 
archaeology which can be targeted by survey and methodology. 
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Chapter Five: The archaeology of battlefield mass graves in 
antiquity 
 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
 Alongside looting, disposal of the battle-dead is one of the two post-battle activities 
documented by the ancient historical record, and contributes to post-fighting site 
formation.141 Understanding what happened to the battle-dead, both in antiquity and later 
historical periods, improves general interpretation of battlefield sites, particularly where 
they shed light on the general post-battle processing on the battlefield. The battle-dead may 
have been disposed of close to where they died or moved to another part of the site for 
more central collective disposal through inhumation or cremation, creating a pit-type 
feature for the purpose or using a pre-existing shallow for this purpose. Alternatively, the 
dead may have been abandoned where they lay, lying exposed until they were eventually 
buried by an unknown party, or were naturally dispersed or covered. The method which was 
used may have had an impact on the composition and thereafter survival of an artefact 
assemblage, particularly artefacts associated with body-worn equipment. Traditional 
approaches to the disposal of the battle-dead in the Greek and Roman worlds suggest that 
battlefield graves were a near-universal feature on sites based on the literary record and 
social analysis (see 5.3). Less idealistic archaeological analysis of conflict remains suggests, 
however, that the battle-dead may have been abandoned on the battlefield with previously 
unimagined regularity (James 2007: 162). 
 
 
 
                                                          
141
 For the purposes here, "battle-dead" is limited to those casualties who died while the combating bodies 
were still located on (or around) the battlefield area, between the commencement of battle-related activity 
and the cessation of post-battle activity prior to departure - any casualties whose disposal, or lack thereof, 
would affect the archaeology of the battlefield. This may include casualties who fell in battle, wounded 
soldiers who died soon after and prisoners executed on the battlefield. Those wounded and who died after the 
units’ departure from the field are not included as their disposal would not directly affect the battlefield 
assemblage. 
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 Although the Classical literary record contains few details on the nature, shape, size, 
capacity, or relative spatial location of battlefield graves documented in the text, a certain 
amount can be extrapolated from their later counterparts. While Greek and Roman civilian 
graves may have demonstrated particular mortuary practices (e.g. Kurtz & Boardman 1971), 
it is not expected that these same practices would be found on battlefields. The pragmatic 
considerations resulting from the mass disposal of large numbers of bodies in a short period 
of time often necessitate a rather more functional approach. Similar burials are often seen 
in graves associated with natural disasters and epidemics, such as the East Smithfield plague 
burial which show typically untidy mass inhumation of large numbers of bodies (Grainger et 
al. 2008). Although mass graves are studied in battlefield archaeology of all periods, the 
contribution which they can make to the identification of battlefield sites from Classical 
antiquity makes research into these features a particular priority. The location of battlefields 
such as Culloden, Waterloo or Gettysburg, is already sufficiently well-established that the 
battlefield location does not need to be verified by excavating mass graves, and they are 
typically not excavated (Pollard 2009b; Wason 2003). However, mass graves can provide 
strong verification when found in a previously unidentified battlefield context. So, for 
example, both Keppie (1981: 85) and Hanson (1987: 137) have previously argued that mass 
graves could verify the location of Mons Graupius, particularly if found in association with 
relevant Roman military material culture. However, in the past skeletal remains have been 
used to support tenuous battlefield identifications without further supporting evidence, as 
in the case of Trasimene where cremation pits on Mt Gualandro were used to argue a 
particular location for the battle (Susini 1960), now widely discredited. The presence of 
human remains in spatial association with a potential battlefield is not enough to 
substantiate an identification without further evidence. 
 
 This chapter considers the evidence for how frequently mass graves were created on 
ancient battlefields and the form that they took, and then discusses the issue of repatriation 
or removal of remains in some literary and archaeological contexts. Following this, evidence 
for the actual process is considered, addressing any impact which it had on the overall site 
formation and artefact assemblage as well as the creation of the features themselves. It 
suggests that far too much focus has been placed on the commemoration of the battle-dead 
in wider society, which has led to a distorted, and somewhat idealised, impression of the 
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practice on the battlefield. In many cases, potentially, the battle-dead were treated 
perfunctorily by either their fellow soldiers or local populations, receiving a basic burial, 
cremation, or even abandonment. 
 
 
5.2: Disposal of the battle-dead in historical context 
 
 Repatriation is unlikely to have been a common method of disposal for the battle-
dead throughout much of history. Deceased elite individuals may have had the option of 
being brought home, at private expense, but the average soldier did not. Repatriation of 
soldiers (after antiquity) is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging on a large-scale after 
the Civil War in the United States and after WWI in Europe. In the early stages of these 
conflicts attempts were made to repatriate the dead immediately but were rapidly 
abandoned once the logistical considerations became apparent (Dickon 2011: 28-29). 
Instead, the dead were buried on the battlefield and reclaimed after the respective wars for 
burial in family or military cemeteries (Gilpin Faust 2006: 996; Dickon 2011: 62-64). From 
this point on, repatriation after the conflict became an increasingly normalised option, 
although Britain legislated against the return of its casualties following the First World War 
(see Oliver 2012). Not all casualties received a formal burial even in the aftermath of battle, 
as is particularly evident on the WWI Western Front where bodies are still being uncovered 
across the battle theatre (e.g. Fraser & Brown 2007; Pollard & Barton 2013). It was only in 
the Vietnam War that battlefield burial was abandoned, as transport and refrigeration 
technology made it possible to repatriate  without waiting for the cessation of conflict 
(Dickon 2011: 144-145). As such, it is expected that for all battles prior to the later C20th, 
mass graves would have been created on the battlefield in the aftermath of fighting, and 
many survive, even on sites where attempts were made to recover the dead at a later point. 
 
 There is little evidence that the majority of victorious armies were in any obligated to 
ensure the burial of the dead of their defeated opponents. Deliberate non-burial of 
casualties by the victors is rare in the historical record, although it is mentioned on 
occasions in some limited contexts (e.g. Foard & Morris 2012: 34 for English examples). 
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Archaeological research is beginning to suggest that it may have been more common than 
the written sources suggest. Examples of unburied dead include the Castilian casualties at 
Aljubarrota, left unburied for at least seven years (Cunha & Silva 1997) and the US Cavalry 
casualties at the Little Bighorn, although they were buried soon after when the remainder of 
the 7th Cavalry arrived at the scene four days later (Scott et al. 1998). During the American 
Civil War victorious soldiers routinely left enemy casualties unburied after stripping (and in 
some cases mutilating) them, as documented in contemporary photographs from the 
battlefields.142 This particularly impacted Confederate soldiers who were frequently 
abandoned and relied on local populations to give them a burial (Reardon & Vossler 2013: 
751-752), although many were left abandoned. However, a certain level of disposal was 
necessary if there were any plans to remain on the battlefield in the medium to long term, if 
only to avoid disease, or in the interests of subsequent land-use. Failure to rapidly remove 
the dead at Aspern resulted in the outbreak of disease (Binder et al. 2014: 366), and this 
was no doubt a common occurrence on any battlefield where the dead, including animals, 
lay unburied. 
 
 Where formal processes for disposing of the battle-dead have taken place on the 
battlefield, mass inhumation has historically been the most common method. Excavated 
battlefield graves show a tendency towards convenience ahead of religious or social 
considerations. Several battlefield archaeologists have argued that the burial methods were 
not intended to be disrespectful, but rather were pragmatic solutions to a large number of 
bodies needing rapid burial (Scott et al. 1998: 105; Sutherland & Holst 2005: 29). In many 
cases, it is unlikely that those doing the burying would have had any personal connection 
with the dead. During many of the Early Modern European conflicts including  the Thirty and 
Seven Years Wars, casualties were buried by army servants and local civilians (Podruczny & 
Wrzosek 2014), the latter were also used at Culloden to bury the Jacobite dead (Pollard 
2009a: 10) and at Aspern to bury the dead of both armies (Binder et al. 2014: 366). Both 
prisoners and local civilians buried the dead in the American Civil War (Reardon & Vossler 
2013: 751-752). Waterloo provides a good example, however, of the struggles to deal with 
large numbers of casualties following a battle (see O'Keefe 2014: 66-70). Initial burial parties 
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 I am grateful to Professor Lawrence Babits for his many comments and insights into the process, and for 
sharing the photographic evidence of the (mis)treatment of the battle-dead during the American Civil War. 
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loaded the dead onto wagons and transported them to pits big enough for 30 to 40 bodies, 
buried at a 6ft depth in pits measuring c.15-20ft². Many graves were subsequently 
uncovered by a combination of hot weather, and following that, heavy rain, which lead to 
resurfacing of the remains.143 By the following week, the burial was so chaotic that the 
remaining bodies began to be cremated in piles, with pits dug, filled with bodies, covered in 
wood, and set on fire. Over a thousand bodies were buried in one fire in the courtyard of 
Hougoumont, with reports that the cremation pyres were still smouldering a month after 
the battle. The example of Waterloo suggests that even when there were intentions to 
implement a consistent and socially-acceptable form of burial, the logistic challenges could 
rapidly lead to alternative methods, including cremation. 
 
 
5.2.1: Mass graves and the battle-dead 
 
 Excavated battlefield graves are typically found in close spatial association with areas 
of intensive artefact deposition and therefore intensive fighting and higher casualties, 
suggesting that graves were deliberately positioned to minimise the distance the bodies had 
to be moved for burial (Foard & Morris 2012: 32). In some cases, bodies could be moved a 
short distance to use pre-existing ditches or other sunken features as makeshift graves, as in 
the mass burial at Towton (Sutherland & Richardson 2009: 165-166) and multiple instances 
in the American Civil War (Gilpin Faust 2008: 73). At Culloden, the Jacobite graves were 
placed on either side of a road, which enabled the bodies to be collected from across the 
battlefield and transported for burial by wagon (Pollard 2009b: 136). In Medieval England, it 
has been suggested that some of the battle-dead, particularly those in the periphery of the 
battlefield, may have been collected and buried in consecrated ground (e.g. Foard & Morris 
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 As also at the Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1998). 
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2012: 32), as suggested for some individual burials at Towton (Sutherland & Holst 2014).144 
If the dead had been left unburied for a period of several days or more however, it was not 
always possible to move them, in which case the bodies might be covered where they lay or 
rolled into individual trenches dug alongside each one, as at Camden (Smith et al. 2009) and 
the Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1998). 
 
Excavation of battlefield graves suggests that they typically contained between 50 
and 200 inhumed individuals. As yet few battlefields have revealed multiple graves, though 
the casualties represented in those excavated is only a small proportion of the total. Only at 
Visby do the excavated graves appeared to contain anything close to the number of 
documented battle-dead.145 The largest excavated battlefield burial from Visby is Grave 2, 
containing 798 casualties, one of the largest excavated battlefield graves of any period. 
Much smaller graves are known from other battlefields. The Towton 2005 grave contained 
only three individuals, alongside a single burial in an adjoining but separate grave-cut and 
two more single graves close by (Sutherland & Holst 2014: 90-91). At Aspern, although 
several mass graves have been reported including an antiquarian discovery of a grave 
containing seventy individuals, the excavated examples contained between two and twenty-
two bodies (Binder et al. 2014: 368). The dimensions of the graves were not large in 
comparison to the battlefield landscapes overall.146 Grave 2 at Visby covers an area of 72m², 
a relatively small area within the wider battlefield, but nonetheless not so small that even 
wide-spaced transect survey/excavated might have missed it entirely.  
 
Many battlefield graves were laid out with a minimum of overlapping and consistent 
orientation. Those graves which do have overlapping are typically identified as casualties 
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 More usually, burials in chapel grounds are associated with battle casualties who died of their wounds at a 
later date, as at Naseby (Foard 1995: 309-319); or skeletal material recovered from a battlefield, as at 
Aljubarrota (Cunha & Silva 1997), Grünwald-Tannenberg (Pluskowski 2013: 346-347), and (unverified) 
Bosworth (Foard & Morris 2012: 32). Recovery and chapel-reburial of battlefield casualties occurs almost 
exclusively within living memory of the battle. At Repton, the disarticulated skeletal remains of c.264 casualties 
were exhumed and reburied in grounds of an Anglo-Saxon monastery in the late C9
th
, which has been 
suggested to represent the casualties of the Danish Great Army which were collected together at a period 
after death for collective burial (Biddle & Kjølbye-Biddle 2001). 
145
 Visby, grave 1 c.268, grave 2 c.798, grave 3 c.119 (Thordeman 1939); two additional graves of comparable 
size to grave 1 have been identified but not excavated. The total Swedish casualties are estimated at c.1700. 
146
 Visby grave 1: 5.5m x 7m x 1.5m; grave 2: 12m x 6m x c.2m; grave 3: 4m x c.11m.Towton 1996 grave: 2m x 
6m x 0.5m (figures from Masters & Enright 2011). 
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buried by the enemy, such as the disordered burial of the Mexican dead at Resaca de la 
Palma by the US army (Wescott et al. 2012). Several disordered mass burials at Aspern have 
also been interpreted as burial of the defeated battle-dead by those with no affiliation to 
them, as other communal graves on the site were laid out in a more organised fashion 
(Binder et al. 2014: 370). That said, overlapping or disordered burials are not universally 
indicative of disrespectful burial of the enemy. The casualties in the large Towton grave, 
although heavily overlain, had been laid out carefully in the grave to make use of the space 
most effectively and had been intentionally buried within the consecrated ground of 
Towton chapel (Sutherland & Holst 2014: 91-94). The field burials of WWI (Australian) 
casualties in a series of pits at Fromelles, France, were conducted (by the Germans) with a 
varying amount of care, some carefully placed in the grave on a ground-sheet, others more 
chaotically deposited including one spread-eagled body (Pollard & Barton 2013: 99-100). 
Graves typically contain few artefacts suggesting that the bodies were stripped of any 
valuables prior to burial.  
 
Whether they were buried in clothing is less certain. No evidence of shroud-pins or 
clothing has been identified in any Early Modern or Medieval graves, but as the large 
Towton grave, for example, contained mainly copper-alloy lace-ends, in some cases the 
dead may have been partially clothed (Burgess 2000). In later periods, the battle-dead could 
be buried entirely naked in mass graves, stripped of all organic as well as metal artefacts 
(Podruczny & Wrzosek 2014). In other cases, however, it may have been too much trouble 
to fully strip the battle-dead. Numerous bodies from Waterloo were buried in clothing 
(O’Keefe 2014: 66-70), while many field graves from WWI also contain the remains of 
individuals who were buried in their clothing (e.g. Fraser & Brown 2007; Pollard & Barton 
2013). At Camden, the individual burials of battle-casualties contained metal artefacts 
(Smith et al. 2009), but their presence may reflect the fact that they were buried at some 
temporal distance from the battle, and it may not have been possible or desirable to 
remove the artefacts. 
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5.3: Disposal of the battle-dead in antiquity 
 
 The literary rhetoric from classical antiquity clearly suggests that the battle-dead 
were formally buried or cremated on the battlefield. This practice has, however, been 
extrapolated from a small number of textual references. Even if they represent common 
practice, there are grounds to question whether these disposal methods would have left 
much archaeological evidence, particularly in contexts where cremation was used (e.g. 
James  2013). The processes by which Greek and Roman armies dealt with the casualties of 
battle, or in some cases declined to, are little understood. The subject is often glossed over 
in discussions of ancient burial practices, addressed by generalised comments such as “... 
[Greek] soldiers fallen in war were buried or cremated at the site of battle” (Felton 2007: 
88), and “... *Roman+ soldiers killed on the battlefield were collectively cremated or buried” 
(Toynbee 1971: 55). Transporting the bodies of the dead any real distance was rarely 
convenient, as demonstrated by the difficulties in implementing repatriation of the battle-
dead in later history. The logistical challenges of transporting corpses in any circumstances 
in antiquity were considerable, usually requiring pre-treatment of the body such as 
cremation or embalming. Where repatriation is historically attested it is mainly associated 
with the elite (see Carroll 2009). However, the bulk transportation of even ashes of the 
battle-dead on campaign is likely to have been logistically difficult and is likely not to have 
been common (e.g. Lee 2007: 253-254). 
 
 However, there is a significant problem in establishing the treatment of the battle-
dead in antiquity based on much of the literary and epigraphic and sculptural evidence. 
Almost all the evidence comes from a commemorative context, rather than the battlefield 
itself. How, therefore, can there be any certainty at all that what is described in this 
commemorative culture is actually a representation of what happened, and not a 
description of what society wanted to believe had happened? As discussed in the previous 
chapter, methods of disposal on the battlefield were often forced into a pragmatism which 
might not have been desirable, but was necessary. This may not have been communicated 
outside the army, leading to a distorted impression in later sources as to what exactly 
happened to the bodies. It should be questioned exactly how the ancient writers, in 
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particular, would have known what had happened in each case. The few more detailed 
descriptions of disposal practice may not represent accepted normalised practice, but rather 
unusual instances which were felt worthy of recording. While it is necessary to consider and 
acknowledge what the literary record documents about the disposal of the battle-dead, this 
evidence should be viewed with a large degree of caution, and assessed to see whether the 
statements which are made represent in any way practices which would actually have been 
possible on the battlefield. What can be said, however, is that the evidence from both the 
literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that there was no social expectation that bodies of 
the battle-dead would be returned home or seen again. 
 
 
5.3.1: Repatriation from commemorative practice 
 
 Although repatriation of the battle-dead has historically been rare, the 
archaeological evidence from antiquity suggests that it was not entirely absent from the 
classical world. Removal of the battle-dead from the battlefield can be traced as far back as 
early Middle Kingdom Egypt (c.2055-1650BC). Sixty males discovered in a rock tomb at Deir 
el-Bahri have been identified as casualties of an unknown battle. The tomb was found in the 
middle of a row of civilian officials from the same period. Many of the bodies had sustained 
significant peri-mortem skeletal trauma to both the head (Winlock 1945) and forearms 
(Vogels 2003: 244). They were wrapped in linen rather than mummified, but had survived 
through desiccation within of the tomb. Varying levels of decomposition prior to placement 
in the tomb suggested variable periods of surface exposure, probably reflecting multiple 
phases of attack, with several bodies also showing evidence of predation by carrion birds 
(Winlock 1945: 19-23). The spatial relationship of the tomb to the conflict site is unknown, 
although a local position is suggested, albeit with no historical context (Vogels 2003). 
 
 In the Greek literary record, repatriation is largely, although not exclusively, 
associated with  Athens, based on Thucydides’ description of the practice as an ancestral 
custom (patrios nomos/πατρίῳ νόμῳ) unique to the polis (Thuc. 2.34.1-6; cf. Pritchett 1974-
1991iv: 254-257; Clairmont 1983). Polybius (22.16.2) claimed that the tradition of 
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repatriation was so well-known in an Athenian context that Philip II not only allowed but 
facilitated the return of their battle-dead to Athens following Chaeronea. The cremated 
remains of casualties were buried in the Demosion Sema area of the Kerameikos. The 
Athenian battle-dead were evidently buried following the public funeral described by 
Thucydides (2.34.1-6). Inhumed burials of conflict dead are also known from the 
Kerameikos, most notably the tomb of the Spartans of an uprising in 403BC (Willemsen 
1977). In the ancient literary record only Sparta is specifically and consistently associated 
with battlefield inhumation (e.g. Plut. Ages. 40.3; Moral. 233C; cf. Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 
255; Low 2006: 91).147  
 
 The division between the practices of Athens and Sparta with regard to the battle-
dead may only reflect however, the fact that these are the only two poleis discussed in any 
great detail in the context of ancient battlefield practice. In some cases, the sources 
mention elite casualties being buried on the battlefield, as Epaminondas at Leuctra without 
documenting what happened to the other soldiers (Paus. 8.11.8). Pritchett (1974-1991iv) 
suggested that if elite casualties were buried on the battlefield it would be unlikely that 
anything different happened to the others. The epigraphic memorialisation of Greek 
casualties, recently studied by Low (2003; 2006; 2012), suggests that in most cases the 
battle-dead were mourned in the absence of the actual body (cf. Rice 1995), although this 
does not necessarily prove that the battle-dead were left on the battlefield itself. 
 
The traditional view of universal battlefield disposal was challenged by Pritchett 
(1974-1991iv: 94-259), who cited multiple examples from the ancient literary record where 
non-Athenian dead were removed from the battlefield, including instances of Spartan semi-
repatriation (Thuc. 5.74.2).148 Pritchett (1974-1991iv: 125-139) also noted a series of 
settlement cemetery burials which he suggested represented repatriations of the war-dead. 
Several of the examples he interpreted as cemetery burials of the war-dead (Akragas, Vrana, 
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 Plutarch's comment that casualties from among the Spartan elite might be repatriated is corroborated, by 
Pausanias’ (3.14.1) observation of the tombs of Leonidas (Thermopylae) and Pausanias (Plataea) in Sparta, 
while the other casualties were evidently left on the battlefield. 
148
 A slight problem is presented by Plutarch’s (Moral. 214F) attribution of "either this or on this" to a Spartan 
woman handing her son his war-shield, which implies repatriation of the battle-dead. This may be a 
romanticism on the part of Plutarch, a corruption from the use of multiple sources, or misrepresent a phrase 
which meant to fall on the shield in battle, not to be carried home upon it. 
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Olynthos, Messenia; pp.125-139) are more likely to be civilian casualties, based on the 
demographic range represented, including women, children, and the elderly, which is not 
typically associated with combatants (see Redfern 2011: 118). His other examples of 
repatriated battle-casualties may instead represent soldiers who died of their wounds after 
being returned to the respective poleis.  
 
However, the communal burials at Thespiae and Tegea cited by Pritchett do appear 
to represent the repatriation burials of, if not conclusively battle-dead, certainly victims of 
armed conflict. At Thespiae, a polyandron grave was found just outside the city limits 
marked with (by then fragmented) a stone lion monument. The burial enclosure measured 
32m x 24m. About 60cm below the surface, a layer of pottery, figurines and strigils (iron and 
bronze) measuring 45cm in depth was found. Below this was a cremation layer varying 
between 2.5cm and 7.5cm in depth, containing ashes, fragmented bone, and more 
figurines, strigils and iron nails, all of which showed signs of heat-fusing. No weapons were 
found in the grave. The cremation layer was estimated by the excavator to contain around 
300 casualties (Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 132). A later extension of the excavation recovered a 
further seven inhumation burials, at a depth of 25-40cm below the cremation layer, 
generally interpreted as survivors of the battle who died of wounds after the first burials 
(Kurtz & Boardman 1971: 248; Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 133). Why these later casualties were 
not also cremated is unclear. The grave has been associated with the Battle of Delium, 
almost 50km from the city. As the bodies were evidently cremated within the burial 
enclosure, the casualties must have been transported to the site. 
 
At Tegea, the communal burial of ten apparent battle-casualties was excavated in 
the main cemetery area following the discovery of a fragmented inscribed casualty list 
(Pritchett 1974-1991iv). The casualties have been cautiously identified with the Battle of 
Delphi. The bodies were inhumed in a single row and were completely articulated, though 
an additional amount of disarticulated bone was also recovered from the grave. There was 
no evidence of cremation and no artefacts within the grave. The burial has been identified 
as representing battle-dead largely on the basis of the casualty list.  
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More recently, a rescue excavation on the western necropolis of Himera in Sicily 
ahead of a railway extension uncovered the remains of casualties which have been 
associated with the Battle of Himera (Lee 2011). Sixty-five bodies were recovered from 
seven different graves, spatially clustered though not entirely separate from the 
surrounding burials. No artefacts were associated with the burials, though several graves 
contained projectiles which were embedded in the bodies when they were buried (Fig. 17). 
These projectiles aided the identification of the Himera burials as conflict-related. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Himera skeleton with embedded projectile (after Lee 2011: 40). 
 
 
There is little evidence for the removal of the battle-dead from the battlefield in the 
Roman world. The costs of repatriating the battle-dead over the distances involved, 
particularly under the Principate, would have been substantial and almost certainly not even 
close to being covered by the contributions made to soldiers’ burial funds (Carroll 2009). 
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Reuter (2005) argued that the battle-dead could have been removed from the battlefield to 
nearby military cemeteries, but that this practice was not represented in the epigraphic 
record as very few soldiers had their cause of death recorded on their tombstone. However, 
Hope (2003) has made a convincing argument that the epigraphy of Roman military 
tombstones is consistent with casualties mourned in absentia.149 As in the Greek world, the 
literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that the battle-dead would have mainly been 
disposed of on the battlefield in mass graves.  
 
A small number of cemetery burials are known in the context of the Roman conflict-
dead. The best example is from the fort cemetery at Krefeld-Gellep (Gelduba) in Germany, 
where casualties from an attack during the Batavian Revolt were buried (Pirling 1974; 
Reichmann 1999 cf. Tac. Hist. 4.25-35). The bodies were placed in foetal positions in cut 
graves without significant associated artefacts. Unlike battlefield burials, the casualties were 
mostly buried in single inhumations though there are some examples of double burials). The 
bones were well-preserved and buried within the topsoil, 80cm-1m below the surface. 
There were no signs of surface-exposure, so the burials can be assumed to have taken place 
soon after the conflict. Given that the conflict took place within the vicinity of the cemetery 
it would, unusually, have proved of comparable (if not greater) convenience to make use of 
the facilities already in place rather than creating new graves within the area of conflict. 
Krefeld-Gellep was later attacked in AD256/257 by a Frankish army, and at least nineteen 
casualties from the ensuring battle were buried in the recesses of an abandoned Mithraeum 
at the site (Reichmann 1997: 23-24). In Britain, a small number of military tombstones 
record death in battle within the perimeter/vicinity of the camp.150 These casualties, like 
those at Krefeld-Gellep, were evidently buried in a normal cemetery context. Conflict-
related violence is certainly evident in several settlement cemeteries, particularly in the Late 
Iron Age, as illustrated in Britain in the cemetery burials at Maiden Castle (see Wheeler 
1943: 62-64; Redfern & Chamberlain 2011). A review of the Maiden Castle evidence by 
Sharples (1991) led him to suggest that much of the evidence for 'conflict' at the site was 
actually the result of industrial activity, although the (Roman) ballista bolts and arrowheads 
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 Although the Caelius stone (CIL 13.8648) dedicated to one of the casualties of the Varus battle seems to 
reserve the possibility that his body might someday be recovered for burial. 
150
RIB 3218; RIB 3364. Only 39 surviving tombstones empire-wide document death in battle as cause of death, 
representing 42 total individuals (Reuter 2005). Most appear to be commemorated in the absence of a body. 
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suggest that the site did come under attack sometime in the C1stAD. However, Redfern’s 
(2011) analysis of the physical anthropology of the skeletal remains reflected multiple 
instances of conflict dating to the Late Iron Age, including internecine violence as well as a 
potential connection with the Roman invasion in AD43. 
 
 
5.3.2: The Greek battle-dead in the ancient literary record 
 
 In some cases the ancient Greek literary record documented the disposal of the 
battle-dead, albeit usually not in any great detail. There is enough literary evidence to 
suggest that formal burial of the battle-dead was a social and religious obligation (Krentz 
1985: 13; Johnston 1999: 149) and a military priority (Vaughn 1991: 40; van Wees 2004: 
145) for both the professionalised and levied citizen armies of the Greek world.151 As such, 
the literary record suggests that efforts were made on some occasions to bury the enemy 
dead when their own were unable to do so. Pausanias (1.32.5) claimed that the Athenians 
buried the Persian dead at Marathon, although had no idea in what manner. Arrian (Anab. 
Alex. 1.16.6) stated that Alexander buried the Greek mercenaries and Persian commanders 
at the Granicus, evidently leaving the ordinary Persian soldiers exposed. 
 
 What was actually done to bury the dead is frequently omitted. In many instances 
the Greek literary record is not even particularly clear about whether the disposal of the 
battle-dead involved inhumation or cremation. The two most common terminologies, 
"θάπτω" (to honour with funeral rites) and its derivations (Hdt. 9.85; Thuc. 3.109.3; 5.74.2; 
Xen. Anab. 6.4.9),152 and "ἀναιρέω" (to take up the dead; Thuc. 3.98.5; 4.44.3; 4.97.1), are 
not uniquely associated with either practice (cf. Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 251-257). The lack of 
elaboration on the process is typically interpreted as reflecting contemporary familiarity 
with the process which would have rendered any explanation unnecessary. Cremation is 
often assumed to be the easiest and therefore most common method of disposal in the 
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 A full summary of the literary references to the disposal of the Greek battle-dead can be found in Pritchett 
(1974-1991iv: 153-235) and Hanson (1989: 197-209). 
152
 The earliest use of θάπτω in the context of the battle-dead comes from Homer (Il. 21.323) and evidently 
means a cremation followed by burial of the ashes below a mound.This may however, reflect epic and/or elite 
tradition rather than any real method of disposal. 
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Greek world, as demonstrated by Ma's (2008: 83) assumption that the fact that the Theban 
dead at Chaeronea were buried rather than cremated reflected their "unfavourable 
circumstances" in the aftermath of battle. As a result of the uncertainty, research on the 
battle-dead in the Greek world has focused on the military and social context, such as the 
status of the battlefield truce (Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 246-49; Krentz 2002: 32-33), the 
identification of casualties after battle (Vaughn 1991) and under what circumstances the 
dead could be abandoned (e.g. Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 235-241; Hanson 1989: 207-209).153 
In considerations of the method of disposal, historians have discussed the ritual, economic, 
propagandist and social aspects of the battle-dead, but almost never consider the pragmatic 
elements (e.g. Low 2006). 
 
 The literary sources rarely mention whether one or more mass grave(s) was 
necessary. In the few instances where multiple graves are mentioned, such as Marathon 
(Paus. 1.32.3) and Plataea (Hdt. 9.85), the separation appears to reflect polis or social 
divisions, not unmanageable casualty numbers. The location of graves are unclear. Ancient 
historians occasionally mention that the dead were buried “on the spot” (Hdt. 7.228; Thuc. 
2.34.5), which may suggest a spatial association with casualty density, or simply that the 
dead were left somewhere on the battlefield. The sources do not mention grave-goods, 
although there were later festivals at the battlefield graves at Marathon and Plataea (Thuc. 
3.58.4) in which artefacts were dedicated to the ‘heroic’ casualties. The battle-dead were 
evidently stripped before burial, particularly those of the defeated army.154 Arrian (Anab. 
Alex. 1.16) recorded that the Macedonian battle-dead from the Granicus were buried with 
their arms and decorations, suggesting that the battle-dead might, in some cases, be buried 
clothed and with military grave-offerings, although whether Arrian was accurately 
representing common practice is difficult to know. 
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E.g. Thuc. 3.24.3;3.113.5; 7.75.2-3. 
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E.g. Thuc. 3.119.1; 4.97.1; Xen. Hell. 3.2.5. 
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5.3.3: The Roman battle-dead in the ancient literary record 
 
 Historians have argued that, as in the Greek world, Roman soldiers expected their 
surviving comrades to bury them if they were to fall in battle, making disposal an issue of 
military morale (Peretz 2005: 124-131; cf. Onas. The General 36.1-2), to which end they 
contributed to a communal burial fund (Veget. Epitome. 2.20). The absence of any 
equivalent to the Greek battlefield truce might cause burial to be delayed by several years, 
with a returning Roman force burying the remains.155 Any such obligation evidently did not 
guarantee burial, even at a later date, if it was not militarily pragmatic to do so, in which 
case the battle-dead would be left exposed on the battlefield indefinitely.156 Cicero 
(Philippics 14.34) suggested that the battle-dead were subject to different guidelines 
regarding non-burial, and Hope (2003) argued that the rhetoric of Roman military 
memorialisation implied that society accepted the dead would not always receive a formal 
burial. The literary record documents the Romans leaving the enemy dead unburied on 
multiple occasions (e.g. Livy 23.36.4; Plut. Marius 21.3; Sulla 21.4), and in turn, occasions 
where the Roman battle-dead were despoiled and abandoned (Livy 5.39). Tacitus (Germ. 6) 
noted, perhaps in surprise, that the Germanic tribes claimed their battle-dead even when 
they had not won the conflict, suggesting that, in the Roman world, the abandonment of 
bodies in the field was not unknown in the provincial territories. 
 
 Although Roman sources mention the disposal of the battle-dead slightly more often 
than their Greek counterparts, in general they go into no greater detail about the actual 
process. Much has been made of a reference in Pliny which suggests that an earlier practice 
of inhuming the battle-dead had to be replaced with cremation when it emerged that 
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 Most famously at the Varian battlefield in AD9 (Tac. Ann. 1.61-62; but also at Zela c.64BC (Plut. Pomp. 39.1), 
and during the Parthian War (AD58-63; Tac. Ann. 15.28). However, several historians have suggested 
descriptions of the later burial of the abandoned battle-dead may be examples of literary "aftermath 
narrative" informed by rhetoric rather than reality (see Pagán 2000: 425-34); for discussion in the context of 
the clades Variana, see Woodman 1998: 81-84; Pagán 2000; Siedman 2014. 
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 For unburied dead Trasimene (Livy 22.7.5) and Cannae (Livy 22.52.6; cf. 22.59.8; 25.12.6), Carrhae (Plut. 
Crassus 27.3), Bedriacum (Tac. Hist. 2.70), and the casualties from an engagement in the Frisian Revolt who 
were left unburied despite the fact that "...a considerable number of tribunes, prefects, and centurions of 
mark had fallen" (Tac. Ann. 4.73). 
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provincial enemies were exhuming and despoiling the remains (Pliny NH 7.54).157 Cremation 
would not prevent the grave from exhumation, and a field cremation might leave pieces of 
skeletal material, depending on the quality of the pyre (Noy 2000). Cremation would not 
necessarily have resulted in a less obvious grave on the surface, although it may have 
displaced less earth and thereby not created a mound which drew attention to the presence 
of buried bodies. With cremations, whether in pits or on the ground, there was a limited 
amount of despoilment which could actually be done to the remains, whether or not the 
ashes themselves were buried.  
 
 Pliny does not give specify in what timeframe this change in practice occurred, 
although he did not imply it was a recent phenomenon, and used the example to 
contextualise the general shift in Roman society towards cremation in the C1st AD. The 
Roman ‘common practice’ has been viewed as cremation of the battle-dead since at least 
the Early Empire (Webster 1998: 280-281). The references in the written sources do not 
reflect an obvious change to cremation at any point between the Second Punic War and the 
AD69 Civil War. This may reflect the incomplete nature of the source material. As reflected 
in Tables 6 and 7, very few Roman sources describe the process used to dispose of the 
battle-dead. Within the surviving examples, there is no obvious shift from inhumation to 
cremation of the battle-dead specifically prior to Pliny’s time. Inhumation, at least in the 
Roman literary record, remained a method of disposal for the battle-dead, in contrast to 
wider civilian practice which had moved towards cremation in Italy, Gaul, Southern Britain, 
among other areas, since the C1st BC. References to the disposal of the battle-dead in Late 
Antiquity suggest a return to inhumation, usually in a mass grave, which may reflect 
contemporaneous societal changes in mortuary practice (e.g. Amm. Marc. 17.1.1). 
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 It should be noted that cremation did not always prevent remains being disinterred and despoiled, as 
observed in the case of Varus, although according to Velleius (2.119.5) he had only been partially cremated. 
Noy (2000: 188-191) suggests that field-cremation was often used to keep the bodies of the dead safe from 
enemies, but was only partially effective when the process was hurried. 
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Battle Date Method Source 
Caphyae 220 BC Inhumation Polyb. 4.13.1 
First Nola 216 BC Inhumation Livy 23.46.5;  
Numistro 210 BC Cremation Livy 27.2.9 
Grumentum 207 BC Inhumation Livy 27.42.8 
Spain (unspecified) 186 BC Inhumation Livy 39.21.7 
Zela 67 BC Inhumation 
(exposed remains) 
Plut. Pomp. 39.1 
Bibracte 58 BC Inhumation Caes. Bell. Gall. 
1.26.5 
 
Table 6: Literary description of inhumation/cremation of the Roman battle-dead 220-31BC. 
 
 
Battle Date Method Source 
Legionary mutiny AD 14 Cremation Tac. Ann. 1.49 
Burial of the Varian 
dead 
AD 15 Inhumation Tac. Ann. 1.62 
Bedriacum AD 69 Inhumation (familial) Tac. Hist. 2.45 
 
Table 7: Inhumation/cremation of the battle-dead 31BC-AD70. 
 
 
 Few of the references to the physical disposal of the Roman battle-dead suggest 
whether single or communal graves were created, while the sources imply that the dead 
were gathered from across the battlefield into a central location and one communal grave. 
At the Teutoburg, Tacitus (Ann. 1.62) describes a single mass grave, although the fact that 
the remains being buried were already skeletal may have been a factor. Similarly at 
Numistro, the dead were collected together into one heap, cremated, and presumably left 
in a single communal deposit (Livy 27.2.9). There is no mention of any grave goods, 
suggesting that the dead were stripped of their armour and weaponry before being buried 
or cremated. However, it is not clear whether the dead were stripped before being moved, 
which would perhaps represent the lesser effort, or once they had been centrally located. 
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5.4: Logistic and pragmatic considerations 
  
 As noted previously, the literary and commemorative evidence for the disposal of 
the battle-dead in antiquity largely fails to engage with the reality of disposal. In later 
periods, it is obvious that the disposal of the battle-dead was governed by pragmatic 
factors, particularly in cases such as Waterloo where the number of bodies to be buried was 
comparatively high. As a result, the most efficient means were used to minimise both time 
and effort, particularly in cases of high casualties and hot weather. In burying the battle-
dead, military necessity and biological reality both have an impact on how long could be 
spent in the process and what it was physically possible to do with the bodies. 
 
There was a limited period in which the disposal of casualties could reasonably take 
place, first because of the period of time an army could remain on the battlefield, and 
secondly the physical reality of decomposition and its impact on post-battle activity also 
affected by how many casualties there were and how widely they were distributed. 
Comparable logistic and pragmatic issues would have impacted the disposal of the battle-
dead in antiquity, from which insights into the disposal process, and consequently into the 
resulting archaeological impact on the site, can be extrapolated. It is probable, given the 
scale of casualties and speed of physical decomposition, that disposal on the battlefield 
would have been the only realistic option following the majority of battles in antiquity. 
Whether that involved a formal disposal process, however, or simply abandonment of the 
dead on the field is another issue. 
 
 
5.4.1: Casualty rates 
The number of bodies requiring disposal would have varied between battles, and 
estimates for average casualty rates largely rely on demographic comparisons ahead of 
accurate historical documentation. Both army and casualty figures in the ancient sources 
are notoriously unreliable, and may have been exaggerated in either direction depending on 
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the purpose of the narrative.158 Demographic calculations have been used to suggest 
average casualty figures, usually 4-6% for the victorious army and 14-16% for the defeated, 
though the latter figure could be much higher in the case of exceptional, ‘total’ defeat.159 
Absolute casualty numbers may have been higher in Roman warfare than Greek purely as a 
result of the average size of the respective armies; in most cases, Greek casualties 
numbered in the hundreds, while Roman seem to number in the thousands.  The statistical 
calculations suggest that up to three-quarters of the casualties would be associated with the 
defeated army. 
 
Based on the written sources, the battle-dead were widely spread across the 
battlefield, although the specific spatial distribution of casualties in ancient battle is not well 
known (e.g. Tac. Ann. 2.18; Plut. Caes. 19.11, Pelopidas 32.7). Some historians have argued 
that casualties were concentrated in areas where the battle-line collapsed, particularly in 
Greek warfare (e.g. Hammond 1968: 18), while others maintain that a higher casualty rate 
would have been sustained in the subsidiary fighting as one of the defeated armies 
attempted to flee the field (e.g. Sabin 2000: 6). Concentration in a single area of the 
battlefield would make the creation of a single mass grave far easier than in instances of 
wide distribution, in which case a series of smaller graves would prove less time-consuming. 
Archaeological excavation on the Roman battlefield at Baecula suggests that, even in 
conventional battle, military activity including but not limited to fighting stretched over 
several (square) kilometres. It would not be insurmountable to collect the dead to one 
central location, but certainly would have been less than convenient in comparison to 
creating a series of graves associated with areas of mortality density. Any military 
involvement in the disposal of the dead would need to fit into the period when the army 
remained on the battlefield, which would also include treatment of the wounded, looting, 
eating, and sleeping, as well as the usual military work of guard duty, patrolling, etc.  
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 For the deliberate adjustment of Roman casualty numbers (both up and down) see Brunt 1971: 694-97; 
contra Rosenstein (2004: 113-117) who argues that figures are roughly reliable. For identification of casualty 
numbers/identities, see (Greek) Hanson 1989: 206-207; Vaughn 1991, (Roman) Brunt 1971: 694; Peretz 2005: 
131-137. 
159
 Greek hoplite warfare 4% victory and 14-16% defeat (Krentz 1985); Middle Republican Rome 2.65-4.2% 
victory and 16% defeat (Rosenstein 2004: 109-25); Roman Empire 5-6% victory (Gabriel & Boose 1994: 29-34; 
Sabin 2000: 5-6). 
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5.4.2: Physical decomposition 
 
 One of the underpinning factors in battlefield burial, as opposed to repatriation, is 
the speed of decomposition of the human body. As seen at Waterloo, one of the biggest 
problems for the disposal process was the rapid and accelerating decomposition of the 
bodies before it was possible to bury them, leading to the adoption of wide-scale cremation 
(O'Keefe 2014: 66-70). The most important requirement was therefore that any method 
employed should be able to deal with the battle-dead in a rapid manner, alongside the 
other post-battle activity - tending the wounded, looting - taking place at the same time. 
Decomposition would have been well underway for many casualties even before the end of 
the actual battle. The physical breakdown of the bodies as a factor has been acknowledged 
by some historians, though principally in the increased unpleasantness of subsequent 
disposal and the difficulty in identifying individual casualties (e.g. Hanson 1989: 204-206; 
Vaughn 1991: 45).  
 
 The sooner that the dead could be disposed of, the physically easier the process 
would be. Rigor mortis sets in within an hour of death, complete after around five to six 
hours, with bodies remaining in this condition for approximately 48 hours, during which 
period it would be difficult to strip the bodies of any armour.160 After 48 hours rigor 
disappears, replaced in its stead with advanced decomposition which sees the body 
becoming severely swollen and difficult to move, let alone strip. After a further 24 hours, 
decomposition is so advanced that the bodies begin to burst, making it difficult to move or 
cremate. The process would continue for another two to three weeks, albeit at a slower rate 
and taking a year or more for the corpse to become largely skeletonised.  
 
The Greek literary record documents several examples where advanced 
decomposition impacted the disposal of the battle-dead. Xenophon recorded an occasion 
where a group of Arcadian dead could not be buried for five days. When he came upon 
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 As at Visby, where multiple casualties were buried wearing their armour. The defeated Gotlander battle-
dead had lain exposed for several days, and once the time came to bury them it was not possible to strip the 
armour (Thordeman 1939). 
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them, many were too decomposed to move and were rolled into pits dug alongside the 
bodies. Even those which could be moved were evidently in a poor condition: 
 
“They buried the greater part of the dead just where they each had fallen; for 
they had already lain unburied five days, and it was not now possible to carry 
away the bodies; some that lay upon the roads, however, they did gather 
together and honour (θάπτω) with as fine a burial as their means allowed, while 
for those they could not find, they erected a great cenotaph, and placed wreaths 
upon it” (Xen. Anab. 6.4.9). 
 
 
The implication from Xenophon is that the Greek army recognised that in certain 
cases informal burial measures were necessary to deal with the dead if they had remained 
unburied for a significant period of time. It would not prove surprising, as on later 
battlefields where a similar process occurred, if individual trench burials were to be found 
across a battlefield where the dead had lain unburied for a number of days.  
 
There is a similar delay in Menander’s Aspis (69-79), where the dead from a 
(fictional) battle were unrecognisable due to bloating three days after a battle. As a result, 
the normal method of disposal had to be abandoned in favour of a hasty mass cremation 
and battlefield interment. The condition of the Athenian battle-dead from the Battle of 
Delium held by the Thebans for 17 days before being returned (Thuc. 4.104) is unlikely to 
have been conducive to any process of recognition, transportation, or even, in all 
probability, cremation. If a victorious army in control of the battlefield did not dispose of the 
enemy dead, the chances are that the remaining bodies would be in an advanced state of 
decomposition by the time that the defeated side was able to return and bury their own. 
There is little evidence to suggest that either the Greeks or Romans felt overly compelled to 
dispose of the enemy dead, suggesting that the casualties of the defeated army may have 
frequently had delayed burial. 
 
 Everything suggests therefore that for both military and personal convenience, it 
would have been necessary to dispose of the dead within 24 hours of battle, although 
several literary examples state that if the battle was fought until nightfall, burial would 
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begin the following day. Frontinus (Strat. 2.10.1) implies as much in describing an overnight 
burial of casualties by the Roman commander Titus Didius, which convinced the opposing 
army that they had sustained more casualties and surrendered. Ammianus Marcellinus 
(17.1.1) referred to enough of a delay in the burial of the Roman casualties at Strasbourg 
that birds had to be prevented from eating the bodies before they were buried, although 
this does not necessarily imply a particularly extended period of time.  
 
 Inhumation may have proved more immediately practical than cremation, which 
requires large amounts of fuel and a long burning period, particularly in the case of a large 
number of bodies.161 That said, both the Greek and Roman literary sources refer to the 
cremation of the battle-dead, and the cremation graves at Marathon and Chaeronea are 
evidence that this was possible in reality in Greece. It may have been more difficult to locate 
sufficient dry fuel to facilitate mass cremation around provincial Roman battlefields, 
although this is not to say that it was impossible. Inhumation may have avoided the need to 
find sufficient fuel and time for a mass pyre, but had time-related issues of its own, in 
particular the necessity of ensuring that the grave was dug sufficiently deep to prevent the 
re-emergence of inhumed remains soon after their internment. 
 
The resurfacing of bodies does not seem to have been unheard of in antiquity. 
Herodotus suggests that skeletal remains re-emerged at Plataea (Hdt. 9.83) and the 
Egyptian-Archaemenid battlefield of Pelusium (Hdt. 3.12), while Plutarch (Marius 21.3) 
described the resurfaced bones of casualties from the Battle of Aquae Sextiae being used by 
the people of Massalia to fence their vineyards. Shallow graves would be at constant risk of 
weathering and exposure of remains, but it would be difficult, in a limited period of time, to 
ensure a deep burial for hundreds or thousands of casualties. 
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 Studies of Roman cremation methods have suggested that burning even a single corpse took in excess of 11 
hours with the pyre requiring constant maintenance (Noy 2000: 188-192). 
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5.5: Excavated battlefield graves from antiquity 
 
 A number of battlefield graves have been excavated in the Greek and Roman worlds. 
Unlike the artefact archaeology of ancient battle, which is dominated to date by Roman 
examples, the examples of mass graves come mainly from the Greek world. Greek 
battlefield graves were deliberately targeted by archaeological excavators in the C19th and 
early C20th, primarily because they were still marked on the surface by monuments which 
made them stand out within the plain. There is no evidence for a widespread comparable 
practice of marking battlefield graves in the Roman world. The literary record suggests that 
they would be torn down as soon as the Roman army left, as Germanicus found when he 
raised a mound over the Varian dead (Tac. Ann. 1.61-2; 2.7). However, the monument at 
Adamklissi, which is likely to mark a battlefield burial, suggests that the possibility should 
not be excluded in the Roman world (Richmond 1967; Frere & Lepper 1988: 299-304). If 
Pliny was correct that the inhumed remains of the Roman battle-dead were disinterred and 
despoiled when left on the battlefield (Pliny NH 7.54), minimal monumental marking would 
be expected, and yet there is no direct literary statement that the Romans did not construct 
battlefield monuments, for whatever reason, as there is regarding trophies. As yet human 
remains have only been excavated on the Roman battlefield at Kalkriese, itself an atypical 
burial, which means that in reality there is no physical example yet discovered that attests 
to the Roman treatment of the battle-dead in normal, victorious circumstances, an issue 
which will be addressed in greater detail below. 
 
 
5.5.1: Greek battlefield graves 
 
 A number of battlefield graves have been excavated in the Greek world. The best-
known is perhaps the Soros mound at Marathon, long identified as the grave of the 
Athenian battle-dead from the battle. The Soros contained the cremated remains of an 
unknown number, along with grave offerings including pottery (Pritchett 1960). Why the 
battle-dead were not returned to Athens, less than a day’s march away, is unknown. Both 
Thucydides (2.34.5) and Pausanias (1.29.4) claimed it was due to the exceptional bravery of 
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the casualties, but it may in reality simply have been the prevailing custom regardless of 
polis-proximity and the easier option (see Clairmont 1983). A pair of tumuli excavated 
c.2.5km to the north-west, near the settlement of Vrana, were for a while identified as the 
burial place of the Plataean and slave dead, an attribution dating back to the early traveller-
topographers (e.g. Clarke 1812-1819ii: 28) and maintained by Hammond (1968: 30). The 
demographic characteristics of the grave however, which contained children and elderly 
men, does not suggest combatant casualties (see Redfern 2011: 118).162 Remains that have 
been cautiously associated with the Persian dead were uncovered by agricultural activity in 
the northern area of the plain in the late C19th (Pritchett 1965-1992i: 1-10). 
 
Given that the area was previously marshland it is possible that these were 
casualties who drowned during the battle, rather than representing a formal battlefield 
burial. The spatial relationship of the burial(s) is difficult to assess due to the lack of 
excavation on the battlefield, meaning that there is no solid evidence for where on the 
extensive plain the actual battle took place. The central clash had been presumed to have 
taken place in the southern area of the plain around the Soros, which marked a convenient 
position to dispose of the Athenian battle-dead, most of which were thought to have been 
sustained in the initial clash (e.g. Hammond 1968: 18). Burn (1969: 118) noted that the 
position of the Soros did not necessarily mark the position of the main battle, nor the 
majority of casualties, which he instead suggested were sustained in the clash at the ships in 
the north of the plain (although his reconstruction of the battle, aside from the orientation 
of the battle-lines, was similar to that of Hammond). Krentz (2010) agreed that most of the 
Greek battle-dead would have fallen in the fighting at the ships, and observed that bodies 
had therefore been moved a not inconsiderable distance for burial. He suggested that the 
grave may have been positioned to be visible from the road approaching the plain from 
Athens, tying in to wider considerations relating to the memorialisation of ancient battles. 
 
Two graves have been excavated on the Graeco-Macedonian battlefield at 
Chaeronea (338BC). They represent some of the most complete anthropological evidence 
                                                          
162
 Leake (1841: 101) recorded a second tumulus close to the Soros during his battlefield visit in 1802 which is 
more likely to be that of the Plataeans; Pritchett (1974-1991iv: 128-129) in particular agreed. Unfortunately, 
Leake did not provide any details as to the distance or direction of the second mound from the Soros, and no 
trace of it is now extant. 
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from a Greek battlefield, although to date have not been studied by a forensic 
anthropologist. The most recent (and detailed) study of the skeletal material was conducted 
by John Ma, who approached the remains in the context of research into the 
commemoration of the battle. The first grave to be discovered located was situated close to 
the ancient settlement at Chaeronea and marked on the surface by a large marble lion, lying 
45cm below the ground-level at the time of the excavations in 1879 and 1880. It contained 
254 inhumed male skeletons laid out in seven rows, and the cremated remains of at least 
one and up to three individuals, placed between the heads of skeletons 13 and 14 in row 2 
(Ma 2008: 82). There was no evidence of surface-exposure or over-lapping in the laying out, 
though many bones exhibited substantial skeletal trauma, particularly to the cranium and 
leg bones. The grave enclosure, unhelpfully, was recorded in size as 26 by 16 paces 
(Pritchett 1974-1991iv: 137), roughly 12m x 20m.163 
 
The only weaponry in the grave was 5 javelin heads which, from their position, were 
most likely embedded in the bodies, although a number of other artefacts were found in the 
grave. A large quantity of bone eyelets, which appeared to be fastening studs for Greek 
trochades sandals, suggested that the dead were buried with their shoes on. There were 
also a large number of iron strigils, five bronze coins and assorted pottery (Ma 2008: 82). A 
communal grave of the Theban dead from the battle, marked by a stone lion, is documented 
by Pausanias (9.10.1, 9.40.10). The artefacts suggested this was a Greek rather than 
Macedonian burial, and it has been tentatively if sentimentally associated with the Theban 
Sacred Band of 300 who were almost wiped out in the battle (Ma 2008: 79-80). No other 
Theban or allied Greek burials have been found on the battlefield to date. 
 
North of the inhumation grave at Chaeronea a second burial, marked by a mound 
rather than a monument, was excavated in 1902 and 1903. The mound stood 7m above 
ground level at the time of the excavations, and measured in 70m diameter. This grave 
contained cremated remains of an unknown number of individuals, interred just below 
ground level with the mound raised above. The ashes were found in a cone-shaped heap, 
with a diameter of 10m and a height at centre of 75cm, covering a total area in excess of 
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 Based on average pace-length of 76cm. 
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100m² (Sotiriadis 1903). The remains were well-cremated with only a small number of long-
bones in a non-fragmented condition. The grave contained a quantity of iron weaponry, 
including lance-heads and sword elements (but with no armour), along with bronze coins 
and pottery including amphorae. The weaponry was heat-fused suggesting it was cremated 
with the dead (Ma 2008: 77). Unsurprisingly, this grave has been associated with the 
Macedonian casualties of battle based on the assemblage, particularly a 45cm sarissa blade. 
Unlike the Theban burial it is difficult to suggest casualty numbers based on the remains, not 
least as there is no record of the varying depth of the cremation layer. It is difficult therefore 
to suggest whether this grave could have contained all the Macedonian casualties, although 
it may be worth noting that the documented dimensions of the cremation layer are well in 
excess of those from Marathon. 
 
 The Greek battlefield graves contain metal and non-metal artefacts, although the 
intentional deposition of weaponry (as opposed to embedded projectiles) is only seen in the 
Macedonian grave at Chaeronea. The dead must have been stripped of any defensive 
armour and metal clothing elements, suggesting that they were buried within 48 hours of 
death. The inhumation burials showed no signs of extended surface exposure, and in laying 
out had no overlapping or other signs of disordered burial. There was no evidence of any 
disarticulated burials, with the exception of the ‘Persian’ burials at Marathon uncovered by 
agricultural activity. All cremation burials had a layer of artefacts which appear to have been 
burnt in situ at the same time as the bodies. The burial areas were of substantial size. All the 
archaeological evidence thus far goes to suggest that care and attention was paid to the 
remains of the battle-dead, with the exception of the potential Persian remains at Marathon 
which show little evidence of ceremony. 
 
 
5.5.2: Roman battle graves 
 
 The direct archaeological evidence for battlefield burial in the Roman world is 
limited. Human remains associated with conflict have been recovered from a number of 
contexts, such as South Cadbury and Dura-Europos (see 1.5). However, the only burials 
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associated with a battlefield rather than a siege or settlement attack come from the Varian 
battle at Kalkriese, more specifically from the Oberesch.164 Rather than an organised grave 
system, there was a series of 8 (to date) bone-pits ranging in size from 30-40cm to 4m² 
(Großkopf 2012: 97). Each bone-pit contained a jumbled assortment of largely human 
skeletal material with a small quantity of animal, which suggests a limited prioritisation of 
human bones (Uerpmann & Uerpmann 2007: 144), although there is little evidence of 
organisation in the laying out of the remains (Fig. 18).  
 
 
Figure 18: Bone-pit 5 from the Oberesch, Kalkriese, containing disarticulated remains including visible human skull (from 
Rost & Wilbers-Rost 2010: 122). 
 
 
There is no obvious spatial concentration of the pits, although all are located away 
from the rampart in concentrations to the east and west edges of the Oberesch sites, with 
bone-pits 1, 2 and 3 possibly forming an associated group. Wilbers-Rost (2009b: 1350-1351) 
suggests that the distribution does not reflect casualty densities but rather recovery rates, 
arguing that the area in front of the rampart would have been covered with surface 
                                                          
164
 Full details on the anatomy of the human remains can be found in Großkopf (2007, 2012) and Uerpmann 
and Uerpmann (2007). 
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vegetation while the peripheral areas were wooded, making it easier to see and therefore 
recover skeletal remains from the latter. The bones had been left unburied and surface-
exposed for a period of between two and ten years before burial, with the result that many 
continued to decompose after burial. Many of the bones (particularly from bone-pits 2, 3 
and 7) survive in very poor condition. Higher rates of preservation were associated with 
limestone blocks in some of the graves, most notably in bone-pit 1. These may have been 
intentionally deposited to provide lining for the graves, as the stone is not ‘native’ to the 
area and its deposition is therefore almost certainly the result of human activity. Wilbers-
Rost (2009b: 1348), however, notes that limestone blocks were used in the construction of 
the German rampart, which may account for its presence in the pit-fill several years later.  
 
 Many of the bones, particularly the limbs, had signs of animal gnawing concentrated 
on the ends.165 A limited number of partially-articulated limbs were found, particularly from 
bone-pit 1, most notably a skull and upper vertebrae, a right arm (radius, ulna, carpal and 
metacarpal bones) and a right hand (carpal and metacarpal bones). A number of bones from 
the hands and feet survived in the pits, particularly bone-pit 1, in far higher numbers than 
most post-exposure burials. Unusually, the hand bones survive in greater quantity than 
those of the feet, despite the greater size and integrity of the latter. The articulated limbs 
and hand and foot bones have led to the suggestion that, if these limbs were not still 
partially fleshed (at best a remote possibility), the bones were held together by the 
remnants of clothing, non-metallic armour (Großkopf 2007: 167) or medical bandaging (Rost 
2012: 106), which have not survived. The bones are predominantly male, aside from one 
bone which is debatably female, aged 18-55 based on the identifiable bone (very little of it is 
workable, however), and the minimum number of individuals is as low as seventeen, 
although the condition of the remains at the time of inhumation makes this estimate highly 
tenuous (Großkopf 2014). 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the bone-pits at the Oberesch have been identified as the Roman 
burial of the dead by Germanicus and his army in AD15, as documented by Tacitus (Ann 
1.60-62) although they do not particularly fit his description of the burial, particularly as 
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 Comparable to the gnaw-marks on the exposed bones from Aljubarrota battlefield (Cunha & Silva 1997). 
238 
 
there are eight pits rather than one single (mass-)grave. Certainly, the period of surface 
exposure fits the timeline given by Tacitus, although the extended period of exposure to 
between two and ten years equally allows for earlier or later activity. One hypothesis 
suggests that the graves were created by the local German population, who allowed the 
remains to skeletonise and then buried them; the fact that the land was populated and 
cultivated has been used to suggest that, after a period of time, the bodies would have 
represented an inconvenience and would have been buried to clear them out of the way 
(Wolters 2003: 165).166 Zelle (2008) questioned whether the pits were Roman in origin on 
the basis that they did not fit the ritual form of the time, in that the remains had been 
inhumed rather than cremated, although Wilbers-Rost (2012/13: 96) rightly observed that 
cremation would this have been impractical years after the battle. As observed above, the 
literary record through to the C1st AD does not reflect a dominance of cremation on the 
battle, only consistent battlefield disposal in general. 
  
It is more problematic that as of yet no graves have been found on any of the other 
Roman battlefields currently excavated. No human remains have been identified at Baecula 
or Harzhorn, despite the extensive survey and excavation of large areas not just of the 
conflict area itself but the surrounding landscape. At Harzhorn, it may be that the full extent 
of the battlefield has not yet been recognised and other areas remain to be discovered, 
particularly given that this appears to have been an ambush rather than a formal field 
battle. By contrast, at Baecula there is no such caveat; the artefacts show the mustering and 
clash of battle-lines and the retreat and pursuit of the defeated Carthaginian force. The 
camp areas of both armies have been identified. Yet there are no traces of (mass) graves 
associated with the battle. The graves may have been dug below the topsoil, although this 
would be unusual in a battlefield context and certainly worthy of verification. More 
plausible is the possibility that the human remains have not chemically survived (see 6.2.2), 
particularly if the terrain has fluctuating ground-water levels.  
 
The artefact distribution is not indicative of a large area turned over for human 
remains disposal however, even without the survival of the skeletal material. Nor is there 
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Although Wolters uses this argument to support his hypothesis that the Kalkriese battlefield in general 
should be associated with the AD15 campaign, not Varus. 
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any area indicative of cremation. There are no scorched areas, heat-fused artefacts or areas 
stripped of artefacts. The absence of any evidence for inhumation or cremation in the 
central battlefield area excavated may reflect non-survival of evidence, particularly of 
surface cremation, and it would be incautious to read too much into the absence of graves. 
However, it may not be implausible to suggest that some trace of a burial should be visible if 
the method of disposal was consistent with a single, central grave, even if this manifested 
only as an area spatially devoid of artefacts through removal of the topsoil and, therefore, 
the battle-deposited material. No mass burials have been found in the areas around the 
battlefield of Abritus, although the battlefield itself has not been excavated and many of the 
artefacts found in the conflict landscape have been recovered somewhat informally. Frere 
and Lepper (1988: 299-304) have suggested that the Trajanic Adamklissi monument in 
Romania marks a battlefield burial of the casualties named on the inscribed casualty list, 
although they are uncertain which battle it could be.167 No human remains have, as yet, 
been conclusively associated with the Roman battlefield. 
 
Roman graves in whatever mortuary context contain very few artefacts, with no sign 
of intentional deposition. Beyond this, whether the dead were stripped or not is uncertain, 
although it seems probable, particularly in regards to weaponry and armour. Nor can 
anything certain be said about the use of cremation or inhumation, the size of graves or 
burial enclosures or the location of the graves in respect to casualty density. The burial of 
the Varian dead (whether they are in the Oberesch bone-pits or not) on the battlefield 
suggests that even when bodies had become skeletonised they would generally not be 
removed from the battlefield, unless a secure cemetery was in the immediate vicinity. 
However, the survival of Roman battlefield graves in the archaeological record may perhaps 
be called into question by Pliny's (NH 7.54) comment that the provincial examples were dug 
up, and the remains despoiled, following the departure of the army. Although he implies 
that the introduction of cremation ended this process, it is not clear whether it was the 
digging up overall that was ended as a result, or just the despoilment. The failure to locate 
graves at Baecula, Harzhorn and other conflict sites may not reflect an initial absence, or 
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 The date of the Adamklissi casualty list and monuments is uncertain. While Trajan did erect a memorial at 
the site, the altar may be contemporaneous with an earlier monument placed at the same site under Domitian 
commemorating his own campaigns in the area (Stefan 2005: 442-444). 
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incorrect location, but rather a process of destruction in antiquity. However, it can be 
observed that much of the evidence for the disposal of the Roman battle-dead in antiquity 
comes from a literary and largely commemorative context, rather than archaeological 
evidence on the battlefields. Based on later conflict examples, the lack of battlefield graves 
may however not reflect destruction, but the fact that they were never created in the post-
battle phase at all. 
 
 
5.5.3: Surface cremation or abandonment: the pragmatic reality? 
 
The problem of where the battlefield graves from antiquity are however, particularly 
in the Roman period, may reflect little more than a modern conviction that something must 
have been done with them. This perspective is certainly backed up by the literary and 
commemorative record. However, the archaeological evidence, and indeed comparative 
reference to later periods, suggests that a rather more pragmatic attitude was taken. The 
easiest solution, in many cases, would have been mass cremation on the battlefield or, in 
other cases, abandonment of the remains on the surface. Distasteful as this may have been 
to contemporary societies, it is hard to argue against when the logistical considerations - 
thousands of casualties to be disposed of in less than three days - are considered. There is a 
risk in relying too much on the commemorative description of what happened, particularly 
the written sources composed by authors who were almost certainly in no position to have 
any idea of what had actually happened on the various battlefields. The Roman battle-dead 
buried in the cemetery at Krefeld-Gellep may represent one of the few instances where the 
disposal of the dead would have been visible to a wider population. Greater care may have 
been taken in this instance than in others where the disposal of the battle-dead would have 
been unknown. 
 
Ritual significance and religious requirement might have had some impact, but 
consideration of these issues may only have been possible up to a certain point in the face 
of practical challenges, particularly if citizens at home were unlikely to find out what had 
actually happened. Mass cremation would have been by far the easiest and quickest 
241 
 
solution, providing enough fuel could be found. Unlike Roman civilian cremations, which 
required substantial fuel and constant maintenance (Noy 2000), the example of Waterloo 
suggests that the battle-dead could be piled into a pit and left to smoulder for an extended 
period with little maintenance (O'Keefe 2014: 66-70). 
 
Abandonment of the Roman battle-dead is known from some archaeological 
contexts. The 'massacre' burials from South Cadbury were originally identified as the native 
victims of a Roman attack on the site during the C1st AD, some of whom showed signs of 
burning which was originally thought to be unintentional (Alcock 1972). Subsequent 
reinterpretation has suggested that the burning on the bones was intentional, and 
represents a number of constructed funeral pyres which succeeded in partially cremating 
the skeletal material (Barrett et al. 2000: 109-111). The casualties from South Cadbury may 
in fact be poorly-cremated Roman soldiers who were disposed of at the conflict site they 
had died at, before being abandoned. At Dura, the skeletal remains of around 20 Roman 
casualties from the Sasanian siege (AD258-259) were recovered from a collapsed 
countermine underneath the city wall. Originally thought to have died in the collapse, 
subsequent research has suggested that they were killed by a Sasanian gas attack (James 
2011b). Spatial reconstruction suggests the bodies had been moved from their original 
location and placed near the entrance to the countermine before it was deliberately 
collapsed, and in the process also killing a Sasanian soldier (James 2013: 94-100). No 
attempts were evidently made to recover the dead, a likely consequence of the city's 
abandonment following the attack. Recent discoveries in the Alken Enge wetlands in East 
Jutland, Denmark, suggest that exposure burials were still used for the conflict dead in the 
C1st AD in a Scandinavian context (Fig. 19).168 The remains show signs of prolonged surface-
exposure, including predator gnawing and disarticulation, but do not appear to have 
belonged to a defeated non-native army. The example of Alken Enge should also serve as a 
reminder that in the context of the disposal of the Roman battle-dead, the archaeological 
record may reflect non-Roman as well as Roman practices. 
 
                                                          
168
 The Alken Enge material has not been fully published to date, but interim results are available at 
http://www.museumskanderborg.dk/Status_2012-1141.aspx (accessed 02/02/2016). Information about the 
site was also provided in a tour conducted by Mads Kähler Holst, the excavation manager, in June 2013. 
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Figure 19: Skull from Alken Enge (http://www.museumskanderborg.dk/Press_Releases-1085.aspx). 
 
The archaeological consequence of this method of disposal would be to suggest that 
there will be little by way of constructed graves or skeletal material on the majority of 
battlefields, especially from the Roman provinces. Certainly this would explain the lack of 
burial evidence from Baecula and Harzhorn, and the general absence of even incidentally 
discovered battle-related graves in the Roman, and even Greek, world. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that there can be no archaeological evidence of the disposal of the 
battle-dead. Large-scale cremation would potentially involved a large area, whether on the 
surface or in one or more pits, which could be detected by remote sensing, particularly 
magnetometry. Mass inhumation pits may also be present on sites, particularly if cremation 
was not possible and there was time to organise the burial of the dead. However, in these 
cases it may be equally likely that the dead were abandoned on the surface, perhaps 
receiving later burial by the local population. Within several days, it would be impossible to 
identify individuals among the dead, and the stripping of the bodies during the looting 
phase would remove any possibility even of identifying the dead from their kit. It is unlikely 
in these cases that any discrimination could have been made for the bodies of the 
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respective armies. The presence of the bodies may have proved an inconvenience in some 
cases, if they were located on land used by locals for agriculture or pasture, but may 
otherwise have been left alone. Plutarch's (Marius 21.3) record of the skeletal remains of 
the dead from Aquae Sextiae being used to fence local fields may represent the far more 
pragmatic attitudes actually displayed on fields, in contrast to the commemorative record. 
 
 
5.5.4: The impact of battlefield disposal on the artefact assemblage 
 
 If the lack of correlation between substantial battlefield artefact excavation in the 
Roman world, and grave excavation in the Greek, has a significant impact, it is in the 
problems it creates identifying the impact of burial processes on the overall assemblage. 
This is further exacerbated by issues with reconstructing the actual disposal process in the 
context of the battle-dead. The archaeological record has suggested that battlefield burial 
may be less common than imagined in the Greek world, and potentially highly unlikely to 
survive in the Roman. However, the evidence has been able to provide very few details 
about what was actually done to the bodies. The excavated graves follow later convention 
in burying the casualties of battle in a communal context, and there is implied evidence of 
the use of multiple graves on the same battlefield, although no direct examples have been 
found. 
 
 The process of burial provided an additional looting phase, which could focus on the 
equipment, armour, clothing and other personal belongings of the respective casualties. 
However, in the context of understanding how the method of disposal impacted the 
artefact distribution, it is necessary to know in particular whether the dead were collected 
together or not, and if so, at how many different locations, and the degree to which they 
were stripped before being moved. At Kalkriese it was observed by the excavators that the 
high number of kit fragments located at the Oberesch resulted not from damage in battle 
but from the process of stripping the dead before their surface abandonment (Rost & 
Wilbers-Rost 2010: 123). However, whether the spatial concentration of these fragments 
relating to the stripping of the dead reflects the original spatial distribution of casualties or 
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their central collection depends partly on knowing whether the armour and kit of soldiers 
was removed before or after they were moved. In the case of Kalkriese, the distinction is 
perhaps less important as the casualties were sustained in a relatively limited, enclosed 
landscape area and it is likely that the numbers were artificially increased by the 
transportation of the wounded and the dead (Rost & Wilbers-Rost 2010: 133). It may be 
difficult to distinguish however, between a concentration of bodies reflecting central 
collection of the dead, and simply an area of intensive fighting and high casualties. As yet, 
there is no way to reconstruct the order of stripping, because no battlefield has been 
excavated with both a spatially-documented artefact assemblage alongside 
contemporaneous mass graves. If the battle-dead were stripped at a distance from their 
place of burial, this would result in a wider distribution of fragmented kit fittings than 
following a central collection. 
 
 
5.6: Conclusion 
 
 The literary and archaeological evidence from battlefields and the wider antique 
world broadly concurs that in most cases the battle-dead were disposed of, or abandoned, 
on or near to the battlefield on which they had died. Although there are some 
archaeologically verified instances where the battle-dead were repatriated for cemetery 
burial, these cases are rare overall and largely confined to C5th Greece. Otherwise the 
functional necessities which have governed the disposal of the casualties of battle 
throughout history are equally true of antiquity: in the interests of rapid burial, for both 
pragmatic and tactical reasons, the dead were disposed of on the battlefield. This does not 
mean, however, that there was a grave, with mass cremation or abandonment potentially 
as common as the mass inhumations implied by many of the literary sources. Whatever the 
form, the disposal is likely to lie in close spatial proximity to an area of fighting, with 
potentially multiple graves or pyres lying within a relatively limited area. Their survival in the 
archaeological record will, of course, be subject to the same taphonomic limits as any other 
feature, and it is doubtful that they will still be present on all sites. Certainly, the lack of 
human remains at both Baecula and Harzhorn is a concern; distinguishing between non-
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survival and original absence may prove an issue as more battlefields are excavated. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that mass graves, as well as shedding light on the 
treatment of the battle-dead in antiquity, a subject dealt with somewhat cursorily in the 
literary record, can theoretically serve as verifiers for battlefield identification in some 
cases. Whether they should, however, in light of both ethical and practical considerations, is 
another question. 
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Chapter Six: Survey and Excavation Methodology 
 
 
6.1: Introduction 
 
 The previous two chapters considered the archaeology of ancient battle and its likely 
form and survival in the archaeological record. This analysis highlighted several areas in 
which the evidence from antiquity differed from that in modern battlefield archaeology. 
Although a certain number of projectiles, particularly lead glandes and various forms of 
ironwork, are found on ancient battlefields, it is likely to be a density of military-associate 
material which contributes to both the identification and analysis of individual sites. Unlike 
the archaeology of modern conflict, the majority of the artefacts may not be associated 
exclusively with the ancient military. Further to this, the assemblage may be primarily 
comprised of iron, rather than non-ferrous material, a contrast to later periods where lead, 
in the form of musket balls and bullets, is the more diagnostically-significant metal. Chapter 
Five concluded that although there are likely to be shared characteristics between 
battlefield mortuary practice in antiquity and later periods, it is far from clear that there was 
a consistent practice with regards to battlefield burial, particularly in the Greek world. 
Battlefield graves may have been created if there was both the will and opportunity to do 
so, but they may have been less universal than previously imagined. 
 
 This chapter explores the practicalities of ancient battlefield archaeology, considers 
the impact which the characteristics of these sites will have on archaeological survey 
methodology, and how best to adapt approaches to make the most of the evidence which 
survives. Although there are some significant challenges, they are not insurmountable. The 
dominance of ferrous material is perhaps the greatest problem, especially when it is 
combined with the fact that sampling or transect survey may be of relatively limited use in 
identifying ancient sites, as it is the nature and distribution of the assemblage across the 
site, rather than the presence of a single artefact category, which is diagnostically 
significant. 
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6.2: Legislative and funding concerns 
 
To be of any value, any theoretical archaeological methodology must recognise and 
demonstrate an ability to work around any practical challenges. Project-relevant legislation 
and overall funding are two of the most significant challenges faced by any archaeological 
project, battlefields included. Although many of these concerns are common to any 
archaeological project, the issues relevant to projects based on Greek and Roman 
battlefields across the ancient world need to be addressed. 
 
 
6.2.1: Legislation 
 
 Any archaeological project requires permission from either the landowner and/or 
state authorities in order to proceed. In terms of ancient battlefields, there is a range of 
concerns with regards to archaeological prospection and excavation. Throughout much of 
the United Kingdom, permission to excavate lies largely with the landowner, unless the 
excavation takes place within the context of scheduled monuments. Across Europe, 
however, the situation is different. In some countries, such as Greece and Italy, state 
licences to excavate can be more difficult to obtain than in those such as Bulgaria and 
Romania. All permissions to survey and excavate in various countries in modern Europe will 
need to be granted in the usual manner, particularly with regard to the intended use of 
metal detection (see below). The potential for permissions to be denied, particularly for 
archaeologists intended to work outside their own country, may create a problem 
 
 Much of the methodology developed to explore ancient battlefields requires the use 
of a metal detector to identify from the surface areas of artefact deposition within which 
apparent concentrations can be targeted by excavation. Within England and Wales, metal 
detection on (potential) archaeological sites is not banned by any legislation, and with the 
landowners permission any detectorist can work on a site. Changes to legislation in Scotland 
now protect scheduled monuments from metal detection and other magnetic-based 
exploration (including magnetometry, gradiometry and GPR) without prior written 
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permission from Scottish Ministers.169 Any land without scheduled monuments can, 
however, be surveyed with the landowner’s permission, although all finds must be reported 
to the Treasure Trove Unit at the National Museums Scotland (see 6.2.4). However, in 
Europe the situation regarding metal detection, and other forms of magnetic survey, is 
theoretically more strictly limited by legislation. These restrictions on practice are outlined 
in the Council of Europe’s European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological 
Heritage, Article 3 (iii), which requires that any use of metal detection (or other magnetic 
survey) be “...subject to specific prior authorisation” by domestic authorities.170 Unlike much 
of the United Kingdom, in many European countries the landowner is unable to authorise 
metal detection survey even on non-scheduled landscapes, with the necessary permissions 
kept within centralised state control. This restriction has greatly assisted the protection of 
battlefields from relic hunting and other unauthorised removal or archaeological material, 
which are of a greater concern than the actual survey itself (Ferguson 2013: 65-66). 
 
However, even strict licensing control of metal detection does not necessarily mean 
that permission to conduct surveys as part of an archaeological project will not be granted 
under any circumstances. Although permission to work on known historical archaeological 
sites is less likely to be granted, ancient battlefields, in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
are not known archaeological sites and are not usually under the same protections. Certain 
elements of the conflict landscape may be legislatively protected, particularly military 
installations or post-battle monuments or graves, but the actual topography of the 
battlefield and its artefact scatters are not. Outside of the US there is little legislation 
anywhere in the world which protects archaeological landscapes or artefact scatters. It 
typically only by incorporating the battlefield landscape within a heritage area, or with the 
co-operation of the landowner, that the sites can be fully protected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
169
 See Historic Scotland guidelines online at http://www.historic-scotland.gov.uk/metaldetecting.pdf, 
accessed 29/11/2015; also Ferguson (2013: 52-60). 
170
 Available online at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/143.htm, accessed 10/01/2016. 
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6.2.2: Funding 
 
 If the appropriate licences to conduct both metal detection survey and excavation on 
a potential battlefield have been granted, there are still issues regarding the funding of the 
project. The costs of even preliminary exploration of potential battlefields can be 
substantial, particularly if a number of sites are involved in the early stages of a project. 
Costs incurred by a battlefield project are consistent with those of wider archaeological 
work, including travel and subsistence, equipment, and man-hours. The latter, particularly, 
can be an issue for battlefields, which are typically of substantial size. In later periods, even 
transect survey and excavation of sites can involve thousands of man-hours of work (e.g. 
Foard & Morris 2012: 121; Pollard 2009b: 142). Battlefields from antiquity face similar 
challenges with regards to scale, particularly given that the nature and distribution of the 
assemblage make it important to survey as much of the site as possible. 
 
 The substantial costs of battlefield exploration can, however, be offset in a number 
of ways, many of which have been introduced to the discipline specifically to address these 
problems. In particular, the use of local metal detectors as site volunteers has in many cases 
significantly reduced the costs of excavation while allowing for a substantial increase in the 
available man-hours. Relations between hobbyist metal detectors and archaeologists have 
frequently been antagonistic. Attempts are now being made within battlefield archaeology 
to work alongside amateur detectorists. As well as an increase in available man-hours, they 
often bring a considerable amount of technical expertise to a battlefield project, in many 
cases alongside a detailed knowledge of the local area which outstrips that of archaeologists 
coming in from outside to work within the area. Eleven experienced detectorist volunteers 
were brought in to work at Harzhorn, for example, substantially increasing the time which 
could be spent at the site, allowing a seven-day running in the initial stages of the project 
(Berger et al. 2010/13: 323-325). Initial survey costs may be kept relatively low through the 
use of local volunteers, particularly detectorists who can supply their own equipment. 
Multiple battlefield projects have begun to involve local metal detecting clubs in battlefield 
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survey, dramatically increasing the site area which could be surveyed as well as decreasing 
the spacing of transects, while also reducing project costs.171 
 
 For unavoidable funding costs, non-traditional, and in many cases non-academic, 
sources are increasingly necessary for battlefield archaeology, particularly those associated 
with heritage management. The lack of legislative protection for battlefields outside the 
United States means that alternative methods are necessary, frequently under the auspices 
of heritage management. While heritage organisations cannot necessarily legally prevent 
the development of identified battlefields, they can attempt to assert some influence in 
preventing commercial development on these sites (Freeman 2001). The Register of Historic 
Battlefields in England and the Inventory of Historic Battlefields in Scotland have attempted 
to provide non-legislative protection to sites within their remit. The Irish Battlefields Project, 
when completed, aims to do the same for sites in the Republic of Ireland,172 while 
consultation over the same for Wales is ongoing.173 Identifying clear landscape areas and 
artefact scatters associated with a battle is an important step in protecting the sites even 
without legislative assistance.  
 
Although ancient battlefields may prove more difficult to identify, their value to 
heritage management is in many cases exceedingly high. There is a significant current public 
interest in battlefields of any historical period, with high-tech visitor centres increasingly 
replacing the static information boards which previously represented the ‘visitor 
experience’.174 The battlefield and visitor centre at Hastings drew 111,990 visitors in 
2010,175 while Bannockburn centre saw 65,000 visitors in its first year of operation between 
                                                          
171
E.g. The Little Bighorn (Fox 1993: 67); Towton (Sutherland & Schmidt 2004), Bosworth (Foard & Curry 2013), 
Camden (Legg & Smith 2009), First Manassas (Reeves 2010). 
172
 http://www.rubiconheritage.com/our-projects/conflict-archaeology/irish-battlefields-project/, accessed 
15/01/2016. 
173
 http://gov.wales/docs/drah/consultation/20110305battlefieldsconsultationdocumenteng.pdf, accessed 
15/01/2016. 
174
 UK: Bannockburn; Bosworth; Culloden; Hastings; Shrewsbury. 
Europe: Agincourt, France; Boyne, Ireland; Kalkriese, Germany; Thiepval, France; Waterloo, Belgium. 
US: Antietam, Maryland; Chickamauga, Georgia; Fredriksberg, Virginia; Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; Little 
Bighorn, Montana; Manassas, Virginia; Mill Springs, Kentucky; Shiloh, Tennessee; Stones River, Tennessee; 
Yorktown, Virginia. 
175
 Association of Leading Visitor Attractions figures, http://www.alva.org.uk/details.cfm?p=423 (02/04/2015). 
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March 2014 and March 2015,176 although both sites pale in comparison to Gettysburg 
where the early 2000s saw annual visitor numbers upwards of 1.6million, generating in 
excess of $50,000,000 to the local economy (Nash 2004: 27). Battlefields can generate a 
significant amount of revenue from visitors which can be put towards archaeological 
research.  
 
However, research may become deliberately skewed towards issues of interest to 
the general public, rather than addressing academic concerns, often attempting to identify 
human interest stories through the discovery and display of artefacts which represent “a 
direct link to the fighting, killing and dying which created the hallowed ground outside the 
building” (Pollard 2009a: 3). It is, however, this public interest that in many cases facilitates 
the cultural protection of sites, regardless of what this does to archaeological research 
(Pollard 2004: 33). This alteration of research priorities on projects funded by non-
traditional means is further exacerbated by the involvement of media organisations, 
particularly those making television documentaries. Although their funding does in some 
cases facilitate projects which might otherwise have struggled for funding, the research 
priorities can be distorted by the desired narrative of the documentary, as at Balaclava 
(Freeman 2011: 154) and Serre (Fraser & Brown 2007: 168), to name two recent examples. 
 
 
6.2.3: Ethics 
 
 Ethical concerns in respect to battlefield archaeology are centred on the remains of 
the battle-dead on the sites themselves, particularly with regards to whether fieldwork 
should intentionally look for any graves, and what should happen to any human remains 
which are recovered. It is unclear whether battlefields should be treated as sites where 
human remains are likely to emerge, akin to cemeteries, or those where any finds will be 
incidental. Any intentional excavation of a (known) battlefield grave will by necessity be 
covered by the same legislation and licensing of any mortuary context, while incidental 
identification of remains across the site should be reported and seek a request either to 
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 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central-31641951 (02/04/2015). 
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rebury or remove the material. Some modern battlefield projects have intentionally 
excluded areas of the site associated with known graves, as at Culloden (Pollard 2009a) and 
Waterloo (Wason 2003) to avoid problems associated with the disinterment of burials 
without significant research potential. 
 
However, in some cases there are strong research reasons to survey for and 
excavate battlefield graves. Exploration of the spatial relationship of the grave(s) to the 
artefact assemblage will shed light on the burial practices, and potentially contribute to a 
better understanding of how to locate more graves on further sites. Skeletal analysis of the 
remains may also reveal new evidence regarding the physical anthropology of ancient 
battle, as has been done at Towton (Fiorato et al. 2000), Aspern (Binder et al. 2014) and the 
Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1998). Although Ma's (2008) reassessment of the skeletal material 
from Chaeronea provided some new insights into the anthropology of ancient battle 
trauma, the level and quality of evidence is still not as high as would be desired for a full 
recreation. Where there is no possibility of identifying individual casualties among the dead, 
the skeletal material associated with the battle-dead of a conflict is typically viewed as 
ethically comparable to that recovered from any mortuary context, particularly cemeteries, 
and there is generally little aversion to the photographic documentation of the bodies. 
 
Whether the graves of the battle-dead should be treated as a separate ethical 
category is a separate issue. Firstly, it should be recognised that archaeological prospection 
for and excavation of battlefield graves is a world away from the relic hunting-associated 
disinterment of remains increasingly seen on sites of C20th conflict.177 Excavation of 
battlefield graves in some cases may be necessary to prevent the disinterment of remains 
for the artefacts associated with them. In these cases, recovery of the battle-dead may be 
the preferable route. It is only in the United States, where legislative protection is extended 
to battlefields, that mass graves can be safely left without excavation. Battlefields such as 
Camden which are not fully protected may have graves left on them, but the location will 
                                                          
177
 See, for instance, the Facebook page “WW1 - WW2 Relic hunting (Excavation on battlefields)” which 
contains photographs of skeletal remains haphazardly disinterred alongside the equipment taken from them 
by relic hunters; 
https://www.facebook.com/WW1-WW2-Relic-hunting-Excavation-on-battlefields-161035087279074/?fref=ts, 
accessed 10/01/2016. 
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frequently be kept from public disclosure to prevent disinterment of the graves by relic 
hunters.178 The growing expertise of archaeologists in investigating mass graves has led to 
archaeological methodology being adopted to excavate graves associated with modern 
civilian genocides in Rwanda, Armenia, and Bosnia, and to reconstruct the narrative of the 
killings (Haglund et al. 2001). Mass graves associated with modern conflict, particularly the 
First World War (e.g. Pollard & Barton 2013) and Spanish Civil War (Renshaw 2011) may be 
intentionally searched for, with the aim of recovering remains for ‘proper’ burial as well as 
to reconstruct the events leading to the death of each individual. Many of the remains of 
modern, particularly C20th, battle-dead are given formalised reburial rather than being 
retained for future research, although this is not common for the skeletal remains 
associated with earlier battles. 
 
There do not appear to be any ethical reasons to avoid disturbing the battle-dead 
from ancient battlefields, although it might be noted that in some cases ‘nationalist’ claims 
might become a factor, not least where it is ‘foreigners’ who are exploring the site. On Early 
Modern and Modern battlefields, documented graves may be avoided if there is no 
significant research benefit associated with their excavation. However, graves that are 
discovered during the course of wider survey will, pending official permissions, be excavated 
and the remains removed for study. Many projects have attempted to locate battlefield 
graves through survey methodology, although have encountered significant problems in 
doing so (6.4.4, 6.4.5). Deliberate searches for mass graves may be avoided to avoid wasting 
resources. However, post-antique projects do not face the same issues as Greek and 
especially Roman battlefields in terms of difficulties establishing the location of a battlefield 
or identifying a landscape as such. Mass graves as indicators of conflict may be a much more 
important diagnostic feature for ancient sites than on their ancient counterparts. While 
there may be ethical issues associated with the deliberate disturbance of the battle-dead on 
any site, in antiquity it is probable that they are outweighed by the research value of a 
battlefield grave. 
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 Steven Smith pers.comm. 27th August 2014. 
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6.3: Physical survival of battlefield graves 
 
 On any site, it should be considered (if possible) whether mass graves are likely to 
have physically survived, based on the hydrology and soil composition of the site in 
question.  The crystals of bone apatite, Ca²⁺ (calcium ion) and PO₄⁻ᶟ (phosphate ions), 
remain highly reactive and vulnerable to physical degradation after death, but can survive 
indefinitely in certain conditions. Skeletal material will survive best in chemical conditions of 
pH neutral or slightly alkaline; skeletal material is less likely to survive in acidic conditions. 
Equally important is the level of groundwater fluctuation on the site. Consistent levels 
(permanently dry or saturated) will produce higher rates of survival than constant 
fluctuation (Nielsen-Marsh et al. 2006). Mass graves are unlikely to survive in areas of acidic 
and/or free-draining soil, but as chemical and hydrological conditions can be variable across 
a site, only certain areas may be affected by these conditions.179 Prior to any archaeological 
survey for mass graves on ancient battlefields, it would be invaluable to establish the 
chemical composition of the soil across the site, and to examine any hydrological research 
conducted previously on the site. It may be that certain areas can largely be ruled out of a 
mass grave survey based on the probability of physical survival. On both ancient and later 
battlefields, scientific research into the spatial relationship between soil chemistry and site 
hydrology and mass grave location might prove useful. 
  
Following from this, before any survey is initiated it would be worth considering the 
previous land-use of the battlefield, particularly whether it has been a focus for agricultural 
activity or other settlement-related development. At Kalkriese the human remains, as the 
artefacts, were protected by the deposition of a thick layer of fertiliser which minimised 
damaged from subsequent agricultural activity. Maps of the soil-content of the Kalkriese 
area were already available at the time of the site discovery, and were factored in from an 
early stage in the research (Tolksdorf-Lienemann 2004). Pre-fieldwork research should also, 
if possible, consider antiquarian reports of human remains reported in the past, if there is 
any chance they date from the time of the battle. Such reports may allow it to be assessed 
whether any remains have already been disturbed and removed in the past. 
                                                          
179
 In modern mass graves, differing levels of skeletal survival have been observed within the same burial 
context (Wright et al. 2005: 146). 
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6.4: Artefact survey 
 
 The nature and spatial distribution of the battle-related assemblage is the central 
factor in reconstruct the narrative of a battle, rather than confirming that the events 
occurred in a particular location. Artefact survey and excavation have been the defining 
characteristic of battlefield archaeology from the Little Bighorn investigations onwards 
(Scott et al. 1989; Scott 2013), with a focus particularly on identifying lead munitions. 
Subsequent battlefield studies have developed the methodology, particularly as the 
discipline has moved into the study of the Medieval world. However, the artefact 
assemblages from ancient sites manifest in a number of ways which require significant 
methodological adjustment. As with Medieval battlefields, many of the more diagnostically-
relevant individual artefacts, particularly projectiles and other weapons, were made from 
iron. The non-ferrous-based methodology of modern battlefield studies may therefore be 
less suitable in an ancient context.  
 
However, as in the modern world, ancient armies had an identifiable metal-based 
material culture, albeit that was not restricted in use to the military. As a result, the 
potential range of diagnostically significant artefacts in antiquity, if not conclusive 
individually, is comparable to that of modern sites. A methodology which fits inside both 
these parameters is necessary to make the most of the archaeology on ancient battlefields. 
However, it must also be practical to implement the surveys on sites the size of ancient 
battlefields. As the deposition of ancient battle could be extensive over a wide area, the 
landscape areas involved in survey can be significant. Transect and sampling survey 
techniques have been used in battlefield archaeology because sites often cover too large an 
area to do much else within a limited timescale, particularly in all-metal mode. However, as 
the aim of these surveys is often to pinpoint a battlefield location, rather than establish one, 
this approach can be more effective - or at least, less problematic – in a historic rather than 
an ancient context. 
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6.4.1: Metal detection and artefacts on modern battlefields 
 
 The survey and excavation methodology used by battlefield archaeology on sites 
from the Late Medieval period onwards has been intentionally developed to suit the 
parameters of sites from these periods. The assemblages recovered from post-blackpowder 
battlefields are recognisably and often distinctively military, formed largely of signature 
munitions made of stabilised lead, the characteristic metal of post-medieval battlefield 
archaeology. There may be a small non-munition assemblage, often deposited in periods of 
hand-to-hand skirmishing, but in most cases these artefacts, by their non-military nature, 
would not be sufficient to identify a battlefield, as opposed to a general military site. The 
surviving assemblage, dominated by munitions, in most cases represents a primary 
deposition resulting directly from fighting, meaning that their spatial distribution can be 
used to reconstruct battle-period activity in most cases (cf. Foard & Morris 2012: 67). That 
said, there are some occasions where deposition resulted from post-battle activity. At Palo 
Alto (1846), a distribution of unfired munitions was identified as shot which had fallen from 
the cartridge boxes of the battle-dead as they were moved for burial (Haecker & Mauck 
2009). On many American Civil War battlefields, the cartridge boxes of the defeated battle-
dead were often deliberately emptied by the victorious force and the unfired munitions 
dumped in a distant area of the site to prevent them being used by survivors of the 
defeated army in a rallying attack (Lawrence Babits pers. comm. January 2015).180  
 
The assemblages can be distributed over a large area, depending on the exact events 
of the battle and excavations have demonstrated that the skirmishing which followed the 
collapse of one side is often archaeologically visible. Concentrations of military kit on 
blackpowder battlefields may be associated with hand-to-hand fighting, as at Culloden 
(Pollard 2009b: 151). Foard and Curry (2013: 191-192) have noted that only limited military 
kit was left by the almost exclusively hand-to-hand fighting at Bosworth, contrary to initial 
expectations based on the assemblage from Towton (e.g. Sutherland 2012). Hand-to-hand 
fighting is not the only explanation for deposition of military kit fragments, as a similar 
                                                          
180
 Unfired British munitions were also found in large quantity within Fort Watson, evidently deposited by the 
defenders during the American assault on the fort, but which the excavators could not explain (Ferguson 1977: 
57-67). 
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assemblage to the Culloden concentration has been recovered from a small area on the 
periphery of the Camden battlefield which cannot be associated with skirmishing activity 
(Legg & Smith 2009: 223). 
 
The methodology originally devised for battlefield archaeology at the Little Bighorn 
was suited to assemblages dominated by military lead munitions located within the topsoil, 
within a relatively wide landscape but with definite areas of fighting being known. The 
distribution largely represented the battle-period depositional pattern and the artefacts 
had, for the most part, been left behind because they were not visible to looters. The Little 
Bighorn methodology was based on these characteristics (Scott et al. 1989: 24-35). The basis 
of the project was a series of fieldwalking and metal detection surveys, starting at the 
position known to be associated with the fighting and working outwards until the 
assemblage stopped. Metal detector hits were marked with plastic pin-flags to identify them 
(Fig. 20). Artefact depositions could then be excavated to locate and identify the battle-
related assemblage. 
 
 
Figure 40: Metal detection survey at the Little Bighorn (1984) with artefact hits marked with plastic pin-flags (from 
http://www.friendslittlebighorn.com/Dig-of-1984.htm). 
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With slight adaptations on a site-by-site basis, this methodology has been broadly 
used in the vast majority of battlefield projects. In particular, because on modern 
battlefields “...most artifacts of war would either be metallic or associated with metal” 
(Scott et al. 1989: 24). Metal detection has become perhaps the technique most 
synonymous with the discipline of battlefield archaeology (cf. Connor & Scott 1998). 
 
At the Little Bighorn, a wide range of non-metal artefacts including bone, leather, 
shell and rubber were recovered in close spatial association to munitions which had been 
identified by the metal detection survey. Metal detection survey at the Little Bighorn was 
complemented by field-walking, which served to identify a number of artefacts, particularly 
stone tools but also some cartridges which had not been picked up by the metal detector 
(Scott et al. 1989: 29). The depth-range of most metal detectors can pick up on artefacts 
located in the topsoil, typically where the majority of a battle-related assemblage will be 
located (Sutherland 2004). Artefact hits were marked on the surface with plastic pin-flags 
ahead of later excavation,181 and the find-spot recorded with GPS tracking to facilitate later 
spatial analysis. From the Little Bighorn project, it was soon demonstrated that a site free of 
surface vegetation is likely to produce the most successful results both from metal detection 
survey and field-walking. It was also recognised as necessary to have multiple brands of 
metal detectors working at different frequencies to avoid cross-contamination and 
distortion of the signals (Scott et al. 1989: 27). 
 
 Most battlefield projects have found it necessary to conduct metal detection survey 
in non-ferrous mode, due to the signal corruption caused by ferrous artefacts unconnected 
to the battle assemblage. On Post-Medieval sites this has proved largely unproblematic. The 
munitions which form the core of the assemblage are almost exclusively made from lead, 
and any kit fittings are likely to be copper-alloy, making non-ferrous mode an effective way 
of identifying the signature of battle (Foard & Morris 2012: 29). Survey in all-metal mode 
can be intensively time-consuming and may not significantly improve artefact detection 
rates, not least because the slow rate of all-metal survey means a significantly smaller area 
of a battlefield can be surveyed. An all-metal survey on part of the Culloden battlefield was 
                                                          
181
 To avoid cross-contamination from the survey itself, plastic or fibreglass markers are used to identify find-
spots. 
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only able to cover 2.4% of the area covered by non-ferrous survey at Edgehill in the same 
timeframe of c.3500 man-hours (Foard & Morris 2012: 121), despite the fact that other 
areas of Culloden had already been surveyed previously (Pollard 2009b: 142). 
 
All-metal survey will be considered where it is expected that the majority of the 
artefacts in the assemblage will be made of iron, such as Medieval battlefields. This can 
prove effective, as in Pollard and Oliver’s (2002: 52-55) survey of the Shrewsbury battlefield 
which recovered a reasonable quantity of iron arrowheads against the expectation of local 
detectorists who had previously worked on the site. If the frequency of a ferrous artefact 
type can be established the detector can be calibrated to identify them more accurately, 
albeit only those of similar constitution. At Towton, the identification of a single arrowhead 
associated with the battle allowed surveyors to isolate the magnetic frequency of 
arrowheads from the period. The resulting resurvey of an area of the battlefield produced a 
further 200 previously undetected iron arrowheads (Sutherland & Richardson 2009: 163). 
The recalibration reduced the ratio of battle-related to non-related ferrous finds in these 
areas from 1:50, compared with up to 1:200 on other areas of the site, although this level 
still represents a problematic cross-signal. Background contamination from later artefacts 
can be particularly problematic. At Towton, surveyors found that post-battle ferrous 
material interfered with geophysical survey in general, resulting in the marginalisation of 
these techniques in the general search for battle-related artefacts (Sutherland & Schmidt 
2003: 15). Recent work at Balaclava faced problems from crossed metal signals, with the 
detectorists unable to distinguish between Crimean, Second World War and modern metal 
signals (Freeman 2010: 154). Ferrous survey may only be recommended on modern 
battlefields when it is certain that the core fighting area of the battlefield has been 
identified and needs to be surveyed in particular detail over a relatively small landscape 
area (Foard & Curry 2013: 195). 
 
 Battlefields of any period represent a large landscape to be surveyed. Targeted 
surveys, transects and sampling can all be used to reduce the time and effort required, 
although the area left uncovered by survey should be minimised to avoid missing important 
artefacts or features. Exclusion of landscape areas because they are not expected to 
produce any finds based on the historical narrative should be, and is, largely avoided. Most 
260 
 
battlefield projects employ transect-based survey, allowing a representative sample of the 
site to be surveyed, attempting as far as possible to correct for sampling bias by continuing 
to survey until the archaeological evidence stops. Transects are typically spaced at 5m 
during the initially sweeping phase,182 although 10m intervals can also be used, which based 
on an average detector sweep of 1.5-2m will still cover upwards of 15-20% of the battlefield 
site, such spacing typically providing only an overview of the battlefield area. Foard and 
Morris (2012: 29) observe that a transect system based on multiples of 2.5m spacing allows 
intensification (up to 2.5m) on certain areas without compromising the comparability of 
results, and recommend that a maximum of 2.5m should be used in all surveys of 
contemporary sites. 
 
In the United States, a grid system known as the ‘2-2-90’ method has been 
developed by Historic Archaeological Research (HAR) to resurvey areas of high artefact hits. 
A series of (15m x 15m) grids are laid out over areas which produced a high detection rate in 
the transect survey. These will then be surveyed in a series of overlapping transects, 
followed by a second set at a 90° angle to the first, preferably using a different detector 
model, frequency or metal-setting (Pratt 2009: 8-9; see also Foard & Morris 2012: 26). 
Multiple sweeps of the battlefield can result in additional artefact detection and a generally 
higher identification rate prior to excavation (Reeves 2010: 89-90). Comparison of artefact 
identification rates by 10m and 2.5m transects in surveys from Edgehill demonstrates the 
positive difference that smaller- scale transects can make (Fig. 21). The smaller transects 
produced a much higher rate of recovery albeit at the cost of a far higher rate of effort, 
which in the context of Edgehill, largely confirmed the pattern represented by the more 
spaced transects. Whether more detailed transects are worth the additional effort is 
debatable, dependent on the context and research aims of the individual project. 
 
 
                                                          
182
 As at the Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1989: 27-29); Pea Ridge (Carlson-Drexler et al. 2008: 23); for discussion 
of transect spacing see Pratt (2009: 8). 
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Figure 21: Difference in artefact recovery on 10m and 2.5m transect survey at Edgehill (Foard & Morris 2012: 123). 
 
 
Confirming that an area was part of the battlefield, the presence of a particular unit 
to a known area of the battlefield, or establishing the extent of fighting may not require the 
same density of finds needed to argue that a previously unidentified area was a battlefield, 
or to reconstruct or radically alter the narrative of a battle from the archaeology. In cases 
such as Edgehill, the higher artefact recovery rate which resulted from the more detailed 
survey did little more than confirm the impression already taken from the wider transect, 
itself used to validate the historical record. The point may be however, that the possibility of 
revisionist archaeological evidence should not be marginalised, and certain areas therefore 
excluded because nothing unexpected is expected. 
 
 It is recommended that records be kept of ground and weather conditions on each 
day of survey, to allow for any systematic bias in detection resulting from environmental 
factors (Foard & Morris 2012: 28). The use of transects minimises the effort needed to 
establish a survey overview of a battlefield, although it risks missing areas of importance if 
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they fall outside the remit of the original transect grid. That this can be marginalised in later 
historic battlefield studies largely reflects the fact that in most cases these projects are not 
necessarily aiming to produce an independent narrative of battle, but rather to establish 
whether an extant literary account is correct or not. Full survey across an entire battlefield 
would, of course, provide a much more thorough picture of the artefact distribution, rather 
than the representational resulting from transect survey, but in most cases it is impractical 
due to the size of battlefields. 
 
 Metal detection survey is likely to remain the predominant survey methodology on 
battlefields from any period. Alternative methods of geophysical remote sensing have 
proved to be of limited use, and are predominantly reserved for detection of features rather 
than artefacts. An electromagnetic survey of the Fort Morton area of the American Civil War 
battlefield at Nashville showed that ground conductivity meters, particularly EM-31 and EM-
38 devices, can detect large metal objects on battlefields, while the latter can also identify 
small artefacts, particularly iron, which can be problematic for some metal detectors (Bevan 
1998: 31-32). However, at best these survey methods supplement metal detection. The 
main methodological issue in battlefield archaeology is the debate between all-metal and 
non-ferrous survey modes, and transects over full survey. The ideal of complete assemblage 
recovery has to be balanced against the time and funding available for projects, and the 
probability that more comprehensive survey will lead to measurably improved results. In 
most cases, particularly on post-blackpowder sites, non-ferrous survey will be sufficient to 
produce a reasonably accurate impression of distribution; however, the transect system is 
proving increasingly unpopular, although has to be retained in most cases for practical 
reasons. 
 
 
6.4.2: Metal detection on ancient battlefields 
 
 As in later historical battlefield studies, the methodology for studying ancient sites 
will be based on archaeological survey, particularly metal detection, of the site, followed by 
excavation of areas presenting with high artefact hits. However, the methods used will have 
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to be altered to take into account the specific nature of ancient battlefields; namely, their 
physical size, and the fact that the majority of the assemblage is likely to consist of iron, 
rather than non-ferrous, artefacts. The initial stages of the survey may be conducted blind, 
particularly if there is no real idea of where the battlefield centre is, although pre-excavation 
research may have revealed a position in the landscape from which to start. Antiquarian 
reports may record chance finds in the past may provide an area to begin survey, although 
the artefacts may not be associated with the central battlefield. At Kalkriese, Clunn began 
his original prospection in the area previously associated by Mommsen (1885) with the 
battle, although the site he discovered ended up being on the periphery of the conflict zone 
(Clunn 2005: 2-3). The work at the Oberesch  has suggested that a higher proportion, if not 
absolute quantity, of artefacts may have been preserved in the peripheral areas. Secondly, it 
has illustrated that in some cases artefacts, particularly weaponry, armour and valuables 
were moved around the battlefield during the looting process, collected together in a 
central area. As such, the relative density of artefacts may not be directly associated with 
the intensity of conflict in a given part of the battlefield. 
 
 Chapter Four discussed the composition of ancient (Roman) battlefield assemblages, 
suggesting that they are typically comprised of small, low-value projectiles and kit fragments 
which evaded notice in the looting process through natural obscuration. As on later 
battlefields, complete weapons are practically unknown, with the reported antiquarian finds 
of helmets and swords to be treated with caution. High value finds are likely to be limited to 
the periphery of the battlefield, and are likely to represent battle-period deliberate hoarding 
of material. The assemblage may not be distinctively military, although all the individual 
artefacts can be associated with the army when found in a known context. As such, the 
signature archaeology of ancient battlefields is not necessarily the type of artefact, as it is 
on more modern battlefields with munitions, but rather the scale and distribution of the 
assemblage, particularly a concentration of multiple projectiles, caligae nails, and kit 
fragments. 
 
The main methodological issue is that these finds will almost exclusively be made 
from ferrous metal, survey for which, as discussed above, comes with a range of technical 
problems. Of only slightly less significance is the problem of the potential size of ancient 
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battlefields, particularly in the early stages of preliminary landscape survey before the area 
of fighting has been securely identified. Although the potential battlefield can be of a 
daunting size, it is potentially problematic to rely on transect survey to identify the 
assemblage, particularly on the larger scale often used in the early stages of battlefield 
survey, as the potential to miss the depositional pattern through transects can be 
significant. 
 
 
Figure 22: Excavation at the Oberesch with excavated artefact finds marked with pins (red arrows; author's own). 
 
The lack of a consistent approach to ancient battlefield survey, particularly the 
process of developing a largely ad hoc methodology without reference to later historical 
sites, has resulted in some problems at certain phases of study. At Harzhorn, the first metal 
detection survey took the guidelines from the Little Bighorn to mark artefact hits on the 
surface to identify hotspots and guide excavation. Unfortunately, they marked them with 
metal pins, distorting the signal for between 20cm and 50cm around the artefact. This 
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problem was soon noticed and the metal pins replaced with plastic flags. Unfortunately, 
those used were too lightweight and easily disturbed by animal activity, resulting in many 
being repeatedly torn out of the ground when they were left overnight (Berger et al. 
2010/13: 325-326). The excavators may have used metal pins as a result of observation 
excavations at the Oberesch, where pins were used to tag find-bags in the ground during 
excavation (Fig. 22). Metal pins however, were not used during the survey stage. Basic 
problems such as this, resulting from differences in approach across the discipline of ancient 
battlefield studies, are an indicator of why it important to move towards methodological 
consistency.183 
 
Rather than working outwards from a central area to see how far the archaeology 
extends, as on later historical battlefields with a verified location, landscape analysis and 
antiquarian reports may make it more profitable to work from the outside in, identifying key 
features and artefacts associated with battle in the wider landscape, drawing the evidence 
together to identify a small area which can then be more intensively prospected. This can 
include military march routes and temporary camps and reports of Roman artefacts not 
usually associated with battlefields as such, concentrations of caligae nails in particular. The 
battle-related archaeology may be located in both in the central and peripheral areas of a 
battlefield due to the impact of inverse spatial proportioning/the ‘donut effect’, and 
therefore as much of a potential site as possible should be prospected. Certainly, we do not 
yet know enough about the archaeological manifestation of ancient battle to say that 
peripheral areas do not need to be surveyed, particularly as some of the key diagnostic finds 
- glandes, caligae nails - are evidently deposited in these areas, and their distribution at all 
three Roman battlefields has revealed previously unknown evidence about the physical 
route of conflict. 
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 One of the self-stated aims of the Baecula project was to contribute towards a common methodology for 
studying Roman conflict sites in Spain (Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012: 358). 
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Figure 23: Surface vegetation at Harzhorn (October 2011; author's own). 
 
There are likely to be methodological issues with the conducting of metal detection 
survey in the field, regardless of the type used. The physical topography and geography of 
the site may have an impact on the effectiveness of remote survey. As previously 
mentioned, the effectiveness of metal detection at the Oberesch was limited by the Esch, 
which resulted in artefacts being too far below the modern surface to be picked up by 
survey devices. At Harzhorn recovery was hampered by the presence of substantial surface 
vegetation and its roots, which prohibited access to certain areas of the site for much of the 
year due to the signal-distorting effects of the plant-matter (Fig. 23). Areas of uneven terrain 
and slope with over-hanging vegetation proved particularly problematic. Survey was 
intensified during a short winter period when the majority of the vegetation died away, 
allowing a few months of relatively unhampered access to the site (Berger et al. 2010/13: 
326). Supplementing metal detection survey with other remote survey techniques is 
desirable but potentially problematic. Fieldwalking can be employed, which may recover 
some battle-related material, although this may be unlikely unless there had been recent 
disturbance of the topsoil. Surface survey could contribute in identifying areas of 
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subsequent activity on the battle, through artefact (particularly pottery) density, which may 
identify parts of the battlefield which were more vulnerable to post-depositional 
disturbance. 
 
As yet, aerial survey of the battlefield or its landscape context has proved of limited 
use due to the physical terrain, particularly at the German sites. Around Kalkriese, while the 
medieval deposition of Esch lead to the preservation of the assemblage, it has also meant 
that aerial survey attempting to locate constructed features associated with the battle has 
been almost entirely unsuccessful. Geophysical prospection has been inconclusive, because 
of the Esch (Wilbers-Rost 2007: 7), with magnetometry particularly ineffective (Wilbers-Rost 
2009a: 128-129). The topographic conditions around Harzhorn, particularly the forestry, 
make alternative forms of remote survey, from aerial to resistivity, almost impossible. Given 
the issues evident at Harzhorn in the metal detection of small iron artefacts, if soil 
conditions were suitable it might be productive to introduce EM-38 survey to limited areas 
of the site, based on the success of this method on battlefields in the United States. 
However, the physical topography of the battlefield may preclude this as a viable method. 
 
 
6.4.3: The use of transects and/or sampling 
 
 The size of a potential battlefield has proved to be a problematic issue for 
archaeological teams, particularly if the peripheral areas which perhaps did not see direct 
fighting are to be incorporated into the project. Full-field survey would be preferable, 
particularly while an understanding the spatial manifestation of battle-related assemblages 
is being developed; however, this is unlikely to be possible, given the physical parameters 
involved. As on later battlefields, it has been necessary for sampling strategies to be 
employed. The results from Baecula suggests that this approach does not always prove 
ineffective, although the level of detail will be significantly reduced in comparison to more 
complete survey. Transects have been used in areas where finds are expected, typically in 
the core battlefield based on the literary narratives, but additional survey has also been 
conducted in the peripheral surrounding to establish the physical extent of the assemblage. 
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At Baecula, the size of the battlefield rapidly led to the adoption of transect survey, in total 
employing 106 transects, sub-divided into 3453 grids, covering a total area of 40ha 
(Cárdenas Anguita et al. 2011: 921). To date 6.88% of the entire 450ha battlefield area has 
been surveyed, equating to about 10% of the actual area of fighting (Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012: 
357). This survey area has been sufficient to identify several battlefield-proximate features 
and trends of movement across the field, with the closer transects used in the central core 
universally confirming the overall impression given by the wider spaced.184 
 
At Harzhorn, the size of the conflict landscape was cited by the excavators as one of 
the chief issues in the methodological preparation (Berger et al. 2010/13: 321). Pressures 
resulting largely from the media coverage of the battlefield meant that the site survey and 
excavation had to be rapidly carried out to avoid illegal relic hunting. To assist in the 
coverage of such a large landscape area – the extent of which was unknown at the time - 
the four archaeologists and five excavation technicians employed were supported by 11 
experienced volunteer detectorists, enabling the Harzhorn project to run seven days a week 
in the early phases (Berger et al. 2010/13: 323-325). As a result, the use of transects was 
minimised, producing an artefact distribution which was much more comprehensive than 
might have otherwise been recorded. 
 
The Harzhorn approach is preferable where possible, as it produced a more 
complete distributional map which was less prone to missing unpredictable spatial 
concentrations. While the Baecula approach certainly provided a reasonable overview of 
the battlefield, and was able to identify key areas of movement as well as recognise the 
changes in depositional density which marked the edges of the fighting-area, the risk would 
be that important finds would be missed. As yet, a ‘typical’ spatial distribution of ancient 
battle archaeology in relation to phases of battle-related activity has not been identified. As 
such, it is not possible to exclude particular areas of a battlefield from survey on the basis of 
specific actions consistently failing to leave an identifiable archaeological trace. However, 
                                                          
184
 It was noted that the inclusion of the peripheral areas of the battlefield, particularly of the Roman 
approach, was vital to the reconstruction of the battle but somewhat distorted the figures in suggesting that 
less of the fighting-area battlefield had been surveyed than actually was (Bellón Ruiz et al. 2012: 357 n.23). 
Most of the survey was conducted in the area between the Roman and Carthaginian camps, and there has 
been minimal exploration of the areas beyond. 
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the transect method is not necessarily an ineffective approach, and there may be certain 
cases where, due to the nature of the site or the project funding it proves to be the only 
effective method. 
 
 
6.4.4: Ferrous and non-ferrous survey 
 
At the Oberesch, the metal detection survey was mainly carried out in non-ferrous 
mode because of the potential problems with signal corruption from non-related ferrous 
material (Moosbauer 2005: 95-96). Multiple phases of metal detection survey were 
undertaken prior to excavation to ensure that as many finds were identified as possible 
(Wilbers-Rost 2007: 7). The majority of artefacts however, particularly in the categories of 
what might be thought of as diagnostically significant, were made of iron (Table 8). Over 
55% (433) of the total weaponry and armour assemblage (including miscellaneous military 
kit and caligae) was made of iron, with these artefacts largely discovered as a result of the 
extensive excavations rather than results from geophysical prospection. All the projectiles 
and caligae were iron, with the assemblage boosted by a large number of iron shield-pins 
lost during the field-reprocessing. Copper-alloy was best represented in the shield 
fragments, deposited by the looting process and the stripping of metal elements, and there 
was a smaller quantity from body kit, particularly buckles and phalerae. Given that the 
deposition of these artefacts is, in contrast to Baecula and Harzhorn,  almost entirely 
associated with the field-stripping of the Roman army, it is unlikely that they would occur in 
any context where the Romans or a similarly well-armoured (in metal) force had not been 
defeated. Otherwise, based on the Oberesch assemblage, the majority of artefacts, 
particularly those of diagnostic significance, are likely to be iron. 
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Artefact Iron Iron +  
copper-alloy 
Iron +  
non-ferrous 
Copper-
alloy 
Copper-alloy +  
non-ferrous 
Other 
Pila 32 - - - - - 
Spear 55 - - - - - 
Arrows 3 - - - - - 
Sword 1 - - - - - 
Scabbard 2 1 - 16 1 - 
Shield 219 - 1 196 4 - 
Helmet 13 2 - 8 5 - 
Armour 3 10 2 21 8 - 
Misc. 
body-kit 
1 3 - 56 43 5 
Fibulae 18 9 - 55 - - 
Caligae 104 - - - - - 
Horse & 
mule 
42 5 - 35 10 - 
       
Total 493 29 3 381 47 20 
 
Table 8: Metals used for weapons, armour and military kit from the Oberesch (data from Harnecker & 
Franzius 2008; Harnecker & Mylo 2011). 
 
 
The team at Harzhorn implemented all-metal survey from the start of the project, 
despite the presence of Second World War ordnance across the site. In part this was the 
result of the composition of the surveying team. The lack of Roman artefact expertise 
among the 11 volunteer detectors further led to a policy of recovering as much material as 
possible from the battlefield rather than relying on inexperienced surveyors to determine 
what material was significant (Berger et al. 2010/13: 323-325).185 All-metal mode slowed the 
survey rate in the early stages of the project. As the excavations emerged however, it 
became obvious that some makes of detector were struggling to pick up artefact hits from 
                                                          
185
 The excavators noted in particular the lack of typological distinction between Roman and post-Roman in 
many of the artefact categories recovered, particularly in hobnails where a similar form was used through to 
the late C19
th
; as such, the team was encouraged to collect all material (Berger et al. 2010/13: 333-334). The 
lack of distinction is largely the reason for the c.950 artefacts which have not, as yet, been assigned to a 
historical period. 
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the small iron artefacts, particularly caligae nails, even when set in ferrous mode (Berger et 
al. 2010/13: 325). 
 
 In trenches 1, 5, 7, and 8, the survey picked up both spearheads in the assemblage 
and seven of the 8 catapult bolts, but only two of the 18 caligae nails and none of the three 
arrowheads, all of which were instead identified during excavation (Berger et al. 2010/13: 
364-365). The team attempted to minimise the impact of patchy identification by using five 
different makes of metal detector, as advised by Scott from the Little Bighorn, and by 
surveying each area of the site up to 10 times (Berger et al. 2010/13: 325). Nevertheless, the 
artefacts mentioned above evaded detection during survey and only emerged during later 
excavation. If all-metal mode is not always able to detect iron artefacts, it must therefore be 
considered whether the additional problems with cross-contaminated signals and modern 
artefacts being picked up make ferrous mode an impracticality, particularly when it may not 
identify additional artefacts. As such, while excavation is guided by areas of high artefact 
hits, following survey in either all-metal or non-ferrous mode, it may turn out that the 
apparent densities have been distorted by the failure to pick up ferrous material in the 
survey stage, regardless of whether it was intended or not. This is particularly problematic in 
all-metal survey, as a lack of iron-related hits might not represent an absence of these 
artefacts in the ground. 
 
Non-ferrous survey may therefore prove largely ineffective in identifying the extant 
archaeological assemblage on an ancient battlefield, principally because of the selection 
bias in the looting process. While many elements of ancient military equipment were made 
of bronze or lead, the majority of such pieces were removed from the battlefield during the 
looting process - helmets, shields, and body-armour in particular. By contrast, the majority 
of artefacts which appear to be unrecovered by looting are made of iron - long-range 
projectiles, spears, and hobnails in particular, which are the artefact types with greatest 
diagnostic and analytical significance on these sites. The looting process, therefore, changed 
a battle-deposited assemblage likely to have been dominated by non-ferrous material into a 
post-looting assemblage which was dominated by iron. Non-ferrous metal detection survey 
is likely to be at best partially ineffective, at worst misleading, with regards to the 
distribution of artefacts on Roman battlefield sites. The artefact-type which emerges as a 
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consistent presence, and therefore diagnostic indicator, for ancient battlefield which is not 
typically made of iron are glandes, most commonly (but not exclusively) cast in lead (Rihll 
2009: 151). However, they will not be found on all sites as they were evidently not always 
used, depending on the nature of the battle, as demonstrated at Kalkriese where very few 
glandes were found. At the Oberesch, there was a higher quantity of copper-alloy artefacts, 
for the most part fragmented kit fittings resulting from the stripping of the Roman battle-
dead rather than fighting-period deposition. As such, a similar quantity of copper alloy 
fitting fragments would not be expected on sites without a comparable phase of stripping 
the body-armour of casualties whose armour had copper alloy fittings. Even allowing for this 
process, the majority of the assemblage from the Oberesch is iron. This is further illustrated 
at Baecula and Harzhorn, where only glandes and coins represent a notable non-ferrous 
assemblage; again, the majority of the artefacts recovered were made of iron. At Kalkriese, 
the negative impact of non-ferrous survey was largely mitigated by the ineffectiveness 
overall of metal detection at the site, largely due to the 1m+ of Esch across the site. Some 
non-ferrous material was identified on the site, and in some areas the Esch was removed to 
allow metal detection. 
 
Excavation has proved a much more effective method for artefact recovery than 
remote survey (Harnecker 2004: 26; Wilbers-Rost 2007: 7). This might not be expected on 
other, less covered sites and non-ferrous survey may prove a greater hindrance in such 
cases. Given the diagnostic significance of iron artefacts in identifying a Roman battlefield, it 
is necessary to condition the survey methodology to have the best opportunity for 
identifying as many non-ferrous artefacts as possible. Despite the time-consuming nature of 
all-metal survey and the likelihood of picking up much irrelevant material, it should be used 
where possible, particularly if excavation will be limited to areas of high artefact 
concentration. Survey would, however, need to accommodate the fact that, based on the 
experiences at Harzhorn, metal detectors may not pick up on the signals from small iron 
artefacts, particularly caligae nails, even in ferrous mode, and once again extensive 
excavation will be necessary. It seems probable in either case that excavation should not be 
confined to areas of high artefact density, but should be supplemented by an initial phase of 
test-pitting in areas of low artefact identification, followed by more if the first pits prove to 
contain a significant amount of material not picked up by the survey. 
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 Most of the evidence base for the methodological development detailed above 
would be equally applicable to Greek battlefield archaeology, without significant change. 
Conventional battlefield study will be difficult on some Greek sites due to topographic 
change, particularly at Marathon where the plain appears to have become heavily silted 
with alluvial run-off, with rises in the ground-level of c.3m around the Soros, even more in 
other areas of the plain since 490BC (Pavlopoulos et al. 2006). Changes in the ground-level 
will have consequences for survey and excavation, particularly as metal detection and other 
remote sensing techniques, are unlikely to be practical in the case of alluvial deposition in 
particular. They are not necessarily prohibitive to study, as demonstrated at the Oberesch, 
although the alteration there is less than a third of that at Marathon; it is unlikely that the 
test-excavation strategy partially employed in lieu of remote sensing would function as well 
on a site like Marathon. It is clear that any metal detection should, as on the Roman sites, 
focus on all-metal survey despite the problems that this will cause in terms of non-related 
material, particularly on sites which were subsequently used for battle in later historical 
periods, such as Thermopylae. As in the Roman world, the majority of the assemblage left 
unrecovered on a Greek battlefield is likely to be dominated by iron. Although it was 
acknowledged that the evidence is more speculative pending any battlefield archaeology 
results, it was earlier argued that there was a selection bias in Greek battlefield looting. Just 
as in the Roman world, this process removed the majority of the shields, helmets, body-
armour, greaves (all bronze) and swords (iron) from the battlefield, leaving behind an 
assemblage which would potentially be dominated by projectiles (iron/lead) and spears 
(iron), and, if they were in common use among Greek soldiers, hobnails (iron). 
 
 
6.4.5: Metal detection and mass graves 
 
 Mass graves are typically difficult to identify on medieval and modern battlefields 
with metal detection as they rarely contain any metal artefacts. Any incidental finds in the 
grave-fill may not be identified due to the depth of burials which, although often not deep 
by the standards of contemporary civilian practice, frequently exceed the effective 
operating depth-limit of the equipment. There is little reliable methodology to identify, prior 
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to excavation, whether metal detector hits are associated with a grave. If all artefact hits are 
excavated this may not present a significant methodological issue. However, in cases where 
excavation of mass burials is avoided where possible this can prove problematic, notably in 
recent excavations on the Western Front of the First World War (e.g. Fraser & Brown 2007). 
Intentional attempts to locate battlefield graves, or to use any skeletal material belonging to 
known battle casualties, in archaeological analysis, has come under criticism, particularly in 
the United States (Fox 1993: 325). As such, efforts may not be made to intentionally locate 
battlefields post-dating the Early Modern period, unless it is to ensure their protection 
and/or reburial, as at Camden (Smith et al. 2009) or the WWI burial at Fromelles (Pollard & 
Barton 2013). Battlefield graves, and the human remains they contain, from the Early 
Modern world back are treated more as anthropological archaeological resources, perhaps 
due to the anonymity of the individuals.186 Greater efforts may be made in these cases to 
identify battlefield graves, although metal detection does not always prove effective in 
doing so. 
 
 Very few medieval battlefield graves contain any metal artefacts, although eighteen 
metal, largely non-ferrous, artefacts were recovered from the grave excavated at Towton in 
1996 (Burgess 2000: 30-32). Very little weaponry or armour is found in any mass grave from 
this period (the latter unsurprisingly given how few soldiers would have worn it), although a 
number of casualties from Visby were buried in armour parts, most likely because there was 
a delay in their burial leading to advanced decomposition making it impossible to remove 
(Thordeman 1939). In the Early Modern period, metal uniform fittings are relatively 
commonly found in battlefield graves, though weaponry remains rare. At Camden 
battlefield in the United States, eight individual graves were identified by metal detector 
survey as a result of artefacts in the grave. Most were uniform fittings such as buckles and 
insignia, but in one case a lead bullet embedded in the body was identified by the survey 
(Smith et al. 2009: 12). In each case the detectorist was unaware that they had found a 
grave until they excavated the area. Several of the mass graves at Aspern contained metal 
artefacts, including uniform fragments and both lead and iron projectiles (Binder et al. 2014: 
370). At the Fallen Timbers battlefield, clusters of United States military insignia were 
                                                          
186
 Individualisation of the conflict-dead is more common with C20
th
 mass graves in particular, and has been 
linked to the presence of recognisable artefacts in association with the remains (Renshaw 2011: 157). 
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identified by metal detection survey and subsequently interpreted as resulting from the 
surface abandonment or shallow burial of casualties from the battle, although as yet no 
human remains have been recovered in conjunction with them (Pratt 2009: 12-15). The US 
Cavalry casualties at the Little Bighorn also possessed many elements of their metal fittings 
and insignia when they were buried (and later reburied) after the battle (Scott et al. 1989: 
191-201). Many casualties recovered in recent years from incidental graves on the WWI 
Western Front also had elements of their military fittings and non-weaponry equipment on 
them when they were buried informally (e.g. Fraser & Brown 2007). The problem is 
however, that there is likely to be a lower concentration of metal artefacts in general in the 
grave area, meaning it could be more easily missed in transect survey. In most cases only 
areas producing high numbers of hits are subsequently re-covered with smaller transect or 
complete survey, and low level areas may not be excavated at all if time (and funds) are 
limited. Any graves located away from concentrations of battle-deposited material, 
particularly those on the periphery, are unlikely to be located as a result of incidental 
discovery during excavation of artefact-dense areas. 
 
 
6.4.6: Metal detection and ancient battlefield graves 
 
 To date, metal detection on later battlefields in regards to graves has largely relied 
on picking up hits from artefacts incidentally deposited in the grave, either as embedded 
projectiles or unwanted military ephemera, and has not focused on using the artefacts to 
find graves. An attempt was made to find a correlation between artefact distribution and 
mass graves by Sutherland and Richardson (2009) at Towton, looking at the spatial 
distribution of ferrous arrowheads which could have been embedded projectiles. This 
research led to the discovery of human skeletal material. However, in most cases metal 
detection is not used in modern battlefield archaeology specifically to find graves, as most 
are not associated with any metal artefacts. 
 
 This is not quite the same situation in antiquity, particularly in the Greek world, in 
which the battlefield graves thus far excavated in fact do contain both ferrous and non-
276 
 
ferrous artefacts, through both intentional deposition in the grave and incidental 
occurrence (embedded weaponry and/or grave-fill). As in any battlefield situation, metal 
detection would not be able to discern that these artefact hits were associated with a grave, 
but it is more probable that graves in this context would contain metal. The Theban burial at 
Chaeronea contained both non-ferrous (bronze coins) and ferrous artefacts: the five javelin 
heads which probably represent embedded projectiles, and the iron strigils. The 
Macedonian cremation grave at Chaeronea contained both bronze (pyre-nails, coins) and 
iron (weaponry, pyre-nails, strigils) artefacts. The Macedonian grave was in the topsoil layer 
and would have been within the range of metal detection, while the lower Theban burial 
layer, at 0.45m deep, would be more difficult to identify. The mixed metals of the artefacts 
means both graves would have been identifiable in ferrous or non-ferrous targeted surveys. 
The metal artefacts were distributed relatively evenly through the grave correspondent to 
the individual bodies. Whether such an artefact range and distribution is typical in Greek 
battlefield graves is unclear, and as-yet there is insufficient evidence to say whether every 
example would contain a similar assemblage. Although they are separated by almost a 
century, the Chaeronea assemblages have similarities with that in the repatriated grave at 
Thespiae. That said, the temporally-closer repatriation grave at Tegea does not contain any 
grave offerings, nor do the Himera necropolis graves. 
 
Embedded projectiles may also provide a source of metal in graves, examples were 
found in the Theban burial at Chaeronea, in the Himera necropolis burials. Embedded 
projectiles were also recovered from a Spartan mass inhumation in the Athenian 
Kerameikos, identified with Spartan casualties from a civilian uprising during the Oligarchic 
period. One skeleton had an iron lance-head in the ribs while another had two bronze 
arrowheads in the right leg (van Hook 1932). In a more civilian context, one skeleton from 
Maiden Castle had an embedded projectile in the neck, originally identified as a Roman 
catapult bolt (Wheeler 1943: 61-62), although Sharples (1991: 81-83) has since questioned 
some of Wheeler's original interpretation. Non-embedded projectiles may also be recovered 
from the grave fill, due to their use in ancient battle. Arrowheads were reported in the 
grave-fill of the Marathon Soros, although the provenance of the examples in the British 
Museum is debatable. Incidental finds such as embedded projectiles and artefacts in the 
grave-fill may also emerge in battlefield graves from the Roman world when more are 
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discovered. The Kalkriese burials were not located because of metal detection hits, although 
the probability of embedded projectiles so many years later would have been minimal. In 
more battle-proximate graves, projectiles may occur in the grave fill, but this remains 
entirely speculative until more examples are excavated. 
 
 The main problem with metal detection survey and ancient battlefield graves is the 
potential to miss them as a result of limited transect survey. Compared to the overall size of 
a battlefield, the graves represent a small area evocative of the ‘needle in a haystack’ 
variety. It is not such an issue that the artefact hits cannot be identified as belonging to a 
grave as such, the feature will be uncovered when the artefact is excavated regardless of 
whether it had been previously identified as a grave or not. Excavation however, relies on 
artefacts being detected during the survey, a process which can be hit-and-miss due to the 
conditions of transect survey. If graves contain metal artefacts, but do not lie in the area 
covered by the survey, they will not be identified and the feature may not be excavated. In 
the two Chaeronea graves, the metal artefacts were associated with the individual bodies 
and were relatively evenly distributed. However, if there are no metal grave offerings but 
only the remains of embedded projectiles, this are unlikely to be evenly distributed, as 
demonstrated in the cemetery graves at Himera. Metal detection survey on ancient 
battlefields has broadly followed the parameters of later methodology, with transects at 
10m intervals with a 0.5m sweep on either side, incorporating around 10% of the total 
battlefield area. If the metal artefacts were predominantly incidental occurrences - 
embedded projectiles and grave-fill - it would be chance as to whether they would be picked 
up during the survey or not. 
 
 
6.5: Geophysical survey 
 
 The effectiveness of metal detection on ancient battlefields has meant that 
geophysical remote survey, such as ground-penetrating radar or magnetometry, has not 
necessarily been developed in the context of studying these sites. However, as discussed in 
the previous section, metal detection is unlikely to prove an effective methodology for 
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locating battlefield graves, not least because of the absence of metal artefacts, and on some 
sites where environmental factors may limit the effectiveness of detectors. Geophysical 
survey has not yet been used on ancient battlefields to locate mass graves. The nature and 
form of battlefield mass graves are as yet too undefined archaeologically for it to be certain 
that these parameters will apply equally to them. Discussion of geophysical survey in this 
context is presented here therefore as an evaluation of the methodologies in a medieval 
and modern context. However, there will be brief consideration of how far these techniques 
could be used in an ancient context. 
 
 
6.5.1: Geophysics and detecting mass graves 
 
 The development of survey methodology dedicated specifically to the identification 
of mass graves on battlefields is relatively limited. That mass graves were created on post-
antiquity battlefields through to the C19th is in no real doubt, and in general it is hoped that 
any extant battlefield graves will emerge during excavation without any dedicated prior 
survey. In 2010 Masters and Enright (2011) began a project to locate battlefield graves 
through geophysics on four Late Medieval English battlefields. While a combination of 
gradiometry, EM-38 and resistivity survey identified a number of sub-surface features which 
could have been graves, the results were not consistent across sites and none of the 
features located have a battlefield grave. One of the earliest attempts to use geophysics to 
locate mass graves was at Towton where areas historically associated with additional mass 
graves were subjected to a range of geophysical survey, initially without success (Sutherland 
2000: 163-166; Sutherland & Schmidt 2003). In 2005 geophysical survey and trial trenching 
in areas targeted following the emergence of skeletal fragments in ploughing activity did, 
however, prove successful in locating a grave close to the 1996 grave (Sutherland 2009). At 
Camden, a ground-penetrating radar (GPR) survey failed to identify any of the eight 
individual graves already known from metal detection, or provide any evidence for a 
historically documented mass grave, despite use of up to 22 individual and overlapping 0.5m 
transects within limited 10m x 15m survey areas (Smith et al. 2009).  
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The effectiveness of GPR for identifying battlefield graves may be limited by their 
depth, typically within the topsoil, which prohibits the identification of the feature edges. 
The Towton 1996 grave was 0.5m below current surface level (Fiorato et al. 2000: 2), while 
the deepest graves at the Little Bighorn were 30-35cm below the surface (Scott et al. 1998: 
97). At Camden, the deepest burial was 48-62cm below surface level, while the rest were 
significantly shallower (Smith et al. 2009). As well as limiting the effectiveness of GPR, 
shallow burials are more likely to have been disturbed by subsequent site activity, 
weathering, and animal activity. Topsoil location however, would assist efforts to locate 
graves through metal detection survey, as any artefacts would likely be placed within range 
of the detector. Very modern mass graves can be identified from aerial photography and 
crop-marking, proving particularly useful in identifying a First World War mass grave at 
Fromelles, France (Pollard & Barton 2013). GPR, resistivity and fluxgate gradiometry have all 
been used in forensic explorations of modern mass graves with relatively high levels of 
success (Wright et al. 2005), although these graves are consistently much deeper than those 
associated with battlefield burials. 
 
 
6.5.2: Geophysics and ancient battlefield graves 
 
 The amount that is known about the form of ancient battlefield graves is limited, as 
is the certainty that they exist on all sites, or indeed, were even originally created on them. 
A significant methodological challenge is presented by the fact that it is unknown whether 
inhumation or cremation was used. The probability is, however, that in many cases graves 
were originally located on the majority of ancient battlefields. Is there any way, therefore, 
of integrating the little evidence that we do have for their form with the geophysical 
methodology described above? If there are mass graves extant on ancient battlefields, they 
are likely to be of substantial size, although their depth in relationship to contemporary 
ground-level may be variable. The Theban burial at Chaeronea was reportedly found 45cm 
below C19th ground-level, although Ma (2008: 82 n.73) notes that the excavation report is 
unclear, and the accurate figure may be 85cm. The shallow depth of the ancient battlefield 
graves excavated to date suggests that GPR will be of limited use in identifying the features 
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regardless of their actual dimensions, as its effectiveness in identifying near-surface features 
is minimal (Cassidy 2001). This may reflect a research bias, in that only near-surface graves 
have been identified and excavated thus far, although it is observable that battlefield burials 
in any period are typically shallow. As grave-cuts have been typically difficult to locate on 
modern sites through geophysical survey, there may be little chance that these features can 
be identified on Greek and Roman sites through the use of GRP. 
 
 Magnetometry may be of some use on ancient battlefields due to the Greek 
(archaeologically attested) and Roman (literarily claimed) use of cremation to dispose of the 
battle-dead. The cremation pyres which would have been required to dispose of a 
considerable number of casualties would have been substantial in size, and the burning may 
leave an archaeological trace which can be picked up by magnetometry. The technique has 
not been used on post-antique battlefields, although this has largely been due to the virtual 
absence of cremation from the treatment of the battle-dead throughout most of the period. 
Magnetometry, therefore, has been judged as being of minimal relevance to sites post-
dating antiquity. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, mass cremation, whether in 
pits or on the surface, may often have been the most pragmatic method of disposal, short of 
abandonment. Where it did happen, magnetometry might, hypothetically, identify some 
trace of the process. Magnetometry is most effective within the top 2m of soil, placing the 
majority of battlefield graves within the physical scale of the technique. It would be 
interesting to test whether any evidence for mass cremation can be detected on ancient 
battlefields. However, the necessary magnetic signals might be distorted by the presence of 
metal artefacts on the battlefield, making this survey method potentially mutually exclusive 
with the successful implementation of metal detection survey. 
  
 The traditional problem with geophysical survey has been that the process is likely to 
be too time consuming if used to try and find graves (that may not even exist) somewhere 
within a large battlefield area. However, new methods of survey being introduced, 
particularly the use of motorised vehicles, has vastly increased the area which can be 
covered in a relatively short period of time. Graves are valuable to find; as well as providing 
archaeological identification of a battlefield to, it would be hoped, even the most sceptical 
historian, they also offer insights into the reality of disposing of the battle-dead in antiquity, 
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and osteological evidence from the skeletal remains themselves. Whether the worth of this 
evidence is, however, enough to justify the effort involved in locating them is questionable. 
Metal detection can identify a range of artefacts, and through them features, from across 
the battlefield and, although a significant time investment, consistently produces results 
which justifies its use. By contrast, there is little evidence to suggest that implementing a 
site-wide process of remote sensing in the search for mass graves would be effective in 
most cases, particularly given the problems which most of these methods have in detecting 
shallow burials. Better results might be achieved if it were possible to narrow down an area 
of potential burials based on the artefact distribution and focus remote sensing on these 
areas, although this would have to wait until more battlefields have been excavated and 
more mass graves identified. 
 
 
6.6: The research value of battlefield graves 
 
 Whether it is worth attempting to locate mass graves prior to excavation is another 
question. There is an inherent danger in battlefield archaeology, as across archaeology as a 
whole, in attempting to ‘find’ a certain feature on a site, and mass graves on battlefields are 
no different. On any individual site they may not have survived, if they were even created in 
the first place, and distinguishing between original absence and non-survival may be beyond 
the time and budget of most projects. At the same time, a mass grave in the vicinity of a 
battlefield provides strong verification for the identification of a site of conflict. While this 
may not necessarily be a priority in the Greek world, in the Roman world, where battlefield 
assemblages may not at first appear overwhelmingly military, mass graves would be much 
harder for sceptics to dismiss. At the same time, even in the Greek world where mass graves 
may not be needed to verify a battle’s general location, there is likely to be value in the 
archaeological study of mass graves. It cannot be denied that the ancient literary record falls 
very short of being satisfactory regarding the disposal of the dead, and it is almost certain 
that physical mass graves have a lot to reveal about the process in reality, in addition to 
evidence about the military and societal perception of the battle-dead and their 
memorialisation. Further to this, it should not be considered acceptable to dismiss the 
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possibility of mass graves surviving on ancient battlefields without attempting to look for 
them, without any site-specific reason for why they are unlikely to have survived. 
 
 The ancient sources and the extant (if limited) archaeology, suggest that mass graves 
were created on the majority of ancient battlefields, although it is unclear exactly where or 
in what form. The impact which the disposal of the dead had on the wider archaeological 
assemblages of battlefields will remain uncertain until evidence of both has been thoroughly 
surveyed and excavated from more battlefields. How far mass graves will survive in the 
archaeological record across battlefield sites is a difficult question, as is the degree to which 
deliberate survey for mass graves should be built into battlefield methodology. Certainly, it 
would be a significant effort to implement remote sensing methodology specifically to 
locate mass graves on ancient battlefields. Metal detection survey conducted across a 
battlefield may locate artefacts associated with graves, although an association with the 
may only become apparent during excavation. Some Greek battlefield graves appear to 
contain a surprising amount of intentionally deposited material, in addition to embedded 
projectiles or other incidental finds in the grave-fill, and it may be that they will be identified 
in a general battlefield metal detection survey without the need of additional remote 
sensing. 
 
However, the transect methodology of metal detection survey is not particularly 
suited to the identification of mass graves in any period and could very easily miss such a 
feature during the course of survey. This provides further support for the importance of 
getting as close to whole-site survey (and excavation) as possible on ancient battlefield sites. 
Other methods of remote sensing offer minimal supplementation, with GPR particularly 
ineffective for locating these typically shallow burials. As already noted, magnetometry is a 
method which has yet to be substantially implemented on ancient battlefield sites, although 
the close association between the ancient disposal of the battle-dead and cremation make it 
potentially worthwhile. In all cases, however, the size of the battlefield makes it impractical 
to apply any remote sensing method (other than metal detection) in the hope of finding a 
feature which may not even survive. If a smaller area of a battlefield could be associated 
with mass graves and prioritised for study through the artefact distribution displayed by 
metal detection it might be more feasible to implement additional remote survey methods, 
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as at Towton, although the lack of any historical evidence relating to the location would 
perhaps prove a problem. Most geophysical prospection, therefore, should be seen as 
supplementary to metal detection used to target specific site areas, rather than methods to 
be applied wholesale across a battlefield area. 
 
 
6.7: Conclusion 
 
The question, overall, is how best to survey, and consequently excavate, a Greek or 
Roman battlefield, taking into account the (probable) specific nature of the extant 
archaeology of battle in this period? The artefact assemblage is likely to be heavily weighted 
towards small iron artefacts unevenly distributed over a large landscape area, deposited by 
pre- and post-battle activity as well as actual fighting. The best methodological approach 
would be to implement full-site survey – certainly, no more than 2.5m transects – in all-
metal mode, of both the central area of fighting and the periphery. It cannot be expected 
that artefact recovery rates will be highest in the central ‘fighting’ areas of the site due to 
the spatial variance in looting density (the ‘donut’-effect of modern battlefield archaeology), 
or that artefacts will be found in their original place of conflict-period deposition. The 
smaller and more peripherally deposited an artefact, the more likely it is that the find-spot 
marks an in situ location, but this cannot be assumed. If a battlefield camp is known, the 
area in between should be incorporated into the survey and excavation, but due to the 
increase in survey size this would require, this would be best conducted in transect mode 
rather than full-survey. Areas of artefact density should be excavated, with all material 
recovered, while test-pitting of areas with low artefact density should, if possible, be 
conducted to minimise the possibility that artefacts have gone undetected by the metal 
detector.  
 
The main focus is to identify key diagnostic indicators on the battlefield and its 
periphery, largely long-distance projectiles and caligae nails, developing into shorter-
distance projectiles, military kit, and coins towards the central area of the battlefield. No 
large-piece weapons or armour should be expected except in fragments, and are most likely 
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to be associated with the defeated army. If the losing force did not wear metal body-
armour, substantial deposition of kit fragments may prove unlikely. If possible and/or 
necessary, metal detection survey could be supplemented by conductivity survey with an 
EM-38 device, which may pick up small iron artefacts missed by a conventional metal 
detector. Inhumation graves may be difficult to find with traditional survey methodology. 
However, the use of magnetometry may be able to identify areas of large-scale burning 
which can be more intensively investigated. Survey on ancient battlefields in general is likely 
to be considerably improved by the introduction of motorised vehicles which allow larger 
areas to be prospected. The archaeology is likely to be widely dispersed over an area that 
was not possible to cover entirely in the past, necessitating the use of transects. Now, 
however, it may be possible to gain a more complete picture into the site as a whole. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 
7.1: Introduction 
  
 The introduction to this thesis set out the major issues concerning the archaeological 
study of ancient battlefields. These sites have, almost universally, been poorly studied. The 
varied reasons for this low level of development in the discipline were also considered. The 
connection of many early practitioners, particularly in the late C19th and early C20th, with 
the contemporary military led to the prioritisation of strategic and tactical applications 
above actual accuracy and verification. Later scholars, although increasingly disconnected 
from the practical military side, followed much of the methodology which had been 
developed over the previous century and a half. In particular, ancient battlefields were 
considered to be sites which fell beneath the remit of historians, rather than archaeologists. 
As such, study of the ancient literary record was prioritised in study, despite its frequent 
unsuitability to the study of battlefield sites, as discussed in Chapter Two. Not only did the 
ancient writers fail to document the issues of concern to modern battlefield studies, but the 
nature of the texts means that even reliable incidental evidence is largely absent from the 
record. Shifts in archaeological practice from the 1960s onwards failed to stake a claim to 
the study of ancient battlefields. Although historians such as Hammond and Pritchett were 
clearly aware of the archaeological evidence which had been found, neither commissioned 
any verification work at their sites, nor even discussed the potential of archaeology for 
doing so. The developments in battlefield archaeology from the 1980s onward have also 
largely failed to draw ancient sites into the wider confines of the discipline, not least due to 
concerns over the survival of assemblages. 
 
 This thesis therefore set out to explore the parameters of battlefield archaeology in 
an ancient context, and establish how both the historical and archaeological evidence can 
be most effectively used in the study of these sites. In Chapter One the contextual 
background of this research was addressed, considering the origins of both ancient 
battlefield studies and battlefield archaeology relevant to the thesis. It highlighted the fact 
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that several of the methodological assumptions, from the nature of the evidence to the very 
definitions of 'battle' and 'battlefield', need to be redefined for antiquity. Chapter Two 
provided an in-depth consideration of the suitability of the ancient literary record with 
regard to battlefields, suggesting that the reliability of even the incidental evidence is highly 
problematic. The texts record at best generalised battlefield landscapes, at worst partially or 
wholly created ones, and it was argued therefore that their contribution to the study of 
ancient battlefields should be far more limited than it has previously been. It was therefore 
then necessary to suggest what could replace the ancient literary record as the primary 
source of evidence, particularly in the early desk-based research phase. In Chapter Three it 
was suggested that archaeological evidence from the wider conflict landscape could be used 
to identify battlefield sites on a localised level, if not to map-reference standard. The impact 
of conflict in antiquity left an identifiable trace on the landscapes surrounding a battlefield, 
potentially allowing a more realistic study area to be identified without relying on 
topographic descriptions from ancient writers.  
 
In Chapters Four and Five the nature of the evidence which would form the target 
for archaeological exploration of ancient battlefields was considered. In Chapter Four it was 
argued that the surviving archaeology of ancient battle, like that of many other military 
sites, was dominated by finds which are not martial or conflict specific. In many cases, they 
can be definitely associated with the army when they come from a known military context, 
a slight issue in the context of discovery of a field which might, or might not, be a battlefield. 
It was concluded that the predominant reason for the presence of these artefacts on sites, 
in that they 'survived' post-battle looting, was their small size contributing to a process of 
natural obscuration. The assemblages were likely, therefore, to be dominated by small finds, 
not necessarily exclusively military in nature, with a distribution impacted by the physical 
process of looting. In Chapter Five the non-artefact archaeological evidence was discussed 
and identified to be represented in most cases by the features, or lack thereof, associated 
with the disposal of the dead. It is reasonably certain that in most cases the disposal 
happened on the battlefield. However, whether there was consistent practice, beyond the 
fact that the methods used are likely to represent the most pragmatic method available to 
those involved in the process, is unclear from the current lack of evidence. This may be less 
negative than it sounds, as the less formal methods may leave a more identifiable 
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archaeological trace than simple battlefield inhumation might have done. The issue of 
adapting survey methodology to the ancient battlefield archaeologies identified in Chapters 
Four and Five was discussed in Chapter Six. The chapter suggested that the main 
methodological challenge would be to adapt survey methodology to sites which are 
extensive in the landscape, with an assemblage which, by both its distribution and ferrous 
nature, requires more intensive survey than is necessary on many later sites. Many of the 
methodologies used on later sites, particularly transect-based non-ferrous metal detection 
survey, are unlikely to make the most of ancient battlefield assemblages, but the use of 
more intensive survey may not be possible with the resources available to an individual 
project. 
 
 This thesis has addressed what it perceives to be the main issues regarding ancient 
battlefield archaeology by considering both the literary and archaeological evidence. While 
the (ancient) literary record provides a backdrop to the study of ancient battlefields, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that its contribution to archaeological exploration of ancient 
battlefields will be limited. However, potential problems were also identified in the context 
of the archaeological material, resulting in no small part from the lack of known evidence for 
the deposition of military equipment on the battlefield, its recovery, and general post-battle 
activity. This evidence from numerous conflict sites from antiquity has been used to 
reconstruct these site formation processes, using this evidence to suggest what the 
signature archaeology of ancient battlefield actually is. Thereafter, it identified how 
archaeological methodology could best be adopted to suit these characteristics. The 
archaeology of ancient battle will become better understood with each new site which is 
identified, surveyed and excavated. The discipline is in a very early stage of development, 
and it should not be too disheartening that there are still elements and processes which 
remain to be identified and their significance exploited. The future development of this 
research will be addressed in this chapter, particularly how the methodologies developed 
throughout the thesis can be used on a case-study basis. 
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7.2: Addressing the research aims 
 
 This thesis did not set out to answer a simple research question. Instead, it was 
hoped that some answers could be provided both as to why the methodological approach 
based on literary evidence has been of such limited use, and how archaeology can be used 
as an alternate basis of study. The unifying, underlying theme to the research presented 
here is one which aimed to consider why ancient battlefields have been so poorly studied in 
the past, and why the archaeological methodology which has proved so effective on later 
period sites has been under-used on sites from antiquity. These questions were addressed 
in several ways. The development of the discipline was considered from its early origins in 
the C19th and the impact of the military relationship of many researchers on contemporary 
and later methodologies. Contemporary attitudes to the archaeology both of the Greek and 
Roman military was also addressed, as was its survival in the archaeological record. 
 
 One of the more significant aims was to demonstrate just how problematic the 
ancient literary record is with regards to battlefield studies. Although historians had 
previously recognised that the record was less than ideal with regard to battlefield location 
and geography (e.g. Sabin 2007; Whitby 2007), archaeology was not seen as a viable 
alternative. Even today, the debate surrounding their use is framed in terms of how far the 
sources can be used, without a discussion of whether they should be in the first place. In 
some cases, the failure to recognise archaeological evidence has been associated with a lack 
of belief in the survival of ancient battlefield archaeology. In reality it often betrays only a 
deeply conventional attitude, which worries that the marginalisation of the written record 
will lead to nothing more than a complete lack of context for anything which is found in the 
archaeological record. An argument has been put forward in this thesis for a cautious 
attitude towards the literary record in regards to ancient battlefields. It does not argue for 
the complete exclusion of the textual evidence, particularly in providing historical context 
and identifying a series of known military campaigns. However, the geographic and 
topographic evidence is a different issue. Although the texts contain some useful location 
evidence, distinguishing these examples from the mass writings which are at best irrelevant, 
at worst deliberately misleading, makes them a highly problematic source of evidence. The 
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concern of ancient authors was not to tell archaeologists two millennia later where a battle 
was fought or what happened on the battlefield. It may seem intimidating to marginalise 
much of what is documented in ancient battle narrative, but when it can be demonstrated 
that that record contains little accurate evidence, there may be no other alternative than to 
do so. 
 
 It is not just the continued use of the ancient historical record which has proved 
problematic to ancient battlefield studies. Even among battlefield archaeologists, there has 
been little reflexive consideration of how the methodologies developed in the study of 
modern battle, of which the Little Bighorn is the most prominent example, can be used on 
sites from much earlier periods. Antiquity has been marginalised by historians (Sabin 2007: 
399) and archaeologists (Foard 2009) both within battlefield and Greco-Roman archaeology, 
largely due to nothing more than the lack of signature munitions of the sort that modern 
battlefield archaeologists are able to find and analyse. This attitude completely fails to 
recognise that the projectile assemblage from ancient warfare was certainly comparable in 
use, and that the metal-based military assemblages from the period often present a far 
more diverse range of battlefield artefactual detritus than many other periods of warfare. 
Ancient battlefield archaeology has been held back by a failure to assess the likely 
assemblages before passing judgement on their viability. 
 
The greatest methodological issues are in respect to the metal composition and 
recognition of assemblages rather than their actual survival, the latter of which can be 
assessed in part by desk-based environmental research prior to survey and excavation. The 
prominence of iron in ancient military archaeology, particularly in the Roman world, is 
perhaps the greatest methodological problem due to problems with the physical survival of 
the material, and indeed in some cases copper-alloy, in many archaeological contexts. This is 
a valid and potentially significant challenge to the investigation of many battlefields from 
the Greek and Roman world, and yet the taphonomic survival of material, as opposed to 
that of the looting process, has been relatively little discussed within the context of the 
discipline. However, the physical survival of metal assemblages is possible under certain 
chemical conditions, as demonstrated by the battlefields already located, and survey 
methodology can be adapted to target ferrous and non-ferrous artefacts in different phases, 
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provided enough time can be dedicated to the project. From an archaeological perspective, 
therefore, it is reasonable to say that ancient battlefields have been so poorly studied 
simply because they are not post-blackpowder sites, as there is nothing in their 
archaeological manifestation that justifies such marginalisation. 
 
 Contrary to the views of some (e.g. Webster 1993: 100; Sabin 2007: 399), there is 
certainly an archaeology of ancient battle. It is not necessarily uniform or uniquely martial in 
nature, consistent with the assemblages from other military sites in antiquity, particularly 
military installations. Most of the weaponry and armour was removed from sites in the 
aftermath of battle, to a degree as part of a wider systematic process of looting, but this 
activity in reality left many smaller artefacts behind. The signature archaeology of ancient 
battle, particularly in the Roman world, is dominated by small projectiles and fragments. 
Lead glandes are particularly diagnostically useful, but are not found in all conflict contexts, 
as demonstrated by their absence at Kalkriese. As seen as Burnswark, it may also be difficult 
to identify from glandes alone between an actual conflict and a training exercise (e.g. 
Campbell 2003; Breeze 2011).187 Iron artefacts, particularly projectiles and caligae nails, are 
also therefore important elements of battle-related assemblages, and have been found 
across conflict sites from the Roman, and indeed the Greek, world. No single artefact or 
artefact category is itself diagnostically conclusive of a battlefield. It is the quantity and 
spatial distribution, relative both to the terrain and other artefacts, which comprises the 
signature of ancient battle. Similar assemblages are documented from Roman forts across 
the Empire, albeit often in lesser quantity and with reduced quantities of weaponry, 
particularly projectiles. The distinctive features of battlefield assemblages as opposed to 
those associated with military installations (and indeed, civilian contexts) primarily concerns 
the widespread distribution of projectiles and kit fragments in the open field, outside of a 
constructed feature. 
 
 The issue of mass graves is more difficult, dominated as it is by discussion of 
contemporary social attitudes and commemorative practice which discourage assertions 
                                                          
187
 See also work conducted at the site in summer 2015, uploaded as an online presentation 
http://www.socantscot.org/resource/burnswark-siege-or-no-siege-by-dr-john-reid-and-andrew-nicholson/ 
(accessed 05/01/2016). 
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that soldiers in antiquity, just like their later counterparts, often did the bare minimum 
when disposing of their battle-dead. This may not have made favourable reading to 
audiences, as mirrored in later practice, hence its exclusion from the record. However, the 
examples from later periods have made it clear that pragmatic considerations, rather than 
mortuary convention, governed the mass disposal on the battlefield. However, this is not 
necessarily a negative in an archaeological context. Such methods should mean either that 
there are, or were, areas of disposal on the battlefield of substantial size, whether in the 
form of pits or trenches dug/used for burial, or surface areas showing evidence of mass 
cremation. The reality of Greek and Roman battlefield disposal may not be pleasant reading, 
but may not be as archaeologically invisible. This reality is slowly beginning to be 
recognised. A recently published re-evaluation of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul by Roymans 
and Fernández-Götz (2015) cited battlefield archaeology as a potential methodology for 
reinterpreting the conflict. This paper focused on the diagnostic potential of lead glandes 
from the siege at Thuin, cautiously identified with the Aduatuci oppidum attacked in 57BC 
(Caes. Bell. Gall. 2.33; Roymans & Fernández-Götz 2015: 75). One hope of this research is 
that the signature archaeology of ancient battle will become recognisable independently of 
a historical context, allowing sites to be located outside of projects aiming to find a 
particular historically-documented engagement. 
 
 
7.3: Avenues for future research 
 
 Much of the discussion in this thesis has been, unavoidably, based on assemblages 
published from other sites, rather than a new range of material. It has not been possible to 
test in the field many of the hypotheses advanced here, although in all cases excavated 
examples have been used to verify any points developed. Ideally, there are two ways in 
which this research might be developed in the future. First it could contribute to the 
database of known ancient battlefield archaeology by locating, identifying, surveying and 
excavating new sites. In the Greek world, in particular, this may contribute to an 
understanding of ancient battle which goes beyond the formulaic narrative descriptions 
backed up by generalised topographic locations which have, in many cases, been accepted 
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as 'good enough' (e.g. Hanson 1989; van Wees 2004). The archaeology of Greek battle has 
almost exclusively been studied through experimental and experiential recreation (e.g. 
Schwartz 2009) and the reality of campaigning assessed as a logistic issue (e.g. Engels 1978; 
Lee 2007), without first establishing what was actually happening on the battlefield, and 
where. Contemporary archaeological study of Greek battle has been confined to human 
remains (e.g. Ma 2008; Lee 2011; Atwood 2014), but the physical sites themselves have a 
valuable contribution to make. 
 
 In the Roman world, the identification and narrative interpretation of conflict sites 
may provide new insights into how soldiers functioned on the battlefield. As in modern 
studies, training manuals such as Vegetius' Epitome of Military Science indicate how soldiers 
and units should have behaved; archaeology provides the potential to assess how far this 
was replicated on the field. At Baecula, the manoeuvring of the Roman soldiers on the 
battlefield could be reconstructed from their caligae, as could the route by which the 
Romans took the ridge at Harzhorn. A better understanding of the function of the Roman 
army in individual military situations is, therefore, one of the main outcomes of battlefield 
identification, although it is only one facet of a much wider potential application. The 
identification of new sites, will establish a more accurate geographic extent for Roman 
campaigning. The discovery of the Harzhorn battlefield, for example, indicated that in the 
C3rd AD a probable Roman army was engaged in active campaigning far beyond the 
contemporary frontier. This force was of considerable size, potentially (at least partially) 
composed of a vexillation unit taken from Upper Moesia, and based on the direction of 
travel, had travelled further north than Harzhorn. The position and nature of this battle 
contributes to a reassessment of the function of not only the Roman army in this period, but 
also the function of the Germanic limes in this period. 
 
The identification of smaller-scale siege sites such as those in Spain, often unattested 
historically, and lower-intensity engagements in the Roman provinces, will lead to a more 
accurate assessment of the field potential of the Roman army. It can also contribute to the 
reassessment of the typical function of the Roman army as an institution based on more 
evidence than the location of military installations, inscriptions, and formal written histories. 
The issue of how the legions have been studied in the past has been previously flagged as 
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problematic (see James 2002). At this stage of research, the number of emerging lower-
intensity sites suggests that the Roman army fought more of these conflicts than it did 
pitched battles, which may encourage more research into the structure and organisation of 
the legions and auxilia. 
 
 Longer term, however, the research aim is to go further than the identification and 
narrative reconstruction of individual battles, and use these examples to inform a wider 
study of the impact of warfare in antiquity. There are many aspects of ancient warfare, such 
as the daily life of soldiers, logistical supply, and organisation both on the march and inside 
installations, which are not discussed by the ancient literature. Study of the artefacts and 
inscriptions related to the army has contributed to new understanding, as has the 
reinterpretation of military installations, but our understanding of the Roman army, and 
thereby also associated themes such as the frontiers, remains incomplete. Identifying 
battlefields as focal points within a conflict landscape allows the impact of the process of 
battle and war on the landscape to be assessed. 
 
A better understanding of the location of battlefields, both pitched and lower-
intensity, may also identify patterns in location. To some degree this draws on work 
developed by the Carman and Carman (2005; 2006; cf. Carman 2013) which attempted to 
identify cultural factors in the location of battlefields. Research into battlefield locations 
could be much better structured by a basis in archaeological, as in artefactual, reality, 
considering military logistical issues as well as the social constructs cited by the Bloody 
Meadows Project. Were battles fought near civilian settlements, and if so, is there a 
difference in the nature of size of the battle relative to the population level? What were the 
immediate and longer-term consequences for local populations? Is there consistent 
evidence of destruction or depopulation in settlements within the hinterland of battlefields, 
as suggested around Baecula? Were certain provincial areas 'hotspots' for battle? It is not, 
therefore, the aim of this thesis that identifying battlefields should be viewed as a complete 
research project, but rather, as a step towards a more refined and accurate interpretation of 
ancient warfare as a whole. In particular, future research in this area will also draw together 
some of the more disparate evidence coming from battlefields and conflict sites in Spain, 
from the Punic, Sertorian, and Caesarian wars. A research trip is planned to Spain in the near 
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future in which preliminary surveys will be made of a number of conflict sites, including the 
supposed battlefield of Munda at La Lantejuela. 
 
 
7.3.1: Mons Graupius 
 
 Perhaps an obvious place to start would be the identification of a site such as Mons 
Graupius. Innumerable antiquarians and archaeologists have looked for the battlefield, 
anyway from Perthshire to Aberdeenshire, and none have seen successful (see Maxwell 
1990). Very little archaeological work has been done, beyond identification of Roman 
military installations which could serve as the battlefield camp (e.g. St Joseph 1978). 
Currently the preferred location for the battle-site, following St. Joseph’s identification of 
Roman marching camps towards it, is Bennachie, near Inverurie in Aberdeenshire and which 
in turn has been become the focus of narrative reconstructions of the events of the battle 
(e.g. Campbell 2010). In order to verifythe identification, most recently Gordon Noble, an 
initial survey of Bennachie was carried out in an attempt to identify battle-related material,  
although no period-relevant artefacts were reported by the project (Gordon Noble pers. 
comm. May 2011). 
 
 Mons Graupius presents an excellent potential site for re-evaluation on an 
archaeological basis. As one of the earliest - and indeed, in some ways the latest - 
historically-attested pitched battles in Britannia, it presents a unique research opportunity, 
particularly as the historical record superficially detailed is in fact so unclear on what 
actually happened. Tacitus (Agric. 35) documented a highly unusual engagement in the 
context of ancient battle-narrative, in which the legions, although present, did not fight, and 
for which the casualty figures are by all common-sense evaluation entirely unrealistic. 
Tacitus' (Agric. 25-38) topographic description of the site suggests that it was located north 
of the Firth of Forth, with the Britons holding the high ground of the "Grampians" which had 
an open plain in front, close to a native settlements and houses, with a fortified Roman 
camp constructed nearby. A northern location in Caledonia has been seen as implied by 
Tacitus' (Agric. 33) comment in Agricola's battlefield speech that it was no shame to die in 
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the furthest reaches of the earth (e.g. Campbell 2015: 410) although this may have been 
intended on a provincial rather than local level. Most of the topographic details are 
incidental to the narrative, rather than a neutral description of the site. Toponymic 
identification of the "Grampians", although attempted by some (e.g. Feacham 1970), has 
proved unsuccessful and is based on false etymological premises (see Ogilvie & Richmond 
1967: 251; Rivet & Smith 1979: 370-371). It has been previously noted that the terrain is 
similar to that of other set-piece battles in Tacitus (Hanson 1987: 130). Attempts to identify 
the site archaeologically have focused on locating positions which could fit the respective 
armies (30000 Britons, 8000 Roman auxilia and 3000 cavalry) within the conflict landscape 
(Burn 1953) and identifying the battlefield camp (e.g. Hanson 1987: 130-137). However, as 
argued in Chapter Three above, it is highly debatable whether any of the topographic or 
narrative details reflect the reality of the battlefield situation. However well an individual 
site meets the criteria set out in Tacitus, it is questionable whether this in any way indicates 
the probability of it having been a Roman battlefield, let alone Mons Graupius. 
 
 This issue with identifying the battlefield, as in so many cases, is that the literary 
description of the battlefield, and consequently the archaeological targets, is too vague so 
that it satisfies a number of different sites, particularly when the potential study area can 
only be narrowed to 'Scotland'. At least 29 different sites have been proposed in various 
publications for the site of the battle (Fig. 24). All meet at least some of Tacitus' topographic 
criteria, and several meet all of them. In most cases, the location of the battlefield was 
suggested following the identification of a topographically-suitable area within the vicinity 
of a Roman military installation. The installations at Dunning, Durno, Raedykes, Strageath 
and Auchinhove have been particularly associated with the battlefield, with nearby plains 
and hills thereby associated with the fighting. No battle-related artefacts or features have 
yet been identified with any of these locations. Each potential site can be assessed with 
desk-based research in terms of the distance from the battlefield camp to the respective 
hills and plains, and evidence for any antiquarian or incidental finds of artefacts and 
monuments. Environmental analysis of the terrain, particularly regarding the survival of 
iron, might also prove useful. Following this, any probable candidates could be assessed in 
the field with preliminary artefact survey, based on iron or lead frequencies (ideally both) 
prior to any full-scale exploration. 
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Figure 24: Suggested locations for Mons Graupius from published papers and internet sources (www.roman-britain.org). 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Dunning temporary camp and landscape (www.canmore.org.uk). 
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 In an earlier stage of this research, a preliminary investigation of the site at Dunning 
was attempted, using the database of the Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical 
Monuments of Scotland (Canmore; Fig. 25). The area had several of the features which, 
from desktop research, could suggest a potential battlefield. The Roman camp at Kincladie 
Wood is c.47ha in size, comparable with the nearby camp at Carey, Abernethy, 16km to the 
east, which may suggest a route of advance and/or retreat to the installation at Dunning. A 
native hillfort has been identified at Dun Knock, c.1.5km south of Dunning, and another at 
Rossie Law, c.3.25km west of the Dunning Roman encampment (Poller 2012). Of potentially 
pertinent other evidence, human remains were recovered in the grounds of ‘The Ship’, 
Tarnavie, in the early C19th (Canmore ID: 26074; NGR: NN 988 131). The grave also 
contained fragments of weapons and armour. Both the artefacts and human remains have 
subsequently been lost with no extant records, and there is little indication of the date 
associated with the burial. Another battle is documented from the Dunning area, the Battle 
of Duncrub in AD964, for which there is a memorial standing stone (Canmore ID: 26715; 
NGR: NO 0185 1469), which may be associated with the remains - without any secure 
dating, it is impossible to tell. Although the proposal to develop the Dunning site did not 
result in any metal detection work, the area between the Roman camp at Kincladie Wood 
and both native hill-forts remain priorities for any survey work in the area. An effective 
initial strategy would take two strands. Firstly, implementation of a large-scale survey, 
particularly magnetometry, to search for evidence of battlefield pyres, followed by metal 
detection survey.  
 
Unlike previous attempts to identify the battlefield, such as that of Noble at 
Bennachie, the survey would avoid scatter-gun sampling strategies or use of transects, 
concentrating instead on covering as a wide landscape area, made feasible by motorised 
survey methods. At Mons Graupius, it would be useful to look not just for the core of the 
battlefield, but also for evidence of artefacts and pyres on the periphery of the battlefield, 
following the lead of the ‘donut effect’ as seen on American battlefields (see 4.3). This 
spatial patterning has been documented in antiquity at Kalkriese (see 4.5.2), suggesting that 
a concentration of battle-related material will be located in the periphery of the battlefield. 
Wide-scale coverage not just of the expected central area, avoiding limited sampling, aiming 
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to identify evidence not just of the fighting, but of advance and rout/retreat phases, 
provides a much better opportunity of identifying battle-related archaeology. Although in 
this case Dunning is unlikely to be connected to a battlefield, rather more to the 
construction of the Gask Ridge, other proposed sites for the battlefield will form part of 
subsequent research into the battlefield location following this thesis. Similar research will 
be prepared for the first set-piece battle of the Roman invasion. It is also planned to take 
this research further in Spain, with a preliminary exploration of La Lantejuela, Spain, 
planned following the incidental recovery of lead glandes from the site and its tentative 
association with the battles of Munda (Grünewald & Richter 2006). 
 
 
7.4: Final conclusion 
 
 As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the archaeology of ancient battle certainly 
exists on battlefield sites. It will be difficult to survey them, even more so to find them in the 
first place, and yet the research potential which they contain is substantial. The discipline of 
ancient battlefield studies had by the 1980s previously reached a point of stagnation, based 
on a continued and unmerited reliance on the literary record from antiquity. Fieldwork at 
Kalkriese, Harzhorn, and Baecula, not to mention numerous siege sites such as Dura-
Europos and Gamla, has demonstrated that there is an alternative methodology for the 
study of Greek and Roman conflict which focuses on the archaeological evidence. This thesis 
has aimed to build on this basis to develop a methodology which can be applied to locate 
and explore classical open-field conflict sites more widely. In adapting the conceptual 
approach towards the archaeology of Greek and Roman battle, the archaeology of 
battlefields from antiquity can be drawn into the mainstream of battlefield archaeology. At 
the very least, it can be taken now as certain that there was an archaeology of ancient 
battle, that its formation was not entirely reliant on the wholesale defeat of a Roman army 
(cf. Coulston 2001: 44-45). Further, the investigative methodologies of wider battlefield 
archaeology can be adapted to detect the lead glandes, iron projectiles, and caligae nails 
which form the basis of this archaeology - the lost, unrecovered detritus of ancient battle.  
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